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Abstract. 
The issue of whose interests should company law/corporate governance seek to 
protect forms one of the oldest debates in company law academic literature. 
However, despite the abundance of literature and the recognised importance of the 
issue, very little practical progress has been made since the debate first ignited in the 
1930 s. The result is that corporate governance and company law protection have 
come to be dominated by the legal model of the company which states that the 
shareholders should be the sole beneficiaries of company law/corporate governance 
protection. 
Academics wishing to expand the scope of company law protection tend to advance 
moral arguments for including stakeholders within the scope of company law 
protection. However, moral arguments are unlikely to convince business leaders and 
policy makers, who are more concerned with economic and legal considerations. 
Economic arguments need to be forthcoming, but to date, economic literature has 
played a limited role in UK corporate governance analysis. 
This thesis aims to demonstrate how the UK corporate governance scene has been 
dominated by the pro-shareholder ideologies of the legal model. It then goes onto 
highlight the deficiencies of the legal model and to advance economic, legal and 
theoretical justifications for expanding the scope of company law protection. 
Paradoxically, this will be done by reference to the arguments traditionally used to 
justify adherence to the legal model itself. 
It will be seen that the traditional arguments that advocate a shareholder-centred view 
can no longer justify such a position. In fact, they are used in this thesis to justify 
company law protection for non-shareholder constituents, notably the employees, 
creditors and the environment. 
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The Scope of Corporate Power. 
Over seventy years ago, Adolf Berle stated: 
It is the thesis of this essay that all powers granted to a corporation or to the 
management of a corporation, or to any group within the corporation, whether 
derived from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all times 
exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest 
appears. 
This approach formed a significant part of what academics have termed the legal 
model of the company. The legal model of the company is a term that will be used 
throughout this thesis so it is worth defining it at the outset. The legal model of the 
company, at its most basic, can be split into two tenets. First, companies should act 
solely in the interests of their shareholders i. e. they should maximise profits. Second, 
in order to facilitate this end, company law should solely protect the shareholders. 
Both of these issues will be examined in this thesis but it is the second issue that this 
thesis concentrates on. This thesis is primarily concerned with what the Company 
Law Review Steering Group termed the scope of company law, i. e. which parties 
within the corporate nexus should company law seek to protect. 
The issue of in whose interests companies should be run is a crucial societal issue. 
The sheer scope of corporate power means that companies have the power to affect an 
extremely large number of persons. Since corporate power is largely related to size, 
this thesis will be concerned principally with the largest of companies, namely large, 
listed public companies. These companies, both historically and contemporarily, have 
represented a very small proportion of the total number of firms. At the end of 2002, 
there were 1,479,100 private companies compared to only 12,400 public companies. 2 
Public companies represent 0.8% of the total number of companies in the UK. 3 But 
while, these companies form only a small percentage of the total number of firms, 
they dominate the economy to such an extent that a large proportion of economic 
A. A. Berle Jr., Corporate Powers As Powers in Trust (1930-1) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 at 1049. 




activity in present-day capitalist economies is concentrated in a relatively small 
number of absolutely large firms. 4 
To gain an impression of the sheer scope of corporate power, consider the following. 
Of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are corporations; only 49 are countries. ' 
The combined sales of the world s largest 200 companies amounts to over a quarter of 
the world s economic activity. 6 These companies have sales larger than the combined 
economies of all the countries in the world minus the largest nine. 7 Individually, the 
largest corporations have staggering power and influence. Wal-Mart, the 12`h largest 
corporation in the world, has larger combined sales than 161 countries including 
Israel, Poland and Greece. Phillip Morris has sales larger than the GNP of New 
Zealand. 8 
As corporations grow, their geographical influence increases. Corporations are often 
perceived as having national loyalties, notably to the country in which they are based. 
For large multinational companies, however, this is no longer the case: 
although we think of IBM and General Motors as American, and Unilever and 
Shell as British (or, more exactly Anglo-Dutch), firms as large and diverse as 
these plan their operations on a global scale in their own interests. In terms of 
sheer size they are sometimes bigger than the countries in which they operate; 
they are estimated to control over a quarter of world output; and their inter-firm 
shipments of goods from one country to another account for nearly one-third of 
recorded trade. 9 
It is apparent that the scope of these firms ensures that they have the ability to 
drastically affect the lives of much of the worlds population. As far back as 1973, 
the CBI stated that: 
Our style of life is largely determined by the activities and style of business; and 
the style of business is largely determined by the activities and style of our 
1o companies. 
4 P. J. Devine et al, Introduction to Industrial Economics, 1985,4`h ed., London: Allen & Unwin, p. 86. 
Top 200: The Rise of Global Corporate Power [Online] Available http: //www. coEpwatch. or /tg rac/ 
corner/glob/ips/top200. htm1 25th September 2000, p. 1. 
6 Ibid. The actual figure is 28.3% of the world s GDP. 
7 Officially, there are 191 countries. This means that the worlds largest 200 corporations ha% e sales 
larger than the other 182 countries. 
s R. J. Barnet and J. Cavanagh, Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order, 
1994. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 45. 
9 P. Donaldson and P. Farquhar. Understanding the British Economy, 1988, London: Penguin, p. 162. 
'° Confederation of British Industry, The Responsibilities of the British Public Company, 1973. 
London: CBI, p. 8. 
Introduction. 
The effect that corporations have on our everyday lives cannot be overestimated. 
Accordingly, the aims that corporations are obliged to follow form a fundamentally 
important societal issue. 
An Overview of this Thesis. 
It is this issue which this thesis concentrates on. In doing so, this thesis is divided into 
four parts. Part I examines the theoretical, legal and practical issues behind UK 
company law and corporate governance. It begins in Chapter 1 with an examination 
of what has come to be known as the Harvard Debate, the opening quote of which 
began this thesis. The legal arguments put forward in the debate are no longer 
contemporary, but the theme of the debate is still of great relevance. It therefore 
forms a useful introduction to the stakeholder issue. 
Chapter 2 examines the oldest justification for the legal model approach, namely the 
ownership model. The basic thrust of the ownership argument is that the shareholders 
contribute the capital. They therefore own the company and have a right to have it 
run in their interests. Already from this simple exposition it can be seen that this 
argument is not without its flaws. These flaws and other related issues will be 
examined in detail. 
The inaccuracies of the ownership model necessitated a new conceptualisation of the 
company. This conceptualisation, entitled the new economic theory of the firm, came 
to prominence in the 1980 s. It was based not on ownership claims, but on contract. 
The company became a nexus of contracts and therefore incapable of ownership. The 
new economic theory currently forms the dominant conceptualisation of the company 
and is examined in Chapter 3. 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the practical and legal realities of the stakeholder debate. 
Chapter 4 looks at the current law relating to the stakeholder debate. The legal 
position of the shareholders is examined together with the only two stakeholders that 
the law has sought to protect, namely the employees and the creditors. As will be 
seen, the law is very much pro-shareholder and those measures that are supposed to 
protect the employees and creditors are seen to be unsatisfactory. Chapter 5 looks at 
3 
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the mechanisms of corporate governance that operate in the UK. All of the major 
mechanisms are examined in depth and two conclusions made. First, it is seen that 
many of the mechanisms are not effective in increasing levels of corporate 
stewardship. The second conclusion carries on from the conclusion of Chapter 4, 
namely that the UK corporate culture is one of shareholder primacy. It is seen that 
almost all of the various mechanisms are designed to protect the shareholders, give 
the shareholders a voice or to place pressures upon the directors to act in the interests 
of shareholders. 
Part I of this thesis, especially Chapters 4 and 5, were designed to demonstrate how 
much the UK corporate scene is influenced by the legal model of the company. This 
is continued in Part II which begins with an examination of the theoretical, legal and 
economic justifications behind this legal model. 
These justifications are examined in Chapter 6. This chapter begins with an 
examination of the legal model s preoccupation with profit maximisation. It is Part II 
of this chapter that this thesis focuses on. Here the three traditional justifications for 
exclusive shareholder governance protection are examined and form the basis of much 
that is to follow. This chapter argues that the traditional justifications for adherence to 
the legal model are no longer sufficient. 
This insufficiency is strengthened by the analysis in Chapter 7. Chapter 7 uses the 
traditional justifications examined in Part II of Chapter 6 to justify expanding the 
scope of corporate governance protection to non-shareholder constituents, specifically 
the employees and creditors. It will be seen that adapting the traditional justifications 
provides a compelling argument for the expansion of our system of corporate 
governance beyond the narrow confines of the legal model. 
Part II of this thesis concludes with Chapter 8 which examines the validity of acts 
which depart from the legal model of the company. It will be seen that the legal 
situation is far from clear. If the law is to adopt a wider approach, the law will have to 
be reformed to reflect this. 
4 
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Part II aimed to demonstrate that there are benefits to expanding the scope of 
corporate governance protection to non-shareholder constituents. However, the 
expansion that was suggested was a modest one, advocating protection for the 
employees and creditors only. There are other parties that the law seeks to protect and 
one of the most prominent over the last two decades has been the environment. 
Environmental protection is the focus of Part III. Here, the traditional methods of 
environmental regulation are examined. It will be seen that none of these methods in 
isolation can effectively regulate corporate environmental activity. This inability is 
accentuated by the corporation s unique ability to evade or to compensate against the 
various forms of environmental protection. These abilities will also be examined. 
Finally, using the traditional justifications for exclusive governance protection that 
were examined in Chapter 6 and used to justify employee and creditor protection in 
Chapter 7, several justifications will be offered for expanding the scope of corporate 
governance protection to include the environment. 
This thesis ends with Part IV. This part examines the work of the Company Law 
Review Steering Group, in particular their recommendations for a statutory statement 
of directors duties and the proposals for the Operating and Financial Review. Their 
recommendations have formed the basis for a governmental White Paper, the 
recommendations of which will also be examined. 
Economics and Corporate Governance. 
For many years the stakeholder debate has been dominated by moral and theoretical 
arguments. Persuasive though these arguments are, they are unlikely to convince 
business leaders and policy makers unless they are accompanied by equally 
convincing economic justifications. Yet it is only recently that economics has come 
to play a role in analytical company law literature. 
This is surprising given the fundamental importance that economics has for 
corporations. A company relies on there being a market demand for its products or 
services. Similarly, those parties within the corporate nexus act in accordance with 
economic considerations. When shareholders purchase equity in a company, they do 
ý 
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so on the basis that they will receive a dividend and that the value of their equity will 
increase. The company s creditors are equally motivated by economic considerations. 
When lending money, they will charge an amount above the money loaned, usually in 
the form of an interest rate. A company s employees will pay close attention to the 
salary and benefits offered by a company before they decide to become an employee 
of that company. 
Given the pervasiveness of economic considerations, economic analysis can offer 
significant insights into the motives behind those who take part in corporate activities. 
In America, economic theory is perhaps the most important and abundant body of 
literature in relation to corporate law. " In the UK, however, economic analysis has 
played a very limited role in company law analysis to date. 
Recognising the importance of economic considerations, this thesis will examine the 
stakeholder debate not only in a theoretical and legal light, but also taking into 
account the various economic arguments. This is especially so in Chapters 6 and 7 
when the rationales behind the legal model and my proposed rationales are examined. 
W 
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Chapter 1: The Harvard Debate. 
1 
The Harvard Debate. 
Introduction. 
In the late eighteenth century, corporations, in both America and Britain, were 
incorporated principally to serve public/social needs. As one commentator noted: 
[A]lmost all of the business enterprises incorporated here in the formative 
generation starting in the 1780 s were chartered for activities of some community 
interest - supplying transport, water, insurance, or banking facilities. ' 
This idea that corporations had a social function was to continue well into the 
nineteenth century. 2 Despite this, corporations were still viewed by the public with 
suspicion. In its earliest incarnations, the corporation was equated with monopoly, 
and monopolies presented great opportunities for abuse. 3 This coupled with the 
liberalization of general corporation laws and the removal of prohibitions regarding 
size ensured that the public remained perturbed by a potentially unaccountable 
concentration of power. 
This concern culminated in the events surrounding the Great Depression. During the 
hearings that grew out of the 1929 market collapse, numerous abuses of corporate 
power came to light, confirming the fears that the public had long held. 
It was out of this period that two academics, Professor Adolf A. Berle and Professor 
E. Merrick Dodd, engaged in a debate which was, and still is, of tremendous 
importance and relevance. The issue on debate was posed by the title of Professor 
Dodd s opening article For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? ' In other 
words, the issue in question was in whose interests should the corporation be run. 
I J. Hurst, The Legitimacv of the Business Corporation in the Last, of the United States 1780-1970. 
1970, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, p. 15. He went on: 
Ibid. at pp. 161-2. 
z A. A. Sommer Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Sen-e? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty 
)'Cars Later (1990-91) 16 Delaware J. of Corp. L. 33 at 36. 
4 E. M. Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? (193: ) 45 Hare. L. Re\. 1145. 
Of the 317 separate-enterprise special charters enacted from 1780 to 1801 in the states, 
nearly two-thirds were for enterprises concerned with transport (inland navigation, 
turnpikes, toll bridges). another 20 percent were for banks or insurance companies; 10 per 
cent were for the provision of local public services (mostly water supply); less than 4 per 
cent were for general business corporations. 
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The Debate. 
In the years preceding the publication of The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, prompted by what he saw as growing problems generated by the growth of 
the modern corporation, Berle wrote extensively about corporate finance and 
directors duties. Berle was concerned about the changes that had taken place in the 
early twentieth century. Corporate power had grown rapidly, so much so that the 
administration of corporations particularly of the few hundred large corporations 
that increasingly dominated the economy, had become the crux of American 
Industrial life. 5 This growth in corporate power and the accompanying rise in 
oligopololistic and monopolistic firms had, in Berle s view, weakened the market 
disciplines to which corporate managers were subject. Moreover, this weakening was 
accompanied by a transformation in the nature of shareholding. By the early 1930 s, 
as The Modern Corporation and Private Property documented, not only had share 
ownership become ever more dispersed it had taken on an increasingly detached 
rentier form. 6 Berle believed that this, by undermining shareholder supervision and 
control, had further enhanced the power of corporate management at the expense of 
accountability. As a result, his work started to concentrate on the growth of corporate 
power and the ability of managers to utilise that power without constraint. In his early 
writings, his solution to this problem was forcefully stated in the opening paragraph of 
his 1931 article Corporate Powers As Powers in Trust: 
It is the thesis of this essay that all powers granted to a corporation or to the 
management of a corporation, or to any group within the corporation, whether 
derived from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all times 
exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest 
appears. 7 
It can be seen that Berle s answer to the problems of corporate accountability was a 
vigorous reassertion of the fiduciary obligation of directors and of the doctrine that 
held that their powers were held in trust for the shareholders as exclusive corporate 
beneficiaries, in other words he advocated adherence to the legal model of the firm. 
5 A. A. Berle Jr., For {Thom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365 at 
1365. 
6 P. Ireland, Back to the Future? Adolf Berle, the Law Commission and Directors Duties (1999) 20 
Co. Law. 203 at 205. 
7 A. A. Berle Jr., Corporate Powers. 4s Powers in Trust (1930-1) 44 Har,,. L. Rev. 1049 at 1049. 
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In Berle s view, many of the rules which constrained the directors power and 
proscribed that they act in the interests of the shareholders were simply outgrowths of 
equitable rules somewhat analogous to those which apply in favour of a cestui que 
trust to the trustee s exercise of wide powers granted to him in the instrument making 
him a fiduciary. 8 
One would assume that any critics of Berle s thesis would concentrate on the 
inaccuracies of this trust analogy and argue that it is inaccurate to analogise directors 
with trustees. In reality, the only public response to the article advocated the trustee 
metaphor even more strongly. In an article entitled For Whom are Corporate 
Managers Trustees? Prof. Dodd stated: 
The present writer is thoroughly in sympathy with Mr. Berle s efforts to 
establish a legal control which was more effectually prevent corporate managers 
from diverting profit into their own pockets from those of stockholders, and 
agrees with many of the specific rules which the latter deduces from his 
trusteeship principle. He nevertheless believes that it is undesirable to give 
increased emphasis to the view that corporations exist for the sole purpose of 
making profits for the shareholders. He believes that public opinion, which 
ultimately makes law, has made and is today making substantial strides in the 
direction of a view of the business corporation as an economic institution which 
has a social service as well as a profit making function, that this view has already 
had some effect upon legal theory, and that it is likely to have a greatly increased 
effect upon the latter in the future. 9 
He pointed out that a number of prominent corporate managers were advocating 
greater corporate social responsibility. For example, Owen D. Young, then CEO of 
General Electric, asserted that he was a trustee of the institution and not merely an 
attorney for the investor. 10 Accordingly, Mr. Young believed that he owed 
obligations to three groups of people: the shareholders, the employees and the 
customers and the general public. Dodd believed that this assumption of social 
responsibility by managers had already manifested itself in areas such as corporate 
philanthropy. 11 Although he acknowledged that voluntary assumption of such 
responsibility might not be expected or the norm, the issue was whether acting in the 
interests of non-shareholder constituents ran counter to the principles of company law. 
Ibid. 
9 E. M. Dodd, For II'hom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? (1931-32) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1 143 at 1147- 
S. 
° Ibid. at pp. 115 -9. 11 See infra. at Ch. 8. 
Chapter 1: The Harvard Debate. 
They did if management acts as trustees only for the shareholders, but Dodd found no 
clear proof for such a conclusion. 12 
Berle s response was prompt. 13 However, whilst many believe that the views of Berle 
and Dodd were completely opposed at this time, a deeper examination of their 
respective positions reveals their aims to be similar. Both men were concerned with 
reversing the decline in corporate accountability that had arisen in the first part of the 
twentieth century. Berle advocated a shareholder-exclusive approach, not because he 
thought their position was more important than other corporate constituents, but 
because he could see no effective mechanism for enforcing a community standard. 
As he stated, you could not: 
abandon emphasis on the view that business corporations exist for the sole 
purpose of making profits for their stockholders until such time as you are 
prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to 
someone else. 
14 
It is this absence of a mechanism to enforce community demand that was the main 
difference between the views of Berle and Dodd. 15 In the absence of such a 
mechanism, it was essential that we had best be protecting the interests we know, 
being no less swift to provide for the new interests as they successively appear. 16 
Accordingly, it can be contended that Berle s view was more pragmatic that Dodd s. 17 
However, pragmatic Berle s view may have been, it was not without its own 
problems. As several commentators correctly pointed out, the very changes in the 
nature of corporations and corporate shareholding which had exacerbated the problem 
of managerial accountability had also served to undermine the shareholder-centred 
fiduciary mechanisms of control that Berle proposed. One of the principal reasons 
why corporate managers had grown so powerful was because of the increased decline 
12 E. M. Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? (1931-32) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1 145 at 1162- 
3. 
13 A. A. Berle, For IIhom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365. 
14 Ibid. at p. 1367. 
15 J. L. Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation (1964) 64 Colum. L. Rev. 
1458 at 1462. 
16 VA Berle, For 117tont Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365 at 
13 72. 
17 P. Ireland, Back to the Future? Adolf Berle, the Law Commission and Directors Duties (1999) 20 
Co. Law. 203 at 206. 
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in active shareholding and the rise of pure rentier investment. As one commentator 
noted, the average shareholder in a large corporation: 
regards himself more as a security holder than as in any sense a responsible 
managing partner in the enterprise the legal distinction between bondholders 
and stockholders is fast becoming a distinction unwarranted by the actual 
situation. 18 
Thus, as Kline observed in a review of one of Berle s books, any movement to 
increase the power of stockholders [such as Berle was proposing] ran counter to the 
historical evolution of corporations. 19 There was no doubt that Berle was aware of 
this, but could simply see no effective mechanism for enforcing a stakeholder 
viewpoint. He recognised that non-shareholder constituents were worthy of 
protection, but also recognised that mechanisms that combine stakeholder protection 
and managerial accountability will take time to develop. Indeed, as we shall see when 
we examine the mechanisms of corporate governance in Chapter 5, it is still the case 
that such mechanisms have not been developed. 
Although in the Harvard Law Review, Berle s view was clear, elsewhere he does not 
seem to have espoused such a pro-shareholder approach. In his seminal text The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle concluded that the American 
corporation had ceased to be a private business device and had become an 
institution. 20 Further, relating to the separation of ownership and control, he 
concluded that the passive shareholders have surrendered the right that the 
corporation should be operated in their sole interest 21 and that the community is in a 
position to demand that the modern corporation serve not alone the owners or the 
control but all society 22 with the managers acting as a purely neutral technocracy, 
balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to 
each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private 
cupidity. 23 
18 
r, n\\1 1 -,. 1 
r. 
. 
/`1 i .! `Y. 
11 r1 /1n1n\ '1n tl_1 
_r7 f^I _i en 
r. ý. wooa, iiie 3tatus q lianagement NocKnotaer-s ýi yzu)su Y aie LJ. Di at Jy. In 
" J. Kline, Review of . -1.. -I. Berle, Studies in the Law of Corporation 
Finance (1929) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 
714 at 717. 
20 A. A. Berle & G. C. Means. The : 1lodern Corporation and Private Property, 1932, New York: 
Macmillan, preface at v. 
21 Ibid. at p. 355. 
22 Ibid. at p. 356. 
Ibid. 
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Maybe this inconsistency was a factor in the final outcome of the debate for in 1954 
Professor Berle overcame his misgivings and stated: 
Twenty years ago, the writer had a controversy with the late Professor E, 
Merrick Dodd, of Harvard Law School, the writer holding that corporate powers 
were powers in trust for shareholders while Professor Dodd argued that these 
powers were held in trust for the entire community. The argument has been 
settled (at least for the time being) squarely in favor of Professor Dodd s 
contention. 24 
In fact, in a complete reversal of his original position, he stated: 
[M]odern directors are not limited to running business enterprise for maximum 
profit, but are in fact and recognized in law as administrators of a community 25 
system. 
What is difficult to see is precisely why Berle conceded the debate to Dodd. Berle s 
original pro-shareholder approach was entirely pragmatic and his assertion that a 
mechanism to enforce a community-centred approach would be a long time in coming 
has been proven correct. As soon as Berle adopted this new position, he was attacked 
by legal model proponents utilising his own arguments first put forward in the original 
Harvard debate. Professor Ben W. Lewis, referring to this community-centred 
approach, stated [i]t is not going to happen; if it did happen it would not work; and if 
it did work it would still be intolerable for free men. 26 Eugene Rostow considered it 
to be the rhetoric of mangerialism 27 and finds it disturbing in both its political and 
legal implications. 
Indeed, if one examines the current law, it is evident that a pro-shareholder ideology 
is still present. The current statement of directors duties is that the directors of a 
company must act: 
bona fide in what they consider - not what a court may consider - is in the 
interests of the company, and not for any collateral purpose. 28 
2' A. A. Berle, The 20" Century Capitalist Revolution, 1954, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 
1.169. 
A. A. Berle, Foreword in E. S. Mason (ed. ), The Corporation in Modern Society, 1959, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, at xii. 
26 B. W. Lewis, Economics bvAdmonition (1959) 49 Am. Econ. Rev. Supp. 384 at 395. 
27 E. V. Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends is Corporate . 
Management Responsible? In E. M. Mason 
(ed. ), The Corporation in , Modern Society, 1959, Cambridge. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
64. 
Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. 119421 Ch. 304 at 306, per Lord Greene MR. The bone fide duty is 
examined in more detail in Ch. 4. 
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Although technically, the duty is owed to the entity, a duty to benefit an artificial 
entity would be irrational, since an artificial entity is incapable of experiencing well 
being. 29 Accordingly, the interests of the company must be defined in terms of human 
interests and objectives. Historically, the interests of the company have come to be 
equated with the interests of the shareholders. 30 Despite provisions such as s. 309 
Companies Act 1985 and increasing calls for a pluralist approach, reform committees 
still perceive the company as a vehicle for shareholder enhancement. In 1998, the 
Committee on Corporate Governance (the Hampel Committee) stated that [t]he 
single overriding objective shared by all listed companies, whatever their size or type 
of business, is the preservation and the greatest practicable enhancement over time of 
their shareholders investment. 31 Therefore, one could legitimately conclude that 
although Berle conceded the debate to Dodd, it has been Berle s view that has found 
greater legal acceptance. 
Conclusion. 
Despite being over 70 years old, the Harvard Debate remains as relevant as it did 
when it first began. The question of in whose interests should the company be run is 
still of tremendous importance. In this respect, the Harvard Debate provides us with a 
useful introduction. However, the basis of the positions of both Berle and Dodd was 
premised upon the directors occupying an analogous position to trustees. Today the 
directors position is totally different to that of trustees. Accordingly, whilst the 
message of the Harvard Debate remains of great importance, the justifications behind 
their respective positions are no longer accurate. The conclusion of the debate came 
with Dodd s view being declared victorious. Yet corporate behaviour has not evolved 
in line with Dodd s views. If anything, it has been Berle s pro-shareholder view that 
has become the norm. 
Irrespective of whether it is the social service contention of Dodd or the pro- 
shareholder approach of Berle that is to be justified today, new theories are required to 
justify them. With the ending of the Harvard Debate, new theories have arisen. The 
'`' P. L. Davies and Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, The Land of Industrial Democracy [1977] 1U 197 at 
199. 
30 See (irccnhal<,, h v . 4rderne 
Cinemas Ltd. [19511 Ch. 286. 
31 The Committee on Corporate Governance, 1998, London: Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 1.16. 
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trustee analogy waned and legal model proponents adopted a property based model to 
justify their position. They argued not that directors were trustees, but that the 
company was owned by the shareholders and so should be run in their interests. It is 
this ownership model that we examine in the next chapter. 
14 
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2 
Ownership of the Firnt 
Introduction. 
The Harvard Debate brought to the fore an issue which has preoccupied academic 
corporate literature since. It has split the academic community with some advocating 
the adoption of a model of the company based around stakeholding principles, whilst 
others have sought to reinvent the traditional shareholder-orientated, Anglo-American 
model. However, what both parties agree upon is that shareholders have an important 
role to play in the governance of the company. Those who advocate the legal model 
of the company often argue that good governance requires the restoration of 
shareholder control. ' Stakeholder theorists argue that the company should not be 
viewed solely as a profit-maximizing enterprise, but nevertheless should require 
committed ownership by shareholders, if only to eradicate the danger of short- 
termism. 2 Accordingly, the Labour government has highlighted the need for more 
active shareholding and one method of achieving this that has been under 
consideration for some time is compulsory voting for institutional investors. 
Underlying this contention that shareholders need to be more active is the assumption 
that shareholders own the company. It should be noted that many company lawyers 
do not assert that the company is owned by the shareholders in the usual sense of the 
word due to the existence of the company s separate personality. Rather, it is 
assumed that shareholders have a proprietary interest in the company akin to 
ownership. Many non-lawyers and economists however, are less hesitant and argue 
that the shareholders literally own the company. The natural corollary of shareholder 
ownership is that the interests of shareholders should take priority, if not complete 
dominance, over the other stakeholders, and that shareholders should have a say in the 
running of the company. 
See A. Sykes, Proposals for Internationally Competitive Corporate Governance in Britain and 
. -Inierica (1994) 2 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 187 at 194 Xtho states that 
effective, internationally competitive corporate governance requires the efficient discharge of the 
ownership role. 
2 W. Hutton, The State We re In, 1995. London: Jonathan Cape, p. 34. 
3 The governance function exercised by institutional investors will be examined in Ch. 5. 
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Like the new economic theory that was to follow, the ownership model of the 
company was based on numerous assumptions that even today are taken for granted. 
However, many of these assumptions, when examined, show themselves to be 
descriptively inaccurate. For example, despite the general acceptance of the 
ownership assumption, the legal nature of the share and shareholding is still not 
clear. As one commentator stated the share does not fit into any normal legal 
category. 4 
This chapter seeks to examine the ownership model and assess its validity. Like the 
new economic theory, this will involve analysing a number of satellite issues. For 
example, many academics argue that the company is owned without establishing 
what exactly ownership entails. The existence of corporate personality may mean that 
the company is incapable of being owned. A significant issue that has produced much 
literature is the relationship between ownership and control. It will be seen that the 
ownership model as a means of justifying shareholder primacy is no longer 
convincing and contains many descriptive inaccuracies. It was these inaccuracies that 
created the theoretical vacuum that provided the opportunity for the new economic 
theory to flourish. 
I. WHAT IS OWNERSHIP? 
The ownership model is premised on the contention that the shareholders own the 
company. As will be seen, this can be doubted for a number of reasons. However, 
many academics discussing the ownership model ignore a fundamental issue, namely 
what is meant by ownership. It is an issue that needs to be addressed because when 
one stated that the shareholders own the company, there is no doubt that the term 
ownership is being used in a different sense to that which we normally understand. 
Many legal theorists when defining ownership look to the classic exposition 
developed by Honor 40 years ago. Honor correctly noted that our conception of 
property has varied across time and cultures. Nevertheless, he concluded that there 
° P. L. Davies, Gott-cr s Principles of ; 1lodern Compani' Law, 1997,6`h ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
299. 
A. M. Honor, Ownership in A. G. Guest (ed. ), Orford Essays in Jurisprudence, 1961, Oxford: OUP, 
p. 106. 
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is indeed a substantial similarity in the position of one who owns an umbrella in 
England, France, Russia, China. In all these countries, the owner of an umbrella may 
use it, stop others using it, sell it, or leave it by will. Nowhere may he use it to poke 
his neighbour in the ribs or knock over his vase. 6 He then went on to explain that 
there was no simple definition of ownership, rather there are a series of 
characteristics, and if enough of these characteristics are present, it is logical to 
describe the relationship as ownership based. Honor lists eleven such characteristics. 
There are several obvious ones such as the right of possession, the right of use and the 
right to manage. There is also a right of income -I can rent my property and keep the 
revenue. There is a right to capital value - if I sell my property, I can keep the 
proceeds. There is a right to security from expropriation - if my property is stolen, I 
can call on the police to apprehend the thief. There is a right to transmission -I can 
transmit possession by sale, gift or bequest. There is no time limit on these rights. 
There is, according to Honor ,a 
duty placed upon me not to use my property to do 
harm. My property can be used to obtain satisfaction of judgment against me - if I do 
not pay my debts, my property can be seized. Finally, there are some rights to 
residual control -I can lend my property to others, who then enjoy the rights above, 
but when the loan ends, all the rights revert back to me. 
Before we apply Honor s test to the issue of company ownership, we need to 
distinguish ownership of the company and ownership of the company s shares. There 
is little doubt that shareholders own their shares. They have a right of possession - 
even under CREST shareholders can still insist on holding a physical share certificate. 
Shareholders obviously have right to the capital value should they sell them. 
Shareholders may not use their shares harmfully (although it is difficult to see how 
they could) and creditors may take them if the shareholder does not pay his debts. In 
relation to the company s shares, shareholders pass ten of Honor s eleven tests. 
Accordingly, it is settled that shareholders own their shares. 
However, this does not mean that shareholders own the company. A shareholder does 
not have a right of possession of the company. Their right of use is limited to the 
6 lhid. at p. 108. 
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company s services, so their rights are the same as any other customer s. They do 
have a right to manage in respect to certain residual powers. However, the vast 
majority of managerial powers are vested in the directors. Their right to an income is 
limited to a dividend. Their right to the capital value is only effective in the event of a 
liquidation, in which case they will be unlikely to get anything. Shareholders do not 
have rights against the expropriation of company assets. 7 Shareholders cannot sell, 
gift or bequest company assets as they can their shares. They have no duty to stop the 
company from acting in a harmful manner and they cannot use company assets to 
satisfy their debts. 
Of Honor s eleven tests of ownership, only two (and these are minor rights) are 
unequivocally satisfied; three are partly met, and six are not fulfilled at all. If 
Honor s tests are indicative of ownership, then in fact the directors have a better case 
for ownership of the company than the shareholders. Directors have rights of 
possession and management and the ability to dispose of its assets. The duty to stop 
the company committing harm is placed upon them and they have the right to take 
action if the company s assets are expropriated. The above findings are set out below. 
Table 2.1: Rights of Ownership. 8 








Possession Yes No Yes Yes 
Use Yes No Yes No 
Management Yes Some Yes Yes 
Income Yes Some No No 
Capital Yes Some Yes No 
Security Yes No Yes Some 
Transmission Yes No Yes Yes 
No limit of term Yes Yes Yes No 
Duty not to do harm Yes No Yes Yes 
Judgment liability Yes No Yes No 
Residual control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The obvious conclusion from above is that, if Honor s ownership tests are valid (and 
it appears to be the most useful definition to date) then no one owns the company. 
7 This was precisely the issue in Short v Treasury Commissioners [19481 AC 514. where the 
shareholders lost. 
IR J. Kay and A. Silberston, Corporate Governance in F. M. Padfield (ed. ), Perspectives on Company 
Lai,: 2,1997, London: Kluwer Law International, p. 55. 
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Many groups have rights and obligations surrounding the company, but none of them 
amount to an ownership claim. 
The dividing factor in the ownership claims of shareholders is the existence of 
corporate personality. From the date of incorporation, the company is fully fledged 
and acquires all the benefits of incorporation, notably separate personality. Persons, 
natural or juristic, are incapable of being owned, but can exercise ownership rights 
themselves. Many of the ownership rights that shareholders enjoy over their shares, 
the company has over itself. As the company is a juridical person, this is perfectly 
logical. 
II. OWNERSHIP OF THE FIRM. 
The Evolution of the Ownership Model. 
The genesis of the ownership model coincided roughly with the rise of company law 
as a subject proper. Company law began life in the early nineteenth century as joint 
stock company law and until the latter half of the century was considered as part of 
partnership law. Characterized by large numbers of passive shareholders, freely 
transferable shares and a specialized management - essential features of a modern 
public company - joint stock companies could in law be incorporated or 
unincorporated. A joint stock company was a joint stock company irrespective of its 
legal status. 1° Correspondingly, early joint stock company law texts examined the law 
relating to both incorporated and unincorporated enterprises. " 
Another important fact was that for many years, all joint stock companies were 
considered to be types of partnership. Like many partnerships, joint stock companies 
tended to be conceptualised as aggregates of individuals. Although incorporation 
created a separate entity, the resulting body corporate was thought to consist of 
several individuals, united in such a manner that they and their successors constitute 
9 P. L. Davies, Goiter s Principles of Modern Company Law, 1997.6`h ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
p301. }(' See C. Wordsworth, The Latin Relating to Railwav. Canal, Water, Dock, Gas and Other Companies, 
1851,6`h ed., London: Benning, p. 1 who opens with the statement that joint stock companies are 
unincorporated and incorporate. 
11 The first company law text is said to be C. Wordsworth, The Law Relating to Railway. Bank. 
Insurance, :l lining and 
Other Joint Stock Companies, 1836, London: Butter orth. 
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but one person in law, a person distinct from that of any of the members, though made 
up of them all 12 There was as of yet no conception of the company as something 
with its own existence. The shareholders were viewed as the company, 13 hence the 
persistence of the view that the directors were agents of the shareholders, subject to 
the control of the shareholders in general meeting. This was also reflected in the 
statutes of the day with many of them stating that people formed themselves into 
companies, with the implication that companies were formed of, rather than by, them. 
As joint stock companies were viewed as partnerships, so it was that they came to be 
regulated by partnership law. One of the main texts of the day, A Treatise on the Law 
of Partnership, Including Its Application to Joint Stock Companies, describes 
company law as a mere statutory development of the law of partnership. '4 In 
accordance with the law of partnership, ownership of a joint stock company share 
bestowed on the holder an interest in the assets of the company, with the shareholders 
being conceptualised as equitable owners of the company s assets. Shareholders were 
not only the company, but they were also legally constituted as the owners of its 
assets. However, whilst the shareholders may legally have been the owners, 
commentators had already started to highlight inaccuracies that would in time render 
the model anachronistic. As early as 1776, Adam Smith observed that: 
the greater part of these proprietors seldom pretend[ed] to understand any thing 
of the business of the company; giv[ing] themselves no trouble about it, 
receiv[ing] contentedly such half yearly or yearly dividend, as the directors think 
proper to make them. 15 
However, despite academic misgivings, there was a proprietary connection between 
the shareholders and the assets of the company, and compared to their modern 
counterparts, eighteenth and early nineteenth century shareholders took a much 
greater supervisory role within the company. Some companies even financially 
penalised shareholders who neglected to attend general meetings either in person or 
by proxy. ' 6 
12 J. W. Smith, 
.4 Compendium of 
Mercantile Lair, 1843,3`d ed., London: Maxwell, p. 81. 
1 -1 P. Ireland, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership (1999) 62 MLR 32 at 39. 
14 N. Lindley, .4 Treatise on the 
Law of Partnership, Including Its Application to Joint Stock 
Companies. 1878,4th ed., London: Maxwell, p. 14. 
15 
, 1. Smith, An Inquiry Into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, p. 74 1. 
16 A. B. DuBois. The English Business Company After the Bubble Act 1720-1800,1938, New York: 
Octagon, p. 319. 
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This position altered radically during the mid-nineteenth century. The catalyst for this 
alteration was the rapid growth in the number and size of joint stock companies. 
Investment was not only on a hitherto unknown scale, it took a much more passive 
rentier form. Consequently, after 1830, for the first time there developed a market in 
joint stock company shares which transformed them into marketable commodities that 
were highly liquid. The law soon came to recognise this transformation in the nature 
of the share. In the seminal case of Bligh v Brent, '? it was held that the shareholders 
had no legal interest in the property owned by the company. All the shareholders had 
was a right to a dividend and a right to assign their shares for value. It was not long 
before the shares of both incorporated and unincorporated companies were established 
as legal objects in their own right, independent of the assets of the company. This left 
the assets of the company under the ownership of the company alone or, in the case of 
unincorporated companies, in the hands of the trustees. The shareholders did not own 
the assets of the company, only the intangible share capital. This created a vital legal 
space 18 between companies - the owners of assets - and shareholders - the owners 
of shares. 
This separation between the shareholders and the company was accompanied by 
related changes. For example, Sealy notes that as long as unlimited liability remained 
general meetings were diligently attended and matters of policy were actively 
debated 19 and that even after the introduction of limited liability in 1855 
shareholders continued to take their role seriously. 20 However, there is no doubt 
that whilst there was for many years a degree of shareholder supervision, as the 
century progressed, this supervision steadily declined. Investors who traditionally 
held shares in one company were starting to diversify their holdings. Shareholders 
now sought security not through monitoring the company s activities, but from 
limited liability and a policy of diversification. Soon the shareholders became what 
one commentator has called blind capital seeking its 5 per cent 21 and any significant 
supervision ended. Professional managers were salaried to run companies and the 
17 (1837) 2Y&C Ex 268. 
18 .,.,, , -, 7 ---,. r_- a ... r_ f(I I- , -- IJ --- r, _.. ___. __i: _. II nnM 41 Aii D '2') ., r , 1n r. ireiana, c, ompani" c. ait' anU /ne : ill'//I OJ JnU/"e/ICI/Uel Vºl'ne/J/uN ý1 ý7ý) vt, IN IL1\ -), '. aº -rv. 
19 L. Sealy, Perception and Policy in Company Law Reform in D. Feldman and F. 1\leisel, Corporate 
and Commercial Law: Modern Developments, 1996, London: Lloyds. p. 25. 
20 Ibid. 
21 
Chapter 2: Ownership of the Firm. 
shareholders finally abandoned their role as owners and adopted the role of 
functionless rentiers. 22 This was coupled by a move away from the company being 
viewed as an aggregate of persons. Not only were shareholders established as money 
capitalists standing outside the company, the company itself, now the sole legal and 
equitable owner of the firm s capital, was depersonified ceasing to be an 
association and becoming an institution. 23 Whereas under the 1856 Act 
companies were formed of people, it was clear under the Companies Act 1862 that 
companies were made by them, not of them. This was the reification of the company. 
This reification of the company and the shareholders expulsion from the position of 
owner had profound effects of the law relating to joint stock companies, notably the 
increased recognition of the depersonified nature of the company. This was 
recognised in the Companies Acts 1844-62 which made corporate personality and 
limited liability available upon simple registration. The doctrine of ultra vires, which 
developed to protect the integrity of the share as a form of capital,, placed the newly 
reified company beyond even the unanimous will of the shareholders. 25 The directors 
were increasingly viewed as an autonomous, self-standing organ, rather than as a 
body subject to the control of the general meeting. This was accompanied by an 
erosion in the rights of shareholders to intervene in day-to-day management issues. 
Power was gradually flowing from the general meeting to the board. As the 
shareholders surrendered their role as owners, so too did they surrender their 
ownership rights and in doing so surrendered a set of definite rights for a set of 
indefinite expectations. 26 
The evolution of the ownership model reveals a definite ebb and wake of the model. 
In the first joint stock companies, there were strong legal and economic reasons to 
regard the shareholders as owners. However, as joint stock companies proliferated 
21 J. H. Clapham, An Economic History of Modern Britain, Vol. 1,1928, Cambridge: CUP, p. 388. 
'' P. Ireland, Company Law and the , 11t"th of Shareholder Ownership (1999) 62 MLR 32 at 42. 
" L. Scaly, Perception and Policy in Company Lain Reform in D. Feldman and F. Meisel, Corporate 
and Commercial Law: . 
1lodern Developments, 1996, London: Lloyds, pp. 24-6. 
N See the judgment of Lord Langdale in Colman v Eastern Counties Railway Co. (1846) 10 Beav. 1. 
4chhrn-y Railway Carriage & Iron Co. v Riche (1874) LR 7 HL 653. 
. \. A. Berle and G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Propert. t', 1932 (re\ lsed ed.. 
1967), New York: Harcourt Brace, p. 244. 
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and the company became increasingly depersonified'27 it was apparent that the 
shareholders no longer occupied the role of owner and instead became simple capital 
providers. This change was not thrust upon them, but seemed to be an organic 
evolution that suited both shareholders and the company. The shareholders received a 
dividend and were able to reduce their risk without having to expend effort in 
monitoring the company, whilst the directors were free to manage the company 
without fear of shareholder intervention. This method of management soon carne to 
be viewed as the most efficient. 
However, as we shall see, this has not spelt the end of the ownership model. In 
several ways, modern company law has failed to take certain developments seriously 
enough and has sought to hang onto certain ownership-based characteristics. This 
explains why, even today the ownership argument is still advocated, despite its 
anachronisms. It is to these issues that we now turn. 
Company Law and the Nature of Share Ownership. 
One significant reason why the ownership model has survived is because the interest 
conferred upon the shareholders by the share has never been adequately defined. In 
the absence of an adequate definition, the courts have appeared to fall back on 
proprietary principles. This part of the chapter considers how a newly emerging 
subject, company law, struggled to come to terms with the material conditions 
surrounding its own creation, the most notable condition being the evolving nature of 
share ownership and the interest conferred therewith. 
As we have seen, come the end of the nineteenth century, shareholding no longer 
entailed ownership of the corporate assets. However, another related development 
was that due to limited liability, fully paid-up shares and a policy of diversification, 
share ownership had ceased to be especially risky. All the shareholders wanted was a 
regular dividend and the managers were happy to provide this. The result was that 
shares came to be seen as sources of steady income rather than speculative 
instruments with wildly varying returns. Put simply, shares came to exhibit debt-like 
27 Here depersonified is taken to mean that it was no longer viewed as an aggregate of persons. In 
another sense, this was accompanied by a strong personification in that the company became a juridical 
person. 
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features. 28 This in turn provided more justification for the erosion of the 
shareholders ownership rights. As shareholders became ever more passive and 
functionless, remarkable only in [their] capacity to share, without effort or even 
without appreciable risk, the gains of growth 29 the justifications for their 
ownership rights became even weaker. Company law as a subject proper was 
premised upon this separation of the shareholder from the joint stock company. 
Despite this, company law while stopping short of according shareholders ownership 
rights over corporations, nevertheless [continued to] vest significant property rights in 
the shareholders as residual claimants. 30 This is still the case. Company law has 
abandoned the ownership model yet still retains shareholders at the centre of its 
governance arrangements. 31 A major reason for this failure to abandon the ownership 
model is due to the imprecise nature of the share. Knowing the legal nature of the 
share helps us determine the relationship the shareholder has with the company. Is it 
one of ownership; is it a principal/agent relationship or is it more akin to a 
creditor/debtor relationship? 
As a leading commentator has stated [t]he court has found it extraordinarily difficult 
to define the legal nature of shares, despite its familiarity with them. 32 As there is no 
direct link between the share and the assets of the company the word share is 
something of a misnomer, for shareholders no longer share any property in 
common. 33 Usually, the court is content simply to define them as choses in action, 34 
which does nothing more than confirm that they are personalty35, which is self- 
evident. 
2S J. B. Baskin, The Development of Corporate Financial Markets in Britain and the United States, 
1600-1914: Overcoming. 4si"mmetric Information (1988) 62 Business History Review 199 at 232-6. 
ý' J. K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, 1967, Harmondworth: Pelican, p. 113. 
10 S. Deakin and G. Slinger, Hostile Takeovers, Corporate Law and the Theory of the Firm (1997) 24 
JLS 124 at 145. 
31 As we shall see in Ch. 5, many, if not all, of the formal governance mechanisms operate to protect 
the shareholders. 
32 R. R. Pennington, Pennington s Companv Law, 1995,7`h ed., London: Butterworths, p. 69. See also 
P. L. Davies, Gower s Principles of ; tlodern Company, Law, 1997,6th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
p. 299 who states that the question what is the legal nature of the share is more easily asked than 
answered. 
33 P. L. Davies, Gower s Principles of Modern Company Law, 1997,6`h ed., London: Sweet & NIax\ý ell, 
p. 300. 
Humble i , Mitchell (1839) 11 Ad. & El. 205; Colonial Bank v Il 
hinnev (1886) 11 App. Cas. 426. 
'' S. 182(1) Companies Act 1985 confirms that shares are personal estate and not realty. 
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Originally, in the old deed of settlement companies, it was evident that the members 
shares amounted to equitable rights of property. 36 However, as we have seen, come 
the early 19`h century, it came to be regarded that the shareholders were not owners, in 
law or in equity, of the company s property. 37 Shares soon came to be viewed in 
terms of the contractual rights they conferred upon the shareholders. Pennington 
asserts that today the share is simply the bundle of contractual rights conferred upon 
the shareholder. 38 He goes on to approve the most widely quoted definition of a 
share, namely that of Farwell J in Borland s Trustee v Steel Bros. & Co. Ltd . 
39 NN-ho 
stated: 
A share is the interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a sum of 
money, for the purpose of liability in the first place, and of interest in the second, 
but also consisting of a series of mutual covenants entered into by all the 
shareholders inter se in accordance with s. 16 of the Companies Act 1862 [now 
s. 14 Companies Act 1985]. The contract contained in the articles of association 
is one of the original incidents of the share. A share is not a sum of money 
but is an interest measured by a sum of money and made up of various rights 
contained in the contract including the right to a sum of money of a more or less 
40 amount. 
Pennington agues that the definition of the share, given the above statement, is clear. 
The s. 14 contract gives rise to contractual obligations of each member as regards the 
company and every other member. The aggregate of these rights and obligations of a 
member is his shareholding and when divided between the shares he holds, they 
constitute his shares. 41 However, he is also aware that this view is problematic in 
that the contractual rights afforded by the s. 14 contract can be used against the 
company which highlights the shareholder s externality to the company and blurs the 
distinction between them and debenture holders. Thus it is tempting to deduce 
that the relationship between [the shareholder] and the company is that of creditor and 
debtor. 42 However, this assumption is quite wrong. 43 Nevertheless, it is apparent 
that the contractual rights conferred by share ownership are unusual. At common law, 
44 they were transferable at a time when other choses in action were not. This has led 
36 Child v Hudson s Bay Co. (1723) 2 P. Wms. 207; Harrison v Prvse (1740) Barn Ch. 324: Ashhr r 
Blackwell and Million Bank Co. (1765) Amb. 503. 
37 Bligh i' Brent (1837) 2Y&C Ex. 268. 
R. R. Pennington, Pennington s Company Law, 1995,7 `h ed., London: Butterworths, p. 70. 
39 [ 19011 1 Ch. 279. 
4" 
Ibid. at p. 288. 41., .,., ". . -. I. ^nr-%-r-- -1 13 11 no minn,. r .. 1nn,, iýý K. K. renn111gT011, L. an 3nares in (-onrpanres öe ciejrnea . ýý i 7oyý 
tu \r V. La W. 1`tV at ý -+ý. 
42 R. R. Pennington. Pennington s Company Law, 1995,7`h ed., London: Buttenvorths, p. 170. 
ai Ibid. 
44 Pinkett v 11'right (1842) 2 Hare 120; Poole v Middleton (1861) 29 Beav. 646. 
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many to conclude that they are property. However, Pennington correctly voices a 
note of concern. Describing shares as property is innocuous enough providing that we 
remember that they do not constitute a proprietary interest in the assets of the 
company. As we noted in the previous section, there is little doubt that shares are 
indeed property, which means that they are owned by the shareholders. However, 
they do not confer on the shareholders a proprietary right in the company s assets. 
Accordingly, when we describe the shareholders as owners, we are defining them as 
owners of their shares as opposed to owners of the company. 
Ownership, Control and Corporate Governance. 
We have noted that one reason for the retention of the ownership model is due to the 
imprecise nature of the share. Another possible reason is that the law has failed to 
fully embrace the implications of corporate personality. This has occurred because 
the law has tried to integrate into our company law two mutually exclusive 
standpoints. The first is the doctrine of corporate personality which reinforces the 
separate existence of the company at law and, through implication, erodes de jure and 
de facto the shareholder s ownership rights. 
The second standpoint relates to company law s failure to fully recognise the 
separation between the company as an entity and the shareholders status as a rentier 
investor. Company law still, despite all the evidence to the contrary, categorises 
shareholders as insiders, members or owners, and continues to grant them residual 
ownership rights such as the right to vote in general meetings. It has done this: 
notwithstanding the true economic nature of the share; notwithstanding any 
property nexus between shareholders and the company s assets; notwithstanding 
the radical externality of shareholders to the company and their superfluousness 
to and disinterest in the process of production; notwithstanding the fact that there 
are serious question marks over the legitimacy of their residual control rights, as 
well as over their desire, competence and practical ability to exercise them; and 
notwithstanding the fact that company law itself has done so much to demote 
them from the status of owners. 35 
The above quote is pointing out a simple fact; company law has not taken separate 
personality to its full conclusion in areas where it is justified to do so, and in many 
respects still treats the company and the shareholders as synonymous. Consequently, 
45 P. Ireland, Company Law and thc , 
115th of Shareholder Ownership(1999)62 MLR 32 at 48. 
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and despite the fact that the company has ceased to be a they and has come to be 
seen as an it, 46 the law insists on treating shareholders, collectively, as [its] only 
legitimate constituency. 47 This is evidenced when one examines the director s 
fiduciary duties, such as the duty to act in the best interests of the company with the 
48 company meaning the shareholders. 
The way many commentators deal with these irreconcilable standpoints is often to 
ignore them. Very often, it is simply assumed that shareholders are owners of the 
company, without any examination of the issues involved. One commentator has 
stated that in this instance ownership operates as a magic solving word 49 or as a 
transcendental nonsense 50 which academics use to avoid the difficult questions that 
the ownership model poses. As Parkinson has noted, many academics argue that 
shareholder s own the firm because they contribute the capital: 
While shareholders are not the owners of the company s assets as a matter of 
strict law, they are in substance the owners by virtue of being the contributors of 
51 company s capital. 1 
However, new economic theorists correctly argue that the ownership of capital 
should not be confused with ownership of the firm. 52 Nevertheless, the mistaken 
analogy 53 of shareholder ownership and the synonomousness of ownership of capital 
with ownership of the firm continue to cast a long shadow over the governance 
debate 54 and does much to reinforce the legal model of the company. 
This loss of ownership rights without the abandonment of the ownership model has 
contributed to one of the most important issues in corporate governance, namely the 
46 L. Scaly, Perception and Policy in Company Law Reform in D. Feldman and F. Meisel, Corporate 
and Commercial Law: Modern Developments, 1996, London: Lloyds, p. 26 
47 lhid. 
48 This duty has been modified by s. 309 Companies Act 1985. However, as we shall see in Ch. -1, it 
does little to alter the legal model of the company. The supremacy of shareholder interests is also 
evidenced in the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, especially the provisions relating to the 
directors ability to frustrate takeover bids. 




1 J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law, 1993, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 34- 
52 f-. F. Fama, . -l ge'nci, 
Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economy 288 
at 290. 
53 J. Kay, The Stakeholder Corporation in G. Kelly et al (eds. ), Stakeholder Capitalism, 1997, London: 
Macmillan, p. 131. 
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separation of ownership and control highlighted by Berle and Means in 1932, and it is 
to this issue that we now turn. 
Berle and Means first stated their hypothesis in the seminal text The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property in 1932. The central tenet to their thesis was 
simple. As little as a century earlier, ownership and control were united with owners 
of the firm also having a controlling interest. As Chandler put it owners managed 
and managers owned. 55 Industrialists such as John D. Rockefeller, Cornelius 
Venderbilt, Andrew Mellon and Andrew Carnegie owned vast numbers of shares in 
companies they controlled. By the time of Berle and Means, this trend had ended 
with those in control holding miniscule holdings. Those who controlled the company 
did not own it, and those who supposedly owned it did not control it - ownership and 
control had become separated. Today this trend has become even more pronounced. 
With the exception of individuals such as Bill Gates of Microsoft and the late Sam 
Walton of Wal-Mart, large companies are run by individuals with stakes that are 
dwarfed by the holdings of institutional investors. The consequence of this separation 
is that management can now escape effective shareholder control. 
It should be noted early on that there was no conscious choice that ownership and 
control should become separated. The separation of ownership and control was an 
unintended consequence of what was then thought as progress, namely the procedural 
and technological changes that were needed to meet the needs of a rapidly expanding 
economy. 56 In order for the economy to expand, the market needed to be highly 
liquid i. e. shares had to be easily transferable. This could only happen if shareholders 
had limited liability and shares were trading at a fairly low rate. Both conditions 
loosened the bonds between ownership and control. In order to have limited liability, 
shareholders had to give up control over day-to-day management. In order to keep 
trading prices low enough to ensure liquidity, shareholders had to allow companies to 
issue millions of shares, thereby making it almost impossible for any one investor to 
hold a meaningful stake. Shareholder control was now almost non-existent, with the 
only real shareholder right being transferability. Shareholders either voted with 
'4 P. Ireland, Company Law and the , thvth of Shareholder Ownership (1999) 
62 NILR 32 at 49. 
,, A. D. Chandler Jnr., The I isible Hand: The ; 1lanagerial Revolution in American Business, 1977, 
Boston, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p. 9. 
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management or sold their shares. This is the famous trade-off between exit and 
voice, or as American commentators term it The Wall Street Walk. The point to 
note is that each improvement in the operation of the stock market made it more 
difficult for shareholders to exercise their ownership rights. It appears that at the 
time, no one noticed this erosion until it was too late. 
These developments ensured that management could now escape shareholder control 
and monitoring. There were two reasons for this. First, as noted by Berle and Means, 
the sheer numbers of shareholders robbed them of any real power. In 1945, the Cohen 
Committee echoed this view: 
The illusory nature of the control theoretically exercised by the shareholders 
over directors has been accentuated by the dispersion of capital among an 
increasing number of small shareholders who pay little attention to their 
investments so long as satisfactory dividends are forthcoming, who lack 
sufficient time, money and experience to make full use of their rights as occasion 
arises and who are, in many cases, too numerous and too widely dispersed to be 
able to organise themselves. 57 
Further, management had every incentive to increase the number of shareholders. 58 It 
increases available capital and helps transferability by keeping the prices of individual 
shares comparatively low. 
Second, increasing the number of shares reduces the incentive and ability of the 
shareholders to gather information. The California Public Employees Retirement 
System (Ca1PERS), the largest equity investor in the United States, has invested over 
$250 millions in General Motors, but, as General Motors is worth well over $30 
billions, even this investment seems insignificant. When the number of shareholders 
is in the hundreds of thousands, or even the millions, and each of those holds shares in 
a number of companies, no single shareholder can become well informed enough to 
monitor effectively. 
Whilst the separation of ownership and control is now universally accepted, what is 
not so clear is exactly when the separation occurred. There is little doubt that by 1932 
- the year that The Modern Corporation and Private Property was published - 
56 R. A. G. Monks and N. Minow, Corporate Governance, 1995, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. p. 100. 
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ownership and control had become separated in America. However, there is evidence 
to indicate that the same separation did not occur in the UK until several decades 
later. 
There was little doubt that the public company was well established by the beginning 
of the twentieth century. However, the Berle-Means corporation was not yet 
prevalent due primarily to the persistence of family involvement. 59 In many UK 
companies floating on the Stock Exchange for the first time, the entrepreneurs who 
founded them held sizeable blocks of shares and played a major role in the 
management of these companies. Accordingly, ownership and control were still, in 
a sense, unified. 
This picture of family dominance continued up until the early part of the twentieth 
century. However, as the decades progressed, family control became less 
pronounced, but it was still unclear when it had decreased sufficiently for the Berle- 
Means corporation to dominate. 
Academic research carried out at the time suggests that the Berle-Means corporation 
did not become dominant until the 1950 s. Sargant-Florence examined share 
ownership patterns in 1936 and 1951 and found a clear move towards dispersed share 
ownership. He concluded that by 1951 a managerial evolution, if not revolution 
had taken place and that a separation of ownership and control was clear for very 
large companies. 60 Hannah lends support to this. He noted that whilst family 
members had a de facto veto over any proposed takeover bid in the 1920 s-30 s, by 
the 1950 s ownership and control had become sufficiently separated to leave a large 
number of companies vulnerable to takeover offers. 61 
However, there is evidence indicating that the separation of ownership and control 
was still not complete even in the 1950 s. Alfred Chandler, an American business 
`8 
: \Ithough the effects of increasing the number of shareholders have become more limited following 
the rise of institutional investors. 
59 L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy, 1976,2nd ed., London: Methuen, p. 24. 
(0 P. Sargant Florence, Ownership. Control and Success of Large Companies:. -tAn A nalvsis of ' English 
industrial Structure and Policy 1936-19-51,1961, London: Sweet & Maxwell, pp. 186-7. 
61 L. Hannah, Takeover Bids in Britain Before 1950: An Exercise in Business Pre-History (1974) 16 
Btis. Hist. 05 at 67-8. 
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historian, has argued that until the 1970 s, the nature of industrial capitalism was 
different in the UK than in America. 62 In America, professionally trained, salaried 
executives carried out the management of the company through evolving corporate 
governance systems. Conversely in the UK, there still existed a commitment to 
personal ways of management and these families played an influential role in the 
company s management. 
Empirical evidence lends support to Chandler s hypothesis. Evidence indicates that 
core shareholders may have had an important role to play well after Florence s 1951 
study. Such evidence convinced some that even as late as 1980 the managerial 
revolution heralded by Berle and Means in 1932 has probably not yet happened. 63 
However, it is probably the case that by the mid-1980 s the separation of ownership 
and control was complete. Scott examined share ownership patterns in the UK s 200 
largest industrial companies and 50 largest financial businesses in the years 1976 and 
1988. His data for 1976 indicated that in the companies examined, nearly 50% had a 
shareholder owning more than 10% of the equity. In 1988, this figure had dropped to 
just over 30% largely due to the decline of family control. 64 
Ever since The Modern Corporation and Private Property, ownership advocates view 
the separation of ownership and control, and the subsequent erosion of shareholder 
control, as a problem resolvable only by a restoration of shareholder supervision. 
However, given the current dispersement of shareholders, not only is this objective 
undesirable, it is probably impossible. Accordingly, Easterbrook and Fischel criticise 
proposals to increase shareholder participation65 and Kay states that all experience 
suggests [that a restoration of shareholder control is] not very likely to happen, and 
would not improve the functioning of corporations if it did. 66 The point to be 
stressed is that the separation of ownership and control is only problematic if the 
ownership model is valid and it is beneficial for the shareholders to behave like 
Q A. Chandler, The Growth of the Transnational Industrial Firm in the United States and the United 
Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis (1980) 33. Econ. Hist. Rev. 396 at 396. 
63 A. Francis, Families, Firms and Finance Capital: The Development of UK Industrial Firms With 
Particular Reference to Their Ownership and Control (1980) 14 Sociology I at l. 
64 J. Scott, Corporate Control and Corporate Rule: Britain in an International Perspective (1990) 41 
Brit. J. Soc. 351 at 362. 
65 F. H. Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law (1983) 26 J. Law and Econ. 395 at 396. 
66 J. Kay, The Stakeholder Corporation in G. Kelly et al (eds. ), Stakeholder Capitalism. 1997, London: 
Macmillan, p. 126. 
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owners. In the modem corporation, it is highly unlikely that either of these views is 
correct. 
Nevertheless, several commentators argue that there is growing evidence that 
ownership and control are being reunited through the involvement of institutional 
investors and the external pressures imposed by the market for corporate control. 67 
Whether or not this is true is a matter of debate. However, there is no doubt that they 
are having an impact, and there is evidence to indicate that it is not a beneficial one. 
There is now little doubt that over the last two decades Anglo-American corporate 
conduct has become more focused on rising share prices, and [on making] corporate 
performance more profitable. 68 If there is a new increase in shareholder activism, it 
appears to be misplaced and campaigning for the wrong objectives. As several 
commentators have noted: 
[shareholder] activists, when they have been effective, have been concerned 
overwhelmingly with financial performance rather than long-term productive 
investment. 69 
The result is that many commentators, rather than view the rise of institutional 
investment as a possible source of accountability, now fear its impact, especially 
when coupled with the market pressures that are now placed on management. The 
fear is that shareholder power will become too strong and bring about a new tyranny 
of money and finance 70 with short-term goals being favoured instead of long-term 
stable policies. 
Given this fear, many commentators are advocating a move towards the governance 
and ownership structures seen in countries such as Germany and Japan. There are two 
reasons why commentators praise the German model. First, the divorce between 
ownership and control is much less pronounced in Germany than in Anglo-American 
systems. Of the two hundred largest German companies, over 90% have a 
67 Both of these mechanisms of corporate governance will be examined in Ch. 5. 
68 C. Cravpo, The Impact of Changing Corporate Governance Strategies on Communities, Unions and 
Workers in the ( '. S. A. (1997) 24 J LS 10 at 12. 
69 T. Ghliarducci et al, Labour s Paradoxical Interests and the Evolution of Corporate 
Governance, 
(1997) 24 JLS 26 at 29. 
° P. Ireland, Company Law and the, l1vth of Shareholder Ownership (1999) 62 MLR 32 at 51. 
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shareholder (usually a bank or another company) with at least 25% of the equity. 71 
Second, Germany takes a much different view of the Verbands-pers nlichkeit or 
corporate personality. There the corporate entity is viewed as an institution with 
personality, character and aspirations of its own [whose] objectives encompass the 
interests of a wide-range of stakeholder groups - investors, employees, suppliers. 
customers and managers. 72 Many have advocated an adoption of this German 
stakeholding conception of the company. 
The view that the corporation is a social organisation is also prevalent in Japan. 
When Sony began business, its prospectus stated that [w]e shall eliminate any 
untoward profit-seeking, shall constantly emphasise activities of real substance and 
shall not seek expansion of size for the sake of size. 73 It is highly unlikely that an 
Anglo-American company would put a similar sentiment in its prospectus. In Japan, 
corporate growth is appreciated and sought after primarily for its contribution to 
utilising the enriching human resources and in creating promotion opportunities 
workers identify their interests with those of the company which, as a consequence, is 
regarded as a sort of community. 74 
CONCLUSION. 
This chapter has sought to highlight the evolution and current validity of the 
ownership model. It has been demonstrated that whilst there is little doubt that 
shareholders own their shares, there is a danger that this will be equated with 
ownership of the company s assets or even ownership of the company itself. It has 
been demonstrated that as the company is a juridical person, it is incapable of being 
owned. Similarly, it is now settled that the assets of the company belong to the 
separate entity and that the shareholders have no proprietary interest, legal or 
equitable, in them. 
71 J. Kay and A. Silberston, Corporate Governance in F. M. Padfield (ed. ), Perspectives on Company 
Luttw: 2,1997, London: Kluwer Law International, p. 56. 
72 J. Kay, The Stakeholder Corporation in G. Kelly et al (eds. ), Stakeholder Capitalism, 1997, London: 
Macmillan, p. 126. 
73 Quoted in J. Kay and A. Silberston. Corporate Governance in F. M. Padfield (ed. ), Perspectives on 
Company Latin: ?, 1997, London: Kluwer Law International, p. 57. 
'4 11. Odagiri, Growth Through Competition: Competition Through Growth, 1991, Oxford: Clarendon, 
p. 106. 
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Accordingly, the ownership model as it is currently understood is insufficient to 
justify the retention of the legal model of the company. It has been for some time. 
Nevertheless, even today it is still frequently invoked as justification for a pro- 
shareholder approach. The recent White Paper concerning the new Companies Bill is 
evidence of this stating that [i]t is crucial to effective corporate governance that the 
owners of the company hold the directors to account for the company s 
performance. 75 It is time to jettison the anachronistic notion that shareholders own 
the company and therefore have a right to have it run in their interests. Shareholders 
are but one of many inputs and to prioritise their interests ignores the contributions 
that other stakeholders make. 
The inadequacies of the ownership model and its inherent shareholder bias did not sit 
well with the academic community by the 1970 s. A theoretical vacuum had arisen 
that needed to be filled. It was filled by the new economic theory of the firm -a 
conceptualisation of the company based not on ownership, but on contractual 
principles. It is this theory that forms the current theoretical justification for corporate 
behaviour and it is this theory that is examined in the next chapter. 
75 
. 
Ifodernising C'ompanv Latin, July 2002, Cm. 5553-I, London: HMSO, para. 2.37. 
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Introduction. 
Theories of the firm inform and undergird corporate law, but they only intermittently 
appear as principal points in corporate law discourse. 1 In the previous chapter we 
noted that for many years the ownership model of the company held prominence and 
that its influence is still felt today. However, we also noted that its descriptive 
inaccuracies ensure that it alone cannot provide an adequate justification for 
prioritising shareholder interests along the lines seen in the legal model of the 
company. Accordingly, as the ownership model s influence waned, a new model 
eventually rose to replace it and it is this model that has dominated corporate law 
literature since. 
This new model was the new economic theory of the firm and it advocated a 
contractual model of the firm rather than a proprietary one. More commonly known 
as the nexus of contracts, both critics and advocates acknowledged it as a 
revolution in our understanding of corporate law theory. 2 However, as will be seen, 
despite the abundance of literature, the new economic theory has not been totally 
understood. 3 Also, the new economic theory is often viewed through a very narrow 
perspective without reference to the number of satellite issues that the theory impacts 
upon. 
This chapter will present an analysis of both the theory itself and the satellite issues 
that surround it such as the relationship with agency costs and residual risk. 4 It will be 
seen that whilst the theory has shown itself to be a useful heuristic, its worth has been 
W. W. Bratton Jnr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History (1989) 
41 Stan. LR. 1471 at 1471. 2 E. g. L. A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on 
Easterbrook and Fischel (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1449 at 1449. 
' See e. g. W. W. Bratton Jnr., The Nexus of Contracts Cor7poration:. 4 Critical Appraisal (1989) 74 
Cornell LR. 407 at 410: [The new economic theory] has not been well understood even though it has 
been well accepted. 
Other issues such as the new economic theory s relationship with state regulation, whilst relevant, are 
not relevant to the underlying themes of this thesis and so will not be examined. 
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overvaluated, and that it, like the ownership model, suffers from some serious 
descriptive inaccuracies. 
Origins of the Theory. 
Commentators tend to place the origin of the new economic theory around the 1970 s 
when a number of prominent economists started analysing the firm in terms of the 
contractual arrangements within it. 5 However, the true genesis of the theory lies back 
much further. 
The nineteenth century business climate was very different from today. Then, very 
little tension arose between economic practice and corporate economic/legal theory. 6 
Economic production tended to be individual rather than collective with sole traders 
dominating the business scene. Individuals produced goods for sale in the market. 
Individuals bought goods for consumption in the market. 7 Any collective 
organization was carried out by the market in the form of price coordination. 8 It was 
generally assumed that the market would keep the incompetence of business owners 
in check, and in doing so, it legitimised private economic power. 9 
This individualistic philosophy meant that very few businesses actually used the 
corporate form. In both the UK and America, the corporations existence relied on 
the granting of special charters. In this area, British company law was heavily 
influenced by developments in America, and therefore an exposition of American 
corporate history will be useful. In Britain, the corporate form was instituted either by 
the Royal Charter or via an Act of Parliament. In America, the individual states 
conferred charters on businesses that received state franchises, e. g. public utilities, 
` Commentators (c. g. W. W. Bratton Jnr., The Nexus of Contracts Corporation: A Critical Appraisal 
(1989) 74 Cornell LR. 407 at 415) trace the origin of this theory to A. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, 
Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1972) 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777. The 
phrase nexus of contracts was coined by M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling, Theorl" of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agenci Costs and Ownership Structure (1976) 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 at 310-11. 
6 H. Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought (1988) 76 Geo. LJ. 1593 at 
1605-12. 
7 W. W. Bratton Jnr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspective from History (1989) 
41 Stan. LR. 1471 at 143. 
R P. l'emin, The Jacksonian Economv, 1977, New York: Norton, p. 177. 
9 J. W. Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United States 1-8O-1970, 
1970, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, p. 82. 
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transport constructors, banks, insurers and water works. 10 This granting of charters 
gave credence to the idea that the corporation was a state created reification. Indeed 
the prevailing corporate legal theory of the time was that the corporation was a legal 
fiction and an artificial entity; " a conception that was stringently upheld by the 
courts. ' 2 
This special charter period was a corollary of the concession theory that prevailed 
in the UK around this time. Likewise, the contractual notion of the corporation was 
inherited from the UK. During the two centuries prior to the American Revolution, 
British lawyers had resisted the sovereign s ability to create juridical persons. They 
contended that only natural persons were entitled to legal status, and to justify this 
they advanced contractual conceptions of the firm. 13 However, American law, 
preoccupied with the artificial entity, resisted this line of reasoning, and continued the 
tradition of individualism. 
A transitional period arose however, in the period 1850-80. The harmony between 
economic practice and legal theory was ended by increased production by 
incorporated businesses. Individualism started to feel the strain and sole traders 
started to object to corporate institutions. Manufacturing corporations arose14 
resulting in the corporation becoming the common form for conducting business. 15 
State general corporation laws appeared to ensure equal access to the corporate 
form. 16 
As the number of corporations grew, so did the dissatisfaction with the theory of the 
firm. The artificial entity ideal was questioned because its roots were based in 
10 Ibid. at pp. 7-8. 
11 P. Vinogradoff, Juridical Persons (1924) 24 Colum. L. Rev. 594 at 601; J. Dewey, The Historic 
Background of Corporate Legal Personality (1926) 35 Yale LJ. 655 at 667-78. 
12 See Trustees of Dartmouth College v Woodward 17 US. (4 Wheat) 599 at 662-3 (1980), per Chief 
Justice Marshall: [the] corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law. 
13 A. L. Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignti and Associations in the Common 
Lam (1980) 29 Buffalo L. Rev. 599 at 662-3. 
14 R 
. 
C. Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management Treatises (1981) 
94 ll arv. L. Rev. 561 at 562. 
15 This also meant that the corporation ceased to be associated solely with public interest enterprises. 
See P. George, The Emergence of Industrial America, 1982. Albany: State University of New fork 
Press, p. 82. 
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concession theory. With access to the corporate form available to almost everybody, 
it was clear that the corporation was no longer a product of sovereign permission. 
Similarly, the abundance of sole traders that characterised earlier periods declined as 
collective corporate manufacturing increased. 
This proliferation of corporations paved the way for the meteoric rise of the 
management corporation 17 commencing around 1890. Prior to this period, 
individuals carried out single tasks of production. Now they were joined with large 
corporations performing multiple tasks. ' 8 Their ability to produce goods quickly and 
cheaply meant that they were a significant success. ' 9 
These corporations were dominated by hierarchies of salaried executives. Those who 
provided capital withdrew from an active participation in management because they 
believed that they lacked the necessary experience. Ownership and control became 
practically separated. 20 
Soon management corporations dominated the economy, facilitated by liberal 
incorporation laws. New Jersey and then Delaware amended their incorporation laws 
in order to attract corporations to incorporate in their state. The fiduciary safeguards 
that were present in the mid-nineteenth century suddenly disappeared. 21 
With the rise of the management corporation came a rise in the debate concerning the 
theory of the firm. From 1930 until around 1980, discussions surrounding the theory 
of the firm were based on a management-centered conception of large corporate 
16 G. A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law (1987) 54 Uni. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1441 at 1455. 
17 The term derives from W. W. Bratton Jnr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical 
Perspective front History (1989) 41 Stan. LR. 1471 at 1486. G. C. Means, The Corporate Revolution in 
America, 1962, pp. 51-2 described it as collective capitalism. 
18 A. D. Chandler Jnr., The ! "isible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, 1977, 
Cambridge; Mass; London: Harvard University Press, pp. 285-6. 
19 Between 1899 and 1929, the population rose 62%. In the same period, industrial production rose 
295'0 and power production rose 331 %. See R. Sobel, The Age of Giant Corporations. 1984,2nd ed.. 
London: Greenwood Press, pp. 52-3. 
20 This of course was the famous point made by A. A. Berle and G. C. Means, The Afodern Corporation 
and Private Property, 1932, New York: Macmillan. For more see supra. at Ch. 2. 
21 R. C. Clark, Corporate Law, 1986, Boston: Little Brown, pp. 160-66. 
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entities. 22 Until the new economic theory appeared, this theory enjoyed widespread 
acceptance amongst both economists and legal theorists alike. 
The managerialist conception has been best described thus: 
The managerialist picture puts corporate management at the strategic center of 
the large firm. Management, because of its expertise in organizing resources, 
possesses power and real discretion in its exercise. Managements power has 
three aspects. First, management groups determine the processes of production 
and distribution. Second, management groups dominate enormous hierarchical 
bureaucracies and exercise authority over all of those lower in the hierarchy. 
Third, management-dominated corporate entities impose externalities on those 
23 outside the entities. 
However, not everyone viewed the management corporation favourably. An anti- 
managerialist group appeared denying the accuracy of the managerialist thesis. What 
is interesting was that they debunked the managerialist picture by advancing a 
contractual theory of the firm. This theory resurrected the artificial entity 
conception but rejected concession theory by replacing the sovereign with freely 
contracting individuals. Paradoxically, however this meant that the theory was hostile 
to both the management corporation and possible state regulation. Anti- 
managerialists opted for a lesser evil and advocated certain minimal state-imposed 
restrictions. 24 
Interestingly, pro-managerialists also drew on contractualism as a means of opposing 
regulation. Soon, however, contractualism temporarily disappeared as a legitimate 
legal theory (until it reappeared in the 1970 s), as the debate centered on the issue of 
whether or not the firm was public or private in nature. 
Managerialist corporations continued to grow in both size and number. However, 
post-war law reviews were critical of corporate theory s pro-managerialist bias. This 
view eventually eclipsed the managerialist conception. 25 By the 1970 s, anti- 
2 W. W. Bratton Jnr., The Nexus of Contracts Corporation: A Critical Appraisal (1989) 74 Cornell 
LR. 407 at 413. 
'' Ibid. 
24 h1., 1. Horvitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory (1985) 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 
173 at 183.204-5. 
G. E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law (1984) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1276 at 1311. 
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managerialists dominated the law reviews. 26 The law, however remained pro- 
managerialist well into the 1980 s27 until the new economic theory arose to challenge 
it. Upon its arrival, new economic theorists made strong claims on its behalf. 
Michael Jensen, one of the founders of the modern theory, stated the new economic 
theory would produce a revolution in our knowledge about organizations [during] 
the next decade or two. 28 
The New Economic Theory of the Firm: A Basic Outline. 
The new economic theory was devised in the 1970 s, but did not appear in 
mainstream corporate legal theory until after 1980.29 This theory challenged the 
managerialist conception of the corporation leading to renewed debate over the nature 
of the firm. 
The new economic theory has two variants, the neoclassical variant and the 
institutional variant. The institutional variant appeared first with an essay by Ronald 
Coase in 1937.30 However, despite the importance of this essay, it had little influence 
until after 1970.31 The neoclassical variant appeared in 1972 ` and attained 
considerable popularity in 1976 following Jensen and Meckling s analysis of the 
firm. 33 As the main themes of the variants are the same, the differences are not 
26 E. g. V. Brudney and M. A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers (1974) 88 
Harv. L. Rev. 297; V. Brudney and M. A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts (1978) 87 
Yale U. 1354. 
27 Cf the rise of corporate constituency statutes which were adopted to allow managers to combat 
takeovers. 
,xM. C. Jensen, Organization, Theory and Methodologvv (1983) 58 Acct. Rev. 319 at 324. 
``' E. g. F. H. Easterbrook & D. R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions (1982) 91 Yale U. 698; F. H. 
Easterbrook & D. R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law (1983) 26 J. of L. & Econ. 395; B. D. Baysinger 
& H. N. Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporation Law: The ALI s Project and the 
Independent Director (1984) 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 557; F. H. Easterbrook & D. R. Fischel, Limited 
Liability and the Corporation (1985) 52 Uni. Chi. L. Rev. 89; F. H. Easterbrook & D. R. Fischel, Close 
Corporations and . agency 
Costs (1986) 38 Stan. L. Rev. 271; L. A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual 
Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments (1989) 102 
Harv. L. Rev. 1820. 
;0R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937) 4 Economica 386. 
31 Coase himself stated in 1972 that his 1937 essay was much cited but little used. See R. H. Coase, 
Industrial Organization: . -1 
Proposal for Research (1972) 3 Economic Research: Retrospect and 
Prospect 59 at 62-3. 
32 
. 1. A.: \lchian and 
H. Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1972) 
62 : \m. Econ. Rev. 777. ;'M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: . 
tfanagerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure (1976) 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305. 
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significant for our purposes. Accordingly, only the neoclassical variant will be 
examined in depth. 
The neoclassical variant s central theme is that the firm is a legal fiction that serves as 
a nexus of a set of contracting relationships among individuals 
34 or a marketplace 
where various constituencies contract for their own protection. 
35 Applying this to 
corporate legal theory, we can see that the managerialist conception is displaced. 
Firms no longer constitute hierarchies where management determines terms by fiat. 
As Alchian and Demsetz noted firms have no power of fiat, no authority, no 
disciplinary action. [They do not differ] in the slightest degree from ordinary market 
contracting between any two people. 36 Management is thus redefined as a 
continuous process of negotiation of successive contracts. 
37 
The firm as a fictional entity, a prominent feature of the managerialst conception, also 
largely disappears. Instead the firm becomes merely a device to facilitate contracting 
between individuals. 38 The firm does not disappear totally as the firm is often a 
party itself, albeit only as a matter of convenience. 
Likewise the issue of who owns the company becomes irrelevant. The firm represents 
a series of contracts and is therefore incapable of being owned. Equity capital, the 
traditional legal situs of ownership, devolves into one of many types of inputs 
39 
As a corollary, the separation of ownership and control is no longer problematic. 
Once the tenacious notion that a firm is owned by its security holders 
40 is removed, 
there is no reason for shareholders to have any control over the decision-making 
14 Ibid. at p. 31 1. 
is L. L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means (1988) 22 U. Mich. 
J. 
L. Ref. 19 at 23. 
36 A. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1972) 
62 
Am. Econ. Rev. 777 at 777. 
37 W. W. Bratton Jnr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History 
(1989) 41 Stan. LR. 1471 at 1478. 
's J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibilittiy: Issues in the Theory of Company Law, 1993. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 178. 
39 W. W. Bratton Jnr., The Nexus of Contracts Corporation: A Critical Appraisal (1989) 74 Cornell 
LR. 407 at 420. See also E. F. Fama, Agencv Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980) 
88 
J. Pol. Econ. 288 at 290 who states ownership of capital should not be confused with ownership of the 
firm. Each factor [of production] in a firm is owned by somebody. The firm is just the set of contr, icts 
covering the way inputs are joined to create outputs 
40 E. F. Fama,. 4gencº" Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980) 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288 at 290. 
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process. 41 It could therefore be argued that the main function of the new economic 
theory is to establish that large publicly owned companies are efficient 
notwithstanding the separation of ownership and control that is a usual characteristic 
of these companies. 42 Some of the above issues will now be examined in more detail. 
The Role of Contract in Corporate Law. 
According to the new economic theory, the corporation is a creation of contract. It 
has been contended that this is only a partially accurate description. As one 
commentator has noted: 
A corporation is a profit-seeking enterprise of persons and assets organized by 
rules. Most of these rules are determined by the unilateral actions or corporate 
organs or officials. Some of these rules are determined by market forces. Some 
are determined by contract or other forms of agreement. Some are determined by 
law. 43 
This observation is true. Of all the rules that govern companies, contract accounts for 
a limited amount. Most rules are contained in law. In America, for example, even a 
small publicly held corporation will be governed by extensive mandatory rules, even 
in a state such as Delaware. 44 Many states contain provisions similar to those found 
within the Revised Model Business Corporation Act which contains many more 
mandatory rules than Delaware. Some states, such as California, impose even more 
mandatory obligations. 45 A larger public corporation will be subject to even more 
extensive rules. `4' New economic theorists have attempted to circumvent this criticism 
by stating that mandatory rules of law are simply off the shelf standard terms that 
serve to reduce transaction costs. The parties would have adopted them if they were 
not statutory. The fact that the parties did not actively bargain for them means that 
41 See D. R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement (1982) 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259 at 1276: no 
reason exists why investors, who provide the firm with capital in anticipation of receiving a certain rate 
of return generated by the firm s assets, should have any input into the firm s decisionmaking process. 
4' J. E. Parkinson, The Contractual Theory of the Company and the Protection of Non-Shareholder 
Interests in D. Feldman and F. Meisel (eds. ), Corporate and Commercial Law: Modern Developments, 
1996, London: Lloyds of London Press, p. 122. 
43 M. A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461 at 1461. 
44 Ibid. at p. 1483. 
45 For example, all directors must be elected annually (Cal. Corp. Code, 1501 (West 1977)). 
46 Any corporation that has 500 holders of a class of equity securities and more than $5 millions in 
assets must register under/ 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act. It will then be subject to much more 
extensive mandatory rules. 
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they acquire them at no cost. 47 Although this is a logical contention, it is ultimately 
sophistical. 48 UK statutory rules are mandatory. 49 They are not contractual and to 
describe them as such highlights the descriptive inaccuracies of the theory. If the new 
economic theory was valid, and the company was contract then state interference in 
corporate matters should have died away by now. However, the sovereign presence 
remains and with it, a vestigial trace of concession theory. 
Although the existence of mandatory rules is problematic for the new economic 
theory s cohesion, they are and should be viewed as beneficial in certain 
circumstances. The management of a large public corporation has little incentive in 
adopting constraints on their own managerial freedom. In fact, they may try to 
insulate themselves from such constraints. Accordingly, the core fiduciary and 
structural rules that govern divergences of interest between management and the 
shareholders should not be determined by or be open to variation by management. 50 
They should remain mandatory. 
Even more problematic than mandatory rules are those rules that are laid down 
unilaterally. The new economic theory rests upon the assumption of free contracting. 
If contractual relations are not free, then the theory is severely compromised. This is 
demonstrated when one examines the contractual position of the shareholders. 51 
Section 14(1) Companies Act 1985 states that: 
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the memorandum and articles, when 
registered, bind the company and its members 
47 F. H. Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target s Management in Responding to a 
Tender Offer (1981) 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 at 1182. 
dR Even Easterbrook & Fischel described the off-the-shelf argument as not entirely satisfactory. See 
F. H. Easterbrook & D. R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416 at 1444. 
49 The same is largely true in America, although certain mandatory rules can be opted-out of. See D. R. 
Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor La it, Compared with Capital Markets and Corporate Law (1984) 51 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1061 at 1063. 
50 Nor should shareholders be allowed to vary mandatory rules as their consent in varying mandatory 
rules that favour management may be coerced or tainted by conflict of interest. See M. A. Eisenberg. 
The Structure of Corporation Lath (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461 at 1474. 
51 The contractual position of other participants within the company will be examined in Ch. 7. The 
contractual position of the environment will be examined in Ch. 9. 
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This means that certain provisions in the articles can be enforced by a member in a 
contract action. 52 If the new economic theory were accurate, then one would assume 
that the shareholders would bargain with management to obtain as many safeguards as 
possible when determining what goes into the articles. In reality, this does not occur. 
In most public corporations, shareholders are so numerous that they neither wish nor 
are able to play an active managerial role. Accordingly, bargaining between 
shareholders and management becomes impossible. 53 Article provisions are 
unilaterally selected by management and the shareholders simply decide whether to 
invest or not. Investors who buy shares in the market a fortiori buy a package of 
rights, the contents of which are non-negotiable. 54 
This has important consequences regarding the company s efficiency. Firstly, 
regarding the public corporation, as the agents (management) are free to act in the 
knowledge that their principals (shareholders) cannot monitor them, they will have an 
incentive to work slowly, a problem known as shirking. 55 They also have an interest 
in diverting their principal s capital for their own use. 56 Secondly, the efficiency 
justification inherent in the new economic theory rests upon the assumption that all 
parties freely contract. If the contract (under which the stockholder is said to offer 
his investment in exchange for managerial services) is knowingly and freely 
made by the parties its performance makes each of the parties better off and creates 
a larger pie for society. 57 In other words, free contracting results in optimum 
governance arrangements and maximum societal wealth creation. Following on from 
this, if contracting is not free, then efficiency must be compromised. As Brudney 
notes, the free and bilateral exchange that the new economic theory envisages is 
absent in the public company. 58 
.-K. W. Wedderburn, Shareholders Rights and the Rule in Foss v Hai-bottle [1957] CLJ 194 at 209-15. 
53 M. A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461 at 1471. See also 
V. Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract (1985) 85 
Colum. L. Rev. 1403 at 1412 who states that [s]cattered stockholders cannot, and do not, negotiate 
w J. F. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law, 1993, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. p. 183. 
,sM. A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461 at 1471. 
56 Ibid. 
57 V. Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract (1985) 85 
Colum. L. Rev. 1403 at 1404. 
58 Ibid. at pp. 1404-20. 
44 
Chapter 3: The New Economic Theory of the Firm and Residual Risk. 
Finally, there are a growing number of non-contractual, non-governmental rules that 
are starting to dominate corporate governance matters. In America, most large public 
corporations are listed on the New York Stock Exchange, which has a virtual 
monopoly in the liquid trading market for the stock of such corporations. This 
monopoly allows it to impose a number of obligations. For example, all corporations 
listed on the Exchange must have at least two outside directors and an audit 
committee composed of independent directors. 59 
The New Economic Theory, Agency Costs and Residual Risk. 
The efficiency justification for the new economic theory is based upon the premise 
that contracting allows the optimum alignment of managerial and shareholder 
interests, which in turn minimises agency costs. 60 Accordingly, this element of the 
theory is based upon the existence of an agency relationship between the shareholders 
(principals) and the directors (agents). 
However, there is good reason to doubt that the shareholder/director relationship is 
one of agency. The case law and text on the subject define agency as a relationship in 
which a principal (P) appoints agent (A), A accepts appointment, and both understand 
that As behaviour is subject to Ps control and direction. 61 One commentator has 
described the agency relationship thus: 
[The] paradigm of agency involves an actual, express authority, conferred by the 
principal upon his agent, their rights and duties often being embodied in a 
contract. 02 
59 New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual ff 303.00,312,00 (1983). The Exchange s 
monopoly has to an extent been weakened by the development of NASDAQ. 
60 It is acknowledged that agency costs can never be totally eradicated. They are an inevitable 
consequence of the delegation of power to individuals best suited to perform those tasks, but who at the 
same time have interests that conflict with those whom they are supposed to act in the interests of. See 
D. R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Afovernent (1982) 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259 at 1262-3; E. Fama 
& M. C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims (1983) 26 J. of L. & Econ. 327 at 333.345 and 
0. Williamson, Organization Forms, Residual Claimants and Corporate Control (1983) 26 J. of L. & 
Econ. 351 at 354-5. 
61 See e. g. Dierksen v . filbert 
106 N. J. Super 220 at 225,254 A 2. d 809 at 812 (App. Div. 1969); W. 
Seavev, Handbook on the Law of Agency. 1964. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., / 3 and H. 
Reuschlein and W. Gregory, Handbook on Agency and Partnership, 1978, St. Paul. Minn.: West 
Publishing Co., /69. 
62 I. Brown, The Agents Apparent Authority: Paradigm or Paradox? (1995) JBL 360 at 360-1. 
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It is apparent from this that the agency relationship is based upon the principal being 
able to exert some level of control over his agent. 63 However, as we have seen, the 
relationship between the directors and the shareholders does not follow this paradigm. 
Shareholders do not control or direct the management. In fact, there exist measures 
that specifically deny the shareholders the power to interfere in management 
activities. Further, in the classic agency relationship there exist restrictions that 
prevent the agent from diverting the principal s assets to his own ends. In the law of 
agency, the starting position is that self-dealing by the agent is categorically 
prohibited. However, in keeping with this move away from the agency paradigm, 
corporate law has permitted directors to partake in self-dealing. 
The corporate law starting position mimics that of the agency relationship by 
imposing a fiduciary standard. As far back as 1854, Lord Cranworth LC held that: 
it is a rule of universal application, that no one having [fiduciary] duties to 
discharge, shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has, or can 
have, a personal interest conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with the 
interests of those whom he is bound to protect. 64 
However, in the corporate context, this rule is not absolute. Upjohn LJ (as he then 
was) in Boulting v Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians65 
explained how this rule could be relaxed: 
The rule is one essentially for the protection of the person to whom the duty 
is owed. Thus the company is entitled to the undivided loyalty of its directors 
But the person entitled to the benefit of the rule may relax it . 
Thus the 
company may, in its articles of association, permit directors to be interested in 
contracts with the company. 66 
Accordingly, many companies adopt the provisions contained in Table A which ousts 
the absolute prohibition and substitutes it with an obligation to disclose the interest to 
63 A. L. Diamond and P. Verrecchia, Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Security Prices 
(1952) 37 J. Fin. 275 at 276-8. 
`"' Aberdeen Railii ay Co. i' Blaikie Bros. (1854) 1 Macq 461 at 471. See also Brav v Ford [ 15961 AC 
44 at 51-2, per Lord Herschell: [i]t is an inflexible rule of a court of equity that a person in a fiduciary 
position is not entitled to make a profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his 
interest and duty conflict. 
65 [196312 QB 606. 
66 Ibid. at p. 636. 
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the board. 67 The validity of such ouster clauses have been the subject of considerable 
debate, 68 most notably due to potential incompatibilities with s. 3 10 Companies Act 
1985. They have however, been judicially upheld. 69 
This has important consequences for the new economic theory. The efficiency 
justification of the new economic theory rests upon the premise that it serves to 
minimize agency costs by efficiently aligning the interests of principal and agent. 
However, as we have seen, contract, in the shape of arts. 85 and 86 Table A, 70 allows 
directors to act in their own interests subject to their other fiduciary duties. 
A further problem with the new economic theory s efficiency justification is that it 
focuses solely on the agency costs arising from the shareholder/management 
relationship. 7' There are other parties within the corporation and a misalignment of 
interests between these groups and management can also produce agency costs. The 
question that occupies us is why are these other parties ignored by the new economic 
theory. 
The answer to this question, according to new economic theorists, involves 
identifying the party best able to bear risk. As corporate performance cannot be 
predicted with complete accuracy, there must be at least one party that can bear the 
costs of under-performance. As a trade-off, the party that bears the costs of under- 
performance will be entitled to the firm s residual income. The shareholders have 
come to hold this position for the following reason. 
67 Arts. 85 and 86 Table A in Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985, SI 1985/805 (although 
art. 94 prohibits the director from voting on the transaction in question). This disclosure obligation is 
reinforced by s. 317 Companies Act 1985 which makes it a criminal offence not to disclose to the board 
an interest in a proposed transaction. However, breach of s. 317 does not, it seems, invalidate the 
transaction (He/i'-Hutchinson v Bravhead Ltd. [19681 1 QB 549; Guinness plc. v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 
663). See also the rules relating to substantial property transactions contained in s. 320 Companies 
Act 1985. 
68 E.. C. D. Baker, Disclosure of Directors Interests in Contracts [1975] JBL 181; R. Birds, The 
Permissible Scope of Articles Excluding the Duties of Company Directors (1976) 39 MLR 394: J. E. 
Parkinson, The Modification of Directors Duties [1981] JBL 335. R. Gregory, The Scope of the 
Companies A ct 1948, Section 205 (1982) 98 LQR 413. 
69 Tito v Waddell [19771 Ch. 106 at 248-9, per Megarry V-C; Motivex Ltd. v Bulreld [19881 BCLC 104 
at 116-20, per Vinelott J. 
70 It should be remembered that s. 14 Companies Act 1985 prescribes that the articles act as a contract 
between the members and the company. 
71 G. Kelly and J. Parkinson, The Conceptual Foundations of the Company: .4 
Pluralist Approach 
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Alchian and Demsetz, believed by many to be the pioneers of the new economic 
theory, characterized the firm as a series of inputs. They also envisaged the 
occupancy of a central position by a party whose function it would be to monitor the 
outputs generated by the firm. 72 Monitoring is essential so that those parties 
providing the inputs do not shirk. Further, this central monitor is given an incentive 
to monitor by being granted the right to the firm s residual income. If monitorin is 
effective, the firm becomes more efficient and accordingly, the residual income 
becomes larger. In the large company, this monitoring function is performed by the 
board, but ultimately the board itself is monitored by the shareholders. 73 Accordingly, 
the shareholders are assigned the right to the firm s residual income. 74 
Where there is only one residual claimant, and all the other inputs receive fixed 
returns, that one residual claimant will act in such a way as to maximize the residual 
wealth. Ultimately, maximizing residual wealth serves to maximize the total value 
received by all the other parties and consequently maximizes social wealth. 75 This is 
why the new economic theory s efficiency justification focuses solely on the 
shareholder/management relationship. 
This is the practical justification behind the new economic theory and like much of 
the theory, it can be criticised. As we shall see, shareholders may not actually bear 
that much risk; whatever incentives may exist, shareholders do not monitor effectively 
and to say that other parties within the firm contract solely for fixed amounts is 
inaccurate. 76 
72 A. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1972) 62 
: \m. Econ. Rev. 777. 73 J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibiliti : Issues in the Theory of Company Law. 1993. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 47. 
74 Linked to this is the idea that other inputs within the firm, most notably the employees, are wealth- 
constrained and so contract for a fixed return as opposed to an indeterminate return based on corporate 
? erformance. 
` P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management, 1992. London: Prentice Hall 
International, pp. 291-3. 
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Conclusion. 
Many commentators correctly state that the new economic theory of the firm does not 
provide a definitive conceptualisation of the company. For example, Bratton states: 
Models of the corporation constructed within the new economic theory s limited 
analytical framework can neither conclusively explain the firm nor adequately 
serve as blueprints for an improved, reconstituted, fully rationalized future 77 firm. I 
The new economic theory, as we have seen, contains many descriptive inaccuracies, 
notably its failure to convincingly incorporate mandatory rules and unilateral rules 
into its framework. This has led some academics to conclude that the new economic 
theory s usefulness is coming to an end. As one commentator noted: 
The contractarian movement peaked. Its highwater mark was reached several 
years ago. Contractarian analysis has been returned to its rightful place as one 
analytical tool among many in the corporate toolbox. 78 
However, it could be argued that this is selling the new economic theory short. It 
certainly is true that the model of the firm provided by new economic theory does not 
provide a definitive explanation of what the company is. However, it is highly 
unlikely that any model could provide a flawless descriptive analysis of the 
corporation. What the new economic theory has successfully done is to bring 
academic company law closer to business practice by focusing on the elements of 
voluntary exchange that exist in many corporate relationships. 
76 
: 1s we shall see in Ch. 7, other parties who contract for fixed amounts may also face fluctuations in 
return as a result of fluctuations in corporate performance. 
77 W. W. Bratton Jnr., The Nexus of Contract. Corporation: .4 
Critical Appraisal (1989) 74 Cornell 
LR. 407 at 464. 
IS D. M. Branson, The Death of Contractarianism and the 1 "indication of Structure and .I uthority 
in 
Corporate Governance and Corporate Law in L. E. Mitchell (ed. ). Progressive Corporate Law, 1995, 
Boulder, Colorado: Westh iew Press, p. 95 (footnotes omitted. ) 
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4 
The Law Relating to Constituents Within the Corporate Nexus 
INTRODUCTION 
The Harvard Debate examined in Chapter 1 advocated two polarised views. On one 
hand, Berle argued that companies should act exclusively in the interests of 
shareholders and the law should therefore only protect shareholder interests, whereas 
Dodd argued that companies should act in the interests of other stakeholders such as 
creditors, employees and the community. In advocating his position, Dodd pointed 
out that it was common practice for companies to engage in corporate philanthropy 
that did not directly benefit the shareholders. In Chapter 2 we saw that the pro- 
shareholder approach that our company law has historically adopted was due largely 
to the ownership model of the company. However, we also saw that the ownership 
model can no longer be regarded as an accurate conceptualisation of the company or 
its relationship with its equity holders. Accordingly, the new economic theory 
analysed in Chapter 3 arose to challenge it and indeed forms the current theoretical 
foundation behind the modem conceptualisation of the company. The new economic 
theory did not place the shareholders at the centre of the company, but rather 
characterised them merely as one of many inputs that enable a company to function. 
This paved the way for non-shareholder constituents to have their inputs 
acknowledged in a way that the ownership model failed to do. It may be a 
coincidence that the rise of the new economic theory in the 1970 s coincided with the 
first attempts of UK company law to recognise legally the position of non-shareholder 
constituents. 
Irrespective of whether or not the new economic theory had a role to play, the fact is 
that today the law does recognise that non-shareholder constituents make a valuable 
contribution to the company. Accordingly over the last two decades, the law has been 
reformed to include non-shareholder constituents within the protective umbrella of 
company law. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the various common law and 
statutory protective measures that have arisen to protect non-shareholder constituents, 
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notably creditors and employees. ' However, before we can determine whether or not 
non-shareholder constituents are now afforded equal protection to that of the 
shareholders, we need to examine what protection the law affords the shareholders. 
This will be the focus of Part I. Part II will them examine the various cases that have 
served to create the beginnings of a directors duty to creditors. Statutory provisions 
such as s. 214 Insolvency Act 1986 and the relevant parts of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 which protect creditors will also be examined. Finally, Part 
III will examine the history behind and the operation of s. 309 Companies Act 1985 - 
a provision which superficially places employees on par with shareholders. Also the 
developments relating to European Works Councils will be examined. 
It will be seen that whilst these developments are welcome in bringing about 
awareness of the stakeholders contribution, the vast majority of these developments 
do little to aid the non-shareholder constituents or the protection afforded them. After 
analysing the various stakeholder provisions and common law principles, one cannot 
help but feel that the legal model of the company is still dominant, and the interests of 
stakeholders are inadequately protected. 
I. THE BONA FIDE DUTY AND THE LEGAL POSITION OF 
SHAREHOLDERS 
The General Statement of Duty. 
The general statement concerning the duty of directors when exercising their powers 
is taken from the judgment of Lord Greene MR in the case of Re Smith & Fawcett 
Ltd. 2 In echoing the words of a former Master of the Rolls, 
3 he held that the directors 
of a company must act: 
The protection afforded to the environment will be examined in Ch. 9. The law relating to the 
company s ability to act in a non-profit maximising manner will be examined in Ch. 8. 
2[ 19421 Ch. 304. 
1 Regarding the power conferred by statute upon the shareholders to alter the articles of association, 
Lord Lindley MR in the case of Allen v Gold Reefs of West Arica Ltd. f 19001 1 Ch. 656 at 671 held 
that: 
Wide, however, as the language of [s. 14 Companies Act 1862] is, the power conferred 
by it must, like all other powers, be exercised subject to those general principles of law 
and equity which are applicable to all powers conferred on majorities and enabling them 
to bind minorities. It must be exercised, not only in the manner required by law, but also 
bona, ide for the benefit of the company as a whole. 
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bona fide in what they consider - not what a court may consider - is in the 
interests of the company, and not for any collateral purpose. 4 
It is interesting to compare this case with subsequent cases. In the Canadian case of 
Teck Corporation Ltd. v Millar, 5 Berger J defined the duty as follows: 
The law says that the directors of a company, in exercising their powers, must 
act bona fide in what they consider to be the best interests of the company 6 
Likewise, in the case of Lee v Chou Wen Hsien, 7 Lord Brightman held that a director 
had to act in what he believed to be the best interests of the company. In Canada, 
there is a legislative requirement that the directors of companies incorporated under 
Dominion law must act with a view to the best interests of the corporation. 8 
A duty to act in the best interests of the company would seem to require that the 
directors make the best possible decisions at all times. There is little doubt that such a 
standard would be impossibly high and almost impossible to police. This has been 
acknowledged by the courts when in Howard Smith Ltd. v Ampol Petroleum Ltd., 9 
Lord Wilberforce stated [t]here is no appeal on merits from management decisions to 
courts of law ... 
10 
Accordingly, given that directors are not required by law to make optimal decisions, is 
it in fact true to say that they are not required to maximize profits? Profit 
maximization implies attaining the optimal amount of profit in a given company, yet 
it has been acknowledged that a duty requiring optimal decision-making is too 
onerous. Therefore, if the company is to be defined as the shareholders alone and 
their sole interest is profit, then the duty imposed is not one of profit maximization. 
However, if the duty is not profit-maximization, it is difficult to see what it is. It 
cannot be one of profit attainment because a company may make low or indeed no 
Re Smith ce Fawcett Ltd. [19421 Ch. 304 at 306. 
4 
(1 972) 33 DLR (3d) 288. 
6 Ibid. at p. 290 (italics added). 
7 [198411 WLR 1202. 
8 S. 117(1) Canada Business Corporations Act. 
9119741 AC 821. 
10 Ibid. at p. 832. See also Richard Brady Franks Ltd. ti" Price (1937) 58 CLR 112 at 136 where Latham 
('J held that [i]t is not for a court to determine whether or not the action of the directors was wise. 
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profits for legitimate reasons, " and it would be inequitable to deem such instances a 
breach of duty. 
Definitions of this duty have been problematic due to the uncertain nature of some of 
the phrases contained within it. Most notably, there has been conjecture over the 
meaning of bona fide and the company. Accordingly, both phrases will be 
examined. 
Defining Bona Fide. 
As has been observed, the expression bona fide has two meanings: in good faith 
and genuine. 12 The distinction is an important one as the former has a subjective 
connotation whereas the latter is more objective. The main issue therefore, is whether 
the bona fide duty is subjective or objective in nature. 
The directors must act bona fide in what they consider - not what a court may 
consider - is in the interests of the company 
13 Semantically, it is therefore clear 
that the duty is subjective in nature and, despite the occasional anomaly, 14 this is how 
the courts have interpreted it. As Lord Wilberforce stated: 
[t]here is no appeal on merits from management decisions to courts of law: nor 
will the courts of law assume to act as a kind of supervisory board over decisions 
within the powers of management honestly arrived at. 15 
There is certainly some merit in the argument that decisions by directors be 
scrutinized by an organ distinct from management. However, that function should be 
reserved for an actual supervisory board as opposed to the court acting as one. 
Fortunately, the court has recognized this in implicitly adopting the business judgment 
rule. 16 
II E. g. companies that engage in large-scale R&D may sacrifice short-term profit for long-term 
stability. 
12 L. S. Sealy, Bona Fides and Proper Purposes in Corporate Decisions (1989-90) 15 Mon. L. R. 
265 at 269. 
13 Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. [ 19421 Ch. 304 at 306, per Lord Greene MR. (Italics added). 
la E. g. Da en Tinplate Co. Ltd. v Llanelli, Steel Co. Ltd. 119201 2 Ch. 124. 
` Howard Smith Ltd. i' Ampol Petroleum Ltd. [19741 AC 821 at 832. 
16 The UK courts have yet to acknowledge the existence of the business judgment rule in that name. 
However, in Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers & Co. (Maidenhead) Ltd. H9271 2 KB 9 at 23. Scrutton LJ 
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However, even though the duty is subjective and the court reluctant to interfere, there 
has always been a bottom line; an objective minimum below which the courts will 
intervene and strike down a decision irrespective of the bona fides of the act. This 
minimum threshold has become known in company law folklore as the amiable 
lunatics test, and is derived from the case of Hutton v West Cork Rly. Co. '7 In a 
decision that embraces both directors and shareholders decisions, Bowen U said: 
[b]ona fides cannot be the sole test, otherwise you might have a lunatic 
conducting the affairs of the company, and paying away its money with both 
hands in a manner perfectly bona fide yet perfectly irrational. 18 
However, this minimum threshold is not particularly high, so in the vast majority of 
cases, the directors conduct will have to be determined by reference to their 
subjective motives. As the duty is subjective, the motives of the directors are 
paramount in judging the validity of an act. Unfortunately in practice, determining 
these motives will be very difficult and almost certainly beyond the abilities of the 
court. Accordingly, directors actions will only be in breach of duty if there is overt 
evidence that the directors have not acted in the interests of the company. For 
example, in the American case of Dodge v Ford Motor Co., '9 the directors mistake 
was to admit that their policy of withholding profits was intended to benefit the 
employees. They could have easily justified the policy on the grounds of enhancing 
long-term shareholder profitability. 20 Corporate philanthropy - an act that 
superficially does not benefit the shareholders - could be justified on the basis that it 
increases goodwill which in turn can increase long-term profitability. Any policy 
aimed at corporate expansion, which can be motivated by factors such as an increase 
in managerial prestige, will appear on the surface to be motivated purely by profit 
maximisation. Other acts may be integral to the internal workings of the company 
and so will not be susceptible to attack. Accordingly, the effectiveness of the duty as 
a means of protecting shareholders is emasculated due to the evidential difficulties of 
establishing that the directors did not act bona fide. 
held that [i]t is not the business of the court to manage the affairs of the company. That is for the 
shareholders and directors. 17 (1883) 23 Ch. D. 654. 
Ibid. at p. 671. 
'9 204 Lich. 459,170 NW 668 (1919). 
'° J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theort of Company Law, 1993, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 94. See also Re W& . 
1I Roith Ltd. [19671 1 \V'LR 432. 
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Defining the Company. 
The definition of this phrase is exceptionally important and may genuinely be said to 
lie at the heart of a directors duties. Identifying the company serves to identify 
whom the directors are legally obliged to act in the interests of. It is worth 
mentioning at the outset that traditionally the company has come to mean the 
shareholders. This has far reaching consequences in terms of how the company is 
run, namely that the company has come to be run in the interests of the shareholders. 
Accordingly, it is an area where judicial interpretation can have important practical 
consequences. However, as we shall see, the legal authority regarding the 
shareholders as the company is not particularly strong. In fact, it is highly 
unsatisfactory. 
As was noted earlier, the bona fide duty echoes the duty upon shareholders when 
altering the articles in that the shareholders must act bona fide for the benefit of the 
company as a whole. 21 Therefore, when defining the company, cases concerning 
the alteration of articles have been used to provide guidance. 
In Brown v British Abrasive Wheel Co., 22 it was stated that prima facie the company 
as a whole might mean two things: it could mean the company as an independent 
entity, 23 an institution 24 or a commercial entity, distinct from the corporators ; 25 
or it might mean all the corporators both the majority and the minority. 26 Following 
the landmark decision three years earlier of Salomon v Salomon & Co. Ltd., 27 the most 
natural definition is the former interpretation, namely that the company should mean 
the corporate entity, 28 and it is apparent that this is what Lindley MR meant. 29 
. 1/len i' Gold Reef* of West Africa Ltd. [1900] 1 Ch. 656 at 
671, per Lindley MR. 
" 119191 1 Ch. 290. 
,, Ibid. at p. 293, per counsel for the defendants. 
'' British Equitable Assurance Conpanv Ltd. v Baily [1906] AC 35 at 39, per Lord Robertson. 
25 Greenhah v Arderne Cinemas Ltd. 19511 1 Ch. 286 at 291, per Evershed MR. 
26 Brown v British Abrasive 11 "heel Co. [ 19191 1 Ch. 290 at 293, per counsel for the plaintiff. 
2' f 18971 AC 22. 
8 L. S. Scaly, Bona Fides and Proper Purposes in Corporate Decisions (1989-90) 15 Mon. L. R. 
265 at 270. 
29 F. G. Rixon, Competing Interests and Conflicting Principles: An Examination of the Power of 
Alteration ofJrticles ofAssociation (1986) 49 MLR 446 at 449-50. 
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For a while, the view that the company was the corporate entity prevailed. 30 
However, there came a transition in the case of Peters American Delicacy Co. Ltd. v 
Heath. 31 Here Dixon J held that the company as a whole is a corporate entity 
consisting of all the shareholders. 32 Whilst this formulation is also nebulous, the 
words consisting of all the shareholders implies that the company is not simply the 
corporate entity. 
This view was confirmed in the case of Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd., 33 where 
Evershed MR held that: 
the phrase the company as a whole does not mean the company as a 
commercial entity, distinct from the corporators: it means the corporators as a 
general body. That is to say, the case may be taken of an individual hypothetical 
member and it may be asked whether what is proposed is, in the honest opinion 
of those who voted in its favour, for that person s benefit. 34 
Accordingly, the company can be taken to mean an aggregate of hypothetical 
members. In reality, the interests of a hypothetical member will be relatively easy to 
define, namely they will act and will desire the directors to act in a way that will 
ensure them a dividend. Therefore, case law has in effect stated that the directors 
must act bona fide in the interests of the shareholders. 
However, whilst there is no doubt that this is true, it could be argued that to apply this 
line of authority to directors duties is inappropriate. The duty when altering articles 
is placed upon the shareholders. When shareholders vote for an alteration of the 
articles, it is perfectly legitimate for them to act in their own interests, as they are the 
company as a whole. 35 Share ownership is still viewed as a property right and voting 
selfishly is merely exercising this proprietary right. In fact, this principle is so strong 
that any director holding shares may shed his fiduciary duties and vote qua 
shareholder. 36 
30 Sidt'hottom i" Kershaw, Leese & Co. [19201 1 Ch. 154; Dafen Tinplate Co. v Llanelly Steel Co. 
j 1920] 2 Ch. 124, Shuttleivorth v Cox Bros. & Co. (Maidenhead) [ 192712 KB 9. 
31 (1938-39) 61 CLR 457. 
Ibid. at p. 512. 
33 [19511 1 Ch. 286. 
34 Ibi(J. at p. 291. 
;` Given that shareholders may act in their own interests, the question arises whether or not it is 
appropriate to describe it as a duty. 
`' afills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150. 
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Conversely, directors per se are not generally permitted to vote in their own 
interests. 37 The fiduciary principle was conceived so as to curtail principals adopting 
self-interested goals. In the case of company law, fiduciary duties were designed to 
minimize agency costs by ensuring that directors act in the interests of those whose 
property they invest. 
The second authority advanced for the contention that the company refers to the 
shareholders is a peculiar one and concerns a 1953 takeover bid of Savoy Hotel Ltd. 
A brief reappraisal of the main events will be of aid. 38 
In 1953, an unknown buyer started purchasing shares in the Savoy Hotel company for 
the suspected purpose of redeveloping the Berkeley, a prestigious hotel in the 
Piccadilly area. However, the current directors of the board did not desire to lose 
control of the Berkeley and so started considering how best to defend their position. 
Finally, they devised what became known as the Worcester Scheme. The precise 
content of the scheme will not be discussed here, but generally the object of the 
scheme was to remove the Berkeley from the control of the speculators. By this time, 
the speculator revealed himself as Mr. Harold Samuel, a well-known property dealer. 
He tried to allay the directors fears but failed and they put the Worcester Scheme 
into action. Samuel responded by requesting the Board of Trade to appoint an 
inspector to report on the legal position of the Worcester Scheme. 39 Accordingly, 
`0 Mr. E. Milner Holland QC. was appointed and he reported his findings in 1954. 
On the findings of fact, it was apparent that the directors were acting in good faith and 
genuinely believed that their actions were in the best interests of the stockholders. 
Accordingly, the Worcester Scheme was intra vires and there was no mala fides. It 
therefore, appeared that there were no legal grounds upon which to impeach the 
scheme. 
37 There are exceptions to this principle, most notably where a director has disclosed his interest. See 
s. 317 Companies Act 1985 and art. 85 Table A, Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985 (SI 
195! 805). 
38 For full details, see L. C. B. Gower, Corporate Control: the Battle for the Berkeley (1954-55) 68 
Harv. L. Rev. 1 176. 
39 Such a power was available under ss. 164-5 Companies Act 1948. 
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However, this was not the view of Mr. Holland. He concluded that it was not 
sufficient that the powers were exercised bona fide; it was also relevant to look at the 
purpose of the exercise of those powers. Here, the directors powers had been 
exercised in order to render irrevocable for all time the policy view of the present 
board, so that never thereafter could the stockholders alter the decision of their 
present Board as to the present or future use of the property of the company. 41 Prior 
to the Worcester Scheme, the shareholders enjoyed rights over the company s 
property and the future use of that property. After the Worcester Scheme, they lost, 
without compensation, the latter right. Mr. Holland stated that as the duties of the 
directors were owed to the shareholders, their impropriety was obvious. 
However, as Mr. Holland freely admitted, his opinion as expressed in the report 
could have no authoritative force if the matter came to be reviewed by a Court of 
Law. 42 It is therefore curious that so many academics cite this report as authority for 
the proposition that the company refers to the shareholders. 43 
Accordingly, one of the most important and pervasive principles in company law has 
no acceptable legal authority. The question that is still unanswered is why have the 
courts never overtly stated that the company refers solely to the shareholders. 
Nevertheless, despite the unsatisfactory legal authority it is widely accepted that, until 
recently the company referred exclusively to the shareholders. As we shall see, 
creditors are now part of the company, when the company is insolvent or of doubtful 
solvency. However, while a company is solvent, the interests of the company are the 
interests of the shareholders. This is the starting point concerning the current law. 
One can therefore see that, based upon the construction of the directors duties, our 
company law in predominantly concerned with offering legal protection to 
shareholders. However, the protection offered by the bona fide duty must be regarded 
as weak because any tenuous link with profit maximisation will be enough to protect a 
proposed act from attack. 
40 The Savor Hotel Limited and the Berkeley Hotel Company Limited: Investigation Under Section 165 
(b) of the Companies Act 1948: Report of , 1/r. E. it/ilner Holland QC., 1954. London: HMSO. dI Ibid. at para. 17. 
42 Ibid. at para. 15. 
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This placing of the shareholders at the centre of the corporate nexus is an approach 
embodied by the Company Law Review Steering Group in their statutory draft 
statement of directors duties. Under this statement, the directors would be obliged to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole. 44 
However, this statement has a number of qualifications and that need to be 
acknowledged. 
Firstly, this duty is subordinated to the duty to act in accordance with the company s 
constitution. 45 This is to ensure that where company s had philanthropic objects, the 
directors would not be in breach of their duties if they subordinated the selfish desires 
of their shareholders to achieving the company s objectives. Accordingly, the duty 46 
to act in the interests of members can be subordinated if the discretion to act in the 
interests of non-shareholder constituents is intrinsic to the company s objects. 
Secondly, there is a belief that the legal model of the company imposes pressures 
upon directors that force them to neglect the long-term health of the company. 47 
Directors should take a balanced view of both long and short-term considerations. 
Accordingly, the draft statement of directors duties states that directors should take 
into account the likely consequences (short and long term) of the actions open to the 
director. 48 
Finally, the draft statement contains a list of other factors that directors should bear in 
mind. Central to this is the reference to the supply chain. 49 Directors should bear in 
mind the company s need to foster its business relationships, including those with its 
employees and suppliers and the customers for its products and services. 50 
E. g. J. H. Farrar & B. M. Hannigan, Farrar s Company Law, 1998,4`h ed., London: Butterworths, 
p. 381. 
44 The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Final Report, June 2001, London: DTI, p. 345 at Schedule 2(2)(a). 
4, Schedule 2(1)(a) Draft Statement of Directors Duties. 
46 The Company Law Review Steering Group, ; Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Completing the Structure, November 200, London: DTI, para. 3.17. 
47 The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Developing the Framework, March 2000, London: DTI, para. 3.54. 
°R Schedule 2((2)(l)(a) Draft Statement of Directors Duties. 
49 The Company Law Review Steering Group, Alodern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Completing the Structure, November 200, London: DTI, para. 3.23. 
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The reason why the Company Law Review Steering Group recommended keeping the 
shareholders as the central group within the corporate nexus was that they believed 
that there was no way of effectively bringing about accountability to a wide range of 
corporate constituents. 51 It will also be remembered that this was Berle s main 
objection to Dodd s position as noted in Chapter 1. Accordingly, the Steering Group 
rejected the adoption of a pluralist approach. However, it can be seen that whilst the 
draft statement places the shareholders at the centre of the corporate nexus, it also 
requires directors to take into account wider issues. It is hoped that by taking this 
approach, it will be easier for the directors to balance the various competing interests. 
A Direct Fiduciary Duty. 
It is a parochial tenet of company law that directors duties are owed to the company 
alone and not to the shareholders. Percival v Wright52 is often cited as support for this 
principle. Here, the plaintiffs offered to sell their shares to the defendants, the 
chairman of the board and two other directors, at the price of E12.50 per share. After 
the sale, the plaintiffs discovered that the defendants had negotiated with an outsider 
for the sale of the entire undertaking, at a price well over £12.50 per share. The 
plaintiffs argued that the directors owed their fiduciary duties to the shareholders and 
as such they could avoid the original sale on the grounds of non-disclosure. The court 
disagreed stating that there was no fiduciary relationship between the directors and the 
shareholders: the directors owed their duties to the company alone. 
However, there is now evidence that this principle is under a considerable degree of 
strain. 53 A series of cases dating from as far back as 1914 have criticized this 
principle and have in certain cases provided ad hoc exceptions. Accordingly, in 
certain cases, the directors may owe fiduciary duties directly to shareholders. 
The first challenge to Percival came in the case of Allen v Hyatt. 
54 Here, the 
appellants were negotiating an amalgamation with another company, induced the 
50 Schedule 2(2)(2)(a) Draft Statement of Directors Duties. 
.1 The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Completing the Structure, November 200, London: DTI, para. 3.5. 
`' f190212 Ch. 421. 
53 D. D. Prentice, Creditor s Interests and Director s Duties (1990) 10 O. J. L. S. 265 at 273. 
,, 0914) 30 TLR 444. 
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respondents, who were shareholders of the company, to grant them options to 
purchase their shares at par value so as to facilitate the amalgamation. However, the 
price the directors paid was lower than the price they had agreed with the purchaser, 
and they made a considerable profit. The Privy Council affirmed the view of the 
Ontario courts in holding that the directors must account for the profits to the 
shareholders. The court acknowledged that in most circumstances the fiduciary duties 
of the directors were owed to the company. In this case, however, the directors were 
agents for the shareholders and accordingly, owed their duties directly to the 
shareholders. 
In Coleman v Myers, 55 the New Zealand Court of Appeal went one step further and 
concluded that Percival was wrongly decided. In England also, the Percival principle 
has not escaped intact. The first erosion came in the case of Heron International Ltd. 
v Lord Grade. 56 Here, Associated Communications Corporation plc. (AAC) was the 
subject of a takeover bid by two companies known as Bell and Heron. Article 
29(A) of AAC s articles provided that any transfer of voting stock could only be made 
to a person nominated by the directors. Commenting upon the duty on directors when 
utilizing article 29(A), Lawton U held: 
This duty to determine which person shall acquire and be registered as the holder of 
voting shares in ACC is a fiduciary power which the directors must exercise in the 
interests of the company and in the interests of the shareholders of the company. 57 
Accordingly, it is now relatively well established, both in the UK58 and in America, 59 
that in the event of a takeover, the directors owe some of their duties to the 
shareholders. 
55 [19771 2 NZLR 225. 
56 [19831 BCLC 244. 
57 Ibid. at p. 264. 
w Rea Company [19861 BCLC 383; Dawson International plc v Coats Patons plc (1988) 4 BCC 305. 
59 1Inocal Co, p. v Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A 2d. 946 (Del. 1985); Revlon inc. v MacAndrews & 
Forbes 11o/dines inc. 506 A 2d. 173,181 (Del. 1986). However, a highly worrying precedent was set 
in the case of Paramount v Time 571 A 2d. 1140 (Del. Supp. 1991). This case concerned a stock-for- 
stock merger between Time inc. and Warner Communications in which the shareholders of Time 
would have the opportunity to vote whether or not to exchange their shares for documents worth about 
$125 per share. Paramount then entered the fray with a bid of $175 per share, which they later raised to 
$200 (it is still widely believed that the bid would have been raised to $225). In light of this generous 
offer, the directors of Time and Warner were concerned that the shareholders would not appro\ c their 
merger and revised the transaction so that it no longer required shareholder approval. The rep ised plan 
meant that the new company would begin life with an estimated debt of at least $7 billions. When the 
case reached the Delaware Supreme Court. the court concluded that as the merger had been planned for 
two Nears, it was proper that it should be permitted to continue, irrespective of the more lucrative 
alternative. 
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The most overt judicial statement to date concerning the limitations of Percival came 
in the case of Re Chez Nico (Restaurants) Ltd. 60 The facts are not directly relevant to 
the issue of to whom directors owe their fiduciary duties. The leading judgment was 
delivered by Browne-Wilkinson V-C who stated: 
Like the Court of Appeal in New Zealand, I consider the law to be that in 
general directors do not owe fiduciary duties to shareholders but owe them to the 
company: however, in certain special circumstances fiduciary duties can arise 
which place directors in a fiduciary capacity vis- -vis the shareholders. 
61 
He also stated during the course of his judgment that Percival was very doubtful 
authority 62 for the proposition that directors owe their fiduciary duties to the 
company. Having said this, however, even though the principle in Percival has been 
This case is extremely worrying for the following reason. The directors contended that they 
opposed Paramount s intervention because they believed that it was not in the shareholders long-term 
interests. However, there is strong evidence that the directors interests were more self-serving and, 
more worryingly, that the courts tried their hardest to accommodate the directors views. These 
concerns arose for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the Time management had negotiated for themselves exceptionally favourable remuneration 
packages. Secondly, the merger had not been negotiated for two years. The involvement of Paramount 
meant that a new deal had to be constructed very quickly, and it was this deal which was proceeded 
with. Thirdly, it is difficult to see how any rational person could ignore the fact that the Paramount 
offer carried with it a 60% increase in capital. Such a company is almost certain to make more money 
and such an offer would certainly be more attractive to the shareholders. Finally, by accepting the 
Warner deal, the management declined the possibility to be equity-heavy in favour of automatically 
becoming debt-ridden. 
The question arises why did the court accede to such an arrangement. It is contended that this is an 
example of the so-called race to the bottom. Despite being a tiny state, Delaware accommodates two- 
thirds of the Fortune 500 because its company laws are so liberal. Decisions such as this contribute to 
the Delaware Factor and encourage companies to incorporate there, in the full knowledge that both 
statute law and the common law will be sympathetic to their agendas. 
('0 [19921 BCLC 192. See also the recent Australian case of Brunninghausen v Glavanics (1999) 17 
ACLC 1247. Here, the company in question had issued 6,000 shares; 5,000 of which belonged to the 
sole effective director, Brunninghausen. The remaining 1,000 belonged to the dormant director 
Glavanics. Over time their relationship soured and Glavanics set up a business directly in competition 
with Brunninghausen s business. However, he did not resign his original directorship. Eventually, the 
two men attempted to resolve matters and Glavanics offered to resign his directorship and sell his 
shares providing that he was given a fair price. 
However, unknown to Glavanics, Brunninghausen had received an unexpected offer from a 
third party to buy the assets of the company. Subsequently, Glavanics sold his shares to 
Brunninghausen for a price well below the price offered by the third party. When Glavanics found out, 
he sued Brunninghausen alleging breach of fiduciary duty. 
At first instance, Bryson J agreed with the plaintiff. Brunninghausen, as a director, owed a 
fiduciary duty to Glavanics as a shareholder, and that Brunninghausen had, in failing to disclose this 
offer, breached that duty. Brunninghausen was ordered to pay A$300,000 to Glavanics. 
Brunninghausen appealed and although the New South Wales Court of Appeal permitted the 
appeal regarding the quantum of damages, it dismissed the appellants contention that there was no 
direct fiduciary duty between company and shareholder. For comment, see G. Stapledon & J. Webster, 
Directors Duties and Corporate Governance (1999) 17 C&SLJ 462: R. 
Goddard, Percival v Wright: 
The End of .4 
Remarkable Career? (2000) 116 LQR 197. 
61 Ibid. at p. 208. 
62 Ibid. 
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heavily criticised, the courts have been careful not to overrule it. 63 In the 
Brunninýhausen case, although the court declined to follow Percival, it did not doubt 
the correctness of the principle that fiduciary duties were owed to the company. 
Accordingly, it is still the case that as a general rule, Percival still represents good 
law. 64 The exceptions discussed above appear to remain confined to certain special 
facts. Percival has enjoyed a remarkable career for a lower court decision. '' For a 
while longer, its principle will remain a general rule and directors will only owe 
fiduciary duties directly to shareholders in certain circumstances. 
Conclusion. 
It is clear that the directors duties operate largely to protect the shareholders. The 
shareholders are the beneficiaries of the bona fide duty whilst the company is solvent. 
However, it is unclear why this is so. The courts have never provided an acceptable 
reason why the shareholders should be the exclusive beneficiaries of the duty. 
Further, it is curious to note how accepted this issue is despite the highly questionable 
nature of the authority. It could be argued that this prioritising of the shareholders, 
despite a lack of any clear justification, is due to our aforementioned reluctance to 
abandon the ownership model of the company and as such, we grant the shareholders 
almost exclusive legal protection despite no convincing justification for doing so. The 
word almost is used because in the last two decades, there have been developments 
that have served to introduce some form of legal protection to other groups within the 
corporate nexus. This first began in the late 1970 s when a number of academics 
voiced the opinion that creditors also needed some form of company law protection. 
Accordingly, the position of the creditor and the protection offered to them will now 
be examined. 
63 E. g. Re Chez Nico (Restaurants) Ltd. [19921 BCLC 192 at 208, per Browne-Wilkinson VC; Glandon 
Ptv. LLtd. v Strata Consolidated Pty Ltd. (1993) 11 ACSR 543 at 548, per Mahoney J and Crindle 
Investments v IVvnzes f 199812 ILRNI 275 at 288, per Keane J. 
64 Cf. Comment, The Last Rites for Percival v Wright? (2000) 21 Co. Law. 261 at 261 where it is stated 
that Percival v II', iht can be safely confined to history. 65 L. Loss, The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading By Corporate Insiders in the United Stares 
(1970) 33 MLR 34 at 40. 
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II. LIMITED LIABILITY AND THE POSITION OF CREDITORS 
The Creditor and Limited Liability. 
S. 2 Bubble Act Repeal Act 182566 contains what is thought to be the first attempt in 
English law to systematically introduce limited liability. 67 This provision tackled the 
issue at the source by persuading the Crown to grant more charters of incorporation 
by conferring wider Crown powers in relation to the granting of limited liability. 68 
The Crown was no longer hamstrung into choosing between full limited liability or 
unlimited liability. There now existed a discretion as to any limit on liability. The 
amount could be below a member s initial contribution or above the amount, allowing 
for a decrease in limited liability. 
However, what happened in reality, was that public opinion, faced with the possibility 
of a rapid rise in the number of chartered limited liability companies, turned against 
an extension of limited liability and became concerned with the position of creditors. 
Accordingly, the Crown responded by using its discretion to withhold limited liability 
in many charters. Paradoxically therefore, England s first attempt to facilitate limited 
liability was accompanied by the first time that limited liability was viewed as 
unpopular. 
Despite a brief resurgence in the popularity of limited liability, public opinion again 
hardened and it was withheld from the Companies Act 1844.69 However, the 
depression of 1845-48 drew attention to the plight of shareholders with personal 
liability to such an extent that limited liability was back in favour by the mid-1850 s. 
In 1852, the Court of Exchequer Chamber acknowledged the validity of a limited 
liability clause. 70 Finally, following two select committees and a Royal Commission, 
66 (1825) 6 Geo IV, Cap XCI. 
67 Prior to this Act, limited liability could only be granted to individual companies through an 
provision in the Royal Charter of Incorporation or by Act of Parliament. 
S. 2 Bubble Act Repeal Act 1825: 





to such Extent, and subject to Such Regulations and Restrictions as His 
may deem fit and proper, and as shall be declared and limited in by such 
"' 7 and 8 Vict. c. l 10. 
70 Halleft v Dowdall (1852) 21 LJQB 98. 
express 
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Parliament passed the Limited Liability Act 185571 and its liberal successor, the Joint 
72 Stock Companies Act 1856. 
Even after limited liability was attained, the Commonwealth legislatures and 
subsequently the courts, still attempted to impose some safeguards to protect 
creditors. These safeguards usually took the following forms. 73 Companies were 
required to adopt a suffix (e. g. Limited, Ltd., Incorporated, Inc. ) as part of the 
company s name. There had to be at least 25 members74 holding £ 10 shares paid to at 
least £2. There were filing requirements involving the company s name, addresses of 
company directors and the company s constitution. The doctrine of ultra vires, 
developed judicially by the House of Lords in Ashburn Railway Carriage and Iron 
Co. v Riche, 75 derogated the company s powers via the company s memorandum. 
Finally, the courts imposed fiduciary obligations of skill and care on company 
directors, although, at the time, these obligations were extremely limited. 76 
However, in reality, these limits were ineffective and were an inadequate trade-off for 
the shareholders limited liability. 77 The disclosure requirements for the company s 
name were never taken very seriously, and in any case did little to aid the creditor. 
The ultra vires doctrine was easily circumvented and could serve to hinder creditors 
as often as it aided them. Any fiduciary duties were owed to the company and not to 
creditors. 78 The duties of skill and care were notoriously lax and in many cases non- 
79 existent. In any case, any breach of duty was ratifiable by the shareholders. 
Accordingly, it has been contended that the concept of limited liability favours the 
shareholders at the expense of the creditors. Limited liability shifts the risk of 
business failure from the shareholders onto the creditors, thereby creating an 
71 18 and 19 Vict. c. 133. 
72 19 and 20 Vict. c. 47. 
73 J. S. Ziegal, Is Incorporation (with Limited Liabilit) Too Easily Available? (1990) 31 Cahiers de 
Droit 1075 at 1085-8. 
74 The 25 member requirement of the 1855 Act was lowered to 7 by the 1856 Act. 
75 (1875) LR 7 HL 653. 
76 E. g. see the cases of Re Denham & Co. (1883) 25 Ch. D. 752; Re Cardi Savings Bank 118921 2 Ch. 
100 and Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd. [19111 1 Ch. 425. 
7 J. S. Ziegal, Is Incorporation (with Limited Liabiliti) Too Easily Available? (1990) 31 Cahiers de 
Droit 1075 at 1088-9. 78 
-.... .. r" e'l_ A^11. n (, "J 0r/. 1 r1nAI11 /-L '1nA 
rercnva[ v º; rrQlit It VU/- i /. t- n. ý+/- i; ne ý, nrrrn Ö. rawcerr c, ra. Ii yy1- I k- n. . 5U4. 
Hogg v Cramphorn (1967] Ch. 254; Bamford v Bamford [96812 All ER 655. 
N) 
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externality. Creditors who lend to a limited liability company are at risk as the 
principle of limited liability creates a perverse incentive for an insolvent company to 
continue to trade. 80 As a company approaches insolvency, the shareholders know 
that their investment may already be lost, so they have an incentive to gamble with the 
assets that are left. If the gamble goes well, the company may again become solvent. 
However, if the gamble fails, the shareholders are protected by their limited liability. 
The creditors, conversely, will probably discover that this final gamble will have 
eliminated all chance that they have of being paid. Accordingly, as insolvency 
approaches, it becomes rational for a company to make an investment which is 
riskier but alone offers the possibility, albeit remote, of a bonanza payoff that will 
prevent insolvency. 81 
Do Creditors Need Further Legal Protection? 
Before examining the extent to which the law affords protection to a company s 
creditors, it is worth noting that creditors may not actually need any form of legal 
protection. The traditional position, as we have seen, is that limited liability serves to 
weaken the creditors position. Accordingly, limited liability results in 
uncompensated risk being imposed on creditors who deal with the company. 
82 
Therefore, when examining whether the creditors need further protection, we are 
attempting to define what risks the creditors of a corporation have not agreed to 
accept in their dealings with it. 83 However, whether creditors suffer from 
uncompensated risk or not is open to debate. 
As this chapter is concerned with the protection offered by the law, not whether or not 
that protection is warranted, this issue will not be examined here. However in 
Chapter 7, the creditor s ability to protect themselves by contract will be examined in 
detail. It will be seen that the academic perception that the creditors are helpless to 
protect themselves is not entirely accurate and that the risk faced by them is not 
80 D. D. Prentice, Creditors Interests and Directors Duties (1990) 10 OJLS. 265 at 265. 
81 J. C. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web (1986) 85 Michigan 
LR. I at 61. 
82 D. D. Prentice, Corporate Personality, Limited Liabilittiy and the Protection of Creditors in R. 
Grantham & C. Rickett (eds. ), Corporate Personality in the 20th Century, 1998, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, p. 104. 
83 J. Dabner. Trading While Insolvent -A Case for Individual Creditors Rights Against 
Directors 
(1994) 17 UNSWLJ 546 at 574-5. 
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always uncompensated. It is worth bearing this in mind when examining the 
protection offered by the law. 
The Traditional Position. 
As we have noted, traditionally a director s duties are owed to the company alone and 
not to the shareholders. 84 On this the Jenkins Committee85 said no fiduciary duty is 
owed by a director to individual members of his company, but only to the company 
itself, and a fortiori that none is owed to a person who is not a member. '6 
Accordingly, in Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co. Ltd. v Multinational Gas 
and Petrochemical Services Ltd., 87 Dillon U held that [t]he directors owe 
fiduciary duties to the company though not to the creditors, present or future, or to 
individual shareholders. 88 
Judicial Developments. 
Although, there exist pre-World War II judgments indicating that creditor protection 
is within the scope of directors duties, 89 1976 was the major turning point as regards 
judicial acknowledgment of creditors rights. Impetus came from the Australian case 
of Walker v Wimborne. 90 In that case, a father and his sons were directors of several 
companies and administered them as a group. A liquidator of one of these companies, 
Asiatic Electric Co. Pty. Ltd., challenged a payment of A$10,000 from Asiatic to 
another one of the companies, Australian Sound & Communications Pty. Ltd. The 
sole reason for this payment was that the company needed the money. However, the 
second company was clearly incapable of paying the loan off. Mason J, speaking for 
the majority, said: 
sa Percival v Wright [190212 Ch. 421. 
15 The Report of the Company Law Committee, 1962, Cmnd. 1749, London: HMSO. 
86 Ibid. at para. 89. 
R' 119831 Ch. 258. 
ss Ibid. at p. 288. 
r`' In the American case of Pepper v Litton 308 U. S. 295 at 307 (1939), Douglas J stated: 
the standard of fiduciary obligation is designed for the protection of the entire 
community of the interests of the corporation - creditors as well as stockholders. 
For more on the American position, see Northern Mining Corp v Cooke Mining 123 F. Supp. 
9 (9`h 
Cir. ) (1941); New York Credit Men s Adjustment Bureau v Weiss 119 NE 2d. 397 (1953) A&K 
Railroad Materials v Green Rai, Western Railroad Co. 437 F. Supp. 636 (1977); Dannen v 
Scafdi 393 
NE 2d. 1246 (1979); Francis v United Jersey Bank 432 A 2d. 814 (1981); Hahn and Hu f Construction 
'Highland Heights Nursing Home 393 NE 2d. 1246 (1986). 
90 (1976) 50 AJLR 446. 
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it should be emphasised that the directors of a company in discharging their 
duty to the company must take into account of the interests of its shareholders 
and its creditors . The transaction offered no prospect of advantage to Asiatic, it exposed Asiatic to the probable prospect of substantial loss, and thereby 
seriously prejudiced the unsecured creditors of Asiaitc. 91 
This trend was followed in a number of cases in New Zealand92 and Australia. 93 
However, there then followed a period of confusion as to when the interests of the 
creditors displace or compliment the duty to the shareholders. In particular, did the 
company in question need to be insolvent for, as was noted in Grove v Flannel, `'` 
although the company in Walker was insolvent, Mason J did nothing to suggest that 
this was a prerequisite. Accordingly, in Ring v Sutton, 95 the New South Wales Court 
of Appeal held that the principle was applicable where the company was clearly 
solvent, whereas the Court of Appeal in Re Horsely & Weight Ltd. 96 held that the 
insolvency was a prerequisite. Finally, it was held that insolvency was required in the 
case of Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty. 97 In that case, Street CJ held that: 
In a solvent company the proprietary interests of the shareholders entitle them 
as a general body to be regarded as the company when questions of the duty of 
directors arise . But where a company is insolvent the interests of the creditors intrude. They become prospectively entitled to displace the power of the 
shareholders and directors to deal with the company s assets. 98 
These commonwealth principles first permeated English law in 1980 in the case of 
Lonhro Ltd. and Another v Shell Petroleum Ltd. and Another. 99 Here, Lord Diplock 
stated that the interests of the company are not exclusively those of shareholders but 
may also include those of creditors. 100 
More notably, in the case of Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co., 101 Lord 
Templeman held: 
91 Ibid. at p. 449. 
92 Re Avon Chambers Ltd. [19781 2 NZLR 638; Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd. [19851 1 NZLR 
242, David Neil & Co. Ltd. v Neil (1986) 3 NZCLC 99,658; Re Lake Tekapo Motor Inn Ltd. (in Lig. ) 
(1987) 3 NZCLC 100,156; Hilton International Ltd. (in Lig. ) v Hilton [19891 NZLR 442. 
93 Ring v Sutton (1980) 5 ACLR 546; Grove v Flavel (1986) 43 SASR 410; Je/free v NCSC (1989) 15 
ACLR 217. 
95 196)43 SASR 410 at 410, per Jacobs J. 
9S (1980) 5 ACLR 546. 
96 I1982] 3 All ER 1045. 
97 (1986) 4 NSWLR 722. 
98 Ibid. at p. 730. 
99 1980 1 WLR 627. 
00 Ibid. at p. 634. 
101 I1987ý 1 All ER 114. 
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a company owes a duty to its creditors present and future. The company is 
not bound to pay off every debt as soon as it is incurred and the company is not 
obliged to avoid all ventures which involve an element of risk, but the company 
owes a duty to its creditors to keep its property inviolate and available for the 
repayment of its debts. 102 
Similar approaches were evidenced in the cases of Brady v Brad_y103 and West Afercia 
Safetywear Ltd. v Dodd. 104 In the latter, Kinsela was approved and there have been no 
major judicial developments since. 
The question that now occupies us is to what extent do these cases establish a duty 
and how is that duty to operate. This is an important question as the Company Law 
Review Steering Group has considered the possibility of incorporating this duty into 
their statutory statement of directors duties. 105 At first glance, these cases appear to 
offer the creditors some effective legal protection. However, when examined more 
closely, one can conclude that this duty to creditors is unlikely to affect the legal 
model of the company. ' 06 
Firstly, many of the aforementioned comments relating to directors duties to creditors 
were only obiter dicta, which of course, are not binding in authority, only persuasive. 
It has, therefore been contended that in future cases, they will not be followed as the 
principle in Percival v Wright is too well-established to be overturned by a principle 
born out of mere dicta. 107 Similarly, this duty could form a potential exception to 
the principle of limited liability, and should not be followed, lest it emasculate a 
principle central to our economy s well being. 108 
102 Ibid. at p. 1 18. The position is similar in America. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N. V. v 
Pathe Communications Corp. 1991 Westlaw 277613 (1991). 
103 [1987] 3 BCC 535 at 552, per Nourse LJ: where the company is both going and solvent, first and 
foremost come the shareholders Conversely, where the company is insolvent, or even doubtfully 
solvent, the interests of the company are in reality the interests of the existing creditors alone. 
104 1988 BCLC 250. 
10` The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Econonn : 
Final Report, 2001, London: DTI, para. 3.13. 
106 See V. Finch, Directors Duties Towards Creditors (1989) 10 Co. Law. 23 at 24 who contends that 
these cases do not [create] duties that are workable in the practical world. 107 C. A. Riley, Directors Duties and the Interests of Creditors (1989) 10 Co. Law. 87 at 91. However, 
as will be seen later, the possibility of a direct fiduciary duty to shareholders may have weakened the 
principle in Percival v 11 'right. 
1os See L. S. Sealy, Directors Duties - An Unneccssari, Gloss (1988) CLJ 175 at 176 who, referring to 
the judgments in the above cases states that it is not an exaggeration to say that if sentiments like this 
had prevailed over the past century and a half, the limited liability company would never have got ott 
the ground. 
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Secondly, is the duty owed to creditors directly or is it owed to the company? This is 
important because if it is the latter, then only the company will be able to bring an 
action for breach. One could argue that if creditors cannot bring an action, then the 
value of the duty will be lessened. However, there are strong reasons for arguing that 
the duty should be mediated through the company. Firstly, it will eliminate the 
possibility of double-recovery. If a creditor could sue for breach, then it may be that a 
directors act that was a breach of his duty to creditors could also constitute a breach 
of his duties to the company for which both the company and the creditor could sue. 
Secondly, mediation through the company preserves the principle of pari passe that 
all creditors should be treated equally, since no one creditor will gain an advantage by 
being the first to sue. 109 Finally, by denying creditors a direct action, the courts are 
preserving the procedural monopoly of liquidation proceedings for dealing with the 
claims of creditors against an insolvent company. ' 10 
Until recently, it was not sure whether or not this duty was owed directly to creditors 
or not. In Winkworth v Edward Baron Co., " Lord Templeman stated that the board 
owed a duty to the company and to the creditors of the company [to] keep its 
property inviolate an available for the repayment of its debts. 112 However, it is now 
clear that creditors have no cause of action following the case of Kuwait Asia Bank 
EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd., 113 where Lord Lowry held that [a] director 
does not by reason only of his position as director owe any duty to creditors or to 
trustees for creditors of the company. 11 4 
Third, irrespective of whom the duty is owed to, there is concern that the duty comes 
into effect too late to be of any real aid to the creditors. There is a view emerging that 
the directors should be bound to take into account the risks that creditor face at an 
109 D. D. Prentice, Corporate Personality. Limited Liability and the Protection of Creditors in R. 
Grantham & C. Rickett (eds. ), Corporate Personality in the 20'4 Century. 1998, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, p. 108. 
110 D. D. Prentice, The Effect of Insolvency on Pre-Liquidation Transactions in B. G. Pettet (ed. ), 
Company Law in Change, 1987, London: Stevens, pp. 69-70. 
111119871 1 All ER. 114. 
112 Ibid. at p. 1 18. 
113 [19911 1 AC 187. A Privy Council decision, but since confirmed in Yukon, Line Ltd. v Rendsburg 
Investments Corporation No. 2) 119981 1 WLR 294. 
114 Ibid. at p. 217. 
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earlier stage. 115 Such a view has been taken in a number of Australasian cases' 16 as 
well as in Delaware. "? This would require directors to take steps to reduce the risks 
of creditors when there was a substantial probability of an insolvent liquidation. The 
greater the probability, the more weight is given to the interests of creditors and less 
weight given to the interests of members. At the point where there is no prospect of 
avoiding liquidation, the interests of the creditors should completely override the 
interests of the members. It is contended that such a rule would provide a more 
effective balance between the interests of creditors and members. 
Finally, a number of academics argue that a common law duty to creditors is 
unnecessary and potentially pernicious 118 as they are adequately protected via 
existing legal mechanisms119 or, more notably statutory measures such as s. 214 
Insolvency Act 1986 and the provisions of the Company Directors Disqualification 
Act 1986. However, as we shall see, these statutory protective measures have shown 
themselves no more effective in protecting creditors than the case law developments. 
In its Final Report, the Company Law Review Steering Group considered the 
possibility that the above duty to take creditor interests into account when the 
company nears insolvency should be incorporated into the statutory statement of 
directors duties. 120 However, we have seen that there are a substantial number of 
problems with this duty that serve to weaken its operation. To date, these weaknesses 
have not been overcome. This would go a long way towards explaining why the 
government, in its recent White Paper on a new Companies Bill, has decided not to 
include a duty to creditors in its statutory statement of directors duties. 121 
115 The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Final Repo, t, 2001, London: DTI, para. 3.17. 
116 Nicholson v Permakraft [19851 INZLR 242; Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Ptv. Ltd. [19681 NJWLR 722. 
117 Crec it Lyonnais Bank Nederland N. V. v Pathe Communications Cotes. [19911 WL 277613 [Del. 
Ch. 1-99-11' 
118 L. S. Sealy, Directors Duties -An Unnecessary Gloss (1988) CLJ 175 at 177. 119/hid. at p. 175 who states that it will be seen that in most cases they are nothing more than 
extraneous words of censure directed at conduct which anyway comes within some well-established 
rule of law, such as the law imposing liability for misfeasance. the expropriation of corporate assets or 
fraudulent preference. 
120 The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Latin for a Competitive Economy: 
Final Report, 2001, London: DTI, para. 3.13. 
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S. 214 Insolvency Act 1986: Wrongful Trading. 
The risks that creditors face was the subject of the Report of the Cork Committee in 
1982.122 The Committee recognised a clear need to protect creditors who had suffered 
as a result of reckless or unreasonable behaviour of company directors. 123 At the time 
of the report, s. 332 Companies Act 1948 provided for liability for fraudulent trading. 
Under this section, directors who had caused the company to trade fraudulently could 
be ordered to pay to the company an amount fixed by the court. If during the course 
of a winding up, the court considered that a director was guilty of fraudulent trading 
then not only did this create a civil and personal liability, it also resulted criminal 
liability. Accordingly, a strict standard of proof was required, which resulted in few 
applications being successful. There was also a need to show dishonest or fraudulent 
behaviour on the part of the director. 124 The Cork Committee concluded that this was 
the main reason why the section was ineffective. 125 If a director was acting honestly 
then he would be innocent irrespective of any recklessness or negligence. 
Given the failings of s. 332, the Cork Committee proposed a new civil liability for 
wrongful trading which is now found in s. 214 Insolvency Act 1986 and, according to 
one commentator, constitutes what is probably the most extreme departure from the 
rule in Salomon s case yet achieved in the United Kingdom. 126 Creditor protection 
was becoming a significant concern given the increasing number of liquidations. In 
1980, there were 6,890 company liquidations. In 1982, the year the Cork Committee 
reported, this figure had risen to 12,067.127 
121 flT  ". / ". ýii1.. -A..  
I'll 
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I 11 uii, moaernrstng company Law, JUIy LUUL, Lm. i., onaon: uii, para. s. i u. 
Report of the Review Committee on Insolvench Law and Practice, 1982, Cmnd. 8558, London: 
HMSO. 
123 Ibid. at para. 1777: [c]ompensation ought, in our view, to be available to those who suffer 
foreseeable loss as a result not only of fraudulent, but also unreasonable behaviour. 
I24 Re Patrick R Lyon Ltd. [1933] Ch. 786: Rv Grantham [1984] QB 674. 
12, Report of the Review Committee on Insolvenci" Law and Practice, 1982, Cmnd. 8558, London: 
HMSO, para. 1776. 
126 P. 1 
. 
Davies, Gower s Principles of Modern Company Law, 1997,6` ed., London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, p. 151. See also D. D. Prentice, Creditors Interests and Directors Duties (1990) 10 OJLS 
265 at 277 who describes s. 214 as unquestionably one of the most important developments in 
company law this century. 
27 C. Cook, Wrongful Trading - Is It A Real Threat to Directors or. 4 Paper Tiger? ( 1999) 1 Insolv. L. 
99 at 99. 
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Under s. 214, a court may declare a director or a shadow director128 of a company 
liable to contribute to the assets of the company if the director knew or ought to ha,, -e 
concluded that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation, 129 
and did not take every step to minimise the potential loss to the company s creditors. 
A finding of s. 214 may also lead to disqualification130 as has occurred in several 
cases. 131 
In relation to creditors, the theoretical aims of s. 214 are obvious. As has been noted, 
limited liability creates an incentive to trade even when the company is unlikely to 
avoid insolvency. Trading at such a time could have the effect of dissipating any 
assets that could have been used to pay the creditors. S. 214 was meant to counter this 
incentive by establishing personal liability should the directors continue to trade in 
such a situation, thereby ensuring that there are at least some funds left inviolate to 
pay the creditors. 
However, the reception that s. 214 has received since its enaction has been mixed, and 
there is now a general feeling emerging that s. 214 has not achieved the objectives that 
it was created for. 
A significant problem concerns the vague nature of the provision. The test for breach 
of s. 214 is that a director knew or ought to have known that there was no reasonable 
prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation. Accordingly, it can be seen that the test 
contains both an objective and subjective element. This test should be read in 
conjunction with s. 214(4) which also contains objective and subjective elements. In 
applying objective standards to company directors in this way, s. 214 breaks new 
ground. 132 These objective standards in effect establish a minimum standard for 
directors to adhere to. For over a century the emphasis in the case law has always 
128 The term shadow director is defined in s. 741 Companies Act 1985; s. 251 Insolvency Act 1986, 
and s. 22(5) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
`' Insolvent liquidation is defined in s. 214(6) Insolvency Act 1986 as the time when the company s 
assets are insufficient for the payment of its debts and other liabilities and the expenses of the winding 
up. 
130 S. 10 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, discussed infra. 
ý32 31 See e. Re Pur point Ltd f 19901 II &P 72; Re Brian D Pierson (Contractors) Ltd [19991 B. C. C. 26. 
L. S. Scaly, Disqualification and Personal Liability of Directors, 1993,4' h ed., London: CCH 
Editions Ltd., f 607. 
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been on the need for honesty rather than any degree of skill or ability. 133 This change 
is underlined by s. 214(5) which puts blameworthy omissions on par with 
blameworthy commissions: if the director does not carry out any functions which 
have been entrusted to him, he is to be judged by the same criteria as if he had. Again 
this is a departure from the common law which has never had effective sanctions to 
penalise passive defaults such as non-attendance at board meetings. 134 
The problem is that whilst s. 214 is to be applauded for introducing a more effective 
standard, it provides no guidance as to how directors should adhere to it. The 
approach of the legislators is based on a somewhat large and highly questionable 
assumption, namely that when insolvency looms, the interests of the company s 
creditors are best served by putting the company into voluntary liquidation or 
receivership, or by seeking an administration order, as soon as possible. These 
proceedings are notoriously costly and creditors may actually lose out from a forced 
sale of assets. S. 214 does not permit directors to take this into account, nor the effect 
that a premature liquidation may have on the company s employees and customers. 
In the absence of such guidance, there is a real fear that directors may panic and put 
their companies into premature receivership or liquidation rather than nurse them back 
into profit. 135 In order to avoid the consequences of s. 214, directors who do decide to 
carry on trading should ensure that their decision is fully reasoned and documented, 
and, if the board lacks experience, with the backing of professional advice. Further, 
since s. 214 extends to former directors as well as those in office, a director cannot 
avoid liability simply by resigning. However, a minority director who cannot 
persuade his fellow directors to take proper precautions may have no other option but 
to have his dissent recorded and resign. ' 36 This is because he has on his own no 
standing to apply for a winding up order or to initiate a voluntary arrangement. 
i; ' E. g. Re On, Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. 119251 Ch. 407. 
"' L. S. Sealy, Disqualification and Personal Liability of Directors, 1993,4`h ed., London: CCH 
Editions Ltd., f 607. 
1; 5 See e. g. A. Hicks, Wrongful Trading - Has It Been .4 
Failure? (1993) 8 Insoly. L. & Prac. 134 at 
135, P. Farmery, The Insolvency . act and the 
Corporate User Part 2 (1986) BLR 4 at 4. 
1.6 A director would be advised to resign rather than simply take no further part in the company s 
management because this could give rise to a breach of his service contract. 
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It may be because of the uncertainties mentioned above that during the period 1986- 
1993, only four s. 214 cases made it to court. 137 This was so despite the fact that 
between 1989 and 1993, there were over 92,500 corporate insolvencies in England 
and Wales. ' 38 Another significant factor inhibiting the usefulness of the offence is the 
issue of funding. While creditors may often urge liquidators to bring proceedings 
under s. 214, the expenses involved ensure that financial reasons alone stop most 
potential claims before they start. Two additional factors compound the funding 
problem. Firstly, it was held by Millett J in Re MC Bacon Ltd. (No. 2)139 that the 
costs of an unsuccessful wrongful trading action cannot be regarded as liquidation 
expenses and therefore a liquidator should be confident of success before 
commencing an action. A liquidator may therefore need to secure outside funding 
and this will only be forthcoming if the action is likely to be successful. The only 
other alternative is for the liquidator to pay the costs himself and this he will be highly 
unlikely to do. One commentator has noted that [t]he paucity of funds available to 
pursue a wrongful trading claim goes to the heart of its effectiveness 140 and as a 
result of the decision in Re MC Bacon, s. 214 is little more than a paper tiger. 141 
Secondly, even if an action is successful, it is highly likely that the directors will have 
no personal assets to contribute to the company. 142 Given these uncertainties, many 
creditors would rather accept what little monies they can get rather than jeopardise 
their return even further with a speculative wrongful trading action. 
Another area of ambiguity concerns the actual nature of s. 214, namely is it 
compensatory or punitive in nature. Concerning this, the Cork Committee stated: 
It is right that it should be an offence to carry on a business dishonestly; and 
right that, in the absence of dishonesty, no offence should be committed. Where, 
however, what is in question is not the punishment of an offender, but the 
provision of a civil remedy for those who have suffered financial loss, a 
requirement that dishonesty be proved is inappropriate. Compensation ought, in 
117 P. Godfrey and S. Nield, The Wrongful Trading Provisions - All Bark and No Bite? (1995) 11 
lnsoly. L. & Prac. 139 at 149. 
138 Ibid. 
X39 f 19901 BCLC 324. 
40 C. Cook, 11 "rongful Trading - Is It A Real Threat to Directors or .4 Paper Tiger? 
(1999) 3 Insolv. L. 
99 at 103. 
141 
Ibid. 
a` See A. Hicks, Advising on Wrongful Trading: Part 1 (1993) 14 Co. Law. 16 at 16: Directors of 
companies in financial difficulty are often in financial difficulty themselves, so it may not be worth 
obtaining an order against them. 
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our view to be available to those who suffer foreseeable loss as a result, not only 
of fraudulent, but also of unreasonable behaviour. 143 
It is clear given the above that s. 214 is intended to be compensatory rather than 
punitive. 144 However, the language and the operation of the section does not reflect 
this. The use of the word wrongful implies that the director is being blamed for the 
way he has treated the creditors. 145 Several commentators have stated that any 
director subject to a s. 214 action will feel that he has been punished rather than 
compensating the company. ' 46 
A further problem is the lack of flexibility given to the liquidator in terms of monies 
accrued as the result of s. 214. Any contribution ordered by the court under s. 214 
simply swells the company pool and the liquidator must then disperse the assets in 
the order prescribed by law. 147 Neither the court nor the liquidator have any 
discretion. In the normal case, where the directors have been found guilty of offences 
under ss. 213-4, all the company s creditors will be affected and so it is right that they 
should be treated equally. However, this is not always the case, but s. 214 does not 
recognise this. It may be the case that not all creditors will suffer loss to the same 
extent. For example, if a company owes money to both a bank and a trade creditor, 
the effect of a contribution under s. 214 will benefit both. However, if the bank had 
been able to secure a personal guarantee from the directors, the court will not be able 
to take this into account. Yet payment to the bank out of the swelled pool will 
reduce the directors liability under the guarantee. If the court had more flexibility 
and were intent on protecting those who had suffered loss from the abuse of limited 
liability, then they could recognise that the bank had avoided the consequences of 
limited liability (by taking the guarantee) and so compensate those who have suffered 
loss. 148 
143 Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice, 1982, Cmnd. 8558, London: 
HMSO, para. 1777. 
i44 See Re Produce 11carketing, Consortiunt Ltd. [1989] BCLC 520, per Knox J: In my judgment the 
jurisdiction under section 214 is primarily compensatory rather than penal. 
145 P. Godfrey and S. Nield, The Wrongful Trading Provisions - All Bark and No Bite? (1995) 11 
Insoly. L. & Prac. 139 at 140-1. 
146 C. Williams, Section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Private Company : If'hv It t%fav Fall 
Short of the Mark (1990) 11 Co. Law. 222 at 223. 
I" S. 175 Insolvency Act 1986 and r. 4.181 Insolvency Rules 1986. 
iaa C. Williams, Section 21-1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Private Company: 11'h y It May Fall 
Short of the . Hark (1990) 11 
Co. Law. 222 at 224. 
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Another inhibiting factor is that all but the largest and smallest or corporate borrowers 
will usually have issued floating charges to their bank lenders. Such companies are 
often reliant on the support of the bank. If it is withdrawn, the bank will appoint a 
receiver who will administer the company s assets. The relevant point here is that it is 
only liquidators, not receivers, who can bring a wrongful trading action. Accordingly, 
where a receiver becomes involved no s. 214 action will be brought even though the 
directors may be guilty of the offence. 
The final problematic area concerns the defence to s. 214 contained in s. 214(3). 
S. 214(3) directs the court not to make a declaration of personal liability against a 
person if it is satisfied that, after the time when he first knew or ought to have known 
that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation, he took every 
step with a view to minimising the loss to the company s creditors as he ought to 
have taken. Several commentators have correctly noted that this defence is going to 
be very difficult to apply in practice. First, when the court attempts to determine what 
the director ought to have done, they will do so crediting him with an awareness of 
the company s financial position and also with a general degree of skill and 
experience that he may not in fact have. This fictitious assumption of the director s 
state of mind is likely to cause difficulties for the court. ' 49 
Second, neither the legislature nor the courts give any hint as to what steps should be 
taken. Numerous academics150 and bodies' 51 have offered guidelines, but they are 
careful to point out that this is all they are and should not be regarded as absolute. 
Directors, fearful of acting without this knowledge, may decide simply to resign. 
However, this will not terminate their liability. On the contrary, the courts may take 
the view that resignation precludes him from taking the necessary steps to minimise 
losses, and his obligation is to remain in office and fight for the creditors interests 
from within. 152 Many directors will assume that the interests of the creditors will be 
best served by placing the company into voluntary liquidation, and indeed as we have 
noted, premature liquidations are a major fear for those critics of s. 214. It may be the 
149 L. S. Sealy, Disqualification and Personal Liability of Directors, 1993,4 ed., London: CCH 
Editions Ltd., f 608. 
150 See e. g. R. Whitehouse and T. Arnold, Protecting Yourself as a Director of a Company in 
Di/%lcultic's (1993) 137 SJ. 218. 
151 See e. g. The Institute of Directors, Companies in Financial Diffrculties. London: IoD. 
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case, however, that ceasing to trade may not be the best option for the creditors, even 
in situations where it is not possible to save the company. Selling the company as a 
going concern may yield more than a forced sale of assets. Further, there is evidence 
that directors who take this course may be permitted to sell the business at an 
undervalue (which is normally a breach of duty) if they honestly believe that to do so 
may save the business. 153 There are also the option of administration and voluntary 
arrangements available to directors. 
Finally, there is confusion as to who bears the onus of proof. Many academics 
assume that the onus is placed on the director to show that he did all that he could to 
minimise the losses to creditors. 154 However, one leading academic has contended 
that the onus is in fact on the liquidator to demonstrate what steps the director ought 
to have taken. 155 
These difficulties in applying the defence are likely to be compounded when one 
considers that s. 214(3) is the only defence to a s. 214 claim. The courts have held that 
the discretionary defence found in s. 727 Companies Act 1985 156 does not apply in the 
case of wrongful trading actions. ' 57 
The Cork Committee, when justifying the new concept of wrongful trading, stated: 
A balance has to be struck. No one wishes to discourage the inception and 
growth of businesses, although both are unavoidably attended by risks to 
creditors. Equally a climate should exist in which downright irresponsibility is 
discouraged and in which those who abuse the privilege of limited liability can 
be made personally liable for the consequences of their conduct. We believe that 
our proposals in this chapter strike a balance between these two conflicting 
needs. We regard them as of the greatest importance as a matter of urgent 
necessity. 158 
15 A. Hicks, Advising on Wrongful: Trading: Part 2 (1993) 14 Co. Law. 55 at 58. 151 Re Wel ab Engineers Ltd. [ 19901 BCC 600. 
154 See e. g. R. R. Pennington, Pennington s Company Law, 1995,7th ed., London: Butterworths, p. 54; 
J. H. Farrar & B. M. Hannigan, Farrar s Company Latin, 1998,4"' ed., London: Butterworths, p. 739. 
155 L. S. Scaly, Disqualification and Personal Liability of Directors, 1993,4`h ed., London: CCH 
Editions Ltd., f 608. 
`% This allows the court to excuse a director where he had acted honestly and he ought to be excused. 
, Consortium Ltd. [1989] BCLC 513. 
ý58 `7 Re Produce 1f ;- arketinýý 
Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice, 1982, Cmnd. 8558, London: 
HMSO. 
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There is a general recognition amongst commentators that the aims of the Cork 
Committee have not been have not been met by the wrongful trading provision. 159 
The vagueness of the provision coupled with the ineffectiveness of its only defence 
ensure that it is of more use as a deterrent than as an actual mechanism for 
compensating creditors. It is, however, the problem of funding wrongful trading 
claims that ultimately reduces the usefulness of s. 214; a reduction that is clearly 
demonstrated by the low number of s. 214 claims that have reached court. 
Accordingly, although s. 214 is a provision designed to protect creditors, it does not 
protect them adequately. 
Despite this, the Company Law Review Steering Group has recommended that s. 214 
in its current form could be included in the statutory statement of directors duties. 
They were unable to reach an agreement and so recommended further consultation on 
the matter. 160 The need for further consultation is apparent given that there are strong 
arguments on both sides. 
There is little doubt that the incorporation of s. 214 into the statement will provide a 
clear indication at the point which the duty to the shareholders is displaced. However, 
the CLRSG has indicated that the duty should come into effect before the onset of 
insolvency. 161 They believe that this is what good directors do anyway. Without such 
a rule directors would apparently be bound to act in the ultimate interests of 
members until all reasonable prospect of avoiding shipwreck has been lost. 162 Yet 
even where insolvency is uncertain, but the risk is substantial, the directors should be 
considering the interests of shareholders and creditors together. 
The problem is that this will require the directors to balance the interests of 
shareholders and creditors. The CLRSG believes that this could have a chilling 
effect meaning that directors could run down or abandon a going concern at the first 
159 See e. g. C. Williams, Section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Private Company: II'hy It . Itui 
Fall Short of the Mark (1990) 11 Co. Law. 222 at 224: A. Hoey, II'rongfd and Reckless Trading - 
Remedies II ithout Substance? (1995) 11 Insolv. L. & Prac. 50 at 52. 
160 The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Last' for a Competitive Economy: 
Final Report, 2001, London: DTI, para. 3.20. However, in para. 3.16 the CLRSG appear to state that 
they do wish to recommend incorporation of s. 214 into the draft statement. 
161 Ibid. at para. 3.17. 
162 Ibid. at para. 3.18. 
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hint of insolvency. 163 Given that s. 214 results in personal liability, there is a real fear 
that many companies would be put into premature liquidation. If the company can be 
saved, the premature liquidation is as damaging to the creditors as to the shareholders. 
It will destroy the company s value and employment. 
Given the above concerns, the CLRSG recommended further consultation. After 
further consultation the Government in its recent White Paper concluded that the 
arguments against incorporation of s. 214 outweighed the arguments for incorporation. 
The Government was concerned that the risk of premature liquidations would destroy 
the rescue culture philosophy that the Insolvency Act 2000 and the new Enterprise 
Bill were trying to promote. 164 Accordingly, the Government recommended that 
s. 214 remain in the Insolvency Act 1986 and not be incorporated into the statutory 
statement of directors duties. 165 
The Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.166 
The power to set up and run a limited liability company is one conferred by statute. ' 67 
It has been contended that absolute power is vested, by means of art. 70, Table A, 
Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985,168 in the board of directors. 169 
Accordingly, the company has come to resemble the State with the directors acting as 
a self-perpetuating oligarchy. 170 Directors therefore have opportunities for fraud or 
self-gain, and stand in a position to affect all those with a stake in the company. In 
order to curtail such behavior, there exist regulatory measures and criminal 
63 Ibid. at para. 3.19. 
64 DTI, Alodernising Company Law, July 2002, Cm. 5553-I, London: DTI, para. 3.11. 
'` Ibid. at paras. 3.10-3. 
ý66 Hereafter CDDA. 
167 S. l Companies Act 1985. 
168 Art. 70, Table A, Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985 (SI 1985/805): 
Subject to the provisions of the Act, the memorandum and the articles and to any 
directions given by special resolution, the business of the company shall be managed by 
the directors who exercise all the powers of the company 
169 A. Hicks, Disqualification of Directors - Forty Years On [1988] JBL 27 at 28. This contention that 
directors have absolute power is of course, incorrect. Provisions such as s. 303 Companies Act 1985 
ensures that there still remains, at least theoretically, a significant portion of residual power in the 
hands of the shareholders. 170 
Ibid. 
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penalties. '7' However, these provide only ex post facto control of directors actions, 
by which time the damage has been done. 
In an effort to strengthen the current restraints on directorial power, in 1985, the 
legislature introduced a provision giving the court the power to disqualify delinquent 
directors, namely s. 300 Companies Act 1985. However, there was significant 
dissatisfaction with this section given that disqualification could only occur if a 
director had been involved with two companies which both in the proceeding five 
years had gone into insolvent liquidation, and if his conduct as a director of either of 
those companies was thought to render him unfit to be a director of subsequent 
companies. Accordingly, this provision was repealed and replaced by the provisions 
of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. Here, we are concerned with 
two sections, namely ss. 6 and 10. 
The majority of cases brought under the CDDA involve the question of unfitness 
under s. 6: 
6(1) The court shall make a disqualification order against a person in any case 
where, on an application under this section, it is satisfied- 
(a) that he is or has been a director of a company which has at any time become 
insolvent (whether while he was a director or subsequently) and, 
(b) that his conduct as a director of that company (either taken alone or taken 
together with his conduct as a director of any other company or companies) 
makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of a company. 
In examining this provision, two issues will dominate, namely the issue of unfitness 
and the problems surrounding sanctions. 
The first issue to be examined is how the courts decide if a director is unfit. Linked 
to this will be an examination of the ethos pervading the disqualification provisions, 
namely do they exist to protect the public or punish the director. 
When determining unfitness, the courts must have regard to the factors set out in 
Schedule 1 of the Act. ' 72 However, these factors are not exhaustive' 
73 and therefore 
171 There are over 200 offences in the Companies Act 1985: see J. Dine, Personal Accountability and 
Corporate Control. - The Role ofDirectors and Officers Liability Insurance (1995) 58 NILR 880. 
171 S. 9 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
17 1 Re Bath Glass Ltd. [ 19881 BCLC 329 at 332, per Gibson J. 
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the courts are generally left with the task of determining unfitness. Unfitness has 
emerged as the most important and controversial aspect of the CDDA. 174 
A major issue that has arisen is whether incompetence, as opposed to fraud or other 
deliberate or reckless wrongdoing, should constitute unfitness. This is a difficult 
question and one which requires the balancing of two potentially conflicting interests. 
On one hand, the purpose of the legislation is the ensure that those who take 
advantage of the privilege of limited liability do so with a proper sense of 
responsibility 175 and to protect the public against those whose past records as directors 
shows them to be a danger to creditors, employees and shareholders. 176 On the other 
hand, overly rigorous standards could inhibit the forming and expansion of new 
business ventures177 and could constitute a substantial, and arguably unwarranted, 
interference with individuals who wish to be involved in the management of 
companies. 178 
In 1962, the Jenkins Committee recommended that incompetence should be a ground 
for unfitness. 179 However, when an opportunity for reform came in the Insolvency 
Act 1976, the government concluded that to permit disqualification on grounds of 
incompetence alone would go unwisely far. 180 S. 9 Insolvency Act 1976 therefore 
permitted disqualification on the grounds of unfitness if an individual had been a 
director of at least two companies that had gone into insolvency within five years of 
each other. The view that disqualification per se could result in disqualification was 
also seen as being too harsh by the Cork Committee in 1982.181 
However, an extreme proposal was put forward by the government in 1984,182 and 
included in the Insolvency Bill 1985, under which every director of a company in 
compulsory liquidation would be disqualified unless he could disprove unfitness. 
174 DTI, Companies in 1994-95,1995, London: DTI, p. 39- 
175 Re Sttvft 736 Ltd. [19931 BCC 312. 
176 Re Gravan Building Services Ltd. [ 19951 BCC 554 at 577, per Henry U. 
177 Re Rolus Properties Ltd. (1988) 4 BCC 446. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Report of the Compani' Law Committee, 1962, Cmnd. 1749, London: HMSO, para. 85(b). 
180 On the background of the 1980 s insolvency legislation, see I. Fletcher, The 
Genc'. sis Q/' . 
tlodern 
Insolvenci, Law-An Odt-s cv of Lair Reform [1989] JBL 365. 
181 Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Lath and Practice. 
1982, Cmnd. 8558, London: 
HMSO, Ch. 45. 
1'2 4 Revised Framework fcrr Insolvency Law, 1984. Cmnd. 9175. London: HMSO, Ch. 2. 
ýý 
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Understandably, this proposal attracted a wealth of criticism and once the Bill had 
been voted down twice by the House of Lords, it was withdraw and what is now s. 6 
CDDA 1986 was enacted instead. Accordingly, as statute gives no guidance, it is up 
to the courts to decide whether or not incompetence should form grounds for 
disqualification. 
In determining this, the courts have concluded that mismanagement or incompetence 
are not ipso facto grounds for disqualification. ' 83 In Re Dawson Print Group Ltd.. 1,84 
Hoffman J spoke of the need to find: 
some conduct in breach of standards of commercial morality or some gross 
incompetence which persuaded the court it would be a danger to the public if [the 
director] was allowed to continue to be involved in the affairs of companies. 185 
In Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd. , 
186 Browne-Wilkinson V-C, commenting on s. 300 
Companies Act 1985 stated: 
In the normal case, the conduct complained of must display a lack of 
commercial probity, although I have no doubt that in an extreme case of gross 
negligence or total incompetence, disqualification could be appropriate. 187 
Finally, in Re ECM (Europe) Electronics Ltd., the court in summing up, repeated the 
words of Peter Gibson J when it stated: 
To reach a finding of unfitness the court must be satisfied that the director has 
been guilty of a serious failure or serious failures, whether deliberately or 
through incompetence, to perform those duties of directors which are attentive in 
the privilege of trading, through companies with limited liability. 
188 
It is apparent that whilst it is acknowledged that mismanagement per se is not grounds 
for disqualification, the courts are not entirely certain as to what constitutes 
unfitness. This is in part due to the confusion surrounding the ethos behind the 
provisions. There are two clearly opposed views. One is that the imposition of a 
disqualification order is a penal sanction designed to punish the director. The other is 
183 E.,,. Re Churchill Hotel (Plymouth) Ltd. [ 19881 BCLC 341. 
'4 [19871 BCLC 601. 
IRS Ibid. at p. 604. 
I\`' [19881 BCLC 698. 
87 Ibid. at p. 703. 
IRR Ibid. 
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that the director should be removed from office so as to protect the public, and most 
notably creditor interests. 189 
In the case of Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd., 190 Dillon U stated: 
It is beyond dispute that the purpose of section 6 is to protect the public, and in 
particular potential creditors of companies, from losing money through 
companies becoming insolvent when the directors of those companies are people 
unfit to be concerned in the management of a company. 191 
However, it is respectfully stated that the purpose of s. 6 is not beyond dispute. 
There is judicial inconsistency in the application of this ethos as regards the 
disqualification of directors. An examination of three prominent cases will 
demonstrate this inconsistency. 
The first case is Re Ipcon Fashions Ltd. 192 Over a period of nine years, the director in 
question, Mr. Hava, saw four of his companies become insolvent. The issue placed 
before the court concerned the last one. That company, Ipcon Fashions, was created 
in May 1985, but by July 1986 was obviously insolvent, 193 and so Mr. Hava decided 
to wind up the company. However, between deciding this and actually completing the 
winding up procedure (some four months) and despite owing significant PAYE and 
VAT sums, Mr. Hava, his wife and two other employees received weekly salaries. 
Hoffman J had no hesitation in finding Mr. Hava s conduct unfit and disqualified him 
for five years. 
Doubtless, this is the correct decision. Mr. Hava s conduct of Ipcon coupled with his 
management of the other companies, the obvious exhibition of the Phoenix 
Syndrome and the extremely casual attitude to his duties [and his] want of probity in 
dealing with certain creditors as well as a reckless disregard of the interests of all 
189 In order to protect such parties, the names of directors who are currently the subject of 
disqualification orders can be found at http: //www. companieshouse. - v. uk. 190 f 1991 ] Ch. 164. 
191 Ibid. at p. 176 (italics added). See also Re Stanford Services Ltd. [1987] BCLC 607 at 620. where 
Vinelott J said (italics added): 
If it is shown that the respondent has been guilty of a serious breach of his obligations as 
a director, and to have caused loss to the creditors of a company, the public interest 
requires that the misconduct be recognized and reflected in an order of disqualification. I` 
(1989) 5 BCC 773. 
19; Ibid. at p. 774, per Hoffman J: it must have been obvious to Mr. Nava that the company was 
insolvent. 
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creditors including in particular the Crown 194 all helped ensure that, despite there 
being no personal dishonesty, a disqualification order was inevitable. 
Ipcon was couched in the language of protection. 195 Thus here, the purpose of the 
disqualification was said not to be penal but rather to protect the public against being 
ripped off 196 by the likes of Mr. Hava s use of limited liability. However, are the 
disqualification provisions purely protective i. e. is some element of blameworthiness 
required? 
Some cases'97 have suggested that blameworthiness is an essential ingredient and in 
the second case for examination Re CU Fittings Ltd. , 
198 blameworthiness was 
certainly present. Here, the director, Mr. Turton, had two companies become 
insolvent under his management. The first company, CU Fittings Ltd. went into 
voluntary liquidation in 1982 and another company, Packaging Ltd., took over the 
viable 199 side of the business. However, Packaging Ltd. made substantial losses and 
a principal supplier, a Canadian company by the name of Streamline, presented a 
winding up petition in June 1984. Prior to the winding up order, Streamline had made 
various promises of financial assistance to Packaging Ltd., all of which were 
unfulfilled. In court, it was submitted that Mr. Turton was unfit to be a director as he 
should have known that after January 1984, the company could not have been saved 
and he should have ceased trading then. 
However, Hoffman J disagreed. He stated that: 
directors immersed in the day to day task of trying to keep their businesses 
afloat could not be expected to possess wholly dispassionate minds regarding the 
likely demise of their companies they cling to hope. 200 
Also Mr. Turton had quite properly relied on assurances from Streamline s 
representative that his company would not be allowed to sink. 
201 Accordingly, he 
X95 Ibid. at p. 775. 
195 V. Finch, Disqualification of Directors: A Plea for Competence (1990) 53 MLR 385 at 386. 
196 Re Douglas Construction Services Ltd. (1988) 4 BCC 553 at 557, per Ilarman J. 
197 Re 1/eNultº s Interchange Ltd. (1988) 4 BCC 533 at 536, per Browne-Wilkinson V-C; Re Lo-Line 
E"ie"c tric Ltd. [19881 BCLC 698 at 703, per Browne-Wilkinson V-C. 
(1989) 5 BCC 210. 
i99Ibid. at p. 21 2. CU Fittings Ltd. dealt in copper tubes and fittings. Accountants advised the 
director 
that the fittings side of the business was still viable. 
2°° Ibid. at p. 213. 
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had not been gambling at the expense of his creditors on the possibility that 
something may turn up. 
202 
Here, the court has moved away from a purely protective stance. In emphasizing the 
honesty of the director, the court implicitly stated that a lack of blameworthiness is a 
factor. In effect, the court will be sympathetic towards honest optimistic directors. 203 
This is despite the fact that a disqualification order is in the public and creditor 
interest. 
The final case is Re Cladrose Ltd. 204 and is apparently based on punitive principles 
alone. Here, the respondents were directors of three insolvent companies in all of 
which there had been a total failure to produce audited accounts and file annual 
returns. One director, Mr. Pollard, contended that he had relied on another director, 
Mr. Platt, a chartered accountant, and that Mr. Platt understood this. Mr. Pollard 
escaped disqualification. Mr. Platt, however, was disqualified for two years. 
This was despite the fact that there was no personal misconduct, no dishonesty and the 
directors themselves had lost substantial sums. Further, Harman J concluded that 
there had been no negligence or incompetence, merely mismanagement. The question 
therefore rested on the failure to submit accounts. 
As a chartered accountant, Mr. Platt could be expected by his fellow directors and the 
court to have a better knowledge and understanding of company law and of the 
formal duties to make returns than persons who do not hold that distinguished 
qualification. 205 Accordingly, Mr. Platt exhibited an unwarrantable disregard, an 
unwarrantable lightness of view, as to the seriousness of keeping the registrar 
informed. 206 Conversely, Mr. Pollard whilst not totally innocent may be very much 
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`4 1 1990) 6 BCC 1 1. 
'05 Ibid. at p. 14. 
206 Ibid. at p. 19. 
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good and sufficient cause to believe was the proper person to rely on. 207 Thus Mr. 
Platt was disqualified even though there was no intention to deceive creditors or the 
public and even if the accounts were filed, they would not have protected the 
creditors. 208 
The fact that the court distinguished between the two directors demonstrates the move 
away from protective principles. Ultimately, both directors were under a duty to 
submit accounts and a protective regime would have demanded that they were both 
disqualified. Mr. Platt was singled out because he was blameworthy and was 
punished accordingly. 
It is therefore apparent that whilst protective considerations are present, that is not to 
say that punitive principles are absent. Despite what the judiciary may say, the 
CDDA provisions are not purely protective. They are an amalgam of penal and 
protective measures. Occasionally, the courts have hinted at this: 
The primary purpose of the section is not to punish the individual but to protect 
the public against the future conduct of companies by persons whose past records 
as directors of insolvent companies have shown them to be a danger to creditors 
and others. Therefore, the power is not fundamentally penal. But, if the power 
to disqualify is exercised disqualification does involve a substantial 
interference with the freedom of the individual. It follows that the rights of the 
individual must be fully protected . [S]ince the making of a 
disqualification 
order involves penal consequences for the director, it is necessary that he should 
know the substance of the charges that he has to meet 209 
The Court of Appeal has now set out sentencing guidelines for disqualification 
orders which seem to indicate a close parallel between sentencing for unfitness and 
sentencing in the criminal courts. 210 
Even if the provisions are punitive, the public and creditors may be benefited as a by- 
product. In certain cases, the courts may take a more stringent, punitive line with 
directors, most notably where the company in question has substantial Crown debts. 
, 07 
Ibid. at p. 14. 
`OR Ibid. 
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However, at first this was not the case. Indeed, the Cork Committee21 recommended 
that private debts should have preference over community debts; a view that has to 
some extent influenced the list of preferential debts in Sch. 6 Insolvency Act 1986, 
although PAYE, NIC and VAT still have preference. This view was shared by the 
court in Re Dawson Print Group Ltd. 212 where they held that the failure to pay certain 
Crown debts was not to be regarded as indicative of unfitness, holding that the Crown 
in appointing tax collectors run the risk of non-payment, a risk compensated by the 
preferential status which those debts enjoy. It is true that a bad debt owed to the 
State is likely to be a drop of water in the ocean, whereas loss of a similar sum to a 
private creditor might be catastrophic. 213 
However, this is not the present view. In Re Stanford Services Ltd., 214 Vinelott J 
refused to follow Dawson in declining to take a lenient view of a company that 
continued to trade whilst owing large sums to the Crown. The court stated that the 
Crown was an involuntary creditor whereas trade creditors are voluntary creditors 
who can check up on the company or secure the loans via reservation of title clauses 
or fixed/floating charges. 215 This view has since been confirmed in Re Churchill 
Hotel (Pl mouth) Ltd. and Others. 216 
What is clear, however, is that the need to protect creditors has been a constant theme 
in the disqualification cases to date and directors who take unwarranted risks with 
creditors money face the real risk of disqualification. 217 As Henry U stated in the 
case of Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Gray: 218 
The concept of limited liability and the sophistication of our corporate law 
offers great privileges and great opportunities for those who wish to trade under 
that regime. But the corporate environment carries with it the discipline that 
those who avail themselves of those privileges must accept the standards laid 
_'11 The Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) Cmnd. 8558. 
-12 [19871 BCLC 601. 
213 C. D. Drake, Disqualification ofDir"ector"s-The Red Card (1989) JBL 474 at 482. 
? 14 [19871 BCLC 607. 
215 See also Re Sevenoaks Stationers Ltd. [19911 Ch. 164. 
_116 1988 BCLC 341. 
217 See Re Synthetic Technology Ltd., Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Joiner [19931 BCC 
519: Re Firedart Ltd., Official Receiver v Fairall [19941 2 BCLC 340; Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry Gray [19951 1 BCLC 276; Secretary of State for Trade and Industn, v Lain" [19961 2 BCLC 
32-4, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v itlcTighe (No. 2) [199612 BCLC 477; Re RichborouQh 
Furniture Ltd. [1996] 1 BCLC 507; Secretary for State and Industr- v Lubrami, Re . Aaron 
Ltd. [19971 
1BCLC115. 
? 18 [1995] 1 BCLC 276. 
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down and abide by the regulatory rules and disciplines in place to protect 
creditors and shareholders . The Parliamentary intention to improve 
managerial safeguards and standards for the long term good of employees, 
creditors and investors is clear. 219 
The second issue we will discuss relates to sanctions. One possible reason for the 
requirement of blameworthiness is the mandatory nature of the sanction. S. 6(4) 
CDDA reads: 
6(4) Under this section the minimum period of disqualification is 2 years, and 
the maximum period is 15 years. 
Unlike s. 300 Companies Act 1985, there is no discretion as to sentencing. If the 
director is to be disqualified, he will be disqualified for a minimum of two years. 22° 
Conversely, if the court feels that disqualification is too harsh, it is forced to avoid 
finding unfitness altogether. It is this lack of flexibility that concerns 
commentators. 221 
The mandatory nature of the Act creates significant difficulties for the courts. The 
whole rationale for forming a limited liability company is to allow and encourage 
entrepreneurial risk-taking. Draconian penalties such as those found in the CDDA 
will defeat this objective by making management excessively defensive. 222 When this 
is coupled with the fear of a wrongful trading action as the company nears insolvency, 
this fear becomes even more pronounced. 
As one commentator has correctly noted [e]ven the most draconian laws against 
delinquent directors will be a dead letter if enforcement is defective. 223 Enforcement 
is probably the CDDA s largest flaw. Initially, the signs were encouraging with an 
impressive annual growth of disqualifications: 
219 Ibid. at p. 288. 
220 Howwwe\ver, it should be noted that the mandatory nature is to an extent mitigated by the ability of the 
court to permit a disqualified director to act as a director during the period of disqualification. S. l 
defines a disqualification order as an order that [the defendant] shall not, without the leave of the court 
be a director Such an order was made in the case of Re Majestic Recording Studios [1989] BCLC 1, 
where the judge made a clear finding of unfitness but allowed the director to continue to be a director 
because of the hardship that it would cause to the employees where he to be fully disqualified. 
221 See e. g. K. T. W. Ong, Disqualification of Directors: A Faulty Regime? (1998) 19 Co. Law. 7 at 
9; 
C. D. Drake, Disqualification ol'Directors: The Red Card (1989) JBL 474 at 479. 
222 
Ibid. 
223 C. D. Drake, Disqualification of Directors: The Red Card (1989) JBL 474 at 485. 
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Table 4.1: CDDA Disqualifications 1986-89.224 










However, it soon became apparent that the enforcement agencies were unable to cope 
with this increase in applications. Evidence came from the National Audit Office in 
their 1993 report. 225 Between 1986-93, there were just under 40,000 corporate 
insolvencies, yet disqualification proceedings were only brought against 1,712 
directors. 226 The NAO found similar shortcomings. Between 1987 and 1993, 
disqualification proceedings were commenced on 2,900 occasions, with just over 
1,700 disqualification orders being made. Despite this, many cases deserving of 
investigation were not pursued. The NAO s study found that among the 153,000 
corporate insolvencies during the period 1987-1993,28,500 involved unfit conduct 
and 4,300 involved serious public interest breaches. Further, even where there is a 
disqualification order made, enforcement is piecemeal. The NAO report found that 
Companies House had failed to maintain an up-to-date list of disqualified directors 
and that insufficient effort was made to ensure that disqualified directors left their 
directorships and did not take up new ones. 227 Given the above, it is not surprising 
that the NAO found that the CDDA had not had a significant deterrent effect of 
company directors. Of the directors questioned, nearly 60% were unaware of the 
existence of the CDDA and 57% said that they were not well informed about 
disqualification procedures. 228 
There is evidence to indicate that the situation is improving. In 1999, the NAO issued 
a follow-up report to its 1993 report. 229 It revealed that in 1997-8, there were over 
1,400 disqualification proceedings compared to 600 in 1992-3. The number of s. 6 
"4 Ibid. at p. 486. 
S National Audit Office, The Insolvency Service Executive Agency: Company Director 
Disqualification, 1993, London: NAO. 
226 T. Pryce-Brown, Efficient Disqualification: -1 uditor s General Report on the 
Insolvency service 
Executive 
.1 enc : 
Company Directors Disqualification (1994) IBFL 16 at 16. 
227 National Audit Office, The Insolvency Service Executive Agency: Company Director 
Disqualification, 1993, London: NAO, p. 19. On the obligations of the DTI and Companies House, sce 
s. 18 CDDA 1986. 
228 Ibid. at p. 16. 
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proceedings has risen from 399 in 1992-3 to 1,267 in 1997-8. The DTI notes another 
rise in 2000-2 to 1,548.230 The Insolvency Service now contends that it proceeds with 
all cases it believes are in the public interest. The 1993 report criticised the 
Insolvency Service for failing to adequately assess the resources it would need to 
pursue sufficient disqualifications. The follow-up report now notes that expenditure 
on disqualification has increased from £9 millions in 1992-3 to £22 millions in 1997- 
8.231 The NAO further states that disqualification as a proportion of the overall 
expenditure has increased from 11% to 28% in 1997-8. 
As a result of the above improvements, the NAO report states that s. 6 
disqualifications save creditors £11 million per year. However, whilst this figure may 
seem initially impressive, there are two reasons why this is not so. First, £I1 million, 
spread across a million or so public companies and a few million or more 
unincorporated businesses, looks like a small amount. 232 Second, this £11 million 
saving to creditors came at a cost of £22 million to the taxpayer. 233 It has also been 
argued that rather than saving creditors money, the disqualification system can force 
costs upon the creditors. 234 When a company is liquidated, the office-holder in 
charge235 must file a report with the Insolvency Executive Agency if it appears that a 
director is unfit. 236 If the matter merits pursuing, the office-holder will then have to 
co-ordinate his efforts with the Agency staff responsible for disqualification. Since 
the office-holder s expenses are payable out of the company s assets in priority to all 
other claims, 237 these costs are borne by the company s creditors. 238 The creditors 
may resent this since they receive no direct benefit from the disqualification order. 
Put simply, there is still a strong presumption that the Act has little or no deterrent 
value and that disqualification does little to protect creditor interests. It appears that 
230 DTI, Companies in 2001-2002,2002, London: DTI, p-38- 
231 National Audit Office, Companv Director Disqualification - .4 Follow Up Report 
1999, London: 
NAO, para. ]. 14. 
, z, A. Hicks, Director Disqualification - the National. -l udit Office Follows Up(] 999) 15 Insoly. L. 
& 
Prac. 112 at 115. 
'" Ibid. 
234 B. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
551 
°` An official receiver in the case of a compulsory liquidation and an insolvency practitioner if it is a 
voluntary liquidation. 
, i`' S. 7(3) CDDA 1986. 
237 S. 115 Insolvency Act 1986. 
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the problem lies, not with the law, but with the enforcement of the law. As one 
commentator has stated [w]hile some of that may be faults in the Act, a major part of 
it must also be the way in which the Act is being implemented. 239 Despite the 
NAO s 1999 follow-up report, this presumption still exists. 
The procedural and resource problems highlighted above were of significant concern 
to warrant reform, namely the Insolvency Act 2000. The new Act introduced what 
has been termed a fast-track 240 method of disqualification under which the Secretary 
of State is able to accept an undertaking from a director that they will not act as a 
director for a period between two and fifteen years. 241 
This fast-track procedure is not strictly new since a similar arrangement was 
available before the 2000 reforms. This arrangement was known as a Carecraft 
disposal following the case of Re Carecraft Construction Co. Ltd. '42 This would 
basically involve both parties reaching an agreement as to the appropriate period of 
disqualification and, if the director agrees, then the disqualification case can be dealt 
with by the court in a summary fashion. The following year, the Vice-Chancellor of 
the Chancery Division recommended to the Secretary of State that he give serious 
consideration to either introducing or amending legislation to permit such 
undertakings and to grant them the same effect as a court order imposing a 
disqualification period. 243 There is little doubt that the motivating factor behind this 
recommendation was the need to cut costs and the workload on the Insolvency 
Service in relation to disqualification orders. Following the new Act, as from the 2nd 
April 2001, these undertakings now have the same force as a court order. 
The effect of this new procedure has been evident. The DTI reports that in 2000-1, 
2 there were 1,548 disqualification orders under s. 6. A In 2001-2, there were only 
548 
. 
2' This substantial reduction is no doubt due to the new procedure. However, 
218 R. M. Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 1990, London: Sweet & Maxwell, p. 71. 
"' Alan Williams, a member of the Public Accounts Committee quoted in A. Hicks, Director 
Disqualification - the National A udit Office Follows Uj 1999) 
15 Insolv. L. & Prac. 1 12 at 118. 
240 A. Walters, Directors Disqualification After the Insolvency A ct 2000 (2001) 3 Insolv. L. 86 at 86. 
14I S. 1A Directors Disqualification Act 1986, inserted by s. 6 Insolvency Act 2000. 
-4 1 [1994] 1 WLR 174, approved in Secretary of State v Rogers [19961 1 WLR 1569. 
241 See Practice Note [ 1996] 1 All ER. 442. 
244 DTI, Companies in 2001-2002,2002, London: DTI, p. 38. 
24 s Ibid. 
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these figures do not tell us how many undertakings there were. Thankfully, these 
figures are available from the NAO, who note that in 2001-2, there were 1,213 
undertakings pursuant to s. lA resulting in an overall increase in disqualification 
orders of 13.8%. 
There is therefore little doubt that the 2000 reforms will benefit the Insolvency 
Service and should allow them to focus their efforts. However, there is the danger 
that the new procedure may serve to undermine the protective objectives of the 
CDDA. We have seen that one of the aims of the CDDA was to act as a deterrent. 
The ability to agree an undertaking, although doubtless cost-effective, may be viewed 
as a soft option, allowing a director to avoid the stigma and embarrassment of formal 
proceedings. This was discussed in the recent case of Re Blackspur Group plc.: 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Eastaway. 246 Here, the defendant director 
wished to accept a period stated in an undertaking. However, he did not want the 
reasons for disqualification attached to the undertaking document fearing that this 
could affect his future career prospects. At first instance, Potter J dismissed the 
undertaking application holding that the Secretary of State was able to reject an 
undertaking that did not have such information attached. The Court of Appeal upheld 
the decision stating that the Secretary of State not only had the power to accept the 
undertaking, he also had the power to reject the content. 
This decision is to be applauded. To have permitted the director to agree an 
undertaking but without stating the reasons for disqualification would have adversely 
affected the deterrent effect of the disqualification procedure. 247 In addition, it would 
prevent the public from knowing the reasons for disqualification. 
Conclusion. 
A leading academic has clamed that the above developments in relation to creditors 
have greatly altered the topography of company law [and constitute] unquestionably 
one of the most important developments in company law this century. 
`48 Analysis of 
'46[20011 EWCA Civ. 1595, LTL 13/9/2001. 
'47 A. Walters, Bare Undertakings in Disqualification Proceedings: A Postscript (2002) 23 Co. Law. 
123. 
11e D. D. Prentice, Creditors Interests and Directors Duties (1990) 10 OJLS. 265 at 277. 
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the various developments relating to the protection of creditors has shown them not to 
be as radical as some academics first thought. The duty of directors towards 
creditors is still extremely vague in its application, and there are commentators who 
believe that it is still not well enough established to alter the traditional beneficiaries 
of the bona fide duty, namely the shareholders. It comes into effect at too late a stage 
ensuring that as long as the company remains on the right side of doubtful solvency, 
they need not consider the interests of creditors. 249 S. 214, first thought by many to be 
a highly effective means of creditor protection, has shown itself to be highly 
problematic in practice with the result that it has had little impact. Despite this, there 
are still commentators who have argued that s. 214 is all the protection that creditors 
need and that it provides them with ample protection. 250 The provisions in the CDDA 
are inadequately enforced and provide only a weak incentive. 
If company law is genuinely concerned about the position of creditors, then stronger 
and more effective measures need to be taken. The Company Law Review Steering 
Group has considered the possibility that its statutory statement of directors duties 
should incorporate the s. 214 test into the general duty as it currently stands. 251 This 
might provide slightly more clarity in terms of determining when the duty has been 
breached and give directors more indication of when they should act. However, many 
of the aforementioned problems would remain. Their suggestion that the duty should 
come into effect at an earlier stage (when there is a substantial probability of 
insolvency) is one to be welcomed. 252 However, they were unable to reach a 
consensus on this issue in the available time and so did not overtly recommend it, but 
rather advised further consultation. 253 As we saw, the Government has since decided 
not to incorporate s. 214 into the statutory statement of directors duties. 
Given this, one cannot help but feel that the protection offered to creditors has been 
relatively ineffective. The great changes envisaged by many academics at the end of 
the 1980 s have not materialised. The creditor developments have done little to alter 
the legal model of the company. Until the company becomes doubtfully solvent, the 
'41) 
N. Hawke, Creditors Interests in Solvent and Insolvent Companies (1989) JBL 54 at 60. 
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directors are still obliged to act in the interests of their members. 254 S. 214 only comes 
into effect once the company is insolvent and due to practical issues, namely the issue 
of funding, wrongful trading claims are extremely rare. The conclusion must 
therefore be that whilst there are legitimate reasons to protect the creditors, the law 
has not changed sufficiently to achieve this. 
III. INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND EMPLOYEE PROTECTION 
The Evolution of Employee Protection: 1870-1980. 
Under early company law, a company s employees were perceived as having no 
legitimate interest in the business or its assets, and were therefore offered no 
protection. Employees could benefit from managerial acts, but only where this 
benefit coincided with the shareholders. 255 This dismissive approach toward 
employees was reflected in the ultra vires rule during this period. For example, in 
Hutton v West Cork Railway Co., 256 the Court of Appeal stated that it was beyond the 
company s objects to make gratuitous payments to past or present employees. 
The first breakthrough regarding employee protection came towards the end of the 
nineteenth century with the advent of the preferential rights regime. Employees were 
given protection in the event of corporate insolvency in respect of a certain proportion 
of arrears of salary. These arrears were to be treated as preferential debts ranking 
ahead of the claims of floating charge holders. This was effected by the Preferential 
Payments in Bankruptcy Act 1888. 
The question we must now ask is what was the reason behind this change in social 
policy. At the time of the creation of the preferential rights regime, employee wages 
were relatively low and would therefore not represent a major drain on the insolvent 
company s assets. Another important point to note is the fact that employees were not 
the only beneficiaries of this change in policy; local authorities owed rates and 
Ij 'I Ibid. at para. 3.20. 
254 Due to s. 309 Companies Act 1985, the employees also factor. However, as we shall see, this 
protection is highly ineffective and in practice, gives the employees little, if any, protection. 
See Hanson v Price .c 
Potent Candle Co. (1876) 45 U. Ch. 437, where the court said that keeping 
the workforce happy was a prudent objective, but was not a legal requirement. 
'ý`' 0883) 23 Ch. D. 654. 
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government departments having claims in respect to unpaid tax also gained 
preferential status. 
The employee s preferential status escaped the cuts advocated by the Cork Committee 
in 1982257 and still survive in Schedule 6 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The Cork 
Report recommended abolishing preferential rights for employees and instead 
protecting them through the state guarantee system, which is discussed shortly. 
This policy of protecting employee interests though a preferential priority mechanism 
is one that has been adopted in most common law jurisdictions. It still survives in 
many countries today258 despite a general cutback in preferential claims in general. 
Other countries, such as Canada, 259 prefer to protect employee interests by making 
directors personally liable for salary arrears on insolvency. 
As was mentioned, our preferential payment regime was further strengthened by the 
introduction of the state guarantee system. Private law relief has now been replaced 
by public law support, due largely to the delays experienced by employees waiting for 
distribution out of the company s assets. 260 Under s. 122 of the Employment 
Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 the state guarantees that certain employee claims 
up to a specified limit will be met in full and where this is unlikely to happen because 
the employer is insolvent, the state will recompense the employee and then seek to be 
subrogated to the employees rights on corporate insolvency. 
However welcome these developments were, they were only of aid once the company 
was insolvent. Employee protection during solvency was longer in coming. For 
many years, the courts upheld the principle that whilst the company was solvent, the 
directors were not obliged to consider the interests of employees. The American case 
of Dodge v Ford Motor Company261 is illustrative of the approach adopted here. The 
directors of the Ford Motor Company decided to restrict dividends in order to 
"57 Report of the Company Law Committee, 1962, Cmnd. 1749, London: HMSO, para. 1450. I [O 
LA 
E. g. s. 556 Australian Corporations Law. 
259 S 1119 Canadian Business Corporations Act. 
2260 D. Milman, From Servant to Stakeholder: Protecting the Employee Interest in Company Last' in D. 
Feldman and F. Meisel (eds. ), Corporate and Commercial Law: Modern Developments, 
1996. London: 
. 
Lloyds of London Press, p. 152 
'61 170 NW. 668 (1919). 
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subsidise the price of cars manufactured by the company in the hope that this would 
stimulate the economy and secure the jobs of company employees. The court held 
that this was unlawful as it was not in the interests of the company s shareholders. 
Nearly 50 yeas later, the English courts in Parke v Daily News Ltd. 262 similarly held 
that it was ultra vices to advance the interests of employees at the expense of the 
shareholders. 
However, this approach came under criticism during the 1970s. In the Canadian case 
of Teck Corporation v Millar, 263 Berger J stated [i]f today the directors of a company 
were to consider the interests of its employees no one would argue that in doing so 
that they were not acting bona fide in the interests of the company itself. 264 Similar 
criticisms surfaced in the UK at a governmental level. The Bullock Committee on 
Industrial Democracy called for a statutory reversal of the common law rule. A 
subsequent Government White Paper on the Conduct of Company Directors made a 
similar proposal. These proposals eventually made their way into proposed 
legislation in the Companies Bills of 1973 and 1978. However, neither of these were 
successfully introduced. Eventually, such a proposal did make it onto the statute 
books in the form of s. 46 Companies Act 1980, which is now s. 309 Companies Act 
1985 and it is this provision that we now examine. 
S. 309 Companies Act 1985. 
Prior to 1985, British company law was governed by no less that eight statutes 
spanning forty years. 265 A major consolidation of our company law was in order, and 
this came in the form of the Companies Act 1985 and three supplementary Acts. 
266 
S. 46 Companies Act 1980 became s. 309 Companies Act 1985, and this is the main 
company law provision concerning employee governance protection. It is also to 
date, the only piece of legislation identifiable with stakeholder theory. In examining 
s. 309, two issues will be examined: the content of the duty and the issue of 
enforcement. 
, `'' 11962] Ch. 927 discussed infra. 
'`'' 119731 33 DLR (3d) 288. 
"'' Ibid. at p. 314. 
"'` These were the Companies Acts 1948,1967,1976.1980,1981 and 1983. the European 
Communities Act 1972 and the Companies (Floating Charges and Receivers) (Scotland) Act 1972. 
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S. 309(l) which concerns the content of the duty provides that: 
309(1) The matters to which the directors of a company are to have regard in the 
performance of their functions include the interests of the company s employees, 
as well as the interests of its members. 
The question that preoccupies us here is to what extent, if any, does s. 309 deviate 
from the legal model. This question has proved to be extremely difficult to answer as 
there are at least two polarized interpretations of the phrase have regard; one being 
overly conservative, the other overly ambitious. In other words, one leaves the legal 
model unaltered, the other renders it obsolete. 
The more ambitious interpretation holds that the shareholders and employees are to be 
given equal ranking by the directors, 267 as is the case with the Draft Fifth Directive. 268 
This view would render the legal model obsolete as the interests of the company 
would cease to be shareholder exclusive and would also encompass employees. The 
more conservative view contends that s. 309 merely requires that directors consider 
the interests of the employees. 269 According to this view, the legal model would be 
relatively unaltered as the shareholders would still be the primary recipients of the 
directors attentions with the employees having a subordinate claim. 270 
Although it is acknowledged that the more conservative approach is the intended 
one, 271 it is unclear which of the two interpretations the courts favour. There is 
surprisingly, some evidence to suggest that the court has favoured the more ambitious 
260 The Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, the Business Names Act 1985 and the 
Companies Consolidation (Consequential Provisions) Act 1985. 
267 V. Joffe, The Companies Act 1980 -A Practical Guide, 1980, London: Oyez, para. 12.103; Lord 
Wedderburn, Derivative Actions and Foss v Hai-bottle (1981) 44 MLR 202 at 208. 
-`'` Arts. 10(a) and 21(q) Amended Fifth Company Law Directive. 
269 1 Birds, Making Directors Do Their Duties (1980) 1 Co. Law. 67 at 72. 
. /0 ""...,.. ý.. thI . -. ".... -- .I -- .. -. -, " H. J. tsoyle, ciore-drown on C ompanles, 1960,44. " ed., tirtstol: Jordans, paras. l /. 4 and L /. 4.1.1 nls 
was the view put forward by ministerial statement in Hansard: 
We start from the proposition that the directors duty to the company is to carry out their 
functions in what they consider to be the interests of the company as a whole. Subsection 
(1) of new clause 20 [what was to be s. 46 Companies Act 1980] does not seek to change 
this and therefore means that the directors, as a matter of obligation, shall continue to 
have regard to the interests of the shareholders, present and future, in the course of 
carrying out their functions. 
1979 Parl. Deb., HoC Official Reports, Standing Committee A. Companies Bill (Lords), col. 360 
(statement of Cecil Parkinson, Minister for Trade). 
Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Latin for a Competitive Economy: The 
Strategic Framework, February 1999, London: HNISO, para. 5.1 21. 
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approach. In Re Welfab Engineers Ltd., 272 the company s liquidator alleged that the 
company s directors, faced with insolvency, had improperly sold the company for less 
than its full value. Hoffman J held the company not liable because the purchaser was 
prepared to take on the company s existing workforce, whereas a higher offer may 
have resulted in the redundancies of the company s employees. Even if there was a 
breach of duty, Hoffman J indicated that relief for the directors would have been 
available under s. 727 Companies Act 1985 because they had acted honestly, 
reasonably and ought fairly to be excused. 
The clearest indication to date came in the case of Fulham Football Club Ltd. v Cabra 
Estates plc. 273 Here, the plaintiff company, Bannerton Ltd., agreed that, in return for 
substantial payments, its football club, Fulham, would stop using its home ground so 
that a subsidiary of the defendant company could redevelop the ground. The directors 
of the plaintiff company, which had by now renamed itself Fulham Football Club 
Ltd., also covenanted not to oppose planning permission for the redevelopment. 
Subsequently, they decided that the redevelopment would not be in the best interests 
of the club, and sought to rely on this fact and the fact that the directors of Fulham 
Football Club Ltd. had, in agreeing not to oppose planning permission, unlawfully 
fettered their discretion. 274 The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, and went on 
to hold that even if the directors had acted improperly, it would have made no 
difference if the agreement had the unanimous assent of the shareholders. The court 
held that: 
the company is more than just the sum total of its members. Creditors, both 
present and potential, are interested, while section 309 of the Companies Act 
1985 imposes a specific duty on directors to have regard to the company s 
275 
employees in general. 
However, despite this, it is still unlikely that this section will have much of an impact 
on management behavior for two reasons. 
272 119901 BCLC 833. See also Re a Companv ex. p. Burr [19921 BCLC 724. a case that concerned the 
acquisition of a new company premises. Vinelott J held that in deciding whether or not to acquire the 
p. remiscs, the directors were entitled to take into account the interests of the employees. 
'7z j 19921 BCC 863. 
a In Kregor v Hollins (1913) 109 LT 225, it was established that a director may not 
fetter his 
discretion by contract with an outsider. See also Thorbv v Goldberg (1964) 1 12 CLR 597. 275 
119921 BCC 863 at 876, per Neill U. 
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The first reason is that the relevant duty is akin to the bona fide duty in that it is a 
subjective one. 276 Accordingly, as s. 309 gives no guidance as to the weighting of the 
interests, the matter must be decided by the directors. What this means is that no 
breach of s. 309 will occur simply because the directors have honestly mis-weighted 
those interests. In effect, s. 309 is subject to the business judgment rule. 277 
Accordingly, any act that is detrimental to the employees will only be a breach of 
s. 309 if the directors lacked good faith. In practice, these cases are likely to be very 
rare as such an act can be in some way justified by reference to the employees or 
shareholders. For example, substantial job cuts in one factory may secure the jobs of 
employees in other factories, or may be viewed as streamlining with a view to 
increasing profits. 
The second problem and indeed the second issue to be discussed relates to 
enforcement. S. 309(2) provides that: 
309(2) Accordingly, the duty imposed by this section on the directors is owed 
by them to the company (and the company alone) and is enforceable in the same 
way as any other fiduciary duty owed to a company by its directors. 
In other words, as the duty is owed to the company, the company can be the only 
plaintiff in a case concerning a breach of s. 309. However, the right to commence 
proceedings for wrongs done to the company is vested solely in the directors leading 
to the possible situation of the directors in the form of the company being the 
plaintiffs, and the same directors being the defendants. Clearly such a situation is not 
going to happen. Accordingly, the only other way for a s. 309 case to reach the court 
is via a shareholder derivative action. 278 An employee who is also a shareholder could 
theoretically bring an action. However, derivative actions are notoriously difficult to 
launch with prospective plaintiffs having to wade through 140 years accumulation of 
276 This is in contrast to France and Italy where the company s interests (1 int rt social or 1 interesse 
sociale respectively) have a more objective interpretation. For example, in Italy, the shareholders right 
to vote is more limited that it is in the UK. Article 2373 prohibits shareholders from voting where their 
interests conflict with the company s. Germany has gone one step further and advocated the enterprise 
interest (Unternehmensinteresse. ) For more, see P. Xuereb in P. Xuereb and R. Drury (eds. ), 
European Company Laws. A Comparative. -I pproach, 1991, Aldershot: Dartmouth, pp. 145-54. 277 Again it is worth stressing that whilst the English courts have not accepted the business judgment 
rule in name, they have accepted it in principle. See Shuttleworth v Cox Bros. & Co. (%faidenhead) 
Ltd. j1927] 2 KB 9. 
278 Lord Wedderburn, Companies and Employees: Common Latin or Social Dimension (1993) 109 LQR 
220 at 2 6: It is as though the legislature expected shop stewards to come to work with a share 
certificate in one hand and the exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle in the other. 
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procedural codswallop. 279 Accordingly, a derivative action will be unlikely to 
succeed. 
Normally when creating a statutory right, Parliament obeys the principle of ubi jus ibi 
remedium. 280 In the case of s. 309, not only have the employees not been given a 
remedy, but there appears to be no workable remedy. It would be na ve to put this 
down to poor drafting as the problems faced by s. 309 were readily foreseeable, 
particularly the problems of enforcement. Instead, it may be the case that the section 
was made purposely impotent. 281 In the 70 s and 80 s, corporate social responsibility 
was in effect industrial democracy. There was tremendous pressure on government in 
the shape of amongst others, the Bullock Committee, 282 to grant employees some 
protection within company law. However, even today, more than 20 years after the 
original provision, 283 the introduction of non-shareholder constituents into the 
company law framework is still very cautious. Accordingly, s. 309 could be viewed as 
a means of satisfying the reformists whilst at the same time bringing about very little 
real change. For this reason, one commentator has described s. 309 as little more 
than a public relations exercise. 284 
These failings mean that s. 309 does little to augment directorial accountability. In 
fact, one could even take the cynical view that the sections true significance is to 
grant directors even more freedom. As s. 309 does not impose the mandatory 
consideration of employee interests, it grants directors a discretion to deviate from the 
profit goal, so long as the employees benefit. The directors in Parke v Daily News285 
that were made to account in 1962, would not be held so accountable today. 
279 L. S. Sealy, Foss v Harbottle:. 4 Marathon Where Nobody Wins (1981) 40 CLJ 29 at 31. 
2¢0 Trans.: When there is a legally recognized right there is also a remedy. 
, xi J. Birds, Making Directors Do Their Duties (1980) 1 Co. Law. 67 at 73 upholds this view by 
describing the 1980 provision as window dressing. J. H. Farrar & B. M. Hannigan, Farrar s Company 
Law, 1998,4`h ed., London: Butterworths, p. 386 describe s. 309 as a statutory provision without 
teeth. 
, s2 The Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy, 1977, Cmnd. 6706. 
wz S. 40 Companies Act 1980. 
2X4 D. Mlilman, From Servant to Stakeholder: Protecting the Employee Interest in Company Law in D. 
Feldman and F. Meisel (eds. ), Corporate and Commercial Law: Modern Developments, 1996, London: 
Lloyds of London Press, p. 1 5 7. 
21; [19621 Ch. 927. 
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There can be little doubt that s. 309 is unhappily drafted. 286 The damming criticism 
offered by Sealy is typical: The emptiness of the UK s section 309 is thus exposed. 
It is either one of the most incompetent or one of the most cynical pieces of drafting 
on record. 287 Despite this, s. 309 has served as a model for reform in other common 
law jurisdictions. An almost identical provision was introduced into Irish company 
law by s. 52 Companies Act 1990. A similar reform was also proposed by Australia s 
Cooney Committee in 1989. 
The unexpected conclusion regarding s. 309 is that it is not as ineffective as widely 
believed. In a minority of cases, it has been of real influence. However, this has been 
due to the courts willingness to embrace the spirit behind the provision rather than the 
actual words. In any case, it is unlikely that decisions such as those mentioned above 
will ever become the norm due to the limitations inherent to s. 309. As Parkinson 
stated: 
An ambiguously worded provision, patently lacking adequate means of 
enforcement, may be too slender a ground on which to anticipate that the courts 
would sanction a derogation from the ownership rights of the shareholders 288 
Given the above failings, it was widely anticipated that s. 309 would be repealed. The 
Company Law Review Steering Group has now confirmed this describing s. 309 as 
neither desirable nor politically sustainable. 289 S. 309 does not give the company 
enough power to subordinate the interests of shareholders. The only true situation in 
which the directors can subordinate the interests of shareholders to that of the 
employees is in relation to ex gratia payments to employees on cessation or transfer 
of the business. Accordingly, this provision will now be examined. 
2S6 D. Milman, From Servant to Stakeholder: Protecting the Employee Interest in Company Law in D. 
Feldman and F. Meisel (eds. ), Corporate and Commercial Law: Modern Developments, 1996, London: 
Lloyds of London Press, p. 1 58. 
2,47 L. S. Sealy, Directors Wider Responsibilities - Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural 
(1987-8) 13 Mon. L. R. 164 at 177. 
-" J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibilit_i": Issues in the Theory of Company Law, 1993. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 86. 
299 The Company Law Review Steering Group, ; 1lodern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Completing the Structure, November 2000, London: DTI, para. 3.5. 
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S. 719 Companies Act 1985.290 
In 1962, a moribund company, Daily News Ltd., proposed to devote the whole of the 
monies received from the sale of its newspaper business to employees displaced by 
the sale. 291 One shareholder disagreed with the payment and brought a derivative 
action in an attempt to halt the payment. In allowing the action, the court stated that 
the directors were giving the company s money: 
to its former employees to benefit those employees rather than the company 
prompted by motives, which, however, laudable and however enlightened from 
the point of view of industrial relations, were such as the law does not recognise 
as a sufficient justification. 292 
In time, it was thought that such a position was too harsh and so s. 719293 came in to 
being. Ss. 719(1) provides that: 
719(1) The powers of a company include power to make the following 
provision for the benefit of persons employed or formerly employed by the 
company or any of its subsidiaries, that is to say, provision in connection with the 
cessation or the transfer to any person of the whole or part of the undertaking of 
the company or that subsidiary. 
This provision is important because it actually permits directors to prioritize the 
interests of employees. As this power is exercisable notwithstanding that the payment 
is not in the best interests of the company, 294 it specifically overrules Parke for the 
reason that as the company is moribund, the future flow of profits is no longer a 
concern. 295 An ordinary majority from the shareholders is required unless the articles 
provide the board to sanction payments without shareholder consent. 296 
However, although prima facie s. 719 overturns the legal model, a closer examination 
reveals that this is not the case. Firstly, the legal model is maintained by the 
requirement for shareholder consent and second, any payment under s. 719 has to be 
made out of distributable profits. Accordingly any payment under s. 719 will be 
decided upon by the shareholders and paid out of profits that would have gone to the 
290 Scc also s. 122 Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978. 
291 Parke y Daily News Ltd. F19621 Ch. 927. See Lord Wedderburn, Ultra 1 "ices and Redundancy 
(1902) CL. 1 141. 
Ibid. at p. 963, per Plowman J. 
Formerly s. 74(l) Companies Act 1980. See also s. 187 Insolvency Act 1986. 
04 S. 719(2) Companies Act 1985. 
N5 J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Poit"cr and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law, 1993, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 87. 
`% 5.719(3) Companies Act 1985. 
103 
Chapter 4: The Law Relating to Constituents Within the Corporate Nexus 
shareholders in the form of dividends. Accordingly, s. 719 is an affirmation of the 
legal model although it benefits a non-shareholder constituent. 
Codetermination and European Works Councils. 
As we shall see in Chapter 7, game theory states that even though consultation with 
workers will result in increased efficiency, there exist incentives which ensure that 
such co-operation does not take place. Game theorists therefore argue that 
governmental regulation is needed to ensure that both companies and workers co- 
operate to ensure joint wealth maximisation. 297 On the continent, such regulation has 
been in place for a number of years, most notably the German system of 
Mitbestimmung (codetermination)298 in which employees play a significant role in 
company affairs. A central element of this system concerns the Works Constitution 
Act 1972. It applies to all but the smallest companies and requires co-operation 
between management and employees towards the aim of creating works councils. 
Management is required to consult the works council in relation to workplace issues 
(e. g. hours, overtime, health and safety) as well as major issues such as plant closures. 
Although management is under no obligation to reach an agreement with the works 
council, there is considerable pressure placed on executives to secure a mutually 
acceptable outcome before proceeding with any redundancies. 299 
The above suggests that Germany s codetermination system has helped managers and 
employees reach mutually beneficial outcomes. The evidence supporting this is 
compelling. Since World War II, the country has enjoyed significant economic 
success and German employees are amongst the highest paid in the world. Many 
commentators attribute this to the above measures. 300 Certainly it appears that this 
ethic of employee protection runs throughout the company. As the chairman of 
Siemens, a large German electronics group, stated codetermination means that we 
create a relationship of trust, that one talks to the people, that one tells the truth, that 
297 M. A. 0 Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor- 
1/anagement Cooperation (1993) 78 Cornell LR. 899 at 936-40. 
For an overview of the system, see M1. Weiss, Germany (1992) 23 Bull. of Compar. Lab. Rel. 107. 
G. Roder, Labor Law Implications of the Restructuring of Enterprises in the Federal Republic of 
Germans, (1994) 28 Int. Lawyer 331 at 336-7. 
300 See e. g. R. J. Adams, The Right to Participate (1992) 5 Employee Resp. and Rts. J. 91 at 94 and 
K. 
Thelen, Union of Parts: Labor Politics in Postwar Germany. 1991, Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, pp. 1- S. 
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one builds up a reserve of trust, not only if you are in difficulties, but over a long 
301 time. 
The apparent benefits of codetermination and employee participation have resulted in 
the German model achieving considerable popularity in UK political circles. In 1993, 
the Labour Party argued that the UK could benefit greatly if the law required that 
British companies have employee directors. 302 
UK law has now moved a step closer to wards the German system following a 1994 
European Union Directive. 303 The Directive came into force on the 22nd December 
1996, yet national implementation was slow. Only six countries managed to 
implement it before the September 1996 deadline - Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Ireland, Norway and Sweden. The Directive requires participating countries to set up 
works councils along the lines of those seen in Germany. When the Directive was 
first introduced, the UK was not bound to apply by its terms due to our infamous opt- 
out of the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty. However, even though the UK 
was not bound to integrate the Directive into our national law, many companies still 
had to abide by its provisions. This is so because UK companies may have a 
significant proportion of their workforce based in countries that are subject to the 
Directive. As early as July 1994, two months before the Directive was passed, the 
TUC had identified 102 companies that fell into this category. 304 Other companies 
decided to implement EWCs on a voluntary basis having works councils in place well 
before the Directive came into force. However, one commentator has stated that 
qualitative and case study work on these works councils has revealed that very few 
305 of them have progressed far from being glorified information bureaux. 
301 Germany Needs its IWorks Councils (1996) Financial Times 16`h February. 
301 See Making Britain s Future, 1993, London: Labour Party, pp. 5-6. 
303 Directive 94/45, Directive on Establishment of a European J forks Council, OJ 1994 L254/64. 
, `u See Unions Central to Works Councils (1996) 85(9) Labour Research 17 at 17. However, research 
carried out at the University of Warwick put this number in excess of 300: see P. Marginson, The 
Coverage on United Kingdom Owned Companies by the European {forks Council Directive, 1996, 
Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations. These included inter alia United Biscuits, the NatWest Group, 
BT, Pilkingtons, GKN, ICI, Coats Viyella, IBM and Burger King 
30i P. Cressey, Transnational ! Works Councils and Macro European Developments in R. Markey and J. 
Monat (eds. ), Innovation and Employee Participation Through I! 'orks Councils: International Case 
Studies, 1997, Aldershot: A%ebury, p. 42. 
105 
Chapter 4: The Law Relating to Constituents Within the Corporate Nexus 
In 1997, however, the Labour Government agreed to join the Social Chapter and so 
was required to make the Directive part of our national law. This occurred on January 
15`h 2000 with the passing of the Transnational Information and Consultation of 
Employees Regulations. 306 
This means that all UK companies coming within the ambit of the Directive will be 
required to set up works councils. Companies qualifying are termed either 
Community-scale undertakings (CSU) or Community-scale groups of undertakings 
(CSGU. ) A CSU is any firm with at least 1000 employees within the Member States 
and at least 150 employees in each of at least two of the Member States. 307 A CSGU 
is defined as a group of undertakings with (i) at least 1000 employees within the 
Member States, and (ii) at least two group undertakings in different Member States 
with at least 150 employees each. 308 Prior to the opt-in, employees in the UK were 
excluded. 
These firms must, by way of European Works Council (EWC) or a satisfactory 
alternative procedure, consult with employees on cross-border decisions which affect 
the workforce. An enterprise s EWC will be composed of representatives from each 
Member State in which the company has an establishment with more than 150 
employees. These representatives are to meet at least once a year, at the company s 
expense, with the enterprises central management. 309 At this annual meeting, the 
central management with give information to and consult with the employee 
representatives on the enterprise s well being and any topics that the representatives 
wish to canvass. 
The EWC has received a mixed reception from commentators. Some have argued 
that for most rank-and-file employees, few things related to work are likely to matter 
less than this annual talking shop 310 and that the information received from the 
306 
Sl 1999/3323. 
", This was why some UK firms were covered before the opt-in. UK firms with over 1000 employees 
in the other r\lember States would be covered under the Directive. 308 
: frt . 
2. para 1(a). 
309 Art. 6. para. (d). See also Annex, para. 2 which contains a minimum structure for an E\VC. 110 B. R. Cheftins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
P-596, Talking Shop Soon Open for Ideas (1994) Financial Times 20th April. 
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meeting is likely to be mumbo-jumbo. 311 Others have been more optimistic. 
Wheeler argues that EWCs are an extremely important development because they are 
the first attempt to confer active participation as a right upon employees rather than 
simply allowing them to be passive recipients of information. 312 In relation to the 
legal model of the company, it has been argued that EWCs represent a substantial 
departure from the neo-classical and Anglo-American notions of exclusive residual 
control for capital owners or their representatives. 313 Research carried out in the last 
few years has demonstrated that EWCs can have beneficial effects. 
First, there is little doubt that EWCs have increased the communication now and the 
exchange of information between employees and management. In relation to this, 
Rogers and Streeck argue that not only is it normatively desirable to for employees 
to have a say in their workplace but that a guaranteed voice for workers is also more 
effective than even enlightened managerial unilateralism in productively integrating 
capital and labour. 314 Other commentators agree stating that this exchange of 
information has several positive effects such as a reduction in the information 
asymmetries between managers and workers, and could even result in more efficient 
labour contracts. 315 This exchange can increase trust between managers and workers 
which can result in an increased willingness to engage in co-operative ventures which 
can in turn increase the total output of the firm. 316 
Second, it has been contended that EWCs can enhance productivity. Schnabel notes 
that because the works councils can hinder (or support) many managerial decisions, 
it could be expected that they exert a decisive influence on productivity. 317 Several 
311 A Spanner in Europe s Works (1995) Economist 2nd December. See also This is No Way to Clinch a 
Deal (1994) Economist 2nd April. 
II? S. Wheeler, Works Councils: Towards Stakeholding? (1997) 24 J. Law & Soc. 44 at 44. 
313 F. R. Fitzroy and K. Kraft, Co-determination and Efficiency, 1998, p. 3. 
'I4 J. Rogers and W. Streeck, Workplace Representation Overseas: The Works Councils Story in R. B. 
Freeman (ed. ), Working Under Different Rules, 1994, New York: Russels Sage Foundation, p. 105. 
315 See B. Freeman and P. Lazear, An Economic Analysis of Works Councils in J. Rogers and W. 
Streeck (eds. ), Works Councils: Consultations, Representation, and Cooperation in Industrial 
Relations, 1995, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
}16 C. Lahovary, Employee Representation, Codetermination and Business Performance [Online] 
Available http: //www. dti. y-ov. uk/cld/esrc2. pdf 23`d March 2001, p. 7. As we shall see in Ch. 7, an 
economic tool called game theory will demonstrate that in order for the firm s output to be maximised, 
managers and employees need to sacrifice self-interest and co-operate. 
317 C. Schnabel, Trade Unions and Productivity: The German Evidence (1991) 29 British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 15 at 20. 
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commentators agree with Schabel s contention. 318 For example, a 1998 study by 
Fitzroy and Kraft suggested that works councils can provide scope for real efficiency 
gains in terms of both productivity and job satisfaction. 319 However, not all agree 
that EWCs have positive effects on productivity. Notably, those within the 
econometric branch of economics argue that the opposite can be true. In a 1985 
comparative study of US and German firms found that works councils in the latter had 
a significant negative effect on productivity. 320 Frick and Sadowski stated that 
according to the few studies on the econometric effects of works councils found their 
effects on productivity to be at best inconclusive, and at worst insignificant. 321 
Linked to productivity is the issue of profitability. Lewin and Mitchell correctly note 
that currently the research on the economic consequences of works councils provides 
little evidence to support the contention that works councils increase profit. 322 
Freeman and Lazear are of the same opinion. However, they then went on to say that 
many of the managers of US subsidiaries who had experience with EWCs believed 
that they did indeed increase profitability. 323 
It is still too early to determine whether or not EWCs are a success. In the UK, they 
have been mandatory for less than two years. However, research looking at the 
operation of works councils in other countries, whilst also at an embryonic stage, is 
hinting towards significant benefits in adopting consultation procedures of this kind. 
Conclusion. 
Once again, as with the position of creditors, we are forced to conclude that the 
protection offered to employees is not particularly effective. Their status as 
preferential creditors is encouraging. However, this only applies when the company 
318 See M. M. Kleiner and Y-M Lee, Works Councils and Unionization: Lessons from South 
Korea 
(1997) 36 Industrial Relations 1. 
119 F. R. Fitzroy and K. Kraft, Co-determination and Efficiency, 1998, p. 20. 
-° Ibid. 
321 B. Frick and D. Sadowski, Works Councils, Unions, and Firm Performance in F. Buttler, 
W. Franz, 
R. Schettkat and D. Soskice (eds. ). Institutional Frameworks and Labor Market Performance, 
1995. 
London: Routledge, pp. 48-9. 
D. Le\vven and D. J. B. Mitchell, Systems of Employee Voice: Theoretical and Empirical 
Perspectives 
(1992) 43 California Management Review 95 at 97-107. 
B. Freeman and P. Lazear, An Economic Analysis of ! i'orks Councils in J. Rogers and 
W. Streeck 
11'orks Councils: Consultations. Representation, and Cooperation in Industrial Relations. 1995. 
Chicago: LJni\ ersity of Chicago Press, p. 33. 
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is insolvent, by which time, the employees will probably be more concerned with 
finding new employment. There are also limits on the amount that the employees can 
receive as preferential creditors. S. 309 Companies Act 1985 does little alter the legal 
model of the company despite the court s creativity in a few hard cases. Similarly 
s. 719 does not affect the legal model because its operation is dependant upon the 
shareholders consent. More encouraging are the potential of EWCs in improving 
consultation between workers and managers. However, they are still new to this 
country and their effects, positive or negative, will not be known for a number of 
years. 
CONCLUSION. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the legal protection available to the 
main groups within the corporate nexus, namely the shareholders, employees and 
creditors. In Part I, we examined the protection offered to the shareholders. We saw 
that, consistent with the legal model of the company and the new economic theory, 
the fiduciary duties flow to the shareholders (although technically they are owed to 
the company). There is even the beginning of a fiduciary duty being owed directly to 
shareholders, meaning that they would not be subject to the rule in Foss v Harbottle. 
It is therefore apparent that the law gives the shareholders considerable protection. 
The same cannot be said regarding the employees and creditors. Regarding the 
employees, until 1980 employees had little company law protection. In 1980, s. 46 
Companies Act 1980 was introduced which became s. 309 Companies Act 1985. As 
we have seen however, the protection offered by s. 309 is minimal, although it is not 
as ineffective as many academics believe. However, the duty is owed to the company 
which means that employees cannot bring an action directly. The vague nature of the 
phrase have regard means that the directors can consider the interests of the 
employees and then dismiss them and act in the shareholders interests. This is 
entirely consistent with the legal model of the company. S. 719 although superficially 
departing from the legal model is also consistent given that the payments require 
shareholder consent. The protection offered by EWCs is more encouraging, but they, ' 
are still relatively new in this country and their effects are still unknown. 
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Similarly the protection offered to creditors is weak. The directors duty to creditors 
is still vague in scope and is believed by many to come into effect too late. Efforts to 
strengthen the duty by incorporating it into the statutory statement of directors duties 
have been rejected by the Government. Statutory measures have also shown 
themselves to be ineffective. Both s. 214 and the CDDA 1986 have not lived up to 
their potential, not so much because of their drafting, but because of the resources 
devoted to enforcing them. Again efforts to strengthen these measures such as the 
incorporation of s. 214 into the statutory statement of directors duties have been 
frustrated by the Government. 
One is therefore forced to conclude that in terms of the legal protection on offer, UK 
company law is still dominated by the legal model of the company. Much of the 
protection that exists benefits the shareholders and those measures aimed at non- 
shareholder constituents are inadequate. In the next chapter, we will examine the 
various corporate governance mechanisms that UK company law provides for. It will 
be seen that like the measures in this chapter, the vast majority of mechanisms offered 
exist to offer protection to the shareholders. The two taken together indicates that the 
legal model of the company is still the dominant model in the UK. 
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5 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
In July 1985, Houston-based Natural Gas merged with Omaha-based InterNorth to 
form a new company called Enron. Kenneth Lay, a prominent energy economist, 
became chairman and CEO. Lay wanted to take this new company beyond the 
business of piping gas and place it at the heart of the energy trading business. 
In the 1980 s, energy corporations lobbied Congress to deregulate the industry. 
Corporations, including Enron, stated that the extra competition would benefit both 
companies and consumers. Washington complied and lifted controls on who could 
produce energy and how it was sold. New suppliers came to the market and 
competition increased. In these free-market conditions, however, the price of energy 
became volatile. 
Enron saw a chance to make money out of these price fluctuations. It decided to act as 
middle man and guarantee stable prices - taking its own cut along the way. In a few 
short years, Enron became a massive player in the US energy market, controlling at its 
height a quarter of all gas business. Buoyed by this success, the company went on to 
create markets in many other energy-related products as well as expanding into 
international energy markets. 
As the dot. com economy prospered, Enron began 2000 with a plan to move into 
broadband internet networks. This idea appealed to investors and the share price 
soared. It was about this time that Enron began to use sophisticated accounting 
techniques to keep its share price high, raise investment against its own assets and 
stock and maintain the impression of a highly successful company. It also started 
legally removing losses from its books and passing them on as assets to independent 
partnerships. Equally, investment money flowing into Enron from new partnerships 
ended up on the books as profits, even though it was linked to specific ventures that 
\\, ere not yet up and running. ' 
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By the summer of 2000, Enron s shares had hit an all-time high of S90. However. 
there was also controversy. Enron s 2000 annual report reported global revenues of 
£100 billion -a rise of 40% in three years. In reality, total revenue would have been 
far lower were it not for the aforementioned partnerships created by finance director 
Andrew Fastow. 
Enron s growth was becoming increasingly dependant on these accounting tools. 
Enron made investments and then shifted the debt off its books to theoretically 
independent partnerships, in return for potential income that provided a buffer against 
future losses. 
Then suddenly, on 14`h August 2001, Jeff Skilling resigned as CEO citing personal 
reasons. Kenneth Lay once again became CEO. Skilling s resignation came as a 
shock to investors who suddenly feared that all was not well. Investors sold millions 
of shares, knocking some $4 off of the share price. Skilling s resignation also shed 
light on a previous departure. In May 2001, another executive, Clifford Baxter left in 
apparently uncontroversial circumstances. However, Skilling s resignation triggered 
rumours that he and Baxter had clashed over the propriety of some of the partnership 
transactions. Soon after, Baxter committed suicide. 
The problems facing Enron were beginning to dawn on Andersen. They realised that 
as Enron had hedged against its own stock, it could never recover its losses whilst the 
share price was falling. Andersen warned Enron that it had no choice other than to 
abandon its special accounting procedures. Soon after this, staff in Andersen s 
Houston office began shredding documents relating to Enron. 
On the 81h November 2001, Enron took the highly unusual step of restating its profits 
for the past four years. By doing this, Enron effectively admitted that it had inflated 
its profits by concealing debts in the partnership arrangement. The following day, 
Enron entered negotiations to be taken over by its much smaller rival, Dynegy. 
One such venture was to distribute Blockbuster videos by broadband connections. The plan fell 
through, but Enron had already posted $110 million venture capital as profit. 
112 
Chapter 5: Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
On the 2nd December 2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy in a New York court, 
simultaneously launching a legal action against Dynegy for pulling out of the merger. 
In three months, Enron had gone from being a company claiming assets worth almost 
£65 billion to bankruptcy. Its share price collapsed from about $95 to below S 1. 
On the 9th January 2002, the Justice Department announced a criminal investigation 
into Enron focusing on allegations of fraud. Andersen s role also came under scrutiny 
after it admitted disposing of Enron documents. 
Scandals such as Enron and Worldcom have brought about calls for a tightening of 
the internal controls that regulate companies. 2 Since Enron especially, corporate 
governance has started to dominate political and business agendas. 3 On an economic 
level, scandals such as those above have had significant impacts on corporate 
efficiency. Many theorists therefore assert that corporate governance mechanisms are 
required in order to maximise efficiency. Over time, governance mechanisms 
contribute to long-term corporate prosperity. Accordingly, sophisticated investors 
will not invest unless their interests are sufficiently protected and, therefore, an 
effective array of governance mechanisms should be in place in the vast majority of 
companies. 
However, whilst it may be the activities of a few nefarious characters that has caught 
the public s attention, the corporate governance debate has been going on for many 
years in academic circles, and has a much deeper significance. It is the purpose of 
this chapter to examine the various mechanisms that are designed to improve 
standards of corporate governance. The term corporate governance, although now 
commonplace, was rarely encountered before the 1990s. Its rapid adoption by the 
academic community however, has not been accompanied by consistent usage. 
Different writers apply different parameters to the subject. As has been noted [i]n its 
narrowest sense, the term may describe the formal system of accountability of senior 
management to the shareholders. At its most expansive the term is stretched to 
include the entire network of formal and informal relations involving the corporate 
` See Committee on Corporate Governance, The Combined Code: Principles of Good Governance and 
Code of Best Practice, 1998, Principle D. 2 appended to Financial Services Authority, The Listing 
Rules, May 2000, London: FSA. 
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sector and their consequences for society in general. 4 Whilst the latter definition 
may be too broad for, it is contended that the former definition is too narrow'. 
However, an examination of the various mechanisms in place reveals that the former 
definition has had more influence. The vast majority, if not all, of the corporate 
governance mechanisms that will be examined exist to protect the shareholders or to 
give the shareholders some ability to influence management. This supports the view 
that the legal model of the company is still an intrinsic part of our corporate 
governance system. 
Parts I-IV will examine the internal mechanisms. Part I will look at the key 
mechanism as far as the shareholders are concerned, namely the AGM. Part II will 
examine the increasingly prominent role being played by institutional investors and 
the limitations upon their effectiveness. Part III will examine the issue of board 
reform, notably the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors. Part IV will 
examine a corporate governance issue that has also aroused public concern, namely 
executive pay. The general perception is that these internal mechanisms provide only 
weak sources of accountability and so the Anglo-American system of corporate 
governance relies on an external mechanism, namely the hostile takeover market. The 
takeover market as a corporate governance mechanism is known as the market for 
corporate control and will be examined in Part V. The effectiveness of these 
mechanisms and the individuals who they are designed to protect will be examined. 
I. SHAREHOLDER VOTING POWER AND THE ANNUAL 
GENERAL MEETING 
Introduction. 
General meetings are fundamental to the company for two reasons. First, from a 
company law standpoint, they are important because company law reserves certain 
decisions in the running of the company to the shareholders in general meeting. 
Second, from a corporate governance point of view, they are important because they 
provide the shareholders with an opportunity to hold the board of directors 
3 KPMG, Corporate Governance: The New Strategic Imperative, 2002, London: KPMG, p. 1. 
K. Keasey, S. Thompson and M. Wright, Introduction: The Corporate Governance Problem - 
Competing Diagnoses and Solutions in K. Keasey, S. Thompson and Iii. Wright (eds. ), Corporate 
Governance: Economic. ,1 fanagement and Financial Issues, 1997, New York: OUP, p. 2. 
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accountable and ask them questions about corporate performance. In fact the AGM 
appears to provide the only formal link between the two key governance bodies of 
the company, the members in general meeting and the directors. 5 
However, despite their importance, there has been a long-held recognition that AGMs 
do not fulfil their functions, particularly the governance function, adequately. The 
Cadbury Committee concluded: 
If too many annual general meetings are at present an opportunity missed, that 
is because shareholders do not make the most of them and, in some cases, boards 
do not encourage them to do so. 6 
This concern was echoed by the City/Industry Working Group under the chairmanship 
of Paul Myners of Gartmore plc. whose report was published in 1995.7 The Group 
stated that virtually all participants in their consultation expressed the view that the 
AGM as it presently stands, forms an expensive waste of time and money. They 
concluded that: 
We believe the AGM is too important to leave as it is. We seriously considered 
proposing that current legislation should be amended to permit shareholders to 
opt out of the requirement to have an annual meeting . However, we 
favoured 
a second option, which was to retain the statutory backing for the AGM but to 
change its format, so that major investors see value in attending. 8 
Given the importance of the AGM in providing the shareholders with a voice in 
company matters, it must be viewed as an important element of the legal model. As 
noted, a number of fundamental company issues can only be decided upon by the 
members in meeting. The existence of the AGM as a means of deciding these issues 
is therefore a critical part of the legal model. 
5 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Company 
General Meetings and Shareholder Communication, October 1999, London: DTI, para. 16. 
6 The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, London: Gee 
Publishing Ltd., para. 6.7. See also Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for 
a Competitive Economy: Company General Meetings and Shareholder Communication, October 1999, 
London: DTI, paras. 3-4: 
AGMs are often described as the key mechanism whereby shareholders hold the 
managers of companies to account . In principle at 
least, then, AGMs are the key 
mechanism for promoting transparency and accountability in the management of 
company affairs. But in practice there is wide agreement that they do not usually achieve 
these objectives very satisfactorily. 
P. Nlyners. Developing a Winning Partnership: How Companies and Institutional Investors are 
Working Together, September 1996, London: DTI. 
Ibid. at p. 12. 
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However, whilst the legal model s influence is evident from the sheer scope of the 
issues that have to be determined in meeting, the value of the AGM to the 
shareholders is lessened by a number of procedural and practical constraints that 
almost render it obsolete from the point of view of most shareholders. 
The Scope of Shareholder Voting Power. 
We have noted that, from a company law standpoint, the AGM is important because 
certain decisions are reserved for the shareholders in general meeting. This 
reservation of powers is a major facet of the legal model. Accordingly, before we can 
analyse the effectiveness of the AGM as a means of improving governance standards, 
we need to examine the scope of the shareholders power to vote at the AGM. If very 
few issues require shareholder approval, then the potential of the AGM as a 
mechanism of accountability is reduced. 
Shareholders of a company have a right to vote where this is provided for by 
legislation, case law or through the company s articles of association. For companies 
listed on the London Stock Exchange, The Listing Rules provide a number of 
additional matters that require shareholder approval. Here, the principal matters that 
require shareholder approval will briefly be examined in an attempt to demonstrate 
that, at least theoretically, there still remains potentially significant residual power in 
the hands of the shareholders. 
Constitutional changes, such as decisions to alter the objects9 or articles10 of a 
company must be approved by special resolution of the shareholders in general 
meeting. This is hardly surprising as a change to the company s constitution affects 
the bargain between the shareholders and the company. Other constitutional changes, 
such as increases in authorised share capital] ] and variations of class rights12 also 
require shareholder approval. 
9 S. 4 Companies Act 1985. 
1° S. 9 Companies Act 1985. 
11 
S. 121 Companies Act 1985. 
12 Ss 12 5-7 Companies Act 1985. 
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A change in corporate status e. g. conversion from a private to a public company, will 
require the passing of a special resolution. 13 The exception to this is the conversion 
from a limited company to an unlimited one. This will require the consent of all the 
shareholders14 as, following the resolution, they will all become personally liable 
whereas once their liability was limited. 
The dissolution of the company may also be a matter for shareholder sanction. It is a 
matter for the shareholders, not the directors whether or not to voluntarily wind up the 
company. To do this requires the passing of either a special or extraordinary 
resolution. ' 5 
If a company wishes to raise capital by issuing shares, then it will need some form of 
shareholder approval in order to do it. The company will need either to pass an 
ordinary resolution or add a provision to the articles given them such a power (Table 
A contains no such provision). 16 Both public and private companies need to obtain 
such authorisation, but the duration of the authorisation differs according to the type 
of company. 17 Shareholder approval is also required if a company wishes to reduce 
its capital. 18 
Certain transactions involving directors also require shareholder sanction. Substantial 
property transactions, broadly those exceeding £ 100,000 or 10% of the company s net 
assets, between the company and any of its directors must be approved by an ordinary 
resolution, 19 as must advances made to a director to meet expenditure or for the 
purpose of enabling him properly to perform his duties. 20 The making of gratuitous 
payments to directors losing office is also subject to shareholder approval by way of 
13 S. 43 Companies Act 1985 (private company converting to plc. ), s. 51 Companies Act 1985 (unlimited 
company becoming limited company), s. 53 Companies Act 1985 (plc. becoming a private company). 
14 S. 49 Companies Act 1985. 
15 S-84 Insolvency Act 1986. 
16 S-80 Companies Act 1985. 
17 A public company s authorisation period is limited to five years (ss. 80(4) and 80A(2) Companies Act 
I985), whereas a private company, if it takes advantage of the special procedure contained in s. 80A 
Companies Act 1985, can have a longer authorisation period or even an indefinite one. 
13 S. 135 Companies Act 1985. 
19 S-320 Companies Act 1985. 
20 S. 337 Companies Act 1985. 
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ordinary resolution. 21 Perhaps most importantly, the shareholders can remove 
directors from office by passing an ordinary resolution. 22 
Shareholders also gain residual power from the articles of association. Table A 
(which most companies base their articles on) provides for shareholders to nominate23 
and appoint24 directors and for shareholders to fix the remuneration of non-executive 
directors. 25 It also ensures that shareholders have an opportunity to consider the 
board s performance by requiring one-third of them to retire annually, although they 
may stand for re-election. 26 
Another superficially important power granted to shareholders by Table A relates to 
dividends. It is for the shareholders, not to directors, to declare a dividend. 27 
However, the shareholders cannot recommend an amount greater than that 
recommended by the directors and so, in reality, the shareholders usually do little 
more than ratify the board s decision. 
The articles of listed companies normally deviate from Table A so as to give 
shareholders a greater say on certain matters. For example, it is common amongst 
listed companies to have a provision in the articles that limits the borrowing power of 
the directors, 28 and if the directors wish to exceed that power, they will require 
shareholder approval. These will be in addition to the additional obligation imposed 
on listed companies by The Listing Rules (e. g. the rules relating to shareholder 
approval of substantial acquisitions and disposals). 29 
It is therefore apparent that, theoretically, there is still a large amount of residual 
power in the hands of shareholders. This must be due in part to the influence of the 
legal model of the company. However, in order for the philosophy behind the legal 
21 S. 312 Companies Act 1985. 
22 S. 303 Companies Act 1985. 
'; 
. \rt. 86 Table A. Note that the board can also nominate new 
directors. 
24 Art-78 Table A. Note that art. 79 Table A gives the board a limited power to appoint directors. 
?< : \rt. 82 Table A. Executive remuneration is determined by the board (art. 84 Table A). 
26 
. \rt. 73 Table A. 27 Art. 102 Table A. Although the directors may pay interim dividends without shareholder approval 
(art. 103 Table A). 
29 Versions of Table A prior to 1985 imposed a borrowing limit. 
'`' Financial Services Authority, The Listing Rules, 2000. London: FSA. Ch. 10. 
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model to be fully realised, the shareholders need to effectively exercise these powers. 
However, the procedural rules relating to the conduct of AGMs make this extremely 
difficult for most shareholders to do. It is these rules that we now turn to. 
The Rules Relating to General Meetings. 
In the case of Re Dorman, Long & Co. Ltd., 30 Maugham J examined the effectiveness 
of the AGM as it was then and in the late nineteenth century. He stated that in the late 
nineteenth century all persons could go to the meeting, listen to what was said, and 
vote for or against the proposal according to the views expressed at the meeting. 
Conversely, in 1933, at the time of the case, he found that only a fraction of persons 
could attend meetings and in the majority of cases, proxies given before the meetings 
had already decided the outcome of the resolution. In a statement that does little to 
inspire confidence in the effectiveness of the AGM, he stated: 
In a sense the dice are loaded in favour of the views of the directors: the 
notices and circulars are sent out at the cost of the company, the board have had 
plenty of time to prepare the circulars. All the facts of the case are known to them, 
proxy forms made out in favour of certain named directors ... If we contrast with 
that the position of a class of objectors, it is to be observed that a member of the 
class who receives notice of the meeting and a circular from the directors is 
generally alone: he has no funds with which to fight the case and he has no 
information, except sometimes that information which has been contained in 
reports and balance sheets which have probably long ago been relegated to the 
waste paper basket. In any case, he has a minimum of information, his personal 
interest in the matter may be exceedingly small, probably he knows a few persons 
in the same position as himself and, if he manages to get in touch with them, they 
together have to raise funds for the purposes of an opposition, which is often an 
expensive matter. They have then to get the names and addresses of the members 
of the class who are concerned, and to frame and send out a circular representing 
their views. Very often there is scarcely sufficient time for those purposes 
between the moment when notice of the meeting reaches objectors by post and the 
date of the meeting. 31 
Developments since 1933, notably the increased scope of institutional investment and 
the consequent decrease in scattered shareholders, makes it appropriate to reconsider 
whether or not the dice are loaded still in favour of the directors. This will be done 
by examining the procedural rules relating to the conduct of general meetings. 
° L1934_] 1 Ch. 63 5. 
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Calling General Meetings. 
The power to call company meetings is usually vested in the board of directors by the 
articles of association. 32 This power is a fiduciary one which must be exercised in 
good faith, in the interests of the company as a whole33 and for a proper purpose. 
Further, the Companies Act 1985 provides for a variety of consequences should the 
directors fail to use this power correctly. 34 
The shareholders do have a non-excludable power to call an AGM. Under s. 368 
Companies Act 1985, a meeting can be called by shareholders providing that they 
hold not less than one-tenth of the voting rights in the company. The case of 
McGuinness v Bremner35 established that delay to hold an EGM following a 
member s requisition could amount to unfairly prejudicial conduct. This case 
highlighted a then loophole in the law in that although the directors were obliged to 
call a meeting at a specified time, there was nothing stopping them from fixing that 
time at some point far into the future. This loophole was closed by s. 368(8) 
Companies Act 1985 (as inserted by Companies Act 1989) which requires the 
directors to fix the date of the meeting not more than 28 days after the date of the 
notice by which the meeting is convened. The practical effect of this is that it restricts 
the time that the directors have to prepare their response to the shareholders motion. 
Given that it would be impractical to allow every shareholder the right to call a 
meeting, one could argue that the 10% requirement is reasonable. However, in 
reality, the s. 368 power in only likely to be used by small coalitions of institutional 
investors. For most private investors, the 10% threshold will almost certainly present 
an insurmountable barrier. Accordingly, the power to call meetings is not overly pro- 
director, but it is only likely to be used by institutional investors and, as we shall see 
later in the chapter, they have their own barriers to activism. 
31 
Ibid. at p. 657. 
32 Art. 37 Table A. This displaces s. 370(3) Companies Act 1985 which, in the absence of a contrary 
provision in the articles, gives two or more shareholders holding not less than one-tenth of the issues 
share capital the right to call a meeting. 
11 Percamon Press Ltd v Maxii'ell 1197011 WLR 116 7. iJ For example, if the AGNI is not held as required by the Companies Act 1985, the company and every 
officer who is in default is liable to a fine (s. 366(4)). Repeated failure to call an AGM may amount to 
unfairly prejudicial conduct under s. 459 Companies Act 1985 (Re a Company ex paste Shooter [19901 
BCLC 384). 
_` 1988 BCLC 673. 
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Drawing Up a Notice of a Meeting: Controlling the Agenda and the Circulation of 
Information. 
The notices of AGMs are normally drawn up by the directors. This is an important 
power because of the rule that, apart from any matters designated as ordinary business 
in the articles, only those matters of which notice has been given can be discussed at a 
meeting. 36 S. 376 Companies Act 1985 requires that the company give shareholders 
notice of resolutions that they wish to put to the next AGM. S. 376 also provides for 
the circulation of shareholders statements. The fact that most shareholders do not 
physically attend meetings and vote by proxy, if they vote at all, means that it is 
important for shareholders to explain the reasons for their own resolutions well in 
advance of the meeting. 
In 1996, the DTI published a consultation document37 seeking views on whether 
companies should be required to circulate shareholders resolutions for the AGM and 
accompanying statements without charge, provided they were submitted by a given 
deadline. The DTI s primary concern was the difficulties faced by individual private 
investors in accessing the machinery of corporate democracy. The contrast here 
between the position of the board and that of shareholders who wish to table a 
resolution opposing the management is stark. The directors are permitted to use the 
company s funds bona fide and reasonably for the purpose of obtaining the best 
expression of the voice of the corporators in general meeting. 38 Within the 
boundaries of their fiduciary duties, the directors can, at the company s expense, send 
out circulars explaining why the shareholders should support their resolutions. 
Conversely, shareholders who wish to table a resolution will have to pay for much of 
it themselves. The costs of providing notice to the shareholders by mail alone may be 
between £50,000-100,000.9 Accordingly, this appears to be one area where the dice 
are still loaded in the managements favour. This is borne out in that in practice 
36 Äai'e vCroydon Trannt'ays [18981 1 Ch. 358; Normandy v lnd. Coope & Co. [19081 1 Ch. 84. 
17 DTI, Shareholder Communications at the Annual General Meeting, April 1996, London: DTI. 
Peel v London and NI J' Railivay H9071 1 Ch. 5 at 18, per Buckley U. 
DTI, Shareholder Communications at the Annual General Meeting, April 1996, London: DTI. para. 
2.11. 
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resolutions are nearly always proposed and moved by the directors, not by the 
shareholders. 40 
Given this, the Company Law Review Steering Group has recommended that 
companies should bear the cost of circulating shareholder resolutions subject to a 
voting threshold and their timely filing. 41 
Ordinary Business at AGMs. 
By convention, the matters normally discussed at AGMs are reasonably predictable; 
e. g. the annual accounts, auditors reports, the election of directors etc. This 
predictability is useful to shareholders. For example, the retirement by rotation 
provisions that will be included in the articles of listed companies ensure that at each 
AGM the composition of the board will be under review, and shareholders can thus 
prepare for it in advance. 
Shareholders can also use the predictable nature of the AGM to prepare questions in 
advance of the meeting. The function of the AGM as a forum for questions is more 
important for private investors and small institutional investors than for large 
institutional investors. This is because the company s large institutional investors will 
be able to ask questions and express their views at informal meetings with the 
management. Currently, there is no detailed mechanism governing shareholders 
questions at AGMs but as a matter of practice, many companies do permit 
shareholders to ask questions and do not confine them to the formal resolutions on the 
agenda. This is supported by the Combined Code which states that boards should use 
the AGM to communicate with private investors and encourage their participation. 
42 
Accordingly, it can be seen that the rules relating to the conduct of AGMs are not 
totally pro-director. Some legislative rules do indeed make the shareholders role as 
monitor more difficult to achieve, but they are not so extensive as to fully explain the 
40 Ibid. at para. 2.8. Although there is some evidence of greater use of the provisions by shareholders in 
privatised utilities. 41 The Company Law Review Steering Group, ; Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Completing the Structure, November 2000, London: DTI, para. 5.33. 
'' The Combined Code: Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice, 1998, para. C. 2. 
appended to Financial Services Authority, The Listing Rules, 2000, London: FSA. 
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current inability of the AGM to act as a medium for corporate democracy. 
Accordingly, if the law cannot fully account for the AGMs failings, we must look 
elsewhere. 
The AGM in Practice. 
An examination of the AGM in practice reveals the basis for the current 
dissatisfaction with the AGM. It has been contended that the AGM can only be an 
effective form of governance if two conditions are met. Firstly, the majority of the 
shares should be held by members who are not directors. Secondly, all or most of the 
members should be willing to participate in the AGM. 43 Unfortunately, only one or 
neither of these conditions are present in companies at either end of the size spectrum. 
As regards small owner managed companies, the shares are held wholly or mainly by 
the directors. These companies are run informally without reference to company law 
for the main. In such companies, where the directors and shareholders are the same 
people, formal general meetings serve little or no use. This was recognised when, in 
1989, rules were introduced permitting private companies to dispense with the AGM 
by unanimous resolution. 44 The Company Law Review Steering Group recommends 
extending this exclusion by totally removing the obligation upon private companies to 
hold an AGM, unless they choose to opt into the AGM regime. 45 
The AGM fails for a different reason in the case of large public companies. Here, 
there may be hundreds of thousands of members living in all parts of the UK and 
abroad. It is impracticable for more than a tiny minority of them to attend a general 
meeting. 46 Moreover, it is unusual for institutional investor representatives to attend 
AGMs; they exercise their power in other ways. 
43 The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Compani" General Meetings and Shareholder Communication, October 1999, London: DTI. para. 18. 
44 5.379.1(l)(c) Companies Act 1985, as inserted by s. 1 16 Companies Act 1989. 
45 The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economi": 
Final Report, June 2001, London: DTI, para. 7.6. 
aG Although recently, representatives of pressure groups have been starting to exercise their rights as 
shareholders to draw attention to wider social or environmental concerns. Whilst it is only proper that 
directors should face questions on such issues, the activities of some of these groups are 
disruptive and 
only serve to increase the cost of the AGM as companies are now having to spend more on security 
arrangements. 
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Given this failing, there have been calls for a provision, similar to that for private 
companies, that would permit public companies to dispense with the AGNI. 47 
However, the governance function that the AGM is supposed to perform must remain 
enshrined in law and so public companies would have to replace the AGM with a 
governance mechanism that was less cumbersome and more effective. Unanimity to 
dispense with the AGM would not be required given the practical difficulties of 
obtaining this. 48 The Company Law Steering Group s March 2000 report thought that 
this would be premature. 49 However, following consultation, their November 2000 
report recommended that public companies should be free to dispense with the AGM 
by elective resolution or if secondary legislation so permits. 50 This has now become a 
recommendation of the final report. 51 
However, surely it would be more preferable to improve the workings of the AGM 
rather than to reluctantly accept its inadequacies and quietly dispense with it. 
Accordingly, a number of recommendations have been voiced aimed at improving the 
AGM s effectiveness. 
One possible improvement is to encourage the use of dispersed meetings. A 
dispersed meeting is a meeting held at more than one location, with real-time 
communication between participants. Many believe that such a meeting is already 
permissible under s. 366 (indeed some companies already hold dispersed meetings) but 
that the law should be clarified to state this. 52 Accordingly, the Company Law 
Review Steering Group recommends that any statutory provision relating to this 
should be enabling, so as not to frustrate any future technological developments. '3 
47 See The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Company General Meetings and Shareholder Communication, October 1999, London: DTI, paras. 24- 
7. 
4' Ibid. at para. 26. 
49 The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Developing the Framework, March 2000, London: DTI, para. 4.27. 
50 The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Completing the Structure, November 2000, London: DTI, paras. 5.18-19. 
51 The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Final Report, June 2001, London: DTI, para. 7.6. 
51 The Company Law Review Steering Group, , 'Modern Company 
Law /or a Competitive Economy: 
Developing the Framework. March 2000, London: DTI, para. 4.31. 
53 Ibid. 
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Also provisions in any future Table A should be included to permit dispersed 
meetings. 54 
Conclusion. 
The quote at the beginning of this section highlighted a general consensus concerning 
the AGM, namely that it is the key mechanism in making directors accountable to the 
shareholders. However, the limitations discussed are also generally accepted by 
commentators. It also appears that there is an unspoken feeling that the AGM as a 
form of governance accountability is becoming increasingly moribund. Private 
companies can now totally dispense with the AGM under the elective resolution 
procedure and if the Company Law Review Steering Group s recommendations are 
adopted, then public companies will be able to do the same. This appears to be part of 
a consensus that the AGM does not work, is inefficient and costly and in practice, 
does not increase accountability. Ideas for reform have been ad hoc and would only 
improve matters slightly. 
The existence of the AGM is a pure product of the legal model of the company. By 
requiring companies to hold AGMs, shareholders have an opportunity to take part in 
management in a limited sense. However, only the shareholders have a right to 
participate in the AGM, yet their residual powers can also have significant effects on 
other stakeholders. In the previous chapter, we noted that the shareholders have the 
power under s. 719 to grant ex gratia payments to employees. The shareholders have 
the power to increase or decrease the capital that is (theoretically) kept inviolate for 
the creditors by the capital maintenance regime. Altering capital can have a 
significant effect on the creditors default risk, yet the matter is entirely left to the 
discretion of the shareholders. 55 Finally, the shareholders in general meeting have the 
power to wind the company up - an act which will affect all parties concerned with 
the company. Given this, a number of academics have argued that certain non- 
shareholder constituents should also have the power to vote at AGMs. Accordingly, 
one is forced to conclude that despite the AGM s obvious flaws, it upholds the legal 
" The Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Completing the Structure, November 2000, London: DTI, para. 5.22. 
Although there do exist statutory safeguards to protect the creditors. 
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model of the company and confirms the legal model s central contention that the 
company should act in the interests of its members. 
II. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS. 
The Scope of Institutional Investment. 56 
In 1963 financial institutions57 held approximately 29% of listed UK equities; 34% in 
1969,47% in 1975,58% in 1981 and 60% in 1992.58 In 1998, the figure is estimated 
at 70%. 59 The Myners Report states that today, over £1,500 billion of assets lie in the 
hands of institutional investors. 60 In America, this concentration is even more 
pronounced in the larger corporations . 
61 Trends indicate that this increase in 
institutional investment will continue. An obvious consequence of a rise in 
institutional investing is a concomitant decrease in the proportion of individual 
shareholding. In 1963, individual shareholdings stood at 54%; by 2000 this figure 
was 16%. 62 It is further contended that the institutional concentration is even greater 
than the figures show as day-to-day management of certain institution funds is 
delegated to a relatively small number of investment houses. 63 For example, a study 
carried out in 1984 revealed that approximately one third of all UK pension funds 
were managed by 15 fund managers, mainly merchant banks. 64 Such statistics are 
56 It is acknowledged that whilst a rise of institutional investing is obvious, the actual figures 
themselves vary. 
57 For our purposes, the term institutional investor will be used unless otherwise stated to denote 
insurance companies, pension funds, unit trusts, investment trusts and open-ended investment 
companies (OEIC s). Unlike Germany and Japan, banks are not major institutional investors, holding 
about 0.1% of the British equities market. See P. L. Davies, Institutional Investors in the United 
Kingdom in T. Baums, R. M. Buxbaum & K. J. Hopt (eds. ), Institutional Investors and Corporate 
Governance, 1994, Berlin; New York: de Gruyter, p. 258. 
5g Office for National Statistics, Share Ownership: A Report on the Ownership of Shares at 31" of 
December 1997,1999, London: The Stationary Office, p. 8, Table A. 
59 G. Stapledon, Analysis and Data of Share Ownership and Control in UK [Online] Available 
http: //www. dti. gov. uk/cld/staple. pdf, 28` March 2000, p. 4. Although the Hampel Committee placed it 
closer to 80%. 
60 P. Myners, Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review, 2001, p. 4. 
61 In Amoco, institutional concentration is 86%, General Motors Corp. (82%), Mobil Corp. (74%), Eli 
Lilly & Co. (710/()) and Citicorp (70%). See J. C. Coffee Jnr., Liquidity Versus Control: The 
Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor (1991) 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277 at 1291. 
62 Office for National Statistics, Share Ownership. 4 Report on the Ownership of Shares at 31" of 
December 2000,2001, London: HMSO, para. 2.3. However, pension funds and insurance companies 
derive the bulk of their funds from individuals so individuals may play a larger part than the figures 
suggest. 
63 J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibiliti': Issues in the Theory of Company Latin. 1993, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 166. See also CBI, Pension Fund Investment Management, 1987, London: 
CBI, p. 54. 
64 T. Schuller, 
, tge, Capital and 
Democracy, 1986, . Aldershot: Gower, pp. 95-6. 
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important as pension funds constitute the largest class of institutional investor at 31 % 
of the market. 65 This eclipse of the private individual by the institutions challenges 
the traditional model of the corporation based on the separation of ownership and 
control and the concomitant rational apathy of the shareholders. This concentration of 
assets creates potential for intervention in the corporate governance matters of 
portfolio companies. 66 This in turn may re-ignite the shareholders ability to 
effectively participate in the governance of the company. The separation of 
ownership and control discussed in Chapter 2 may thus be halted or even reversed. 
From a corporate governance standpoint, perhaps more importantly than the overall 
market concentration of equities held by institutions is the amount held by a single 
institution in any one company. Whilst it is commonplace for institutions to hold a 
diversified portfolio in order to minimise risk, 67 an institutions stake may 
nevertheless be significant enough to affect the share price if sold back to the market. 
This could have the effect of locking institutions into their portfolio companies. 68 If 
such an institution becomes dissatisfied with the way a company is run, the only 
realistic choices available will be to remain passive, or to take steps to improve 
performance. 
An institutions potential to exact change becomes even more compelling when 
institutions coalesce. In 1961, Professor Florence argued that the twenty largest 
shareholders often held enough shares to effectively control even the largest British 
corporation. 69 In 1986, John Scott re-examined this contention. 70 He discovered that 
ownership concentration had fallen and that the top twenty institutions never had 
65 B. S. Black & J. C. Coffee Jnr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behaviour Under Limited 
Regulation (1994) 92 Mich. LR. 1997 at 2008. 
66 This potential has been recognised for some time; see A. A. Berle, Power Without Propert': .J 
New 
Development in American Political Economy, 1960, London: Sidgwick & Jackson, p. 53. 
67 As of 1998, Prudential, the UK s largest institutional investor, held 3.87% of the market share. By 
necessity this means that it holds an average of 3.87% of the equities of each company it invests in. Of 
course, some will be less, some will be more. See Dr. G. Stapledon, Analysis and Data of Share 
Ownership and Control in UK Available [online] 28`h March 2000 http: //www. dti. 2, ov. uk 
/cld/staple. pdf, p. 6. 
63 J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law, 1993. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 167. 
69 P. Sargant Florence, The Logic of'British and American Industry, 1961 (rev. ed. ). London: Routledge 
& K. Paul, p. 192. 70 See J. Scott, Capitalist Property and Financial Power: I Comparative Study (? I' Britain, thu' United 
States and Japan, 1986, Brighton: \Vheatsheaf Books. See also J. Scott, Corporate Control and 
Corporate Rule: Britain in an International Perspective (1990) 41 Brit. J. Soc. 351. 
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control but instead held around 20-29% of the voting stock. 71 Scott s data is useful 
for two reasons. Firstly, by comparing it to recent data, we can see that there has been 
an increase in concentration when compared to 1977. One commentator has 
contended that the largest twenty-five shareholders hold an absolute majority of the 
shares of many British corporations. 72 A recent consultation document states that the 
twenty largest institutions control 37.06% of the UK equities market. 73 Second, 
Scott s data shows that although the figures have changed the institutions have not. 
The same institutions cropped up time and time again. For example, Scott examined 
the top twenty shareholders in the top 100 corporations and found that Prudential 
Assurance appeared 88 times. 74 
Accordingly, the UK appears comparatively well suited for institutional intervention. 
As we have seen, ownership concentration is high. The institutional environment in 
the UK is close-knit in that most institutional investors are based within a small area 
in the City of London. Institutional shareholders can communicate quite easily, both 
through formal committees and through more informal professional contact. For 
example, insurance companies views on corporate governance tend to be channelled 
through the investment committees of their trade association, the Association of 
British Insurers (ABI). The National Association of Pension Funds Ltd. (NAPF) 
performs the same function for pension fund investors. This type of formal and 
informal contact creates the potential for monitoring on a more cost-efficient basis 
than could ever be achieved by individual shareholders acting independently. Finally, 
the legal environment is conducive to institutional ownership as communication 
between institutions is largely unregulated. Conversely, in America, securities law 
prescribes a variety of constraints and restrictions on institutional behaviour. ' 
Further, active institutions have more onerous duties than passive ones. 76 The UK s 
71 Ibid. at p. 95. 
72 T. Jackson, The Institutions Get Alilitant (1991) Financial Times June 1l th at 18. 
73 Dr. Geoff Stapledon, Analysis and Data of Share Ownership and Control in UK Available [Online] 
28`h March 2000 http: //www. dti. gov. uk/cld/staple. pdf, p. 6. 
74 J. Scott, Capitalist Property and Financial Power. - .4 
Comparative Study of Britain, the United States 
and Japan, 1986, Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, p. 100. 
75 E. g. owning a 5% stake triggers filing requirements under s. 13(D) Securities Exchange Act (15 
U. S. C. /78m(d)). Owning a 10% stake triggers short-term profit forfeiture under s. 16(b) Securities 
Exchange Act (I 5 U. S. C. /79p(b). 
76 For example, an active shareholder must make costly filings under the Hart-Scott Radino Premerger 
Rules: a passive shareholder is exempt. 
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legal environment therefore appears more conducive to activism than Americas. 77 
The question that needed to be asked is this conducive environment enough to foster a 
climate of institutional activism. This issue will now be examined. 
Examples of Institutional Activism. 
One possible reason for the notion that institutional activism is rare is due to the fact 
that British institutional investors have a reputation for behind-the-scenes negotiation. 
One reason for this is that if a large institutional investor were to publicly display 
dissatisfaction with the way that a company is being run, it could trigger a race to 
exit. If the institutional investor did not feel that their grievance was adequately 
resolved they might sell their stock, thereby depressing the stock s price. If this 
dissatisfaction was made known to other institutions, they may decide to sell their 
stock first before the stock price drops, 78 although some fund managers considered 
such behaviour unethical or even constituting insider trading. 79 
However, despite this, there are examples of instances when a coalition of 
institutional investors publicly voiced their dissatisfaction and attempted to remove a 
board of directors. 80 Our task is to examine these instances and determine whether 
77 One commentator has said of American situation: 
No single legal rule forecloses shareholder action. But the obstacles are many, and their 
cumulative effect is large. A shareholder who remains quiet is safe. A shareholder who 
buys a large stake, especially a shareholder who becomes active on governance issues, 
pays a price. That price, for a shareholder whose stake is kept small by legal rules, is 
often enough to make passivity the preferred course. 
See B. S. Black, Agents 11'atching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice (1992) 39 UCLA. 
L. Rev. 811 at 824. 
'R One fund manager phrased the problem thus: 
You must remember that in communicating dissatisfaction, you are possibly giving a 
signal of your future intentions. Would a person you are talking to abuse the information 
by trading on it? You have to fear a race to the exit in which you will be last by staying 
to challenge management. 
Quoted in B. S. Black & J. C. Coffee Jnr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behaviour Under 
Limited Regulation (1994) 92 Mich. LR. 1997 at 2062. 
79 S. 57(2)(a)(i) Criminal Justice Act 1993 defines insider to include shareholders. 
so Of course, often the removal of a director or directors helps avoid a public display of dissatisfaction. 
In 1991, Maurice Saatchi was forced to resign as chairman of the advertising group Saatchi & Saatchi 
(since renamed Cordiant) plc. by a group of institutional investors holding about 30% ä of the company s 
stock. He summarized the situation thus: 
By threatening the Directors with an Extraordinary General Meeting - at which they 
could outvote others - they have given the Directors their orders: 
Take your Chairman 
into a corner and shoot him quickly-we don t want the fuss of a public trail. 
See S. Schiff, Master ol'Illusion (1995) A'c'tt" Yorker May 15`h 52 at 66. 
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they suggest a systematic increase in institutional activism or if they represent 
anomalous shareholder behaviour. 
The first example arose in 1991 when a coalition of institutions led by Norwich 
Union, one of Britain s largest insurance companies, 81 attempted to replace the board 
of Tace plc. 82 Press accounts branded the Tace board as inefficient, although it is 
believed that the real grievance was the inordinately high compensation paid to Tace s 
founder. One shareholder complained to the Bank of England about this excessive 
remuneration. Avoiding direct involvement, the Bank of England advised the 
shareholder to contact Norwich Union, which held 5% of Tace s shares. 
Negotiations began between the institutions and the Tace board over the selection of a 
new CEO. However, without consulting the institutions, the Tace board selected a 
replacement that the institutions found unacceptable due to his close associations with 
the previous CEO. Insulted by this, the CEO of Norwich Union and coincidentally, 
the chairman of the Institutional Shareholders Committee, E. M. Sandland, lined up 
two other institutional shareholders - Framlington and GT Management - to share the 
cost of the campaign to oust Tace s management. Framlington, which held 16% of 
Tace s shares, stayed with the campaign, but GT Management soon pulled out. 
Tace s management did not remain passive; it used its own investment bankers to 
contact shareholders and assemble a friendly 29% block of shares. Eventually 
however, Norwich Union assembled proxies from 40% of Tace s shareholders, called 
an emergency general meeting of the shareholders and voted the board out of office. 
What at first may seem to be a victory for the institutions is, when examined, a 
Pyrrhic Victory at best. Although the media praised Sandland and Norwich Union for 
taking the big corporations on, Sandland s actions were questioned by his own board 
and other fund managers. They accused him of headline hunting and criticised an 
un-British approach that would only serve to embarrass the City. Further, Norwich 
81 By 1998, Norwich Union was the 13`h largest institutional investor and the 6`h largest insurance 
company in the UK with 1.361o of the total market share. Rz For piecemeal accounts of this story, see R. Gourlay, 4.4% Holding in Tace Changes Hands (1991) 
Financial Times June 24 `h at 18; R. Gourlay, Institutions Launch Bid to Oust Tace Board (1991) 
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Union and Framlington had to split between them a £60,000 bill for solicitor s 
expenses. 
In terms of the future of institutional activism, the significance of the Tace case is 
doubted. Tace was a relatively small company with sales of only £36 millions. 
Further Norwich Union only became involved at the bequest of the Bank of England. 
The Norwich Union coalition was a relatively small one and even then the difficulties 
of maintaining it were considerable. It is difficult to envisage a successful coalition 
that could challenge the management of a major firm, such as General Motors, who, 
in 2000, had a revenue of over $189 billions. 83 
In the same year, another acrimonious battle commenced by institutional investors 
took place in which the CEO of Brown & Jackson, a large British discount retailing 
chain, was removed. 84 The cause of the institution's condemnation was a combination 
of poor performance and a disastrous 1988 acquisition of a business from a group that 
included the ousted CEO. At first, the institutions demanded the resignations of the 
entire board, but soon reduced their demands to a new CEO, to be picked by the 
outgoing CEO but who would be required to leave if a new financial advisor 
requested that he do so. 
This contest was less bitter and less costly than the Tace battle simply because the 
institutions did not carry the battle to the bitter end, but were instead prepared to 
compromise. However, like the Tace battle, the institutions did not escape criticism 
for publicly voicing their disenchantment. The lead institution was Fidelity 
Investments Ltd., a subsidiary of Fidelity Group, the largest U. S. mutual fund group. 
Maybe because Fidelity was foreign-owned it felt less constrained in voicing its 
disapproval. Nevertheless, not long after the resignation of Brown & Jackson s CEO, 
Fidelity s chief corporate governance advisor, Alistair Blair was sacked because it 
Financial Times May 4th at 10; R. Gourlay, Tace Board Quits at Angrv EGA (1991) Financial Times 
June 20th at 23 and N. Cohen, Getting Directors on Board (1992) Financial Times April 6th at 12. 
83 The exact figure was $189,058,000,000. See Fortune Magazine, The Fortune 1000 List [Online] 
A\'ailable http: //www. fortune. com/fortune/fortune500/ 18th September 2000. 
34 For piecemeal accounts, see N. Cohen, New Advisor at Brown & Jackson (1991) Financial Times 
October 23 rd at 24; N. Bennett. Brown & Jackson to Seek Rescue Approval (1992) The Times June 15th 
/2 (Business) at 20: A. Blair, . -1 
Coalition I'crsus a Dictator (1992) Financial Times May 27th at 13 and 
N. Cohen, Tough Tactics Behind the Unit Trusts (1992) Financial Times August 5th at 15. 
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was felt by [Fidelity s] marketing men that such activity drew too much attention 
to Fidelity s investment failures. 85 
The final and perhaps most publicised contest concerned a 1993 campaign led by 
Prudential to install new management in Spring Ram. 86 Spring Ram s founder and 
CEO Bill Rooney, who owned 16% of the stock, had made a number of poor business 
decisions by pursuing new ventures in a recessionary climate. He urged the 
accountants to report good news which led to the accountants resigning and one 
division to falsify numbers. Eventually, these events surfaced and Prudential and 
other institutions informally urged Spring Ram to find a new CEO. However, 
Rooney s handpicked board rebuffed Prudential s advice. The institutions were 
temporarily placated when Spring Ram appointed a new finance director with strong 
ties to Prudential. However, after further poor earnings reports, Prudential decided 
that Rooney had to go. 
Rooney continued to resist but Prudential was able to amass the support of a dozen 
institutions, collectively holding about 35% of Spring Ram s stock and the board 
conceded. A new CEO chosen by Prudential was installed, together with a majority 
of new directors. 
These episodes demonstrate that when united institutions can make a difference, but it 
is often at a cost. The Brown & Jackson contest took a year or more to unfold, 
during which time the share prices declined steadily. 87 The acrimony surrounding 
the Tace affair continued for a year after the management was ousted, with similar 
detrimental effects on the share price; the Spring Ram ouster took over six months. In 
1993, IBM s CEO was forced to resign. It was heralded as an example of institutional 
activism. However, the only real change that occurred was the corporation gained an 
annual loss of $5 billions and the stock price of its shares was halved for the next six 
's T. Blackstone, Fidelity Group Goes Nfad on Media (1992) Evening Standard May ist at 35. Alistair 
Blair said himself [b]eware your own chief executive. Does it look wise, from where he sits, to put 
your firm in the spotlight? See A. Blair, A Coalition Versus a Dictator (1992) Financial Times May 
27`h at 13. 
86 For piecemeal accounts, see A. Bolger, Hostages to Declining Housing , Market Fortunes (1993) 
Financial Times September 23d at 20; A. Bolger, Rooney s Future Remains Unclear (1993) Financial 
Times July 15th at 22; P. Weever & T. Amoore, Corporate Assassins: Poor Performers Beware, the 
Institutions are Gunning For You (1993) Sunday Telegraph October 17`h City Section at 5. 
87 See A. Blair.. -1 Coalition ! Versus a Dictator (1992) Financial Times May 
27 `h at 13. 
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months. 88 Similarly, by the time Maurice Saatchi had been pressured into resigning, 
the company s share price had fallen 98% against the market. 89 
However, financial losses due to increased activism of the kind described above are 
not the only factors inhibiting institutional activism, and it is these other inhibiting 
factors that must now be considered. 
Barriers to Effective Activism. 
The concentration of institutional share ownership and the above examples give the 
impression that through institutional shareholders we may be on the brink of a new 
era of corporate accountability. As one commentator has said: 
the holdings of these institutions are now so large that a manageable number 
of funds could feasibly join hands to supervise managers in a new system of 
control. 90 
Experience, however, has shown this not to be the case. Possible reasons for 
institutional passivity, such as the effect on the share price, have already been touched 
upon. When institutions are active, they try to do so as part of a coalition of other 
institutions. However, forming and maintaining a coalition is a difficult task and there 
exist a number of barriers that most institutions fail to overcome. It has been 
estimated that in practice an institution will need to line up 10-15% of the company s 
stock to even be granted a formal meeting with the board. 91 This is why to date 
institutional activism has not delivered all that it promised. 
The first barrier concerns the costs of commencing and maintaining a challenge. As 
noted earlier, the Tace battle cost the Norwich Union and Framlington £60,000. 
These two institutions held 20% of Tace s stock; the total institutional opposition was 
40% of Tace s stock. Although the remaining 20% agreed to vote with Norwich 
Union and Framlington, they did not agree to share the costs. This highlights a classic 
barrier concerning institutional activism. 
88 R. A. G. Monks & N. Minow, Corporate Governance, 1995, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 200-1. 
89 Saatchi Ousting Shocks . 4dmen 
(1994) Sunday Tines December 18`h. 
90 A. F. Conrad, Beyond , iianagerialism: 
Investor Capitalism? (1988) 22 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 117 at 119. 
91 A. Blair,. 4 Coalition I crsus .4 
Dictator (1992) Financial Times August 5`h, p. 13. 
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The free rider problem is frequently advanced for the failure of increased 
institutional activism. Governance by institutions is reduced because of the potential 
of individual institutions to benefit from the actions of others. It is contended that as 
the benefit of collective action goes to every individual institution irrespective of 
whether or not the institution shared in the costs of collective action, it follows that, 
unless the group is small, the collective good will not be provided through market 
mechanisms or voluntary coalitions. 92 Concerned primarily as we are with large 
public companies, this can have important ramifications. In such companies, the 
largest institution will hold at most 5% of the company s stock and in many cases 
much less. Such companies therefore represent a large group where no single 
member gets no more than a small share of the benefits of collective action. 
Accordingly, in such groups, the free rider problem dictates that the incentive to co- 
operate with other potential beneficiaries disappears. Even when institutional 
coalitions do form, they are usually small in the number of participants, but large in 
terms of collective shareholdings. 93 
Related to this is the cost of information. Acquiring information on corporate 
governance matters can often be costly. Accordingly, a small shareholder will not 
wish to incur such costs as their chances of affecting any change will be negligible. 
For such shareholders, apathy will be the rational course. 94 Apathy is also the logical 
choice for large institutional shareholders. Whilst a large shareholder will have the 
ability to make a change his problem is different. As other shareholders will be 
uninformed, the large shareholder will have to pay the costs of informing them. This 
cost of acquiring and disseminating information could outweigh the prospective 
benefits from improvements in corporate governance. Therefore, large shareholders 
will also follow a course of rational apathy. 95 
Of course, before the institutions can even begin to mount a challenge against 
management, they need to be aware of the business operations of their portfolio 
02 H. Short & K. Keasey, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom 
in K. Keasey, S. Thompson & M. Wright (ed. ). Corporate Governance: Economic, Management and 
Financial Issues, 1997, New York: OUP, p. 32- 
()-I B. S. Black & J. C. Coffee Jnr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behaviour Under Limited 
Regulation (1994) 92 Mich. LR. 1997 at 2054. 
J. N. Gordon, The ,1 tandutorv Structure of Corporation Latin (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rey . 1549 at 1575. 95 
Ibid. at p. 1576. 
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companies. This can only be done through active monitoring of their portfolio 
companies. However, even the largest insurance companies have small monitoring 
staffs. For example, Norwich Union, the catalyst in the aforementioned Tace affair 
and the manager of a £24 billion portfolio, has a full time research staff of 12; before 
1986 it had none. 96 Similarly, Prudential, the UK s largest institutional investor, 
employs only twenty full time professional analysts. Yet these companies hold 
globally diversified portfolios containing hundreds of both UK and foreign stocks. 
Such staffing policies are clearly inadequate for effective monitoring. It is also the 
case that very few pension fund trustees and fund managers have no professional 
qualifications in finance or investment. 97 Consequently, monitoring tends to focus on 
those companies who are in most financial peril. 
Given the above problems, in many cases, coalitions will not be formed. Usually 
what will happen is that one or more disgruntled investors will communicate their 
concerns to the board or to a NED. The board will get the message and will either 
make changes or the company s financial results will improve, diminishing the need 
for change. Occasionally, the institutions will get what they want but more commonly 
the outcome will be a compromise. The institutions willingness to compromise 
indicates their uncertainty over the best course of action, the difficulties of 
maintaining a coalition and their reluctance to make their concerns public. 98 
A second barrier to institutional activism concerns the potential for conflicts of 
interest. For example, pension fund managers are usually affiliated with merchant 
banking firms. If the parent merchant bank represents a company in the fund 
manager s portfolio or a firm involved in a takeover bid for that company, an actual or 
potential conflict of interest exists. Fund managers are always seeking new corporate 
business. A reputation as a troublemaker is to be avoided if new corporate clients are 
,*B. S. Black & J. C. Coffee Jnr., Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behaviour Under Limited 
Regulation (1994) 92 Mich. LR. 1997 at 2068 
97 See P. M1yners, Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review, 2001, London, p. 5. 
Although there is evidence that fund managers are becoming more qualified with almost 2000 people 
registering for the Chartered Financial Analyst examination in 2001. 
yx B. S. Black & J. C. Coffee Jnr., hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behaviour Under Limited 
Regulation (1994) 92 Mich. LR. 1997 at 2050. 
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to be gained. As one banker said, a merchant bank s optimum public profile is 
below the level of the floor. 99 
One commentator has presented three different hypotheses that aim to explain the 
relationship between institutions and their potential to intervene in corporate affairs. '°° 
The efficient monitoring hypothesis states that institutional investors are more 
informed and able to monitor management at a lower cost than smaller 
shareholders. 101 The strategic alignment hypothesis suggests that institutional 
shareholders and management may find it mutually advantageous to occasionally co- 
operate. 102 Finally, and more importantly for our purposes, the conflict of interest 
hypothesis suggests that institutional investors may have current or potential business 
relationships with firms that they hold shares in, which will make them less willing to 
oppose management. 103 Fund managers who develop an anti-manager reputation will 
lose business and find it harder to attract new clients, e. g. several companies withdrew 
pension fund assets from Tiger management when Tiger ran a proxy contest for 
representation on the Cleveland-Cliffs board, despite Tiger s strong performance 
record. 104 Such conflicts may lead some institutions to vote pro-manager even when 
doing so is likely to decrease company value. 
A third barrier to institutional activism concerns the company s desire for soft 
information. Institutions who oppose management risk cutting themselves off from 
this flow of soft information that management provides. Whilst the magnitude of this 
problem is difficult to assess, there is some evidence that institutions that publicly 
chastise companies they invest in may be denied further information. ' 
05 
Here, there is again evidence of the trade-off between exit and voice. Institutions 
desire soft information so that they can outperform the market e. g. if the soft 
information suggests a downturn in profits that the market is not aware of, then the 
99 P. Weever & T. Amoore, Corporate Assassins: Poor Performers Beware, the Institutions are 
Gunning For You (1993) Sunday Telegraph October 17`h City Section at 







S. Black, Agents It itching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice (1992) 39 UCLA. 
L. Rev. 811 at 826. 
105 See D. Galant, The Hazards of : Negative Research Reports (1990) Institutional Investor July 
73. 
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institution will be able to stay one step ahead of the market by selling its shares. It has 
been argued that it is highly questionable that institutions can actually outperform the 
market. 106 However, there now appears to be no doubt that if an institution is in 
possession of truly material non-public information, then it can make abnormal 
returns even in an efficient market. 107 Further, where markets are highly competitive, 
this ability to outperform the market and consequentially to out perform competitors 
could lead to an increase in investors. 
The final barrier concerns the unfettered nature of the shareholder s voting power. A 
shareholder may cast their vote as they think fit. A vote is regarded as a property 
right and the shareholder will not be deprived of that right simply because the court 
disapproves of the motive influencing its exercise. 108 Further, a director who is also a 
shareholder is not constrained by his directorial fiduciary duties when voting qua 
shareholder. 109 
Just as a shareholder is not required to vote in any particular way, they are not 
required to vote at all. A shareholder can legitimately, be totally passive in respect of 
his investment or, as Lord Lowry stated the shareholder may lock away his paid up 
shares and go to sleep. 110 However, whilst shareholders are not required to vote as a 
matter of company law, for institutional shareholders, there is the added issue of 
accountability to their clients. Given this, there is a growing acceptance in practice, 
although not yet in law, that the obligations of institutional shareholders extend to 
exercising their voting rights in respect of shares in their portfolio. The issue here is 
to what extent do institutional shareholders exercise their voting rights. 
106 See M. C. Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964 (1968) 23 J. Fin. 389 
who found that mutual fund returns, a traditionally highly competitive market, were no better than 
those of a passive investor holding a market portfolio. 
107 See N. E. Mains, Risk, The Pricing of Capital . -Assets, and the 
Evaluation of Investment Portfolios: 
Comment (1977) 50 J. Bus. 371 at 384. See also J. N. Gordon & L. A. Kornhauser, Efficient , ttarkets, 
Costly Information, and Securities Research (1985) 60 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 761 at 839-41 who argue that 
this ability to outperform the market casts doubt upon the validity of the Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
1OS Ponder v Lushington (1877) 6 Ch. D. 70; Carruth v Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. [19371 AC 
707. 
IN North 14est Transportation Company Ltd. v Beatty (1887) 12 AC 589; Northern Counties Securities 
Ltd. E Jackson & Steeple Ltd. [ 19741 1W LR 1 133. 
10 Kinvait Asia Bank EC iv National ttutual Life Nominees Ltd. [19911 1 AC 187. 
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An ABI survey on Voting by Institutional Shareholders, published in July 1991, stated 
that whilst insurance companies normally voted, practice amongst pension funds was 
more uneven, with over 20% of them saying that they never voted. A similar survey 
published by the NAPF in November 1995 indicated some increase in voting by 
pension funds, although 20% still stated that they never voted. This passivity amongst 
major groups of institutional shareholders became a target for criticism during the 
1990 s and the view that institutional shareholders, as responsible investors, should 
vote gained ground. "' 
Taking the lead from the USA where pension funds are required to vote as a matter of 
law, some commentators have argued that the government should impose mandatory 
voting obligations upon institutional shareholders to counteract the economically 
detrimental effects of institutional investors behaving as absentee landlords who are 
happy to collect rent in the form of dividends but who do not seek to monitor 
management with the result that sub-optimal managerial performance goes 
unchecked. 112 
However, there are strong arguments against mandatory voting. It could result in box 
ticking by institutional shareholders - that is routinely supporting management 
without considering the merits of their decisions. This would not be a positive step 
forward and could serve to swamp genuinely active monitors who would find 
themselves outvoted. Also policing mandatory voting would be extremely difficult. 13 
The alternative to statutory regulation is therefore self-regulation and whilst self- 
regulation is perceived to be working, legislative reform is unlikely. ' 14 
That institutional shareholders should vote has now become an established aspect of 
good corporate governance. The Combined Code specifically states that 
III Institutional Shareholders Committee, The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders in the UK, 
December 1991, London: ISC, paras. 3.1-3.3; The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance, 1992, London: Gee Publishing Ltd. para. 6.1 1: The Report of the Committee on 
Corporate Governance, 1998, London: Gee Publishing Ltd.. paras. 5.7-5.9: The Combined Code: 
Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice, 1998, London: FSA. para. E. 
11' E. Ferran, Company Law and Corporate Finance, 1999, Oxford: OUP, p. 248. 
113 The mandatory voting system in the US has been criticised precisely on this ground and led to 
accusations that it is basically a form of window dressing: see G. P. Stapledon, Institutional 
Shareholders and Corporate Governance, 1996, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 285-8. 114 The Company Law Reform Steering Group, I lodern Company Law for a Competitive Econonzy, 
March 1998, London: DTI, para. 3.7. 
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[i]nstitutional shareholders have a responsibility to make considered use of their 
votes. 115 Both the ABI and the NAPF have begun to actively encourage their 
members to participate in proxy votes at company meetings and, to counteract the 
problem of box ticking, established voting information services to assist them in doing 
so. Through these services, the ABI and the NAPF provide their members with 
guidance whether the matters which are proposed comply with corporate governance 
best practices. A similar service is provided by Pensions Investment Research 
Consultants (PIRC). However, whilst this has resulted in some improvements, 
surveys indicate that there still remains a considerable gap between these initiatives 
and the voting behaviour of pension fund managers in practice. ' 16 This gap between 
intention and practice has been recognised in the Combined Code which states that 
institutions should take steps to ensure that their voting intentions are being translated 
into practice. ' 17 Recently, the NAPF has gone one step further and advocated that 
regular considered voting should be regarded as a fiduciary responsibility. 118 In 
advocating a quasi-mandatory voting regime, the NAPF has obviously been 
influenced by the position in America. There private pension funds' 19 are mandated 
to vote by the Department of Labor s regulations governing proxy voting by 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) funds. Due to this requirement, 
the late 1980s/early 1990s saw firms averaging 80-90% voting levels, 120 with recent 
voting levels being placed at 83%. 121 
There is evidence to indicate that voting levels are increasing. The Myners Report 
found that 1999 voting levels had risen to 50% as compared to 20% in 1990.122 
However, this figure needs to be higher. Rather than advocate mandatory voting, 
which as we saw earlier is problematic, the Myners Report recommends making it a 
115 The Combined Code: Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice, principle E. 1, 
appended to Financial Services Authority, The Listing Rules, 2000, London: FSA. 
116 See Cadhu, _v Fails to Shift Voting (1997) Guardian 25`h March reporting the results of a survey by 
PIRC indicating that the average vote for annual general meetings stood at 39%. 
117 The Combined Code: Principles of Good Governance and Code of Best Practice, para. E. 1.3, 
appended to Financial Services Authority, The Listing Rules, 2000, London: FSA. 
118 NAPF, NAPF Eniuin Into UK Vote Execution, 1999, London: NAPF. 
119 Public pension funds are outside the scope of ERISA, yet many major funds such as the California 
Public Employees Retirement System (CAPERS), the New York City Employees Retirement System 
(NYCERS) and the State of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB) all have a policy of using their 
shares. 
120 C. Mallin, Institutional Investors and Voting Practices: An International Comparison (2001) 9 
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legal duty to vote when it is appropriate to do so. 123 In recommending this, they 
advocate adopting the principles stated in the US Department of Labor Interpretive 
Bulletin, in particular the principle that [t]he fiduciary obligations of prudence and 
loyalty to plan participants and beneficiaries require the responsible fiduciary to vote 
proxies on issues that may affect the value of the plan s investment. 124 
The Future of Institutional Activism. 
Accordingly, there is not much to indicate that the increased concentration of 
institutional share ownership is indicative of a new era of shareholder activism. As 
one investment manager has stated: 
. any conceivable 
interest in [institutional] activity will not amount to a major 
new element of accountability in our system matching that of the bank-based 
economies, since share ownership unaccompanied by the additional 
involvement in providing finance and other services will never provide the 
depth of knowledge and commitment that arises with the combination of 
banking and proprietary interests. 125 
The comparison with bank-based economies, such as Germany and Japan, is a 
legitimate one. A common feature of these two countries is that banks closely 
monitor companies, and will intervene where necessary. In Japan, many companies 
follow a structure known as the keiretsu. '26 The structure of a keiretsu typically 
consists of a group of companies clustered around a main bank. This structure 
allows banks to evade s. 11 of Japan s Anti-Monopoly Act, 127 an Act passed by the 
American occupational forces to prevent concentrations of economic power. This 
restriction failed. Such keiretsu s now hold around 65-70% of all the shares in the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange. 128 In Germany, bank domination does not result from 
outright ownership. 129 Rather, German banks hold control because they provide the 
122 P. Myners, Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review. 2001, London, para. 5.84. 
23 Ibid. at para. 5.90. 
24 Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy i'oting Policy or 
Guidelines, Code of Federal Regulations Table 29 Chapter XXV, 2509.94-2,1994. 
125 R. E. Artus (Group Chief Investment Manager of Prudential Corporation plc. ) in National 
Association of Pension Funds, Creative Tension, 1990, London: NAPF, p. 14. 
26 The word keiretsu is derived from the words kei meaning faction or group and retsu meaning 
arranged in order. 27 Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi kosei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru horitsu (An Act regarding the 
prohibition of private monopolies and the maintenance of fair trade), 'l 1(a), Law No. 54 of 1947. 
1R A. Viner, Inside Japanese Financial 1 Iarkets, 1988, p. 56. q Of the largest one hundred German corporations, the banks hold less than 5°0 of each company s 
stock. See J. Cable, Capital 1larket Information and Industrial Perlcormance: The Role of Wei 
German Banks (1985) 95 Econ. J. 1 18 at 120. 
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country s stockbrokerage services, and shares in German corporations are generally 
deposited by their owners with the banks, who can then exercise the voting rights 
attached to the shares. Further, by virtue of their representation on the supervisory 
board, the banks enjoy a formal channel for intervention. ' 30 In these countries it can 
therefore be seen that the bank, as the main financial institution, exercises a strong 
ownership function with a view to securing the long-term stability of the firms 
within which they invest. 
In contrast, banks in the UK have a much more limited role. As of 31 S` December 
2000, banks held only 1.4% of UK equities. 131 Other financial institutions, although 
holding considerable stock portfolio s, view their shares as investments rather than a 
means of securing corporate long-term prosperity and shareholder accountability: 
Despite the size of their holdings in industry, the institutions still look upon 
them primarily as investments, to be bought or sold according to investment 
criteria; the financial institutions have their own businesses to run (of 
providing insurance cover, etc. ) and neither wish nor need to be involved in 
managing the businesses in which they invest. 132 
Accordingly, a criticism commonly levelled at institutional shareholding is that it 
concerned only with short-term profitability, and not the long-term health of the 
company. An increase in corporate accountability, be it the election of independent 
directors or an increase in institutional voice, will seldom, if ever, increase profits in 
the short run. Therefore, for a short-term trader who intends to hold shares only for a 
short time, the benefits of increased accountability means little whilst the costs of 
attaining it will be very real indeed. It has been contended that the competition 
between institutions exacerbates this short-termist outlook. Many institutions are in 
direct competition for investor funds. If their profitability lags for even a quarter, the 
investors may withdraw their funds and move them to a competing firm. 
' 33 
130 The three main banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank) have such influence that 
one commentator has noted that they are often regarded as a super-supervisory board of the 
supervisory boards of industrial concerns. See E. J. Horn, Management of Industrial Change in 
Germanv, 1982, Brighton: Sussex European Research Centre, p. 40. 
131 Office for National Statistics, Share Ownership: .4 Report on the 
Ownership of Shares at 3l,, of 
December 2000,2001, London: HMSO, p. 8, Table A. 
132 S. J. Prais, The Evolution of Giant Firnis in Britain, 1976, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1 14. 
J. C. Coffee Jnr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Cor poratc Alonitor (1991) 
91 Colum. I.. Rev. 1277 at 1325. 
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Therefore, while fund managers are still held accountable in terms of monthly or 
quarterly performance and the benefits of improved corporate governance are not 
realised over this period, which they will not be, they will understandably be reluctant 
to incur costs that do not improve their overall position in relation to their 
competitors. 
It is, however, contended that the short-term nature of institutional holdings has been 
exaggerated, if not misunderstood. It has been contended that pension funds (22.1 % 
of market) and insurance companies (23.5%) have acquired their strong positions as 
equity holders because they are in fact instruments for long-term saving. ' 34 The 
Myners Report stated that the average holding period for any given share in a pension 
fund portfolio is over 8 years. ' 35 
Concerning insurance companies, their strong position derives from their position as 
providers of life insurance. Although life insurers were traditionally concerned to 
provide an income to their dependants after their death, today life insurance is often 
used as an instrument for pure saving over long periods e. g. 10,20 or 25 years. 
Likewise, pension funds are clearly instruments of long-term saving. The typical 
occupational pension scheme consists of a fund to which both the employer and the 
employee make defined contributions over a significant period of time. 
Further evidence for the contention that institutions are long-term can be derived from 
those firms that engage in R&D. R&D is a quintessentially long-term investment. 
Yet: (i) stock prices react favourably, on average, to increased R&D spending, 
36 and 
(ii) if institutional investors are more myopic than other investors, they should own a 
lower percentage of investment in R&D intensive firms, but institutions hold higher 
stakes in such firms. ' 37 
134 P. L. Davies, Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom in T. Baums, R. M. Buxbaum & K. J. 
Hopt (eds. ), Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance, 1994, Berlin; New York: de Gruyter, 
p. 258. See also H. T. C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment (1990) 38 
UCLA. L. Rev. 277 who argues that institutions are not systematically myopic. 
135 Developing a Winning Partnership: How Companies and Institutional Investors are ºWorking 
Together, September 1996, London: DTI, p. 6. 
136 F. \Voolridge, Competitive Decline and Corporate Restructuring: Is a . 
tlvopic Stock Market to 
Blaine? (1988) Continental Bank J. Applied Corp. Fin. 26 at 33-4. 
13' Jones, Lehn & Mulherin, Institutional Ownership of Equirv. Effects on Stock Market Liquidity and 
Corporate Long-Term Investments in A. Sametz & J. Bicksler (eds. ), Institutional Investing: 
Challen, es and Responsibilities of the 21" Century, 1991. pp. 115 at 123-4. 
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Conclusion. 
As noted, the governance work of institutional investors takes place behind the scenes 
and so its impact is difficult to assess. In 1991, testifying before the House of 
Commons, Michael Sandland, the then chairman of the Institutional Shareholders 
Committee, was asked how often institutions use the threat of coalition action to 
remove the board or an inefficient director. He answered that he did not know what 
other institutions were doing, but when pressed to estimate how often his own firm 
had engaged in such a threat, he responded: 
We saw over the last year there have been two, possibly three, confrontations 
which have reached public notice. As to the numbers of serious or possibly 
robust discussions which have not surfaced in the press or wider public I find it 
very difficult, maybe a dozen. 138 
Despite this, we have seen that there is evidence suggesting that institutional activism 
is not uncommon. However, when activism is present, it is usually crisis-driven. The 
largest insurance firms - Prudential, Norwich Union and Legal & General - and a few 
large unit trusts, such as M&G, engage in regular proactive monitoring and do lobby 
for governance changes when their portfolio companies are not in crisis. However, as 
we have seen, they have limited resources and so focus their attention of poorly 
performing companies. Accordingly, companies performing adequately and above 
can resist corporate governance reforms with little fear of institutional intervention. ' 39 
III. BOARD REFORM 
The Composition of UK Boards. 
A leading academic has stated that [a] widely held sentiment is that all is not well 
with the way UK companies are run. 140 The fact that British firms appear to have 
been losing ground to other firms on the world stage lends support to this, as does the 
collapse of a number of prominent companies and allegations of severe misconduct 
against their CEOs. Many agree that the source of these problems lies at the apex of 
the corporate hierarchy, the board of directors. In response to the increasing criticism 
138 Trade and Industry Committee, House of Commons, Takeovers and Mergers: Minutes of Evidence, 
1990-91,1991. Sess. 278, quoting the testimony of Michael Sandland of Norwich Union. 
139 B 
. 
S. Black & J. C. Coffee, Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behaviour Under Limited 
Re, ulation (1994) 92 Mich. LR. 1997 at 2053. 
140 B 
. R. Cheffies, C'ompaiw 
Law: Theorie, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
p. 602. 
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aimed at the detriments of unbridled corporate power has come a wealth of 
suggestions aimed at limiting the power of directors through changes in corporate 
structure. Governmental or legislative constraints have not been entirely abandoned, 
but a major effort has been made to internalise the corrective process via the 
monitoring of the board. As the European Commission pointed out: 
legislators in many Member States have attempted to solve the problem of 
supervision by introducing into the company s structure a new element: a 
body distinct from either the general meeting or the managing board or 
council which has as its function the supervision and control on behalf of the 
shareholders of those managing the company. 141 
Of all the structural reforms, few have such broad support as the notion of the non- 
executive director (NED). 142 It has been contended that the recent reliance on NEDs 
is a market-induced mechanism to limit agency costs in compliance with widely 
dispersed shares. 143 There is no legal requirement for companies to appoint non- 
executives. Indeed, statute does not recognise any distinction between executives and 
non-executives. The theoretical advantages of NEDs as monitors of the board are 
easy to see. As NEDs are generally not involved in the actual running of the business, 
they seem perfectly able to assess the company s performance, and that of 
management, from a more neutral standpoint. 144 NEDs are now common amongst 
large companies145 and are becoming an increasing numerical force on the board: 
Table 5.1: Composition of Boards of Quoted UK Industrial Companies 1979-93.146 
1979 1982 1985 1988 1993 
Average proportion of non-executive directors 30% 33% 35% 38% 44% 
141 Emploi"ce Participation and the Company Structure in the European Community (1975) Bull/Supp. 
8/75 at 18. 
14 On the history and evolution of NEDs, see J. Parkinson, Evolution and Policy in Company Law: The 
Non-Executive Director in J. Parkinson, A. Gamble & G. Kelly (eds. ), The Political Economy of the 
Company, 2000, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 246-57. 
143 J. Parkinson, Evolution and Policy in Company Law: The Non-Executive Director in J. Parkinson, 
A. Gamble & G. Kelly (eds. ). The Political Economy of the Company, 2000, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
p. 234. 
144 J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law, 1993, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 192. 
14> Over 95°o of the top 200 companies now have at least one NED: see Institute of Chartered 
Accountants for England and Wales, Report of the Study Group on the Change in the Role of the Non- 
E. vecutivc Director, 1991, London: ICAEW, p. 8. 
146 For 1979 and 1982, sec Bank of England, The Composition of Company Boards in 1982 (1983) 23 
Bank Eng. Q. Bull. 66 at 68. For 1985, see Bank of England, The Boards of Quoted Companies (1985) 
25 Bank Eng. Q. Bull. 233 at 235 (Table D). For 1988 and 1993, see M. J. Conyon, Corporate 
Governance Changes in ('f< Companies Between 1988 and 1993 (1994) 2 Corp. Gov.: Inter. Rev. 97 at 
103 (Table 2). 
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As can be seen, there has been a steady increase in the proportion of NEDs on boards 
during this period. However, even in 1993, the average board of a quoted industrial 
company still had only a minority of NEDs. Indeed in 1985, only 22% of quoted 
industrial companies had a board with a majority of NEDs; 147 by 1993 this figure wtiwas 
only 25% (although a further 24% of companies had a board with equal numbers of 
executives and non-executives). ' 48 
Figures however, are not consistent. Given this, and the fact that Table 5.1 concerned 
only industrial companies, Stapledon carried out a study for the years 1971,1981 and 
1991. 
Further to Table 5.2, NEDs were in a majority on the boards of 92% of financial 
companies in the 1971 sample; at 92% of the financial companies in the 1981 sample, 
and at 94% of the financial companies in the 1991 sample. 149 Concerning industrial 
companies, non-executives were in the majority in a mere 10% of the 1971 sample; at 
17% of the 1981 sample, and at 27% of the 1991 sample. 150 It is therefore clear that 
NEDs are more numerous in financial companies as the following table suggests: 
Table 5.2: Composition of Boards of Large UK Listed Companies 1971-91.1; j 
Average % of non-executive directors 
1971 1981 1991 
All companies 42 45 48 
Financial companies 76 72 66 
Industrial companies 31 36 43 
Cadbury and the Non-Executive Director. 
UK boards have always contained directors who have been part-time and without 
executive office, be it the six-month old Marquis of Bute in Re Cardi Savings 
147 Bank of England, The Boards of Quoted Companies (1985) 25 Bank Eng. Q. Bull. 233 at 235 (Table 
C). 
148 G. P. Stapledon, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance, 1996, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, p. 140. 149 
Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid. at p. 141. 
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Bank152 or the country gentleman of Re Denham & CO . 
153 Such directors were often 
employed simply to allow the company to be associated with a person of their 
reputation and distinction. 154 However, only recently has the resurgence of NEDs has 
acquired a new importance since the Cadbury Report, 155 which was subsequently 
described by the Hampel Committee as a landmark in thinking on corporate 
governance. 156 
Cadbury s central recommendation was that the boards of all listed companies 
registered in the UK should comply with a Code of Best Practice. 157 The Committee 
also recommended that any reasons for non-compliance should be set out in the 
company s reports. 158 The Code of Best Practice was widely welcomed upon its 
publication and the statement of compliance was made a continuing obligation of 
listing by the Stock Exchange, the task having now been taken over by the Financial 
Services Authority. 159 
The main thrust of Cadbury relates to NEDs. 160 According to Cadbury, they should 
bring an independent judgement to bear on issues of strategy, performance, 
resources, including key appointments, and standards of conduct. 161 To this end, 
there should be a minimum of three NEDs on the board. 162 The Combined Code has 
152 
f 189212 Ch. 100. 
153 (1883) 25 Ch. D. 752. 
154 The notorious Times advertisement for A titled person required to add distinction to the board of a 
wine company. No responsibility, investment or participation required-firm very sound, encapsulates 
this antiquated view of the non-executive director s role. 
155 The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, London: 
Gee Publishing Ltd. 
156 The Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance, 1998, London: Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 
1.5. 
157 The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, London: 
Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 3.1. 
M I)id. at para. 3.7. 
159 See Financial Services Authority, The Listing Rules, May 2000, London: FSA, para. 12.43A. 
160 V. Finch, Board Performance and Cadbury on Corporate Governance [1992] JBL 581 at 591. 
161 The Cock of Best Practice, 1992, London: Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 2.1. 
162 The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992. London: 
Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 4.11. By 1999,93°ý of companies were complying with this requirement: 
see Pensions & Investment Research Consultants Ltd., Compliance With the Combined Code: .4 Study 
Prepared. for the Company Law Revicit-. September 1999. [Online] Available 28th March 2000 
htttý: iýýýýýw dti guv. ukicld pirc. pdf., p. 8. 
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since argued that in order for NEDs to be able to carry significant weight in the 
board s decisions, NEDs should compromise no less that one-third of the board. 163 
The key to this aim lay in the NEDs being independent. On this, the Code states that 
NEDs should be independent of management and free from any business or other 
relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of their independent 
judgement. 164 They should be appointed for specific terms and reappointment 
should not be automatic. 165 
The attraction of board-level monitoring is convincing at first when compared to other 
governance mechanisms. Unlike shareholders, NEDs, at least in theory, have 
unlimited access to company information. Monitoring at board-level will also avoid 
the problems of collective action that plague other governance arrangements. Finally, 
board-level monitoring is less costly than other forms of governance, notably the 
market for corporate control. One could even argue that effective board level 
monitoring would render the market for corporate control obsolete as a truly 
independent board would not tolerate suboptimal managerial performance. 166 
However, as we shall see, NEDs suffer from several serious limitations which make it 
extremely difficult for them to effectively carry out their monitoring function. 
There has also been strong criticism of the Cadbury Report. Several commentators 
have argued that the recommendations are too vague and should have been more 
explicitly delineated. 167 Others argue that Cadbury s recommendations are not 
ambitious enough and do not go far enough to give the NEDs a serious monitoring 
role. 168 
163 Committee on Corporate Governance, The Combined Code: Principles of Good Governance and 
Code of Best Practice, para. A. 3.1 appended to Financial Services Authority, The Listing Rules, May 
2000, London: FSA. 
164 The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, London: 
Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 4.12. 
165 Ibid. at para. 4.16. 
166 J . C. Coffee, Regulating the Market 
for Corporate Control: .4 Critical 
Assessment of the Tender 
Offers Role in Corporate Governance (1984) 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1145 at 1203. 
16j See e. g. J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law, 
1993, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 193-4. 
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However, there is also evidence to indicate that Cadbury has strengthened the position 
of NEDs. NEDs are now able to use Cadbury as a yardstick. If companies do not 
comply, the NEDs can state that unless change is forthcoming they will communicate 
their concerns to the institutional investors. Hence, as one member of the Cadbury 
Committee stated in 1995 Cadbury has provided the conscientious non-executive 
director with a bannister to hold on to in the face of a dominant chief executive. 169 
Further, since Cadbury, there is evidence that NEDs have been taking their role more 
seriously. A 1991-94 study discovered a spectacular productivity increase in the 
output of NEDs with the amount of time that they spent working for their company 
increasing 50% without any increase in pay. 170 The indications are that this workload 
will increase even further as companies make even more use of their NEDs in the 
future. 171 
However, it has to be acknowledged that, despite the above, the impact of Cadbury 
was always going to be limited. A 1994 study of 200 of the UK s largest listed 
companies found that only half had corporate governance structures in place that fully 
complied with the Cadbury Code of Best Practice. 172 Full compliance was even less 
common in small and medium-sized listed companies. 173 
There is little doubt that Cadbury has had an impact on the role of directors in UK 
listed companies. It is probably still too early to tell whether or not the impact will be 
positive and long-term but for the time being, the Cadbury guidelines seem to be 
operating in the manner that the Report envisaged. Perhaps even more significant, 
16R See e. g. N. G. Maw et al, Maw on Corporate Governance, 1994, Aldershot: Dartmouth, ch. 13; P. L. 
Davies, Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom in D. D. Prentice and P. R. J. Holland (eds. ), 
Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance, 1993, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 93-4. 
169 See Sorting Out Son of Cadbury (1995) Times 26`h January, p. 24. 
170 See Outside Directors More Productive (1994) Financial Times 17`h October (discussing research 
carried out by 31, a large investment company. ) Later studies, however, indicate that NED 
remuneration is starting to rise to reflect their increased workload: Non-Executive Fees Rise Along with 
Extra Responsibility (1996) Times 13t1i May. 
171 PRO-NED, Chairmen and Non-Executive Directors: Fees, Facts and Attitudes, 1994, London: 
PRO-NED, pp. 26-7. ýe 172 See e. g. Half of UK Companies Fail Corporate Governance Code (1995) Financial Times 
23 
January (research by PIRG): Boardroom Code Largely Ignored (1994) Daily Telegraph 25`h February 
(research by NAPF. ) 
173 See e. g. Smaller Firms Too Slow on Non-Execs (1995) Times 
th March: Half a Revolution (1995) 
Economist 27`h May and A. Belcher, Compliance with the Cadbury Code and the Reporting of 
Corporate Governance (1996) 17 Co. Law. I1 at 14,17. 
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Cadbury went a long way toward establishing the current trend of self-regulation that 
is becoming increasingly important in UK corporate governance. 
The Role of Non-Executive Directors. 
As noted, there have long been directors without executive office. However, our law 
does not reflect this as the Companies Act 1985 refers only to directors: it does not 
differentiate between executive and non-executive directors. Whilst all directors have 
the same legal duties174 and statutory responsibilities, the very existence of NEDs 
implies that their role is in some way different to that of their executive counterparts. 
It is widely accepted that the boards of virtually all large public companies do not 
manage their companies day-to-day business. 175 Rather their role has been referred to 
as one of direction and control of the company. 176 It is this control or monitoring 
function that concerns us here as it is this function that distinguishes the roles of 
executive and non-executive directors: executive directors are responsible (as 
managers) for activities which it is the duty of the board as a whole to monitor This 
means that the nature of the monitoring role is ipso facto different for non-executive 
directors. 177 Accordingly: 
Non-executive directors have two particularly. important contributions to 
make to the governance process as a consequence of their independence from 
executive responsibility The first is in reviewing the performance of the 
board and of the executive The second is in taking the lead where potential 
conflicts of interest arise. 
178 
During the 1980 s and 1990 s, structural support for the second of these functions was 
given by the introduction of audit, remuneration and nomination committees. 
179 
However, the monitoring function has not been as successful. 
174 See Dorchester Finance Co. Ltd. v Stebbin, [19891 BCLC 498, where Foster J held that [i]n the 
Companies Act 1948 the duties of a director whether executive or not are the same. The same is true 
of the Companies Act 1985. See The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance, 1992, London: Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 4.3. 
175 G. P. Stapledon, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance. 1996, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, p. 142. 
176 The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. 1992. London: 
Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 1.4. 
177 J. P. Charkham, Corporate Governance and the , 1larket for Control of Companies, 1989, 
London: 
Economics Division, Bank of England, p. 13. 
178 The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. 
1992. London: 
Gee Publishing Ltd., paras. 4.4-4.6. 
179 See M. J. Conyon, Corporate Governance Changes in UK Companies Between 1988 and 1993 
(1994) 2 Corp. Gov.: Inter. Rev. 97. 
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Barriers to Effective Monitoring. 
Firstly, there is ambiguity concerning the role of NEDs, namely are they required 
solely to monitor the board or are they also required to play an active part in 
managing the company. 
The answer appears to be both. 180 NEDs appear well placed to monitor the board. 
Further, if the chairman is an executive director, a senior non-executive director 
should be appointed in order to maintain a balance between the executive and non- 
executive influence. 181 However, this should not detract from the primary 
contribution which they are expected to make, as equal board members, to the 
leadership of the company. 182 However, this creates problems from a monitoring 
standpoint. As NEDs are required to work with the executives in leading the 
company, they will in effect be required to an extent to monitor their own conduct. 
It has therefore been contended that Cadbury aims to segregate the executives from 
the non-executives. 1 83 This will create, if not an implicit two-tier board, then certainly 
a bifurcated one. 184 In doing this, Cadbury has been criticised for imposing a two-tier 
board philosophy upon a unitary board structure. '85 Yet it is perceived that the law 
still refuses to acknowledge any distinction between executive and non-executive 
directors. 
This contention is only partially true. Whilst it is true that the dual role of NEDs 
creates problems and some segregation will inevitably occur, Cadbury cannot wholly 
be blamed. Throughout its report, Cadbury was extremely careful to state that 
executives and non-executives were part of one unified board. 186 However, despite 
180 See M. Ezzamel & R. Watson, Wearing Two Hats: The Conflicting Control and Management Roles 
of Non-Executive Directors in K. Keasey, S. Thompson & M. Wright (eds. ), Corporate Governance: 
Economic, Management, and Financial Issues, 1997, New York: OUP, pp. 54-79. 
181 The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, London: 
Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 4.3. 
182 Ibid. at para. 4.7. 
183 V. Finch, Board Performance and Cadbury on Corporate Governance [1992] JBL 581 at 592. 
184 J. Sims, Horn Two-Tier Boards Can Cut Corporate Confusion (1992) Independent on Sunday 
December 6th at 24. 
185 Sir O. Green, 11 by Cadburi Leaves a Bitter Taste (1992) Financial Times June 91h 
I S6 The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, London: 
Gee Publishing Ltd., paras. 4.1-4.4. 
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this, there are still those who contend that Cadbury s proposals have created two 
distinct classifications of director, the doers and the checkers 187 and the law should 
reflect this. 
Striking the balance between a NED s monitoring and managerial function is 
important in relation to determining the scope of their legal duty of skill and care. If 
NEDs are to be primarily viewed as monitors, 188 this opens the way to placing blame 
upon them for failure to detect and rectify underperformance or abuse by the 
executive directors. However, it would be much more difficult to lay this blame if 
their role as managers is emphasised more strongly than their monitoring role. ' 89 
Perhaps even more worrying from a NED s point of view is the extent of their liability 
under the CDDA. It now appears that a NED who fails in his role as executive 
monitor may be disqualified. In Re Continental Assurance Co. of London plc., 190 an 
insurance company had gone into liquidation with debts in excess of £8 millions. All 
three directors of the company were disqualified including a NED. The court 
accepted that the NED had not known of the executive s misconduct of the company s 
affairs, in particular the fact that it was lending money to its parent company in breach 
of s. 151 Companies Act 1985. However, the court concluded that any competent 
director in his position should have known what was going on and that his failure to 
discover the wrongdoing displayed serious incompetence or neglect and was 
sufficient to justify disqualification. Accordingly, if a NED can be disqualified for 
not carrying out his roles properly, surely clarification is needed so that NEDs know 
what their role is to be. 
A second barrier to effective monitoring concerns executive dominance of the board. 
NEDs are commonly outnumbered by the executive directors. Since they are in the 
minority and lack the co-operation of management, they are effectively impotent. 
191 
187 P. Martin, Taming the Overmighty Boss: The Cadbur}v Report Hopes to Make UK Companies Better 
Run, But 11 'ill it Make Then Afore Profitable (1992) Financial Times December 2"d at 20 quoting Peter 
Morgan of the Institute of Directors. 
188 The Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance, 1998, London: Gee Publishing Ltd., 
para. 3.7 stated that Cadbury emphasised the NEDs monitoring role to an unwarranted extent. 189 1-. Ferran, Company Law and Corporate Finance, 1999, Oxford: OUP, p. 220. 
90 X996] BCC 888. 
J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company' Law, 1993, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 194. 
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Not only do executives dominate numerically, but also as full-time executives they 
have privileged access to and control of internal information. If the executives decide 
not to disclose key facts, even the most diligent non-executive will find it almost 
impossible to monitor the executives. '92 Even if non-executives do have access to 
inside information, they may not be in a position to do anything with it. A typical 
NED will spend between one or two days a month on company business and this will 
be spent in the boardroom. This is little time to become conversant with the 
company s business. 193 NEDs therefore rely on the executives to draw attention to 
what is important. Accordingly, some distortion is likely to occur. 194 Since the 
presence of NEDs on the board is seen to be one way of redressing the informational 
asymmetries that exist between the management of a company and its shareholders, 195 
the difficulties that they face with regards to access to management information 
represents a serious problem. '96 
The final and perhaps most emasculating barrier concerns the NED s independence. 
Firstly, many NEDs are themselves executive directors of large plc s, 197 a position 
which produces a heavy workload: indeed it has been suggested that persons who 
have not experienced the responsibilities of executive directorships would be 
unsuitable for positions as non-executive directors. 198 This means that (a) they are 
unlikely to have the time to monitor effectively the companies in question, and; (b) as 
they are executive directors themselves, they may socialise with or serve on other 
boards as fellow non-executives with-the executives they are supposed to monitor. 
Accordingly, it has been noted most outside directors share management s 
192 A 1994 survey indicates that having insufficient information was a major concern for two out of 
three non-executive directors: see BDO Binder Hamlyn, Non-Executive Directors-li'atchdogs or 
. ldi i. vors? p. 5 discussed 
in Non-Executives and the Expectation Gap (1994) Accountancy, September 
74. 
193 G. Mills, On the Board, 1985,2nd ed., London: George Allen & Unwin, pp. 137-40 
194 A. Demb & F. F. Neubauer, The Corporate Board: Confronting the Paradoxes, 1992, New York: 
OUP, pp. ] 17-23. 
195 J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law, 1993, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 174-7,191-9. 
196 M. C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Systems 
(1993) 48 Journal of Finance 831 at 864. 
197 In 1993,54°c of non-executives of UK industrial companies were executive 
directors of other 
unconnected companies. See Korn/Ferry International, Boards of Directors 
Study UK, 1993. London: 
Korn; Ferry, p. 33. 
198 1. Stratton, Non-Executive Directors: Are They Superfluous? (1996) 17 Co. Law. 162 at 164. 
Accordingly, one commentator has suggested that companies seek directors who 
have a strong record 
of managing a company, so that they can bring this expertise in their role as non-executive 
director. 
See D. Bell, Setting Pay at the Top (1994) Incomes Data Services 5 at 9. 
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ideological disposition toward the single issue most central to their monitoring 
responsibilities: how intensely outside directors should monitor management. 199 
There is also the real possibility that non-executives may pull their punches out of 
an innate fear of encouraging non-execs on their own boards to rock the boat too 
200 often. 
The appointment of NEDs is also a cause for concern. 201 In virtually all UK listed 
companies, the appointment of all NEDs must be confirmed by an ordinary resolution 
of the general meeting, and they are then subject to periodic re-election by the 
shareholders. 202 Nevertheless, most NEDs of UK companies are selected by the 
chairman of the board, in many cases because the potential NEDs have a personal 
acquaintance with the chairman, with the shareholders providing only the official 
rubber stamp. 203 In 1994, it was stated that 50% of non-executives in UK industrial 
companies were chosen by the chairman. " 4 If the chairman is also the CEO, then a 
NED may feel compelled to exhibit loyalty to the person who appointed him. 205 
The difficulties posed by managers selecting their own monitors have diminished 
recently. The Cadbury Committee recognised this problem and recommended that 
non-executives should be selected through a formal process and both this process 
and their appointment should be a matter for the board as a whole, 206 and regarded it 
as a matter of good practice for a nomination committee207 consisting of a majority of 
199 R. J. Gilson & R. Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Inj, estors 
(1991) 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863 at 875. 
110 See Knives are Out in the Boardroom (1992) Financial Times May 1st at 11. 
201 A PRO-NED survey carried out in the early 1990 s discovered that 86% of senior business people 
and investors were dissatisfied with the appointment process of non-executive directors. See A. Jack, 
Cadburi" 
.1 stacks 
Old-Boy Network (1992) Financial Times September 28`h at 8. 
°`' This requirement is not legislative but most companies articles will probably contain provisions 
similar to arts. 73-80 Table A; cf. the position as regards executive directors. 
oz L. Miles and G. Proctor, Re-Designing the Office of Non-Executive Director: Has the 
Consultation 
Document Gone Far Enough? (2000) 21 BLR 143 at 144. 
204 KPM1G Peat Marwick, Survei" of Non-Executive Directors, 1994, London: KPNIG, p. 12. 
'0' On the loyalty point, see J. D. Cox & H. L. Nlunsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: 
Psychological 
Foundations and Legal Implications of Coiporate Cohesion (1985) 48 Law and 
Contemp. Problems 83 
at 91-9. 
206 The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance, 1992, London: 
Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 2.4. 
'07 By 1999,78°¬ of companies appointed non-executive directors by a nomination committee: see 
Pensions R Investment Research Consultants Ltd.. Compliance With the Combined Code: A Study 
Prepared for the Company Law Revieit'. September 1999. [Online] Available 
http: /i\w'\\ w. dti., ov. 
uk/cld/pirc pdf., p. 12,2 8`h March 2000. 
i, I 
Chapter 5: Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
NEDs208 to carry out the selection process and make recommendations to the board. 209 
Further, at Cadbury s behest, 210 it has become common practice for companies to split 
the chairman and CEO roles . 
211 However, this by no means ensures transparency and 
objectivity. In companies with nominating committees, the CEO can often continue 
to play a significant behind the scenes role in selecting nominees. 212 Where the 
chairman and the CEO are split, relations between the two are often close. The reason 
for this is that it is common for the chairman to be the company s former CEO who 
2 would have had a strong input as to his successor. 13 
Even if objectivity is secured in the appointment process, there is reason to doubt the 
motivation NEDs will have for their monitoring function. Part of this problem is that 
NEDs are often paid considerably less than their executive counterparts 
and pay is rarely tied to performance. Therefore it has been contended that NEDs 
have incentives to use their power in a manner that will discourage risk-taking and 
stifle entrepreneurship. 214 Further, if they are executives for another company, as we 
have noted they may well be, the fees will be paid to that company rather than the 
director. Accordingly, from a financial perspective, NEDs have little to gain by being 
diligent and meticulous. 215 This may explain why in recent years, there has emerged a 
growing scarcity of non-executive director talent. A 1994 Korn Ferry survey found 
that the proportion of boards that had been turned down by prospective NEDs had 
216 increased from 24.9% in 1989 to 65% in 1993. 
208 At 1999,79% of companies had nomination committees consisting of a majority of non-executive 
directors: Ibid. at p. 13 . 209 See Committee on Corporate Governance, The Combined Code: Principles of Good Governance 
and Code of Best Practice, 1998, para. A. 5.1 appended to Financial Services Authority, The Listing 
Rules, May 2000, London: FSA. 
210 The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, London: 
Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 4.9. The Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance, 1998, London: 
Gee and Co., paras. 3.18-19 felt that Cadbury s recommendation on the separation of roles was too 
restrictive. 
211 In 1999, it was reported that 87% of companies had split the roles of chairman and CEO: see PIRC 
Ltd., Compliance With the Combined Code: A Study Prepared for the Company Law Review, 
September 1999, [Online] Available http: //www. dti. gov. uk/cld /pire. pdf., p. 4,28th March 2000. 
212 B. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
609. 
13 D. Clutterbuck & P. Waive, The Independent Board Director, 1993, London: McGraw-Hill, p. 41. 
214 B. R. Cheffins, Company' Law: Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 
025. 
215 GW Dent, Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation [1989] Wisc. L. 
Rev. 881 at 899. 
216 See G. F. Davies, The Significance of Board Interlocks for Corporate Governance (1996) 4 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 154. 
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Evidence of Problems. 217 
Critics of NEDs have drawn attention to several instances where executive managers 
have acted in an imprudent or self-serving manner and assigned blame to those 
directors who failed to detect or remedy the behaviour in question. One example 
involved a dirty tricks campaign carried out in the early 1990 s by British Airways 
plc. against Virgin Atlantic. Many felt that the NEDs should have more closely 
monitored what Lord King, the CEO and chairman of the board, was doing. 218 
Another example concerned the drinks company Guinness plc. In 1986, its bid for 
Distillers plc. was largely conducted by three of the company s directors, these being 
the CEO, the finance director and a US lawyer, Mr. Thomas Ward. The bid was 
highly controversial culminating in a series of criminal trails involving allegations of 
illegal share price support, conspiracy to defraud and theft. 219 In particular, criticism 
was levelled at the NEDs for failing to scrutinise what was going on. This was 
brought to bear when the House of Lords held that Mr. Ward should return to the 
company £5.2 millions he charged as fees. 22° Finally, in 1987, Blue Arrow plc., an 
employment agency group, orchestrated a takeover of US-based Manpower inc., then 
the world s largest employment agency. 221 Two DTI investigations drew attention to 
the fact that Mr. Tony Berry, the chairman and CEO of Blue Arrow, was allowed to 
exercise an extremely wide discretion in relation to the company s affairs. The DTI 
inspectors stated that a balanced board structure was not present and this failure had 
meant that Blue Arrow s three NEDs did not have the information, time and resources 
required to monitor Mr. Berry s conduct. 
A second set of examples concerns companies that have suffered dramatic financial 
problems due to the failure of the NEDs to monitor effectively. A common thread 
within these cases is that these companies are run by a charismatic and public 
principal character whom the NEDs (and for that matter, the executives) fail to 
211 The following examples are drawn from B. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theori. Structure and 
Oeeration, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 611-14. 
'1` E. g. N. M1acErlean, D&O: Do You Need It? (1993) Accountancy, March 40. 
219 See M. Levi, The Investigation, Prosecution and Trial of Serious Fraud (Research Study No. 14 for 
the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice), 1993, London: HMSO, pp 219-22. 220 Guinness PLC v Saunders [19901 2 WLR 324. There were also failures to comply with the 
disclosure requirements contained in s. 317 Companies Act 1985. See G. McCormack, The Guinness 
Saga: In Tom We Trust (1991) 12 Co. Law. 90, especially at 91-33 - 
155 
Chapter 5: Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
exercise control over. 222 The most recent and spectacular example concerned press 
baron Robert Maxwell and two public companies, Maxwell Communications 
Corporation and Mirror Group Newspapers plc. In 1991, when Mr. Maxwell died, his 
vast business empire quickly collapsed. It subsequently came to light that the 
company s pension funds had been siphoned off to support other business interests of 
Mr. Maxwell and that he had been involved in what was likely an illegal share price 
support scheme. Both companies contained NEDs, including former politicians. 
These individuals conferred respectability on Mr. Maxwell, but either did not have the 
ability or the will to put a stop to his activities. 223 
This has been repeated. In 1990, the food and consumer electronics group, Polly Peck 
International plc. had shares with a market value of £1.75 billion. Within months 
however, the equity was worthless and its CEO and chairman, Mr. Asil Nadir, fled the 
country after being charged with stealing over £100 millions from the company. In 
1991, the property and leisure group, Brent Walker plc. collapsed with debts of £ 1.5 
billion following a number of dubious transactions by its CEO Mr. George Walker. 
And finally, between 1989 and 1993, the hotel management firm Queens Moat 
Houses plc. suffered a dramatic reduction in share price culminating in a 1992 loss of 
£ 1.02 billion. All of these firms collapsed amidst accusations that the NEDs had let 
the investors down by not making sufficient efforts to stem the company s decline. 224 
Evidence suggests that these are not one-off incidents. A study by Franks, Mayer and 
Renneboog found that the presence of NEDs on the board was not related to 
managerial changes when corporate performance was poor. 225 A follow-up study 
confirms these findings. 226 
''I See 11. Shilling, Blue 
.l rron : 
Lessons on Corporate Governance (1993) PLC, June 35. 
2'1 - C. Boyd, Ethics and Corporate Governance: The Issues Raised by the Cadbury Report in the United 
Kingdom (1996) 15 J. of Bus. Ethics 167 at 168-9. 
223 P. Stiles and B. Taylor, Ala. vwell-The Failure of Corporate Governance (1993) 1 Corp. Gov.: Inter. 
Rev. 34 at 40. a T. Sheridan and N. Kendall, Corporate Governance: An Action Plan for Pro/stability and Business 
Success, 1992, London: Pitman Publishing, p. 106; T. Smith, .1 ccounting 
for Growth. - Stripping the 
Camou/lageftom CompanvAccounts, 1992, London: Century Business, pp. 221-3. 
` J. Franks, C. Mayer and L. Renneboog, Who Disciplines Management in Poorl_I Performing 
Companies, 2000. 
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The above suggests that the monitoring role provided by NEDs is unlikely to be 
effective, and therefore one would imagine that they would contribute little to 
corporate performance. If NEDs have indeed evolved as a market-induced 
mechanism to increase efficiency by monitoring the board, then their failure to 
monitor would also result in a failure to improve efficiency. 
The majority of the available empirical evidence seems to support this. A number of 
studies show no positive correlation between corporate performance and the presence 
of NEDs on the board. 227 Indeed, some studies even suggest that the presence of 
NEDs can have detrimental effects on corporate performance. 
Conclusion. 
The predicament surrounding the corporate governance potential of non-executive 
directors has been summed up succinctly thus: 
Non-executives are in general picked by the executives, owe their salary to 
the executives, and commonly share social and other business connections 
with the executives. They rely on executives for information and advice, and 
their principal duties are carried out in the presence of the executives. It is 
hardly surprising that changes in executive management are more frequently 
the product of expensive, external action through take over than 
consequences of the activities of non-executive directors. 228 
Accordingly, the notion that outside directors with little or no equity stake in the 
company could effectively monitor and discipline the managers who selected them 
has proven hollow at best. 229 In theory, the concept of the NED is an attractive one. 
226 S. Letza, P. Hardwick and J. Ashton, Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing 
Companies? An Updated Study [Online] Available http: //www. dti. gov. uk/cld/bourne. pdf 23`d March 
2001. 
227 E. g. S. Bhagat and B. Black, The Relationship Bem, een Board Composition and Firm Performance 
in K. J. Hopt et al, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research, 
1998, Oxford: OUP, p. 281. 
»v F. Davis & J. Kay, Corporate Governance, Takeovers and the Role of the Non-Executive Director 
in M. Bishop & J. Kay (eds. ), European Mergers and Merger Policy, 1993, Oxford: OUP, p. 212. 
Similar concerns have been voiced in the USA: 
[non-executive directors] are effectively nominated by the CEO, they must rely on 
the executives for most of the information they receive, and they need good 
relationships with the officers if they are to function well in guiding corporate policy. 
Often, directors share similar backgrounds and interests with the firms executives. 
Frequently, they themselves are senior executives in other firms. Moreover, outside 
directors who are not CEO s of other firms may well derive a significant portion of 
their incomes from their directorship. 
See P. Mlilgrom & J. Roberts, Economics, Organization and , 
tanagement, 1992, Eaglewood Cliffs. 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, p. 434. 
229 M. C. Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation (1989) Harv. Bus. Rev. (Oct. ) 61 at 64. 
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Prima facie the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee would do much to make 
that theory a reality. The practical weaknesses of the office however, most notably 
issues of independence, ensure that NEDs are only likely to be involved in anti- 
management action when the company is in some sort of crisis. Ultimately. the most 
significant problem is not the rules or procedures relating to NEDs, but the fact that it 
is in their best interests not to monitor too critically. One commentator has suggested 
that most outside directors share managements ideological disposition toward the 
single issue most central to their monitoring responsibilities: how intensely outside 
directors should monitor management. 230 If ultimately both the executives and non- 
executives are of the opinion that NEDs should not monitor too closely, no rule or 
procedure is going to avoid this limitation. The failure of the nomination committee 
is evidence of this. Until these inherent ideological weaknesses can be removed, the 
NED will never be able to fulfil his role as envisaged by Cadbury. 
IV. EXECUTIVE PAY 
Introduction: Executive Pay As A Governance Mechanism. 
In late 1994, British Gas plc. proposed changes to the remuneration packages of its 
senior executives. One such change resulted in a pay rise of 70% to the then CEO, 
Mr. Cedric Brown, thereby increasing his pay to £475,000 per year. 231 Public 
condemnation ensued and the media latched onto the issue of increasing executive 
pay under headlines such as Derailing the Gravy Train, 
232 Executive Gluttony 
Under Attack 233 and Fat Cats in the Dock. 234 The issue soon became a political one 
and Mr. Brown was forced to justify his increase to a House of Commons 
employment committee. 235 Labour politicians argued for legislative reform, 
236 whilst 
Conservative politicians, with their free market philosophy, were unenthusiastic. 
237 
I '0 R. J. Gilson and R. Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda 
for Institutional 
Investors (1991) 43 Stan. LR. 863 at 875. 
31 
. \Ithough qtr. Brown contended that the pay rise was only 
28°ö. See J. Kampfner, British Gas Chie 
Defends Large Pa. v Rises Before, IIP s (1995) Financial Times January 
25th at 6. 
232 
(1995) Sunday Times January 22" '. 
'" D. Cohen (1994) Financial Times Noy ember 26i27th at 3. 
214 ,... . ... 
, nth 
235 
236 - -' 
v' ua-'. .' "' - ..... ", -- 
cPl- rr,,,,,. " 11,141 14,11t n; ºvwnr. c Grc"i" Train (1995) 
Observer April 9th 
- Vl1VV{f/ "" 1II I Iý"II .. . ý. ý" -- - 
237 See Portillo Ste'clrs Clear of . 
tlajor s : Vot" Line on 
Pay (1995) The Times March 2 "d 
tiyy-)) Ccononnst marcn -+ 
Case Stuch: The Czse' of British Gas (1996) 4 Corp. Gov.: Inter. Rev. 21 at 22--). 
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Nevertheless, the then Prime Minister, John Major, indicated that statutory changes 
may be required. 238 
In 1995, responding to the growing calls for reform, the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI), an organisation that speaks on behalf of the business community, 
established a study group to examine executive pay. This group, chaired by Marks 
and Spencer plc s CEO Sir Richard Greenbury, reported within a few months of its 
formation. 239 As with Cadbury, 240 compliance with its recommendations became a 
Stock Exchange listing requirement. 241 
More recently, in July 1999, the DTI published a consultation document in which the 
Government advocated a more formal approach to determining directors 
remuneration. 242 Recommendations included mandatory remuneration committees for 
all quoted companies, 243 an increase in the disclosure of remuneration packages and 
the possibility of shareholder approval for the directors remuneration report. 
Following on from the DTI s recommendations, on the 1St August 2002, the Directors 
Remuneration Report Regulations came into force. 244 These regulations inserted a 
new s. 234B into the Companies Act 1985.245 S. 234B requires directors of quoted 
companies to prepare a directors remuneration report. The contents of the report are 
set out in a new Sch. 7A which is also inserted into the Companies Act 1985. The 
information required in the report is extensive. Sch. 7A requires that the company set 
out in full the composition of its remuneration committee. The bulk of the report 
concerns the actual remuneration itself. Directors are required to disclose in full their 
remuneration including all share option and long-term incentive schemes. Full 
218 See K. Brown and J. Blitz, Dodging Through the Executive Pay Field (1995) Financial Times 
March 2nd at 10. 
219 Directors Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard Greenburv, 1995, 
London: Gee Publishing Ltd. 
240 In relation to executive remuneration, Cadbury made only a modest series of proposals: see The 
Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, London: Gee 
Publishing Ltd., paras. 4.40-46. This has led to one commentator stating in the controversial area of 
executive pay, the report falls conspicuously short. See Leading Article: Tightening Up Governance 
(1992) Financial Time. ' May 28`h at 20. 
241 Financial Services Authority, The Listing Rules, May 2000, London: FSA, para. 12.43A. 
, '' Department of Trade and Industry. Directors Remuneration: .4 
Consultative Document, July 1999. 
London: DTI. 
' Ihid. at para. 3.15. 244 The Directors Remuneration Report Regulations 2002. SI 2002/1986. 
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disclosure of the board s service contracts is also required. Once the report is 
prepared, it has to be approved by the shareholders. 246 
Given these developments, one might assume that the payment of excessive 
remuneration would become an increasingly rare event. However, this has not been 
the case. Further, directors can, to an extent, conceal their total remuneration. Under 
the Companies Act 1985, a company is not required to specify each directors pay or 
provide a breakdown of a director s remuneration package, e. g. share options, salary 
and bonuses. 247 This lacuna was heavily criticised with one commentator describing 
the situation as Byzantine. 248 Accordingly, following Greenbury s 
recommendations, the Stock Exchange revised the Yellow Book (now The Listing 
Rules) to require that a listed company s remuneration committee (or the board if no 
committee exists) to prepare a report accompanying the accounts and an annual report 
setting out data on share options and long-term incentive schemes. 249 Nevertheless, 
there are still numerous forms of remuneration package, some of which serve to 
obfuscate a director's true income. 
Firstly, and most obviously, directors may simply receive an inordinately high salary. 
Although it was Cedric Brown s £475,000 salary that ignited the issue, his salary is by 
no means the highest. In fact, compared to some, his is positively modest. In the 
same year, Peter Wood, a director for the Royal Bank of Scotland, was paid 
£ 18,473,169, an increase of 201.8% on the previous year. 250 More startling is the pay 
increase of Octov Botnar, a director for the Automotive Financial Group, whose pay 
rose to £3,809,000, an increase of 2,830%. 251 
24S The Directors Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, SI 2002/1986, reg-3. 246 S. 241 A Companies Act 1985, inserted by The Directors Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, 
S1 2002/1986, reg. 7. 
247 However, a company does have to supply information about share options in the notes 
supplementing its accounts and in the annual report: Sch. 4, para. 40 and sch. 7, paras. 2A and 2B 
Companies Act 1985. 
24¢ D. Eggington et a!, Executive and Employee Share Options: Taxation, Dilution and Disclosure 
(1993) 23 J. of Bus. Res. 363 at 368. 
: 49 Now contained in Financial Services Authority, The Listing Rules, May 2000, London: FSA, para. 
12.43A(c), implementing Directors Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard 
Greenbury, 1995, London: Gee Publishing Ltd., paras. 5.5-5.25 and Code of Best Practice, part B. 250 Labour Research Department, Boardroom Bonanza Continues (1994) 83(8) Labour Research 7 at 8. 
'`1 Ibid. 
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One possible reason why Cedric Brown was vilified was that at the time of his pay 
increase, British Gas was making hundreds of employees redundant and cutting the 
wages of many more. 252 The relative position of senior management and their 
employees should be borne in mind when determining remuneration. A 1995 poll 
revealed that 90% of UK adults believed that inordinate rises in executive pay could 
reduce employee morale. 253 The Greenbury Committee recognised this when it urged 
remuneration committees to take into account rank-and-file wage levels when 
formulating executive pay. 254 This recommendation also became part of the 
Combined Code. 255 
However, when one compares the pay of senior executives and their workforce, there 
is little to indicate that this is being done. Median highest paid director pay has grown 
from £239,000 in 1994 to £410,000 in 1999, a rise of 72%. 256 In the same period, 
median average employee pay has risen from £ 17,332 to £20,485, a rise of 18%. 2S' 
Thus during the period 1994-9, director pay rises outstripped employee pay rises by a 
ration of 4: 1. In 1994, the average earnings for a male manual worker were £ 14,882 
per year. 258 In the same year, 14 companies paid their directors at least that amount 
per week. 259 In 1996, the lowest basic rate at Tesco was £2.82 per hour - 145 times 
less than the £533.40 per hour that Tesco director, Sir Ian MacLaurin, was earning. 260 
252 See Nice Work If You're the Boss (1995) The Times January 17th; Big Guns Will Put Down 
Shareholder's Gas Revolt( 1995) Independent on Sunday May 28'n 
253 Salary Rises Among Leading Company Chiefs Reached 12% (1995) The Times July 14'n. 
2s4 Directors Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired bi' Sir Richard Greenburv, 1995, 
London: Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 6.13. In 1995, Barclays Bank failed to do this and many bank 
workers went on strike. Their justification for greater pay increases was the substantial pay rises that 
the Barclays board had received. See R. Donkin, Staff at Barclays Vote to Strike (1995) Financial 
Times May 5th at 20. 
255 Committee on Corporate Governance, The Combined Code: Principles of 
Good Governance and 
Code of Best Practice, para. B. 1.3 appended to Financial Services Authority, 
The Listing Rules, May 
2000, London: FSA. 
256 Trades Union Congress, Top Cats: The Last Closed Shop, August 2000, London: TUC, p. 2. 
2" Ibid. 
258 Labour Research Department, One Director Worth 127 Cleaners! (1995) 84(7) Labour Research II 
at 12. 
2-'9Ibid. These companies were SmithKline Beecham, Glaxo, 
Unilever, Tesco. Hanson, BET, IISBC 
Holdings, National Westminster Bank, Barclays Bank, Argyll, Grand Metropolitan. Tomkins. Thorn 
EMI and Cable & Wireless. 
260 Labour Research Department, The f4 A Minute Minimum Wage (1996) 85(5) Labour 
Research 13 at 
14. 
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The greatest difference was the pay of the highest paid director of Thom EMI who, in 
1994, earned the equivalent of 376 rank-and-file workers. 261 
Such inequalities of pay are accentuated when companies move their manufacturing 
base to countries where rates of pay are low. For example, in 1993, Lawrence 
Bossidy, CEO of US firm Allied Signal, announced on national television that his 
company would not shift jobs from the United States to Mexico if the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)262 was passed. Within two years on NAFTA s 
passage, AlliedSignal boasted the highest number of petitions to the Department of 
Labor claiming job loss due to NAFTA. In 1995, Allied Signal s Mexican plant paid 
its employees $0.82 per hour following the peso devaluation. At that rate, Allied 
Signal s 3,800 Mexican employees earned a combined annual total of about $7.8 
millions; less than Lawrence Bossidy s total 1995 compensation of $8.4 millions. 263 
One would suspect that this imbalance would be partially evened out by the 
introduction of the minimum wage. The TUC argued for a minimum wage of around 
£4.60 per hour. The CBI in its evidence to the Low Pay Commission, argued for a 
national minimum wage of between £3.10-20 per hour. The decision to set the rate at 
£3.60 for workers aged 18-21 was according to the CBI towards the higher end of 
what is acceptable to business. 264 However, if one examines the earnings of leading 
CBI members, it becomes clear that they value themselves much more highly than 
those earning the minimum wage. 
Sir Clive Thompson, President of the CBI, earns £446.34 per hour as CEO of Rentokil 
Initial - 129.5 times the minimum wage that the CBI believes is towards the higher 
end of what is acceptable to business. 265 Similar trends are present among other CBI 
261 Labour Research Department, One Director Worth 127 Cleaners! (1995) 84(7) Labour Research II 
at 12. 
M NAFTA is an organization dedicated to eliminating tariffs between the US, Canada and Mexico. 
Many US employees correctly feared that once tariffs are removed, their jobs will be taken by Mexican 
employees willing to work for much less. 
263 S. Anderson and J. Cavanagh, CEOs Win, Workers Lose: How Wall Street Rewards Job Destroyers 
(Online] Available hgg: //www. cocRwatch. org/comer/elobtiRatceo. htmi 291° June 2000. 
Quoted in Labour Research Department, Bosses Rate Themselves Highly (1998) 87(11) Labour 
Research 9 at 9. 
265 /bid. 
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members. 266 It should be remembered that the CBI instigated the Greenbury study 
into executive pay and yet they themselves are amongst the highest paid. In 1995, Sir 
Richard Greenbury himself earned f l, 156,010, excluding his non-executive 
directorships of Lloyds Bank and Zeneca. 267 It is therefore no surprise that this 
situation has been described as a case of putting Dracula in charge of a blood 
bank. 268 Whatever the issues involved, the major point is that inordinate executive 
pay rises can cause dissatisfaction amongst the rank-and-file workers. Consequently, 
morale and productivity will suffer. 269 Further, excessive executive earnings can 
complicate salary negotiations. In 1995, Barclays Bank experienced a period of 
severe employee dissatisfaction. During bargaining, which was marked by strike 
activity, Barclays employees sought to justify their wage demands by drawing 
attention to the substantial pay increases that the Barclays board had received. 270 
Secondly, directors may conceal their total remuneration by receiving modest salaries 
and then boosting their income by other means. This is most commonly done via the 
use of share options and/or dividend payments. Share options are popular with 
companies because they are seen as a means by which payment can be tied to 
performance. They are also popular with directors because they offer a risk-free 
opportunity to make a large profit. 271 Share option schemes offer the director a 
chance to buy a number of shares in their company, usually at a slight discount to the 
current market price, 272 in at least four to five years time. Once this period has 
passed, the director has several options. If the share price has dropped, then the 
Mid. For example, Sir Peter Bonfield of British Telecom earns 98 times the minimum wage; Sir 
John Browne of British Petroleum earns 83.5 times the minimum wage and Niall Fitzgerald of Unilever 
earns 83.2 times the minimum wage. 
267 Labour Research Department, High Pay: Leading By Example (1995) 84(3) Labour Research 17 at 
17. 
268 Ibid. 
269 L. J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay 
(1992) 68 Ind. U. 59 at 69-70. 
270 See Staff at Barclays Vote to Strike (1995) Financial Times 5`h May and Pickets Tell How Disparity 
Drove Them on to the Street (1995) Times 31 ,t May. 
271 Directors can make a profit even if the share price falls. In 1995, Robert B. Palmer, CEO of 
American firm Digital Equipment, was granted 300,000 options at the then-market price of $48. The 
next year, the share price fell and his options package for 1996 was smaller and valued at $37.75 per 
share. Should the stock return to its depressed 1995 price, Palmer will pocket nearly S2 millions. 
See 
J. Reingold, Executive Pay [Online] Available htti): //NN! wNN-. businessweek. com/common frames, "b\ý s. 
litiii'? htti): //www. busiilc,,,, week. com/I997/I6/b3523I . 
html 24`h August 2000. 
272 Often known as the exercise or strike price. 
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director simply lets the options lapse with no personal loss. 273 If, however, the share 
price has risen, then the director will most probably sell the shares off immediately for 
an instant profit. So, for example, in 1999, James Hynes, chair of telecoms group 
Colt, took up options on nearly a million shares and immediately sold them for a 
274 profit of £6,388,465. 
Proponents of performance-related pay advocate share options as a risk-free method 
of tying pay to performance. This however is not correct; options come at a cost. By 
putting more potential shares into circulation, options reduce every shareholder s slice 
of the profits. For example, in 1996, PepsiCo Inc. reported that its options grants 
275 reduced earnings by $68 millions or 6%. 
Dividends can also be used to substantially boost an directors income. One 
individual has stood out by consistently receiving extremely high dividends. In 1998, 
David Sainsbury s dividend payments amounted to £36,047,886; 276 in 1996, the figure 
was £38,992,623277 and in 1995, they amounted to £37,635,924.278 To date, the 
highest UK dividend payment encountered by the author went to Ronald Hobson, a 
director of National Parking Corp., who in 1995 received £60,413,139.279 
Therefore, through the use of dividend payments and share options, directors can to an 
extent conceal from the public their true income. A startling example of this can be 
seen in the remuneration package of Sandford Weill, CEO of the US corporation 
Travellers Group, now Citicorp. In 1997, his salary amounted to just over $7 
," Conversely, the shareholders will incur genuine losses: see B. Walters et al, Top Executive 
Compensation: Equity of Excess? Implications for Regaining American Competitiveness (1995) 14 J. 
of Bus. Ethics 227 at 230. 
274 Labour Research Department, Opting For A Share of the Profits (1999) 88(6) Labour Research 15 at 
16. 
275 J. Reingold, Executive Pav [Online] Available http"//www. businessweek. com/common frames/bws. 
litiil'. 'Iittp: //www. businessweek. com/1 997/I6! b35231. html 24`h August 2000. 
l`' Labour Research Department, Big Dividend For Fat Cats (1999) 88(1) Labour Research 25 at 26. 
277 Labour Research Department, Double Creani Directors (1996) 85(10) Labour Research 17 at 18. 
278 Labour Research Department, Making .4 
Killing On Dividends (1995) 84(10) Labour Research 9 at 
10. 
271' Labour Research Department, Double Cream Directors (1996) 85(10) Labour Research 17 at 18. 
Ronald Hobson was not the only National Parking Corp. director to gain handsomely from dividends 
in 
1995. Sir Donald Gosling also received dividends totalling £50,823,721. 
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millions. However, once stock options and dividend payments were added, his total 
remuneration came to just over $400 millions. 280 
Thirdly, there is a growing trend amongst large companies to issue sizeable payments 
to departing directors. These payments, or golden handshakes as they are known, 
are steadily increasing in both size and number. To date, the largest golden 
handshake discovered by the author was to Jim Fifield, the departing director of 
Thorn EMI, who, in 1998, received £12,420,000.281 A more worrying trend is the 
payment of golden handshakes to directors departing due to poor performance. In 
1993, due to a series of poor financial reports British Aerospace sacked 21,000 
employees. The CEO, John Cahill, thought this a matter of considerable regret 282 
and promptly resigned. However, despite his failure, he still received a golden 
handshake of £3.1 millions. 283 Similarly, Phillip Green received £ 1,132,000 when he 
left department store group Amber Day in the same year that the company announced 
a loss of £7 millions. 284 In America, departing directors have been able to negotiate 
even more incredible retirement plans. Recently, Coca-Cola s CEO Douglas Nester 
announced his retirement. During his two-year tenure as CEO, the company produced 
a negative return to shareholders of 7.3%, and yet he walked away with a golden 
handshake of $120 millions. He was also able to negotiate a separation agreement 
that included annual payments of $1.5 million, additional monthly payments of 
$66,300, medical benefits for himself and his wife, office space and secretarial 
services, maintenance of his home security systems and club dues for his existing club 
memberships. He also received title to his company car, cell phones and 
computers. 
285 
Finally, we are starting to see the appearance of golden hellos. These are payments 
given to directors merely for agreeing to join a company and, as such, are not in any 
2 80 See Forbes Magazine, The Top Paid CEOs [Online] Available http: //www. forbes. com/forbes/98 
/05 18 /6110224a. htm. 14`h March 2000. 
181 Labour Research Department, Goodbye and Thanks . -1 Million 
(1998) 87(10) Labour Research 11 at 
12. 
. N, Quoted in Labour Research Department, i%lore Than A Fond Farewell? (1994) 83(9) Labour 
Research 23 at 23. 
, Si Ibid. 
, aa Ibid. Similarly, Mr. Bob Horton, ousted as CEO of British Petroleum plc. in 1992 after profits 
collapsed, was awarded £ 1.5 million upon his departure. 285 Executive Pay Watch, Case Studies in Global CEO Pam [Online] Available http: /nv ww w. aflcio. org'/ 
fl ywatchi2cl_m l . 
htm 18 `h April 2000. p. 3. 
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way tied to performance. The top golden hello discovered by the author to date 
went to Ann Iverson when she agreed to become CEO of textile group Laura Ashley. 
Previously president and CEO of US company Kay Bee Toy Stores, she received a 
£350,000 signing on bonus. 286 Likewise, her fellow director, James Walsh, received a 
£100,000 welcome. 287 
It is now universally acknowledged that board compensation, and the mechanisms 
that regulate it, are one on the most important incentive mechanisms that shape and 
direct director behaviour. 288 Accordingly, an effective mechanism for regulating 
board remuneration will benefit society by guiding directorial efforts towards 
legitimate economic and societal goals. These mechanisms will now be examined. 
Remuneration Committees. 
It is a fundamental rule of equity that directors and fiduciary agents shall not make 
any profit from their office and therefore have no claim as of right to be remunerated 
for their services. 289 Directors are entitled only to receive remuneration which has 
been authorised by the shareholders 290 or a body authorised to remunerate by the 
articles of association. 291 In the UK, this power is usually vested in the company s 
board. 292 These details are then usually set out in service contracts that the executives 
will enter into with the company. In other words, remuneration levels depend largely 
on the executive s self-discipline. 293 Concerns that directors would award themselves 
inflated remuneration packages led many to conclude that the board should delegate 
286 Labour Research Department, Basking in Golden Retirement (1996) 85(8) Labour Research 9 at 10. 
Similarly, Stephen Brandon received £100,000 when he joined British Gas, as did Roy Gardner; 
(George Charters received £ 160,000 when he joined Safeway and Kevin McCarten received £62,000 
\\, hen he joined marketing group J. Sainsbury. 'r' 
Ibid. 
'1919 See e. g. J. Cordeiro, R. Veliyath and E. J. Erasmus, An Empirical Investigation of the Determinants 
(? 1 'Outside Director Compensation (2000) 8 Corporate Governance: An International Review 268; L. R. 
Gomez-Mejia and R. M. Wiseman, Reframing Executive Compensation: An Assessment and Outlook 
(1997) 23 Journal of Management 291. 
1189 Hutton v IVest Cork Railivav Co. (1883) 23 Ch. D. 654. 
290 
: Vrt. 82 Table A in Companies (Tables ,\ to F) Regulations 1985, SI 1985 805. 291 Guinness pIc. r Saunders [19901 2 AC 663; Runciman v 11 alter Runciman plc. [19921 BCLC 1084. 
Arts. 72 and 84 Table A in Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985, SI 1985,805. 
ýUZ \V. Forbes and R. Watson, . 
11anagerial Remuneration and Corporate Governance: A Review of'the 
Issues. Evidence and Cadbur. v Committee Proposals (1993) 23 Accounting and Business Res. 331 at 
?? 1. 
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the function of determining remuneration to a remuneration committee. 4 
Subsequent proposals went further and advocated that the remuneration committee 
should consist entirely of non-executive directors. 295 Currently, The Listing Rules do 
not require companies to set up remuneration committees, although the Combined 
Code appended to The Listing Rules does. 296 However, the DTI recommends that all 
quoted companies be formally required to set up a remuneration committee consisting 
entirely of independent NEDs. 297 
These recommendations have been followed almost unanimously. In 1990,45.64% 
of companies had set up a remuneration committee. 298 By 1995, this figure was 
97.99%. 299 However, in order for these committees to be successful [e]xecutive 
directors should play no part in decisions on their own remuneration. 300 However, 
purging executive influence from remuneration committees has not been so easy. 
Regarding the removal of executive influence, the figures are encouraging. A 1995 
survey revealed that 51.22% of remuneration committees had no executive 
members. 301 By 1999, this figure was 97%. 302 It used to be common for the 
executive CEO or chairman to also chair the remuneration committee. 303 By 1999, 
293 The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, London: 
Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 4.42. 
295 Directors Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbuy', 1995, 
London: Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 4.8. R. Bostock, Company Responds To Cadbury (1996) 4 Corp. 
Gov.: Inter. Rev. 72 at 74 contends that executive free remuneration committees were emerging before 
Greenbury s recommendations. 
296 Committee on Corporate Governance, The Combined Code: Principles of Good Governance and 
Code of Best Practice, para. B. 2.1 appended to Financial Services Authority, The Listing Rules, May 
2000, London: FSA. 
297 DTI, Directors Remuneration: A Consultative Document, July 1999, London: DTI, para. 3.15. 
298 M. J. Conyon, Institutional Arrangements For Setting Directors Compensation in UK Companies in 
K. Keasey, S. Thompson & M. Wright (eds. ), Corporate Governance: Economic, Management and 
Financial Issues, 1997, New York: OUP, p. 111. 
299 Ibid. See also M. J. Conyon, Corporate Governance Changes in UK Companies Between 1988 and 
1993 (1994) 2 Corp. Gov.: Inter. Rev. 87 at 93-5 who states that 94% of companies had set up a 
remuneration committee. 
The Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, London: 
Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 4.42. 
301 M. J. Conyon, Institutional. -Irrangements For Setting Directors Compensation in 
UK Companies in 
K. Keasey, S. Thompson & M. Wright (eds. ), Corporate Governance: Economic, Management and 
. Financial Issues, 1997, New York: OUP, p. 111 302 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, llonitoring of Corporate Governance Aspects of Directors 
Remuneration [Online] Available http: //www. dti. gov. uk/cId/pwcrep. pdf, 28`h March 2000, p. 7. This 
document can also be found in Department of Trade and Industry, Directors Remuneration: A 
Consultative Document, July 1999, London: HNISO, annex B. 
303 M. J. Conyon, Corporate Governance Changes in UK Companies Between 19N8 and 1993 (1994) 2 
Corp. Gov.: Inter. Rev. 87 at 95-7. 
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only 27% of chairman chaired the remuneration committee, 304 although this figure 
could be less. However, the figures do not tell the whole story. 
For example, it is standard practice for the actual executive pay details to be worked 
out by an outside firm of compensation consultants working to guidelines set by the 
remuneration committee but hired by the executives. 305 If a compensation consultant 
becomes well-known for recommending frugal remuneration packages, he will 
become unpopular with executive management and will lose his client base. 
Compensation consultants themselves admit this. Peter Brown of the Top Pay 
Research Group has stated [y]ou are not going to tell your clients what they don t 
want to know. What is the point of telling them to cut pay if that will not work. We 
give practical, not other-worldly advice. 306 
Even where executive influence is not the problem, there still exists considerable 
dissatisfaction with the remuneration committees effectiveness. A 1994 survey 
actually discovered that companies with a remuneration committee paid their 
executives more than companies without and did little to align pay and 
performance. 307 This has led two commentators to conclude that these committees 
seem to do little more than legitimise generous pay awards. 308 Put even more 
starkly, the concern is that remuneration committees may provide a veneer of 
independence which cloaks a system of mutual back-scratching amongst directors. 
309 
The reasons for this can be traced to the inadequacies of the monitoring function of 
NEDs and the aforementioned problems regarding their selection. 310 
As noted, the chairman, working with a nomination committee, will select the NEDs. 
These people will usually have been chosen on the basis that they fit in with the 
, 04 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Monitoring of Corporate Governance Aspects of Directors 
Remuneration [Online] Available http: //www. dti. eov. uk/cld/pwcrep. pdf, 28`h March 2000 p. 7. 
305 Greenbury itself acknowledged this: see Directors Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired 
by Sir Richard Greenburv, 1995, London: Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 4.17. 
; 66 Quoted in N. Garnett, Afore Than .4 Fond 
Farewell: An Eve on the Big Earners (1993) Financial 
Times April 24/25`h at VIII. 
307 Risk of Losses in New Issues (1994) Independent on Sunday February 27`h 
108 B. Main and J. Johnston, Deciding on Top Pay h_i Committee [1992] July, Personnel Management 
32 at 35. 
309 E. Ferran, Company Law and Corporate Finance. 1999, Oxford: OUP, p. 222. 
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company in the sense that they identify with its goals and are compatible with the 
management team. 311 Such individuals if placed on a remuneration committee, may 
well be reluctant to speak out against generous executive pay. 312 
These NEDs, as we have seen, may well be executives in other companies. If 
executives in one company were present as non-executives on the remuneration 
committee of another, this would be worrying indeed. This would suggest a you 
scratch my back and I 11 scratch yours situation. 313 Indeed, there is some evidence of 
an old boys network operating in this country. In 1999, amongst the top 98 
companies, 30 directors sat on more than one remuneration committee. 314 Topping 
the list with four remuneration committee appointments apiece were Sir Michael 
Angus315 and Sir John Banham. 316 Further, both men sit on two remuneration 
committees in an executive capacity. This being said it is very rare that executives in 
a pair of listed companies will advise directly on each others pay. 317 Furthermore, 
cross-directorships have to be disclosed to the shareholders. 318 Nevertheless, such 
individuals are setting, if only indirectly, the going rate for executive management. 
This creates an opportunity for them to raise the benchmark of their own pay. They 
3 may therefore be sympathetic to pay increases. 19 
Executive Pay: The Role of the Law. 
Despite the self-regulatory stance in this area, there do exist legal constraints on the 
board s power to determine remuneration. S. 319 Companies Act 1985 prohibits 
310 M. J. Conyon, Institutional, 4rrangenments for Setting Directors Compensation in UK Companies in 
K. Keasey, S. Thompson & M. Wright (eds. ), Corporate Governance: Economic, Management and 
Financial Issues, 1997, New York: OUP, p. 119. 
311 BR. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
ýp. 668-9. 
12 G. S. Crystal, In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation of. 4merican Executives, 1991, New York: 
W. W. Norton, pp. 226-7. 
113 R. Brownstein and M. J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pa_y? The Press? Congress? Shareholders? 
(1992) May-June, Harv. Bus. Rev. 28 at 38. 
314 Labour Research Department, Fat Cats & the Old Boys Network (1999) 99(7) Labour Research 19 
at 19. 
315 Sir Michael Angus sits on the remuneration committees of NatWest, Britsh Airways, Boots and 
Whitbread. 
116 Sir John Banham sits on the remuneration committees of Kingfisher, AMVESCAP, National Powcr 
and Tarmac. 
317 Pav and the Old Bov Network (1991) Independent on Sunday November 24th. 31 s Directors Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired b. Sir Richard Greenburv, 1995, 
London: Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 4.8 and Code of Best Practice, para. A4. 319 See Punters or Proprietors' (1990) The Economist May >`h at 1 0. 
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companies from entering into service contracts with directors for a term of more than 
five years without shareholder consent. 320 This provision was first introduced in the 
1980 Act to stop directors entering into long-term contracts and thereby entrenching 
themselves by making their removal prohibitively expensive. S. 312 Companies Act 
1985 provides that shareholders must give their approval before the company provides 
ex gratia payments to directors leaving office. 321 
Most notably, whatever the nature of the board s power over directors remuneration, 
they are subject to an overriding duty to exercise it bona fide in the interests of the 
company 322 One would assume that if the director was receiving exorbitant 
remuneration, then the shareholders could take action on the grounds that it was 
clearly not in the interests of the company. 323 However, the effectiveness of this duty 
is limited by its focus on proper purpose as opposed to the merits of a particular 
decision, indicating once more the court s reluctance to interfere in matters of 
business judgment. 324 The court in Runciman v Walter Runciman plc. 325 confirmed 
that the apparent generosity of an award of remuneration will not constitute a breach 
of duty despite the obvious disadvantage to the company. The court will only act to 
determine whether payments are actual remuneration or whether they are fortuitous 
distributions to a shareholder out of capital dressed up as remuneration. 326 In a series 
of cases, stemming from the same facts, arguments based on directors duties were 
unsuccessful in curtailing excessive remuneration. 327 Conversely, in America, cases 
concerning excessive remuneration are reasonably common. 328 
120 The Report of the Conmzittee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992, London: 
Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 4.41 recommended that service contracts should not exceed three years. The 
Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance, 1998, London: Gee and Co., para. 4.9 went further 
and advocated a reduction to one year. 
321 Ss. 313 and 314 Companies Act 1985 impose analogous restrictions regarding payments that take 
place when a company is undergoing a change in control. 
'" Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. 119421 Ch. 304 at 306, per Lord Greene MR. 
32; Directors Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury, 1995, 
London: Gee Publishing Ltd., p. 35, stated that directors who receive pay that is over the odds are in 
breach of this duty. 
'24 See e.,,., Howard Smith v 4mpol Petroleum [1974] AC 821 at 832, per Lord Wilberforce: There is 
no appeal on merits from management decisions to courts of law: nor will courts of law assume to act 
as a kind of supervisory board over decisions within the powers of management honestly arrived at. 
ýý' f19921 BCLC 1084. 
; 'b Re Halt Garage (1964) Ltd. [1982] 3 All ER. 1016 at 1042, per Oliver J. 
''Smith 
v Croft [19861 1 WLR 580; Smith v Croft (No. 2) [19881 1 Ch. 114 and Smith v Croft (No. 3) 
11987] BCLC 355. 
For a discussion of the American position, see D. Vagts, Challenges to Executive Compensation: 
For the , tlarkets or the Courts? 
(1983) 8 J. of Corp. L. 252-7,263-6. 
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However, in Zemco v Jerrom-Pugh, 329 the Court of Appeal did find circumstances in 
which a breach of duty could be established. Here, the board had paid one of its two 
directors a year s salary in advance shortly before he was dismissed by the company s 
new controllers. The Court held: 
The only purpose of the payment was to secure Mr. Jerrom-Pugh against the 
possibility that when the money actually fell due either the new management of 
the company might be reluctant to pay or, alternatively, the company might be in 
insolvent liquidation. Accordingly, it is clear beyond doubt that the payment 
was in breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the directors and that accordingly 
Mr. Jerrom-Pugh held the money as constructive trustee for the company. 330 
Ascertaining the directors proper purpose is notoriously difficult. In Zennco, there 
was no clear evidence of a proper purpose; the minutes of a board meeting could have 
provided this. It has been contended that where such evidence is lacking, the court 
should adopt a more stringent approach than exhibited in Runcinian and place the 
burden of justification on the director. 33' With the enhanced risk of detecting an 
improper purpose, procedural formality would be reinforced thereby safeguarding the 
company and its shareholders. 
The Shareholders as Monitors of Executive Pay. 
The legal model of the company dictates that the shareholders are residual claimants; 
all the directors are entitled to is the market rate for the services they provide. 
Directors who pay themselves too much are in effect increasing agency costs, which 
directly affects the shareholders. If the board of directors or the remuneration 
committee has shown itself ineffective in regulating the directors remuneration, then 
one would imagine that the shareholders would be keen to intervene. If they do not, 
an opportunity to reduce agency costs will be lost. 332 Profits destined for shareholders 
329 j19931 BCC 275. 
330 /hid. at p. 281, per Hoffmann U. He was therefore not allowed to set-off this payment against his 
claim for wrongful dismissal. 
331 
. 1. Griffiths, Directors Remuneration: Constraining the Power of the Board 
[1995] LMCLQ 372 at 
383. 
331 P. Gregg et al, The Disappearing Relationship Between Directors Pay and Corporate 
Performance 
(1993) 31 Brit. J. of Ind. Res. 1 at 8. 
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will be dissipated, 333 reduced employee morale will cause a loss in productivity and 
the share price might be adversely affected. 334 
However, although shareholders have occasionally intervened in executive pay issues. 
there are several reasons why, for the most part, they do not intervene. 
Firstly, there are procedural barriers. An individual shareholder who tries to 
challenge an executives pay by means of procedural irregularity or breach of duty 
will soon discover that doing so is extremely difficult. Such infringements must be 
litigated through the medium of the company, and, therefore, the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle335 will usually preclude a member from suing on the company s behalf. 
However, there are exceptions to this rule. One possibility concerns the ultra fires 
doctrine, namely that if there has not been a genuine exercise of a company s 
remuneration power, the court can set aside the arrangement as an unauthorised 
gift. 336 Another possibility concerns the unfair prejudice remedy contained in s. 459 
Companies Act 1985. S. 459 is not subject to the procedural constraints of Foss v 
Harbottle and, further, the courts have indicated that excessive remuneration can be 
unfairly prejudicial. 337 However, neither option is ideal. Certain members of the 
judiciary have indicated that they are reluctant to use the ultra vires doctrine to 
resolve disputes concerning executive pay. 338 Further, s. 459 as regards executive pay, 
is much more likely to work if the company in question is closely-held as opposed to 
the type of company that we are focusing on, the public company. 
339 
Secondly, for a shareholder who owns a small stake in a public company s equity, the 
costs of mounting a challenge will often outweigh the benefits. 
340 According to a 
133 G. S. Crystal, In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation of American Executives, 1991, New 
York: W. W. Norton, pp. 172-3. 
''a L. J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay 
(1992) 68 Ind. U. 59 at 67,69-70. 
. 
its 
(1843) 2 Hare 461. 
"' Re Halt Garage [ 198213 All ER. 1016. Note, however that this case concerned a director who had 
performed no services during the relevant period. It may therefore legitimately be confined to similar 
facts. 
337 See Re Cumana Ltd. [ 19861 BCLC 430; Sandford v Sanford Courier Services Pty. Ltd. (1986) 10 
: \CLR 549 (concerning the Australian equivalent, s. 260 Australian 
Corporations Law). 
See for example, Smith v Croft (No 2) 19881 1 Ch. 114 at 159-64, per Knox J. 
'39 B. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 
666. 
340 (/. the position of a shareholder in a closely-held company: 
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1990 study, the top managerial salaries of 800 leading US corporations amounted to 
less than 1% of all corporate profits. 341 The UK position is likely to be similar, 
especially as UK directors are paid less than their American counterparts. 342 As 
excessive remuneration is unlikely to have a significant effect on profits, the return 
that shareholders accrue from corrective action will be minuscule. 343 Indeed, it may 
be the case that such action will cost the company more than it saves. When Cedric 
Brown announced his pay increase, many private shareholders wished to attend the 
1995 AGM in order to voice their dissatisfaction. The coasts of mounting such an 
AGM were estimated at £530,000, almost £60,000 more than his full salary. 344 
Thirdly, individual members will often find it difficult to obtain the information 
necessary to mount a challenge. If the board needs to defend a proposed remuneration 
package, it will have access to the information compiled by the remuneration 
committee. Conversely, the challengers will be in a much more inferior position to 
put forward their case. 345 Although Greenbury recommended that such information 
be available to the members, 346 neither the Stock Exchange, nor its successor the FSA, 
has made this requirement part of its listing rules. 
Therefore, the question that now occupies us is how can we enhance the role of the 
shareholders in relation to executive pay issues. One possibility is to increase the 
scope of judicial intervention. In Australia, the courts have considerable powers 
regarding the regulation of executive pay. There, a public company is prohibited from 
providing remuneration to managers unless the shareholders have approved the 
Levels of management compensation are related to the degree to which a firm is closely 
held because major shareholders have a meaningful economic incentive to engage in 
monitoring activities that reduce the residual loss portion of agency costs. 
See E. A. Dyl, Corporate Control and Management Compensation: Evidence on the Agency Problem 
(1988) 9 Managerial and Decision Economics 21 at 24. 
141 L. J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay 
(1992) 68 Ind. LJ. 59 at 67. 
. 14' Returning once more to British Gas, Cedric Brown s controversial salary of £475,000 was 3,000 
times less than the company s profits for that year: see Lex Column, Gas Chief Defends Pa_v Rise 
(1995) Financial Times January 25'h at 6. 
'41 Shadow SEC Roundtable on the New Disclosures of Executive Pay (1993) 5 J. of App. Corp. Fin. 62 
at 73 (Professor Michael Jensen on the US situation commented [i]f you took all the CEO s of our 
1,000 largest companies and got them to work for nothing forever, the effect on aggregate shareholder 
wealth \vould be almost imperceptible. ) . 44 Shareholders Wrath Forces A G: 11 Switch (1995) Financial Times May 18`h. 
141 R. C. Clark, Corporate Laºtw, 1986, Boston: Little, Brown, p. 201. 
346 Directors Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired b. v Sir Richard Greenburv, 1995, 
London: Gee Publishing Ltd., paras. 5.1-3.7 and Code of Best Practice, para. B2. 
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arrangement or its is exempt because it is reasonable. 347 However, it is unlikely that 
judicial intervention will increase here. As noted, the judiciary is reluctant to use the 
ultra vires doctrine or s. 459 as a means of regulating executive pay. Further, English 
judges are often unwilling to scrutinise corporate decisions honestly arrived at. The 
US experience shows that a conservative judiciary can emasculate a statute designed 
to regulate executive pay. There, the court can grant relief if payments to directors 
constitutes waste. However, to date, the court has not found any pay so excessive as 
to constitute waste. 
348 
Apart from those measures discussed earlier, shareholders did not, until recently, have 
a vote on matters of remuneration. Accordingly, the only option left to shareholders 
was to vote the directors out of office under s. 303 Companies Act 1985. " A less 
drastic method of intervention was required. Now, as we have noted, the shareholders 
are required to approve the directors remuneration report under the new s. 234A 
Companies Act 1985.350 
Strengthening the Link Between Pay and Performance. 
One should note that the function of the remuneration committee or the role of law in 
determining executive pay is not to limit it, but rather to more effectively tie pay to 
performance. It is clearly unacceptable for a company on the brink of insolvency to 
pay its directors an exorbitant salary. However, if a company is performing well, then 
it is perfectly legitimate, if not commercially beneficial, 
351 to pay the board 
handsomely. Accordingly, many commentators argue that a significant proportion 
of the directors remuneration should be linked to performance. 
352 However, a 
147 S. 243K Corporations Act 1989, Act No. 109 of 1989, added by s. 27 Corporate Law Reform Act 
1992, Act No. 210 of 1992. For more on the Australian position, see A. Defina et al, li'hat 
is 
Reasonable Remuneration for Corporate Officers? An Empirical Investigation Into the Relationship 
Between Pav and Performance in the Largest Australian Companies (1994) 12 C&SLJ. 
341. 
'8 C. M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board Based Solution (1993) 34 Boston Coll. L. Rev. 
937 at 959-66. 
149 There are those who have urged that shareholders should use this threat more often: see 
Reward for 
Failure (1996) Independent on Sunday March l 0th 
350 Inserted by The Directors Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, SI 2002/1986, reg. 7. 
i'l For example, setting a high pay make entice talented individuals to join the company: see 
D. Bok, 
The Cost of Talent: How Executives and Professionals are Paid and How it A11E'cts 
America , 
1993. 
New York: Macmillan, pp. 1 15-6. 
ji) Committee on Corporate Governance, The Combined Code: Principles of 
Good Governance and 
Code of Best Practice, 1998, Principle B. 1 appended to Financial 
Services Authority-, The Listing 
Rules, May 2000, London: FSA. 
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common theme amongst not just UK companies, but also American353 and 
Australian354 corporations is that pay is not adequately tied to performance. It is a 
popular thesis that executives are handsomely rewarded when the company s share 
price goes up but suffer few negative consequences when equity values decline. 
The most obvious method of linking pay to performance is based on the premise that 
pay should fluctuate along with shareholder return. The theory which underpins this 
approach is that an executive needs to be motivated to think like a shareholder. 
From a shareholders perspective, the benefits of this approach are obvious. As the 
executive occupies a similar beneficiary position as a shareholder, he will place a high 
priority on the shareholders investment. 356 In the UK, it is generally perceived that 
executive pay has little correlation with shareholder return. 357 In October 1999, a 
PIRC report found that of almost 100 new share option and similar schemes for 
directors of listed companies, two thirds will pay out if the company s earnings per 
share figure rises by 3% above the rate of inflation -a target broadly in line with 
general growth forecasts, and therefore representing only average corporate 
performance. 358 Similarly, PriceWaterhouseCoopers found that seven out of ten 
directors could be receiving performance-related share option payouts, despite their 
businesses turning in average or below average results. 359 The same is true of 
American companies. A 1991 survey discovered that when the share price rose 10%, 
the CEO s salary increased 13.4%. However, when the share price decreased 10%, 
then the CEOs salary still rose 4.1%. Even a 55% decrease in share price still 
353 See H. Stretton, Directors Par in M. Dugan (ed. ), Furious Agreement, 1991, p. 14: Waving the 
banner of pay-for-performance, bosses have acted like Barbary pirates, plundering the cash flows of 
America s biggest firms with little regard for shareholders or fellow employees. For example, 
Stephen M. Case, CEO of America Online Inc. earned $33.5 millions between 1993 and 1996, yet his 
company s return on equity was negative 413%. See L. Bongiorno, Which Bosses Earned Their Pav 
and Which Didn t? [Online] Available http: //www. businessweek. com/1997/16/b35231 l. html 24`h 
; \ugust 2000. 
54 E. g. during 1990-91, shareholders funds in Australian company Adelaide Steamship fell from A$1.7 
billion to A$67.4 millions. Yet the managing director received a 25% pay rise to A$1.51 million. 
B. M. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
p678. 
356 M. C. Jensen and K. J. Murphy. Performance Par and Top-Management Incentives (1990) 98 J. of 
Pol. Econ. 225 at 225-6,242-3. 
35' P. Gregg et a!, The Disappearing Relationship Between Directors Pay and Corporate Performance 
(1993) 31 Brit. J. of Ind. Res. I at 8; Random Numbers (1995) Economist June 3rd. Cf. W. Lewis. 
Directors Par Moving Closer to Performance (1996) Financial Times May 7`h at 7. 
358 
Quoted in Trades Union Congress. Top Cats: The Last Closed Shop, August 2000, London: TUC, 
4. 
i" Price WaterhouseCoopers, Sharing in the Boardroom 2000: Incentive Arrangements in Large UK 
Companies, May 2000, London: PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 
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resulted in only the CEO earning the same as the previous year. 360 An earlier study 
came to the following worrying conclusion: 
The [data implies] that on average CEO wealth increases by $918,000 in years 
in which shareholders earn a zero return Thus the average pay-related wealth 
increase for a CEO whose shareholders gain $400 million is 51.04 million, 
compared to an average annual wealth increase of $800,000 for a CEO whose 
shareholders lose $400 million. 361 
This does not mean, however, that remuneration is unaffected by the share price. It is 
common for directors, via a bonus scheme, to be rewarded if certain performance 
criteria are met. For example, an executive might receive an additional sum, perhaps 
in the form of equity, 362 if the company s shares trade above a certain level. 363 
However, we should be wary of tying more closely executive pay to shareholder 
return. The thesis that management remuneration should be tied to shareholder return 
assumes that directors act solely in their own financial interests. )64 Such an 
unremarkably flattering 365 assumption is not wholly true. Directors may also seek 
less tangible rewards such as a high level of prestige and social or political power. 366 
However, these goals will complement, not replace, an executives desire for 
substantial remuneration packages. Empirical evidence exists which indicates that the 
potential to earn large sums is a major factor for aspiring executives. 367 
Given this, an executive may be wary of joining a company that allows pay to 
fluctuate according to the share price. 368 Further, existing directors may leave. As 
160 G. S. Crystal, In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation of American Executives, 1991, New York: 
W. W. Norton, p. 147. 
361 M. C. Jensen and K. J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990) 98 J. of 
Pol. Econ. 225 at 232. The same survey discovered that for every $1,000 increase in company value, 
the CEO s salary increased just 3.3 cents. 
162 Although the shares will usually be restricted, in the sense that a director will not be able to trade 
them for a number of years. 
363 Such an arrangement is often called a phantom share scheme: see S. Pickering, Employee 
Share 
Schemes: More Complex Structures (1993) July, PLC 43 at 51. 
364 V. L. Blackburn, The Effectiveness of Corporate Control (1994) 2 Corporate Governance 196 at 197. 365 D. Bok, The Cost of Talent: How Executives and Professionals are Paid and Ho%i it .1 ttý'cts 
America, 1993, New York: Macmillan, p. 109. 
366 See N1. C. Jensen and K. J. Murphy, Performance Par and Top-Management Incentives (1990) 
98 J. 
of Pol. Econ. 225 at 252. 
367 See A. Francis, Company Objectives, : Managerial Motivations and the 
Behaviour of Large Firms: 
An Empirical Test of the Theory of Managerial Capitalism (1980) 4 Camb. J. of 
Econ. 349 at 352-3 
who states that of a total of 17 managerial goals, the potential of earning a high 
income ranked 6`1, 
368 S. Finkelstein and D. C. Hambrick, Chief Executive Compensation: A Synthesis and 
Reconciliation 
(1988) 9 Strategic Mgnit. J. 543 at 5 51-2. 
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one US businessman and multiple remuneration committee member stated You can t 
just keep your guys if you allow a lot of swing in pay. People can t live that way, and 
boards don t let it happen. 369 Empirical evidence exists which states that manager 
controlled firms have much more stable remuneration packages than shareholder 
controlled firms: 
Management controlled firms clearly design compensation systems to avoid the 
vagaries of fluctuating performance and to take advantage of a more stable 
factor, size . The managers in owner controlled firms were in riskier positions- 
they were primarily awarded for performance, a more variable and risky factor, 
in all components of compensation. 370 
Accordingly, companies that doggedly link pay with performance may soon find that 
they have to change their philosophy. 371 Even if a director does stay with the 
company, a fluctuating remuneration package that is linked to performance may 
encourage him to become more risk-averse. 372 Further, an executive with a pay 
regime dependant upon shareholder return will be concerned by his lack of 
diversification. As has already been noted regarding the shareholders portfolio, 
diversification is a prudent investment strategy since the result is the spreading of risk. 
However, most executives are poorly diversified. A typical executive will have 
significant human capital tied up in his firm to the extent hat he is likely to be over 
invested. Unless such executives are not concerned with placing all their eggs in one 
basket, they will probably not want to have their income tied directly to the fortunes 
of the firm. Accordingly, they will not be keen on their remuneration taking the form 
373 
of equity or on having their pay determined in accordance with the share price. 
Given these problems, it is no surprise that only a small part of a director s 
remuneration will be linked to performance. As one US survey concluded: 
; `'`' The People Who Set the CEO s Pay (1990) Fortune March 12`h 58 at 58. 
; 70 L. R. Gomez-Mejia, H. Tosi and T. Hinkin, Managerial Control, Performance and Executive 
Compensation (1987) 30 Academy of Mgmt. J. 51 at 65-6. 
371 Salomon Brothers, a US investment bank, discovered this to their detriment. In 1995. the 
firm tied 
the pay of senior bankers and directors to the firm s performance. The philosophy 
behind the scheme 
was to make the firm s directors behave like owners. Instead, numerous 
key staff resigned. 
Ultimately, Salomon had to abandon almost the entire scheme. See P. Harverson, Salomon 
Forces 
Directors to Share Pain as Well as Gains (1994) Financial Times November 7`h and M. 
Urr`v, Salomon 
Shelves Plan to Cut Salaries of Top Earners (1995) Financial Times June 13`h at 22. 
372 C. W. Smith and R. L. Watts, Incentive and Tax Effects of Executive Compensation 
Plans (1982) 7 
Australian Journal of Management 139 at 145-7. 
173 B. R. Cheffins, Compani' La'i': Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
p. 686. 
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most studies share something in common: the total amount of explained 
variance in executive pay attributed to firm performance is minimal, seldom 
exceeding 15 per cent, and often well under 10 per cent. 374 
Further, under a scheme of performance related pay, an outstanding economic year 
can be used to justify exorbitant pay increases. For example, in 1996, America 
experienced a year of outstanding economic growth. The Standard & Poor s 500- 
stock index rose an unprecedented 23% and corporate profits rose an impressive 
11%. 375 Surely in such a year no one could begrudge US CEO sa healthy pay rise. 
Unfortunately, CEO s took a great deal more than a healthy pay rise. In 1996, CEO 
gains far outstripped Americas booming economic performance. A CEO s average 
salary rose 39% to just over $2.3 millions. Add to that stock options and incentive 
schemes and total CEO compensation rose an astounding 54% to $5,781,300.376 
Further, American factory employees gained a raise of just 3% with white-collar 
workers edging ahead with 3.2%. Under the banner of performance-related pay, such 
inordinate pay rises can be justified. In the same year, Lawrence M. Coss, CEO of the 
little-known company Green Tree Financial Corp., earned $102.4 millions -a rise of 
56% over his 1995 income of $65.6 millions. When questioned about this huge 
increase, Coss was not apologetic stating [i]ndeed it is a huge number but Id 
rather talk about the success of the company. 377 This seems to be enough to appease 
the shareholders. Thomas W. Smith, a partner at Prescott Investors Ltd., which holds 
2.7 million shares in Green Tree, stated [i]n no way would I consider him overpaid. 
Maybe he was not aware that Coss pay increase cut Green Tree s earnings 16% to 
$308.7 millions. 
Those companies who do seem to be effectively tying pay to performance are doing 
so not because of any regulatory pressures, but because of a willingness by their CEO 
to keep pay low. Between 1995 and 1996, sales of Microsoft s products jumped from 
$5.9 billions to $8.7 billions and Microsoft s web browser, Internet Explorer, had 
3'4 H. L. Tosi and L. R. Gomez-Mejia, The Decoupling of CEO Pay and Performance: 
An Agency 
Theorav Perspective (1989) 34 Administrative Science Quarterly 169 at 185. 
)7- J. Reingold, Executive Pay [Online] Available http //www. businessweek. com/common framcsýb\Vs. 
htnl'? Ilttp: //www. bLisiiicssNN, eek. com/1997/]6ib3523l. htmi 24 `h August 2000. 
3 76 
Ibid. 
377 Ibid. This would not be hard to do. Between 1991 and 1996, 
Green Tree s shares had annual 
returns of 900. 
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acquired more than 20% of the market share. 378 Shareholder returns jumped over 
3 10%. Yet between 1994 and 1997, William H. Gates total pay amounted to just 
$1.4 millions. 379 Similarly, between 1991 and 1996, James E. Preston, CEO of Avon 
Products Inc., froze his annual pay at just $610,000 and achieved a return on equity of 
141%. 380 
Conclusion. 
One commentator has described executive remuneration as a central governance 
issue. 381 However, as we have seen, like many of the corporate governance 
mechanisms that we have examined, it is in many ways flawed. This is because, as 
Cheffins has correctly stated [e]xecutive pay is a topic where it is much easier to find 
problems that solutions. 382 Indeed this Part has not set out to offer any solutions to 
the problem of executive pay. Rather, it is intended to reawaken an important debate 
that seems to have lost its way. The recommendations of the Greenbury Committee, 
whilst they are being followed, were not particularly radical or effective. The reliance 
on NEDs contains an inherent flaw, namely the inadequacies of the office of non- 
executive director. Similarly, another common theme is that pay should be more 
closely tied to performance. However, as we have seen, this may not be desirable. 
The philosophy of many performance-related schemes is to make directors behave 
more like shareholders, but is this really desirable? Such a scheme could result in a 
potential bane of company law, namely short-termism. It may be time to admit that 
despite the success of self-regulation in corporate governance matters, executive pay 
is one area where self-regulation has not proved effective. Directors simply have too 
much to lose by imposing upon themselves measures that serve to limit their pay. 
Accordingly, if they will not impose accountability upon themselves regarding 
178 L. Bongiorno, Which Bosses Earned Their Pay and Which Didn t? [Online] Available http: //www. 
husinessweek. com/common frames/bws. htm'? http: //www. businessweek. com/1997/16/b35231 1 html 
2`111' August 2000. 
zm Ibid. Of course, one possible reason for this is that his 15% stake in Microsoft is worth an estimated 
$50 billions. 
380 Ibid. With $22 millions worth of share options still unexercised, Preston advocates performance- 
related pay stating I will do well or not depending on how the stock does. 381 M. J. Conyon, Institutional, 4rrangenments for Setting Directors Compensation in UK Companies in 
K. Keasey, S. Thompson & M. Wright (eds. ), Corporate Governance: Economic, 1lunagement and 
Financial Issues, 1997, New York: OUP, p. 1 19. 
The Disclosure of UK Boardroom Pm '. the larch 2001 DTI Proposals (2001) 9(4) Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 276 at 276. 
-R` B. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation. 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Pres. 
p. 706. 
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executive remuneration, the courts or Parliament may have to. Parliament has shown 
itself willing to impose statutory regulation in this area following the enactment of 
The Directors Remuneration Report Regulations 2002.383 
The legal model dictates that companies should be run in the interests of shareholders. 
Under this model, corporate governance mechanisms would have shareholder 
protection as their primary function. We have noted that the aforementioned 
mechanisms, such as the AGM, all operate to benefit the shareholders by protecting 
them or giving them residual managerial powers. The rules relating to executive 
remuneration epitomise this philosophy. The current preoccupation with linking pay 
to performance theoretically ensures that the directors benefit if the share price rises. 
Accordingly, the rules relating to executive remuneration provide directors with an 
incentive to maximise shareholder value, or to put it more bluntly, to run the company 
in the interests of the shareholders. Accordingly, they fully embody the philosophy 
behind the legal model of the company. 
However, the current mechanisms relating to executive remuneration do little to allay 
the fears of non-shareholders who may also be concerned by executive pay levels. 
These individuals will not be particularly interested in linking pay to performance. 
Instead their concern will simply be the level of managerial remuneration; from their 
point of view company executives are simply paid too much. Reforming 
remuneration committees and increasing shareholder power is unlikely to alleviate 
these concerns. 
V. THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 
Introduction. 
We have seen that traditionally, internal mechanisms are perceived as providing only 
weak sources of accountability. Accordingly, the Anglo-American system of 
corporate governance relies on an external form of governance, namely the hostile 
takeover bid or, as it is known in governance terms, the market for corporate control. 
Indeed, as Macey and Miller have stated the market for corporate control lies at the 
183 SI 2002/1986. 
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heart of the American system of corporate governance. 384 Other commentators 
believe that the market for corporate control provides a useful backup mechanism for 
when the others fail. 385 
The Market for Corporate Control. 
The issue that now preoccupies us is how can the hostile takeover bid improve 
standards of corporate governance. The theory is as follows: 
If a company is being operated below its true potential, shareholders, 
dissatisfied with the returns they are obtaining, will sell their shares. If they 
divest in significant numbers the price of the company s shares will fall. 
Observers of the market will conclude that the company s shares are trading at a 
discount because of the inadequacies of its current managers. This acts as a 
signal to one or more rival management teams who will respond by mounting a 
bid to buy the company s shares from their existing owners with a view to 
unlocking the profitability that the current management is failing to extract. 
Having obtained control of the company the successful bidder will replace the 
board with its own appointees and make the necessary changes to improve 
efficiency. 386 
The practical effect of the market for corporate control is that it transfers corporate 
assets to those who can make optimal use if them. 387 However, the theory goes 
further in that a takeover need not occur in order to encourage improved standards of 
governance. The mere existence of the threat of a takeover may ensure that directors 
keep profitability high as in order to ward off takeovers, they will need to keep share 
prices high. 388 As two prominent commentators note: 
A robust market for corporate control improves managements performance 
because incumbents inevitably prefer to reduce the probability that an outside bid 
will be made. Incumbent management will be unsure how much better a 
particular rival management team is; consequently, management will be unsure 
how far the firm s share price must fall before attracting a hostile bid. This 
z" J. R. Macey and G. P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: .4 
Comparative 
Examination of Germany, Japan and the United States (1995) 48 Stan. L. Rev. 73 at 101. 
; S5 R 
. A. Romano, .4 
Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation (1992) 9 Yale J. on Reg. 
119 at 129. 
3S6 J. Parkinson, Company Law and Stakeholder Governance in G. Kelly, D. Kelly & A. Gamble (eds. ), 
Stakeholder Capitalism, 1997, Macmillan Press Ltd., p. 145. 
387 J. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law, 1993, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 119. 
Asa See DTI, , lfergers Policy: A Department of Trade and 
Industiy Paper on the Policy and Procedures 
ol', llerger Control, 1988, London: DTI, para. 2.27: The Government believes that the threat of take- 
over is a powerful spur towards efficiency in the management of UK companies. 
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uncertainty creates an incentive for managers to improve a firm s performance, 
even if a hostile offer never actually materializes. 389 
The Market for Corporate Control in Practice. 
This forms the theoretical underpinnings of the market for corporate control. 
However, for numerous reasons, this theory does not work so well in practice. To 
these reasons we now turn. 
The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis. 
The effectiveness of the market for corporate control is based on the proposition that 
the company s share price is an indicator of corporate performance. As information 
disseminates into the market, it affects the share price. This proposition has been 
termed by financial economists as the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis 
(ECMH). 390 The ECMH is therefore vital for the market for corporate control to be 
effective for if it was not, there would be considerable scope for take-overs based on 
speculative and other motives where corporate control changes hands because of 
differences in information, or of opinion about the accuracy of stock market 
valuations, between sellers and purchasers of control, rather than because of proposed 
changes in management objectives or operating efficiency. 391 Accordingly, the 
effectiveness of the ECMH needs to be analysed. 
Three versions of the ECMH have been tested: the weak form, the semi-strong form 
and the strong form. The market is efficient in the weak sense if prices fully reflect 
all information contained in past share prices. Empirical evidence suggests that stock 
markets are efficient in this sense, since share price movements are generally 
independent of prior fluctuations. Consequently, studying past share price 
fluctuations will not enable investors to beat the market and obtain abnormal 
returns. ` 
389 J. R. Macey and G. P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative 
Examination of German_i", Japan and the United States (1995) 48 Stan. L. Rev. 73 at 104 (italics 
added). 
390 For a more detailed analysis of the ECNIH, see S. M. Keane, Efficient . 
Markets and Financial 
Reporting, 1987, Edinburgh: ICA of Scotland. 
'QI A. Hughes, The Impact of Merger:. 4 Studi- of Empirical Evidence for the UK in J. A. Fairburn and 
J. A. Kay (eds. ), Afergers and , ilerger Policy, 1989, 
Oxford: OUP, p. 33. 
''' The 
. Ifathenratics of . 
Markets (Survey of the Frontiers of Finance) (1993) Economist, 9`h October 
who argues that computer studies of trading patterns is a viable strategy to predict market movements. 
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A market is efficient in the semi-strong sense if share prices reflect all publicly 
available information. Testing this form of the ECMH is done by using event studies. 
These are carried out by examining the response of share prices to public 
announcements of notable occurrences such as takeover bids, changes in dividend 
policy and dismissals of senior executives. 393 These tests indicate that share prices 
adjust rapidly to reflect this information. Accordingly, the market appears to be 
efficient in the semi-strong sense. 
Finally, a market is efficient in the strong sense if share prices fully reflect all 
knowable information, be it publicly available or not. Immediately, one can be 
forgiven for being sceptical regarding this form of the ECMH as it states that 
information known only to senior executives is somehow in the market. Empirical 
evidence confirms this scepticism. If share prices reflected all information, it would 
be impossible for senior executives to partake in insider trading. Instead under the 
strong ECMH, the share price would react instantly to the information that the 
insiders would try to rely on. There is no doubt, however, that insiders can obtain 
significant abnormal returns by utilising confidential, price-sensitive information. It 
is therefore apparent that the market is not efficient in the strong sense of the ECMH. 
It would therefore appear that the market operates in accordance with the semi-strong 
form of the ECMH. This would indicate that, in the main, the ECMH contention is 
largely correct and that share price does reflect corporate performance. However, 
there are a number of reasons why this might not always be the case. 
Firstly, if trading in a company s shares occurs only rarely or in a small volume, it is 
unlikely that the share price will be efficient in the semi-strong sense. This is because 
the market professionals who have the ability and resources to detect mispricing will 
not be studying the company and therefore will not be performing the price-setting 
function that they will with companies that have well-traded shares. 
394 The practical 
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implications of this are that the ECMH will not apply to all stock markets, or to all 
shares listed for trading on a single stock market. 395 
Secondly, describing the share price as efficient may be misleading in that it infers 
that it is a reliable indicator of future net cash flows. There are several reasons to 
doubt such an inference. Notably, if there are relevant price-sensitive facts of which 
only the corporate insiders are aware, this will not be reflected in the share price. 
Further, even if all information is in the market, future events that can affect a 
company are still unknown. Accordingly, a company s share price cannot be a 
reliable indicator of future performance. 396 
Finally, the assumption that the share price is a reliable indicator of the company s 
future value is rested on the presumption that investors buy and sell equity on the 
basis of future net cash flows. This assumption is not always correct. Investors may 
instead invest on the basis of other factors collectively referred to as noise. 397 An 
example of noise-trading is where investors were acting as trend-chasers. This is 
where investors, instead of examining the underlying value of companies, get caught 
up in a wave of market sentiment and buy shares even though there has been a 
sustained rise in price or sell shares after prices have been falling for a period of time. 
Empirical evidence backs up the existence of such noise-trading on both the London 
and New York stock exchanges. 398 This means that markets can overreact to dramatic 
events which will of course result in inaccurate share pricing and so will reduce the 
effectiveness of the ECMH. Given this, it may be possible to make abnormal profits 
395 R. J. Daniels and J. G. Macintosh, Toward a Distinctive Canadian Corporate Law Regime (1991) 29 
Osgoode Hall U 863 at 877-8. 
The true issue here is whether markets are fundamentally efficient or informationally efficient. 
On this, see I. Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating how Corporations Speak to the ,I larket 
(1991) 77 
Va. L. Rev. 945 at 968-75 and G. P. Miller, Fraud-on-the-Market Theory Revisited (1991) Va. L. Rcv. 
1001 at 1012-4. 
397 See W. K. S. Wang, Some . 
arguments that the Stock ; Market is Not Efficient (1986) 19 UC. 
Davis 
L. Rev. 341 at 344-8 and A. Schleifer and L. H. Summers, The Noise 
Trader Approach to Finance 
(1990) 4 J. of Econ. Perp. 19. 
398 NI. Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of Inaccurate Stock Prices (1992) 41 Duke LJ 
977 at 990-2 and T. L. Hazen, The Short-Terns, Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment Theory: 
Implications. for Securities . 
Market Regulation and for Corporate Law (1991) 70 NC. L. Rev. 137 at 144- 
7. 
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by betting that noise-traders will overreact and pay too much for shares or sell them 
at too low a value. 399 
Takeovers and Transaction/Social Costs. 
A significant obstacle to the operation of the market for corporate control are the 
transaction costs of acquiring control of a company. It was estimated that the total 
fees paid to third parties in the takeover process in the UK in 1985 amounted to £500 
millions. 400 By 1989, this figure was over £800 millions for financial advice alone. 401 
There are numerous examples of failed bids that have cost the company dearly: the 
abortive Elders IXL bid for Allied Lyons in 1986 cost the bidder £30 millions and the 
target £ 14 millions; underwriting, professional fees and advertising cost Argyll nearly 
£50 millions in their unsuccessful bid for Distillers in 1985 and, finally, the abortive 
consortium bid by Hoylake for BAT is reputed to have cost £140 millions. 402 These 
figures do not take into account the premium that will have to be paid to acquire the 
target s shares. 
These costs are likely to act as a significant disincentive to any company wishing to 
engage in takeover activity. Anything which increases the costs of acquiring control 
of a company interferes with the market for corporate control because a rational 
predator will balance the costs of a takeover against the prospective benefits to be 
derived. 403 In order for the market for corporate control to work, the predator must 
be able to acquire control of the target company for less than the profit it will make by 
remedying the existing managements inefficiency to the company. 
404 If the costs 
are too substantial, and indications are that they can be, a rational predator will not 
takeover an inefficient company. Accordingly, these transaction costs can provide a 
399 See Yes, It Can Be Done (1992) Economist, 5th December. On whether this herding behaviour 
which should arise with trend-chasing actually occurs, see W. Christie and R. D. Huang, 
Following the 
Pied Piper: Do Individual Returns Herd Around the Market? (1995) Financial A nalvsts Journal, July- 
Aug, 31. 
400 J. A. Kay, The Role of Mergers, 1986, Institute of Fiscal Studies Working Paper 94 quoted 
in J. 
Franks and R. Harris, Shareholder iVealth Effects of UK Takeovers: Implications for Merger 
Policy in 
J. A. Fairburn and J. A. Kay (eds. ), Mergers and, 1ferger Policy. 1989, Oxford: OUP, pp. 169-70. 
101 J. Charkham, Keeping Good Company: A Study of Corporate Governance in Five Countries, 1995, 
Oxford: OUP, p. 311. 
401 A. Peacock and J. Bannock, Corporate Takeovers and the Public Interest, 1991, 
Aberdeen: 
Aberdeen University Press, p. 13. 
403 D. R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market jr oCorporate Control, and the 
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers (1978) 57 Tex. L. Rev. I at 26. 
404 C. Bradley, Corporate Control: Markets and Rules (1990) 53 N1 LR 170 at 172. 
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barrier behind which inefficient management can hide. One commentator has 
concluded that the cost of acquiring control is so great that the disciplinary force of 
the market is likely to be limited to instances of gross managerial failure. 405 
The existence of a market for corporate control can also result in increased social 
costs. As we shall see, the market for corporate control can result in the transfer of 
funds from long-term investments to appease short-term shareholder interests. 
Accordingly, the public interest may be harmed due to research that was not 
undertaken due to the existence of a market for corporate control. Some acquisitions 
result in an increase in the level of debt of the combined enterprise. This may in turn 
jeopardise the position of the company s creditors. Finally, if, through predator 
behaviour, a company significantly increases its power in the market within which it 
operates, it may engage in monopolistic behaviour. This may result in goods of lower 
quality, an increase in the price of its goods or an increase in the time that it takes to 
pay its creditors. Such actions could be harmful to consumers and suppliers. 
Predator Behaviour. 
Commentators argue to a greater or lesser degree that all companies are potential 
targets. As Charkham has noted [t]here is nothing cut and dried or mechanistic about 
bids except, to repeat, that every company has its price. 406 Predator behaviour, 
according to the market for corporate control, is the mechanism that serves to displace 
inefficient management. However, in practice, it may be used by management as a 
means to ward off potential takeover bids. Empirical evidence suggests that the most 
effective takeover defence for a company is to increase its capitalisation by itself 
becoming a predator. 407 For example, P&0, in the space of two years, increased its 
market capitalisation from £300 millions to £1.6 billion through a policy of mergers. 
405 J 
. 
C. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender 
Offers Role in Corporate Governance (1984) 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1 145 at 1200. Another survey 
indicated that a company s shares will need to fall 13% below their potential before there is a 
significant risk of a takeover: R. Smiley, Tender Offers, Transaction Costs and the Theory of the Firm 
(1976) 58 Rev. of Econ, and Stats. 22. 
406 J. Charkham, Keeping Good Company: A Stuck- of Corporate Governance in Five Countries, 1995. 
Oxford: OUP, p. 310. 
4p7 E. g. Singh, Take-overs: Their Relevance to the Stock ; Market and the Theor. v of the Firm, 1971, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Mueller, The Determinants and Effects of, tlergers. An 
International Comparison, 1980, Cambridge. Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers Inc and 
Mueller, The Modern Corporation. Profits, Power, Growth and Performance, 1986, Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press. 
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Accordingly, in some instances, the management in promoting a policy of growth 
through acquisition as opposed to organic growth can be seen to be acting in a self- 
serving sense rather than in the interests of the investors. 408 Given this, it has been 
argued that management is not competent to make this type of business decision. `' `10 
The form of predator behaviour can actually increase the scope of managerial 
inefficiency. If a company becomes a predator in order to insulate itself from 
potential takeover bids, and the management is inefficient, then this will simply result 
in more assets being controlled by the ineffective management. Growth motivated 
purely for defensive reasons are economically damaging by-products of an active 
market for control, 410 causing a huge diversion of managerial effort into devising 
11 ways to reduce a vulnerability that did not grow out of managerial inefficiency. 1 
However, there is evidence to suggest that the defensive advantages of size are being 
eroded. Changes in financing methods, particularly a trend towards paying for 
acquisitions with borrowed money, and the emergence of consortium bids, have 
resulted in increased predatory purchasing power. 412 
More significantly, in recent years, evidence has started to suggest that large 
conglomerates are subject to an increased threat of break-up or demerger 
acquisitions. 413 Management may become predatory in order to protect themselves 
and their companies from the threat of takeover, but at some point the conglomerate 
produced by these acquisitions, becomes vulnerable to the threat of a demerger 
takeover, which suggests that the acquisitions which created the conglomerate in the 
first place failed to increase efficiency. 414 In terms of increased efficiency, break-up 
408 C. Bradley, Corporate Control: Markets and Rules (1990) 53 MLR 170 at 174-5. 
409 G. W. Dent Jnr., Unprofitable Mlcrgers: Towards a Market Based Legal Response (1986) 80 NWUL 
Rev. 777 at 782. 
410 J. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law, 1993, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 128. 
all Herman and Lowenstein, The Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers in J. C. Coffee et al, Knight, 
Raiders and Targets, 1988, Oxford: OUP, p. 215. 
412 See Chiplin and Wright, The Logic of ; Mergers, 1987, London: lEA, pp. 
14-8,58-61 and C. Moir, 
The Acquisitive Streak, 1986, London: Hutchinson Business, pp. 122-23. 
al? E. g. Takeover Activity in the 1980 s (1989) February, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 78 at 79; 
Coyne and Wright (eds. ), Divestment and Strategic Change, 1986, Oxford: Phillip Allen Publishers 
Ltd. and Wright, Chiplin and Coyne, The 4larket for Corporate Control: The Divestment Option 
in 
Fairburn and Kay (eds. ), Mergers & Alcrgers Policl", 1989, Oxford: OUP. 
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takeovers seem to be desirable since they are an instance when the market for 
corporate control reasserts itself. However, takeovers, as we have seen, involve 
substantial transaction costs and so it would be preferable that takeovers that do not 
increase efficiency did not occur in the first place. 
The Economic Effect of Takeovers. 
We have seen that according to the theory, the beneficial effect of the existence of a 
market for corporate control is that efficient management displaces inefficient 
management. Accordingly, one would expect that a change in management by 
takeover would result in an increase on the firm s profitability. Recently, empirical 
research in this area has increased enabling us to assess the validity of the efficiency 
justification behind the market for corporate control. As we shall see, the evidence 
suggests that certain presumptions held by the market for corporate control may be 
doubted. Notably, however, the efficiency justification seems to be evident in 
practice and so it is this we will examine first. 
Loughran and Vijh in 1997 studied a large sample of takeovers in the US between 
1970-1989. `15 They measured the returns to shareholders of the target during the 
announcement period and up to five years after the consummation of the 
merger/takeover. They found that after five years the returns to shareholders in 
merging firms had hardly changed from 25.8% to about 30%. However, the returns to 
shareholders in companies that were taken over improved dramatically from 24.5% to 
127%. The author s explanation for the difference was that tender offers, which are 
often hostile to incumbent managers, may create additional value as new managers are 
appointed. In the case of mergers, that are friendlier and enjoy the co-operation of 
incumbent management, the additional value creation is less likely to occur. 416 
This study appears to agree with the theory underpinning the market for corporate 
control, namely that companies perform more efficiently post-takeover. However, 
this study only examined the position of the target company and so only gives a 
partial justification. We also need to examine the position of the bidder. In 1996, this 
415 T. Loughran and A. M. Vijh, Do Long Term Shareholders Benefit from Corporate Acquisitions 
(1997) Journal of Finance 1780. 
4161hid. at p. 1787. 
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was done by Higson and Elliot417 who examined the performance of a large sample of 
UK takeovers between 1975-1990. They found that bidder earned abnormal returns 
of about 0.43-1.3%. Accordingly, substantial gains are to be made but they almost 
entirely accrue to the target. 
However, the market for corporate control is largely concerned with the position of 
the target. Therefore, the efficiency justification is largely affirmed. However, the 
assumptions upon which it is based are debatable. 
The efficiency justification is based on the premise that potential targets are under- 
performing. However, the evidence does not confirm this. In 1996, Franks and 
Mayer studied 80 hostile takeover bids in the UK in 1985-1986.418 They found that 
there was little evidence to support the conclusion that the targets of hostile takeovers 
were below average performers prior to the bid. For example, over the five years 
prior to the bid, companies that were successfully taken over had shareholder returns 
of -0.14%. However, the returns of matching companies that were not targets only 
appreciated by 0.14%. The difference is almost negligible. Both sets of firms had 
returns that were practically zero. The same authors used another benchmark to 
validate this conclusion, namely the payment of shares. Again, this indicated that the 
target firms were not under-performing. They found that a majority of the target firms 
increased their dividends during the two years prior to the bid, and only 8% of target 
firms reduced or omitted a dividend in the year prior to the bid. 
So while the efficiency justification of the market for corporate control seems to be 
upheld, the motivating factors behind takeovers seems to be in doubt. In fact, it is 
generally accepted that takeovers occur for reasons other than ineffective 
management. As we shall see, takeovers occur for a variety of reasons. 
Firstly, ignoring any actual motive, the occurrence of takeovers seems to be 
dependant on economic climate and so tends to be cyclical. For example, many 
academics perceive the 1980s as a decade of unparalleled merger and takeover 
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activity. However, this perception appears to be inaccurate as the Fortune 500 noted 
in 1997: 
Like a lot of people, you may still think of the 1980s as the era of merger mania. 
Well, wake up: Today s mergers and acquisitions make the 80s look small-time. 
The global M&A market broke all records lat year at $1 trillion and at its current 
pace will hit $1.3 trillion this year. (The biggest year of the 80s was 1989: $600 
billion. ) 419 
Secondly, and more importantly, there is a wealth of reasons why a company may 
wish to takeover another. It may even be the case that inefficient companies are not 
favourable targets. A US survey carried out in 1981 considered that the feature that 
made a company most attractive to takeover was that it had excellent management 
and the majority of respondents agreed that managerial inefficiency would actually 
deter them from making a bid. 420 This has been borne out in practice. Nestl bought 
Rowntree because its management had been good, not bad. When Deutschebank took 
over Morgan Grenfell, it gave the Morgan Grenfell head a major role and a seat on the 
Vorstand in recognition of his abilities. 421 Other reasons for a takeover include 
diversification, access to new markets, increasing a market share, to reduce 
competition or to acquire the benefits of economies of scale. 
This has a worrying consequence as regards the market for corporate control. If 
managerial ineffectiveness is not a major concern when entering the market for 
corporate control, it can be assumed that badly managed companies are no more at 
risk than well-managed ones; in fact, as we have seen, many bidders prefer their 
targets to be well-managed. This serves to significantly reduce the disciplinary effect 
of the market for corporate control. 422 As one commentator has stated [s]ince 
takeovers appear to have no systematic impact on weak management or suboptimal 
resource use takeover threats cannot affect management behaviour except in an 
418 J. Franks and C. Mayer, Hostile Takeovers in the UK and the Correction of Managerial 
Failure 
(1996) 40 J. of Fin. Econ. 163. 
419 Quoted in K. Gugler (ed. ), Corporate Governance and Economic Performance, 2001, New York: 
OUP, p. 32. 
', ° See J. C. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender- 
QtT°ers Role in Corporate Governance (1984) 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1145 at 1212. 
J. Charkham, Keeping Good Company: A Study of Corporate Governance in Five Countries. 1995. 
Oxford: OUP, p. 31 1. 42J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company La%%'. 
1993, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 123. 
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inconsistent manner. If doing well is no protection, the incentive to avoid doing badly 
423 
is weak. 
Despite this, there is still a presumption by management that if a company s share 
price is not kept high, the company will be vulnerable to a takeover. If managers are 
concerned with the immediate share price, this will necessarily involve a reduction in 
long-term investment. In other words, the market for corporate control is another 
factor that contributes to the UK economic problem of short-termism. Many CEOs 
will state that their strategic policy is not influenced by a fear of a takeover. Yet as 
has been pointed out no CEO ignores his share price. 424 
Evidence backs this up. In the fourth quarter of 1989, at the height of the 1980s 
takeover boom, the dividend pay out ration had reached an unprecedented 62%. The 
Bank of England noted that there is quite substantial empirical evidence that the 
growth in dividend payments has been strongly associated with the boom in hostile 
bids. 425 This unprecedented dividend pay out took place in a year in which the 
corporate sector s financial deficit was £24 billions and indebtedness to banks rose by 
E33 billions. 426 One commentator has written [t]he monetary squeeze has been 
tighter for longer as companies have borrowed to pay dividends: and when the 
recession comes it will be amplified by higher than needed cuts in investment and 
workforce so that dividends, having reached ever higher levels do not suffer. 
'`' In 
other countries where market pressures are not so severe, dividends are not so 
important. For example, in Germany and Japan, shareholders receive relatively small 
dividends. Conversely, in the UK, the market pressures caused by a fear of takeovers 
has caused shareholders to be paid more than is good for the long-term health of the 
company. This point was made by the Financial Times in 1992 when it stated [t]he 
result is that dividends enjoy priority in a recession over capital investment, pay and 
4, ' R. M. Buxbaum, Corporate Legitimacy, Economic Theory and Legal Doctrine (1984) 45 Ohio State 
U. 516 at 531. 
424 J. Charkham, Keeping Good Company:. 4 Studs, of Corporate Governance in Five Countries, 1995, 
Oxford: OUP, p. 312.3 ýd a_s See W. Flutton, Takeover Legacy Has Touched Us . 
all at Great Cost (1990) Financial Times 
September. 
4 ,6J. Charkham, Keeping Good Companv.. a Study of Corporate Governance in Five Countries, 1995. 
Oxford: OUP, p. 313. 
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jobs. German corporations by contrast operate on the reverse set of priorities with 
dividends coming bottom. Ominously, and in a passage that resonates strongly with 
the UK takeover experience, Adam Smith in the final chapter of book I of The 
Wealth of Nations noted that the rate of profit is naturally low in rich and high in 
poor countries, and it is always highest in the countries which are going fastest to 
428 
ruin. 
The Effect of Takeovers on Stakeholders and Implicit Contracts. 
On a theoretical level, there is a general presumption amongst commentators that 
shareholders benefit from takeover activity whereas takeovers inflict significant losses 
on stakeholders. This has led some to conclude that takeovers bring about a 
redistribution of wealth from the stakeholders to the shareholders. Again this would 
be consistent with the philosophy behind the legal model of the company. However, a 
number of recent studies have found that this presumption of stakeholder loss may not 
be entirely accurate. 
The most common stakeholder associated with takeover losses are the employees. 
Many commentators assume that following a takeover, job losses and wage cuts will 
follow. However, empirical studies investigating the effect of takeovers, mergers and 
acquisitions on labour do not provide convincing evidence for the widely held belief 
that employees do suffer losses in these situations. Brown and Medoff examined 
employment and wage data on over 200,000 Michigan firms over a 26-month period. 
They found that, although mergers were associated with a wage decrease of 4%, 
employment in the same firms actually increased by 2%. 
429 Conversely, asset-only 
acquisitions were associated with employment reductions of 5% but with wage 
increases of 5%. 430 These results led the authors to conclude that the common public 
perception that acquisitions provide the occasion to slash wages and employment 
finds little support . 
431 Similarly, Yago examined the correlation between lay-offs 
and leveraged buy-outs (LBOs) during 43 LBOs concluded between 1984-86. He 
', e A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1986, Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics. 
429 C. Brown and J. Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on 
Labour in A. Auerbach (ed. ), 
Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, 1988, Chicago: Chicago 
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430 Ibid. 
431 Ibid. at p. 23. 
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found that on an average means basis, LBO firms reversed patterns of job loss 
prior to ownership change and increased employment after the buyouts. 432 
Another common non-shareholder constituent assumed to suffer during takeover 
activity are the creditors. For creditors, the loss from a takeover transaction will come 
from the wealth losses from depreciated debt. Any event that increases the default 
risk (the risk that the creditors will not be paid) can result in credit devaluation. This 
increase in risk will be reflected in an increase in the size of the discount necessary to 
entice other individuals to purchase the debt instrument. The greater the decrease, the 
greater the creditor s loss. 
However, there exists empirical evidence that both agrees with and refutes the 
contention that creditors suffer loss. Early studies indicated that takeover activity did 
not have a negative effect on creditors. Kim and McConnell studied monthly returns 
to non-convertible bondholders between 1960 and 1973 for 20 acquiror firms and 19 
acquired firms and found that there were no significant gains or losses from either 
group upon takeover activity. 433 Conversely, later studies, which parallel the rise in 
more leveraged transactions, appear to support the claim that takeover activity can 
result in losses to creditors. For example, Crabbe points to the Nabisco LBO where 
shareholder gains amounted to over $12 billion whereas the creditors lost $1 
434 billion. 
It is also believed that other groups can suffer losses through takeover activity, yet 
with these groups also, the evidence is far from conclusive. It has been said that the 
firm s customers will suffer through the termination of certain product lines. Yet 
there is no evidence to suggest that product terminations occur following a 
takeover. 43S It has even been stated that entire communities can be severely affected 
436 by change-of-control transactions. 
432 G. Yago, Junk Bonds: How High Yield Securities Restructured Corporate America. inerica. 1991, New 
York: OUP, p. 135. 
433 See Kim and McConnell, Corporate Afergers and the Co-Insurance of Corporate Debt (1977) 
32 J. 
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Ibid. 
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Accordingly, the established contention that takeover activity results in stakeholder 
losses cannot be easily established, at least so far as employees and creditors are 
concerned (the only two stakeholder groups for which useful data is available. ) 
Further, the contention that shareholder gains come at the expense of stakeholder 
losses cannot be justified. In those instances where the stakeholders have made 
losses, these losses have been a tiny fraction of the shareholder gains. Therefore, the 
contention that takeovers redistribute wealth from the stakeholders to the shareholders 
must also be doubted. 
Conclusion. 
The empirical evidence seems to suggest that the takeovers are beneficial for 
shareholders (more so for target shareholders as opposed to bidder targets. ) Hostile 
takeovers are even more profitable, a fact which can be attributed to a willingness to 
change management. However, the targets of hostile takeovers do not show evidence 
of being poor performers. Target companies appear to be average or slightly below 
average performers in comparison with other quoted companies. This may be enough 
to establish that takeovers benefit the economy, but it is not enough to establish the 
existence of a strong market for corporate control. To establish that, one must 
demonstrate that takeovers occur in order to replace inefficient management. The 
empirical evidence does not support this. 
We have noted that the vast majority of the internal mechanisms discussed uphold the 
legal model of the company by making the directors act in a pro-shareholder manner 
or by providing shareholders with some form of protection. The market for corporate 
control, although an external form of governance, also upholds the legal model of the 
company. In fact, the takeover market is probably the most overt mechanism that 
upholds the legal model, in that it places market pressures upon directors 
forcing them 
to keep the share price high. In order to do this, directors will adopt a policy of profit 
maximisation, which is the goal of the company under the legal model. 
Accordingly, 
the market for corporate control forces the directors to uphold the legal model of 
the 
company or risk being replaced by management who will. 
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CONCLUSION. 
The purpose of this chapter has been twofold. The first purpose was to demonstrate 
that the various corporate governance mechanisms in this country offer only weak 
sources of accountability. In Part I, we saw how the AGM s effectiveness has been 
weakened by the various procedural rules that govern it and the practical difficulties 
of co-ordinated shareholder activism. Part II examined the possibility of a new era of 
accountability through the efforts of institutional investors. However, we also saw 
that there are a number of practical barriers that make this possibility unlikely. The 
effectiveness of NEDs was examined in Part III and severe doubts expressed as to 
their ability to effectively monitor management. Despite the recommendations of 
Cadbury and the Combined Code being almost universally adopted, behind the scenes 
executive influence still ensures that NEDs are not the independent monitors that they 
should be. Part IV examined the various mechanisms in place designed to regulate 
executive pay. Again, as with NEDs, despite the various self-regulatory 
recommendations being almost universally followed, executive influence ensures that 
the various remuneration mechanisms, notably the remuneration committee, are 
flawed. Finally, in Part V, we noted that the aforementioned internal mechanisms 
provide limited accountability and so we tend to rely on an external mechanism, 
namely the hostile takeover market. However, we also saw that the effectiveness of 
the market for corporate control as a disciplinary mechanism must be doubted. 
The second aim of this chapter was to demonstrate that the limited pressures the 
above mechanisms impose all aim to make the directors comply with the legal model 
of the company, in that they either make the directors act in a profit maximising way 
or give the shareholders some way to attack the directors if they do not act in a profit 
maximising way. The AGM is the primary, if not the only, mechanism whereby the 
shareholders can communicate their wishes and queries to management. Stakeholders 
play no part in the AGM. Institutional investors will have the same concerns and 
desires as normal investors and so they will pressure directors to maximise profits. 
The various remuneration schemes in place are supposedly to be based on linking, pay 
to performance, so that directors pay will rise if the share price is high. In order to 
keep the share price high, directors will adopt a policy of profit maximisation. 
Finally, the limited market pressures imposed by the hostile takeover market require 
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directors to keep the share price high, and once again this will be achieved by a policy 
of profit maximisation. 
The above discussion has focused on the formal mechanisms of corporate governance, 
but increasingly, informal mechanisms are starting to play an increased role. The 
main form of informal mechanism concerns self-regulatory Codes and non- 
governmental bodies. The actual effectiveness of these informal measures will not be 
examined here as this chapter is concerned with formal mechanisms. However, their 
impact upon the stakeholder debate is worth mentioning given that they appear to 
espouse the same approach as the formal mechanisms i. e. they uphold the legal model 
of the company. The various codes to date have stated little on the stakeholder 
debate. However, in 1998, the Committee on Corporate Governance (informally 
known as the Hampel Committee) did say that [t]he single overriding objective 
shared by all listed companies, whatever their size or type of business, is the 
preservation and the greatest practicable enhancement over time of their shareholders 
investment. 437 So even though, the actual content of the self-regulatory reports says 
little on the stakeholder debate, it appears that the committees that draft these reports 
firmly believe in the ethos behind the legal model. 
Accordingly, the conclusion regarding the various corporate governance mechanisms 
in place in the UK must be that they provide only a limited source of accountability 
and impose upon directors weak pressures, and what pressures they do impose are 
firmly in line with the goals of the legal model of the company. 
437 The Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance, 1998, London: 
Gee Publishing Ltd., para. 
1.16. 
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Examining the Legal Model of the Company: Profit 
Maximisation and Exclusive Shareholder Governance 
Protection 
Introduction. 
One of the aims of corporate governance is to bring about accountability and 
transparency. Company law should provide for a system whereby companies should 
be free to partake in risk-taking activity that can enhance societal wealth but at the 
same time, they should do it in such a way that encourages transparency in order that 
the regulatory authorities can ensure that corporations adhere to their legal 
requirements as well as providing interested parties with information concerning the 
company. This is the raison d etre of company law. However, bearing this in mind, 
consider the following description of a large multinational company: 
Exxon is a typical corporate giant. Like the hundred or so corporations with 
assets of at least $1 billion and, in combination, the lion s share of Americas 
industrial profits and earnings, Exxon does not really sell the products that 
produce its mind-boggling revenues. Its oil, chemicals, electronic typewriters, 
and motors are actually sold by an array of companies that Exxon owns . Most 
remarkable about Exxon s empire, however, is its scope. It operates in nearly 
100 countries. Its 195 ocean-going tankers, owned and chartered, constitute a 
private navy as big as Britain s. 1 
In 2000, Exxon Mobil had revenues of $163.9 billions. 2 This figure is larger than the 
gross domestic product of 161 countries, including Israel, Poland and Greece. 3 Exxon 
is not even the largest corporation in the world - General Motors has revenues of over 
$189 billions. Of the 100 largest economies in the world, only 49 are countries; the 
rest are corporations. ` It is difficult to reconcile notions of accountability with entities 
of this size and power. This may go some way to explain why profit maximisation 
has held such a well established place as a yardstick for corporate accountability. In 
Chapter 1, we saw that Berle noted that one of the main objections to stakeholder 
ideologies is that, to date, they have not provided an accurate enough means of 
W. N. Shaw & V. Barry, Moral Issues in Business, 1995,6`h ed., Belmont, California: Wadsworth 
Publishing Co., pp. 199-200. 
See The Fortune 1000 List [Online] Available http: //www. fortune. com/fortune/fortune500 27`h 
September 2000. 
' S. Anderson and J. Cavanagh, Top 200: The Rise of Global Corporate Power [Online] Available 
l'ttP: //Nvww. corpwatch. org trac; 'corner/glob/ips/top200. html 25th September 2000. 4 
Ibid. 
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accountability. This is one of the main attractions of the legal model. Acting in the 
interests of the shareholders means keeping the share price high. In order to keep the 
share price high, consistent dividends need to be paid. In order to pay consistent 
dividends, profit must be maximised. The goal of profit maximisation carries with it 
the benefit of being easily quantifiable. Therefore, adherence to the legal model 
provides an easy means of accountability. 
However, this is not enough to justify a policy of profit maximisation. Part I will look 
at the various economic rationales for adopting a policy of profit maximisation. It 
will be seen that none of the modern justifications are longer sufficient to justify a 
profit maximising approach. 
The adoption of the legal model not only requires adopting profit maximisation as the 
corporate goal. It also requires that our company law be pro-shareholder. In fact, 
total adherence to the legal model requires that our company law protect shareholders 
exclusively. The various justifications for exclusive shareholder governance 
protection will be examined in Part II and will form the basis of the justifications for 
stakeholder protection in Chapter 7 and for environmental protection in Chapter 9. 
I. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROFIT MAXIMISATION. 
As noted above, the legal model requires that companies act in the interests of 
shareholders i. e. in a profit maximising manner. Over the years, a number of 
arguments have arisen that seek to justify this pro-shareholder approach or more 
specifically contend that corporations should not engage in socially responsible, profit 
sacrificing activity. 
The Efficiency Argument. 
In 1962, Milton Friedman famously wrote: 
The view has been gaining widespread acceptance that corporate officials and 
labor leaders have a social responsibility that goes beyond serving the interest of 
their stockholders or their members. This view shows a 
fundamental 
misconception of the character and nature of a free economy. 
In such an 
economy, there is one and only one social responsibility of business-to use 
its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so 
long as it 
stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages 
in open and free 
competition, without deception or fraud Few trends could so thoroughly 
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undermine the very foundation of our free society as the acceptance by corporate 
officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their 
stockholders as possible. 5 
This is the essence of the efficiency argument. Societal wealth, and consequently 
societal well being, is maximised only if companies engage in activities that accrue 
profit. The function of business is to produce sustained high-level profits. The 
essence of free enterprise is to go after profit in any way that is consistent with its own 
survival as an economic system. 6 Accordingly, if companies depart from the profit 
goal and engage in what they believe to be social responsible behaviour, then they are 
in fact producing sub-optimal societal outputs. In essence, the socially responsible 
thing to do is to increase profits. 7 For example, if a plant becomes unprofitable then, 
according to the efficiency argument, the socially responsible thing to do would be to 
close it down. The company may think that it is behaving in a socially responsible 
manner by keeping the plant going by diverting funds from elsewhere, but those funds 
would not be yielding their full return and so, ultimately, society would suffer a net 
loss. 8 Therefore, according to this theory, it would be wrongful to ask a corporation 
to do something which would fly in the face of its members wishes, such as looking 
after the interests of the unemployed, just as it would run counter to our understanding 
of liberty and freedom to impose positive duties on human individuals to act 
altruistically towards others. 9 
Linked to this idea that proactive social activity that departs from the profit goal is 
actually socially inefficient are two further criticisms. Firstly, as noted, in a free 
market system, a company s function is to make a profit. If managers depart from this 
function to pursue social projects, they are diverting managerial time and effort away 
from the company s legitimate activities. 10 Secondly, expenditure on socially 
responsible goals could actually reduce societal well being through a loss in investor 
M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 1962, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 133. 
6 T. Levitt, The Dangers of Social Responsibility in H. D. Marshall (ed. ), Business and Government: the 
Problem of Power, 1970, Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, p. 26. 
7 This, of course, is the thesis of Friedman s famous slogan the social responsibility of business 
is to 
increase its profits. See M. Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its 
Profits 
(1970) New )Fork Tinies Magazine September 13`h 
F. A. Havek, Law, Legislation and Liberty Vol. 3,1982, London: Routledge, pp-81-2. 
H. J. Glasbcek, The Corporate Social Responsibility Afovement-The Latest in , %1ciginot Lines to 
Save 
Capitalism (1988) 11 Dalhousie LJ. 363 at 371. 
10 T. Levitt, The Dangers of Social Responsibiliti" in H. D. Marshall (ed. ), Business and Government: 
the Problem of Potter, 1970, Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company. pp. 
35-6. 
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confidence. Social expenditure lowers profits, thereby reducing the attractiveness of 
equity investments bringing about an increase in the cost of capital and a concomitant 
reduction in business activity. " 
Some critics have gone even further in their condemnation of social activity that 
departs from the profit goal. They argue that the making of profit, not social 
sentiment, lies at the heart of a capitalist system12 and to depart from profit is to shake 
the foundations of capitalism itself. [A]s the profit motive becomes increasingly 
sublimated, capitalism will become only a shadow-the torpid remains of the creative 
dynamism which was and might have been. 13 
Accordingly, the thesis of the efficiency argument is that profit is the legitimate social 
aim of the corporation and to depart from this is to be socially irresponsible. 
However, there are reasons to doubt this contention. It can be demonstrated that 
certain perceived profit maximising techniques are ultimately non-profitable and in 
these areas, departing from this perceived profit goal can, in the long-term, prove 
more profitable, both from society s point of view and the individual corporations. 
As we have seen, in order to maximise profits corporations will, in the absence of 
legal restraints, externalise their costs onto third parties. It is generally believed that 
by passing on their costs to third parties, corporations can lower costs and thereby 
raise profits. However, there are valid reasons to believe that ultimately, externalities 
may not raise profit. In fact, in certain circumstances, they may lower profits to such 
an extent that they jeopardise the company s existence. 
On an efficiency level, externalities can represent a misallocation of resources. The 
firm does not bear the full cost for the production of the good and, therefore, will not 
11 C. D. Stone, Public Interest Representation: Economic and Social Policy Inside the Enterprise in K. J. 
Ilopt and G. Teubner (eds. ), Corporate Governance and Directors Liabilities: Legal, Economic and 
Sociological Analyses on Corporate Social Responsibility, 1985, New York: Walter De Gruyter & Co., 
pp. 123: F. H. Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 14 16 at 
1447. 
1' See T. Levitt, The Dangers of Social Responsibility in H. D. Marshall (ed. ). Business and 
Government: the Problem of Power, 1970, Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, p-35 
who states [t]he governing rule in industry should be that something is good only if it pays. Otherwise 
it is alien and impermissible. This is the rule of capitalism. 13 Ibid. at p. 30. 
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reflect this cost in the price that it charges. Accordingly, output will be higher than 
the good s social cost of production resulting in the resources being devoted to its 
production being higher than the socially efficient level. ' 4 When commentators argue 
that corporations should be made to ensure that their costs are internalised and not 
externalised, they do not do so as the result of any notions of corporate social 
responsibility. They do so to comply with the precepts of the ideal market which 
requires that the true costs of production are factored into the price of a product. '5 
Even more damaging to the individual corporation than this misallocation of resources 
is the increased possibility of litigation that externalities bring. In examining this 
area, two different forms of externality can be identified; (i) the traditional externality, 
namely the corporation foregoing or passing on costs to the detriment of others and; 
(ii) product externalities which are not so much the direct passing on of costs, but 
rather the pursuit of profit via the manufacture of goods that increase the social costs 
upon society. 
Product externalities are slightly more subtle than traditional externalities. Certain 
industries do not to a great extent externalise their costs. However, the very existence 
of their product increases social costs. The trade-off is simple; they produce goods 
that make them a profit and these products result in increased social costs. These 
social costs are not borne solely by the corporation, if borne by the corporation at all, 
but rather by everyone. In that sense, they represent a form of externality. The goods 
in question are usually goods that are perceived to be damaging to society. The point 
that individual corporations who produce these goods need to be wary of is that, in 
certain circumstances, the courts have started to attach liability to corporations who 
produce these socially detrimental product. The following examples demonstrate this. 
A number of tobacco companies, mainly American companies, have been besieged by 
lawsuits brought by smokers who are seeking millions of dollars for illnesses and 
1' J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law, 1994, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 31 I. 
15 H. J. Glasbeek, The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement-The Latest in Maginot Lines to Save 
Capitalism (1988) 11 Dalhousie U. 363 at 377. 
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deaths that they contend were brought about by smoking. 16 To date, tobacco 
companies have won every case, " but the number of cases continues to mushroom, ' 8 
and in a few instances, tobacco companies have settled out of court. Even when these 
companies win, they still have to expend vast sums in representation costs. Bars, off- 
licenses and restaurants are being sued with increasing frequency by patrons, as well 
as injured third parties, when motor vehicles accidents are linked to alcohol 
consumption. 19 Finally, in an American decision that has stunned commentators, a 
handgun manufacturer was held liable to a shooting victim for selling a gun that was 
subsequently used in a robbery attempt. 20 The following example demonstrates how 
product externalities can be devastating for a corporation. 
In 1982, Johns-Manville Sales Corporation voluntarily filed for reorganization under 
Chapter 11 of the American Federal Bankruptcy Act. 21 The reason for this 
reorganization was the financial burden of defending more than 15,000 lawsuits filed 
by former employees, or their next-of-kin, for injury or death caused by exposure to 
asbestos while working for the company. By 1981, the company had disposed of 
1,900 claims at an average cost of $15,000 per claim and costs had risen to $21,000 
per claim ($40,000 if legal expenses were included). Further, new lawsuits were 
being filed at over 500 per month and studies forecast at least another 32,000 likely in 
the future. James F. Beasley, Treasurer of Manville, predicted that the total cost of 
16 See Kepko, Products Liability-Can it Kick the Smoking Habit? (1985) 19 Akron. L. Rev. 269. 
lawsuits are also increasing from non-smoking employees asserting their right to a smoke-free 
environment. See Walsh and Wool, Nonsmokers Rights: Shimp v New Jersey Bell Telephone (1984) 
26 Wash. U. J. Ur. & Con. Temp. L. 211 and Note, Nonsmokers Rights: The Employers Dilemma (1984) 
(1984) 28 St. Louis U. L. J. 993. 
17 See e. g., Note, Plaintiffs Conduct as a Defence to Claims Against Cigarette Manufacturers (1986) 
99 Harv. L. Rev. 909; Reskin, Cigarettes Aren t Unreasonably Dangerous: Roysdon v R. J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. (1986) 72 A. B. A. J. 92 and Campion, Third Circuit Reverses Key Tobacco Ruling (1986) 
117 N. J. L. J. 3. Although, no tobacco company has lost a case, there have been settlements worth 
hundreds of millions of dollars. 
1R See Tobacco Firms Defend Smoker Liability Suits with Heavy Artillery (1987) Wall St. J. April 29th at 
and RJR Nabisco Might Encounter Big Obstacles if it Seeks to Repackage its Tobacco Business 
(1987) Wall St. J. March 2nd at 45. 
19 See Comment, Imposition of Liability on Social Hosts in Drink Driving Cases: A Judicial Response 
. 
1landated bi" Principles of Common Law and Common Sense (1986) 69 MMarq. L. Rev. 251 and Tacium, 
Liquor and Liability: The 
Social Host (1985) 15 Manitoba L. J. 105. 
10 Kr! /rt" yRG Industries Inc., 304 Md. 124,497 A . 
2d 1 143 (Md. Ct. App. 1985), 44 A. L. R. 4th 563. 
See Dana, Tort Law: Handgun Manufacturer Liability (1986) 9 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 764 and Jett. Do 
I'iCtims of Unlawful Handgun Violence Have a Remedy Against Handgun Manufacturers: An 
Ovc"n'ie"tt 
and A nah"sis (1985) U. 1 Il. L. Rev. 967. 
See Note, The Asbestos Bankruptcy: Johns-Manville s Petition for Reorganization Under Chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code-A Good Faith Filing or a Sham? (1985) 19 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 55. 
202 
Chapter 6: Examining the Legal Model of the Company: Profit Maximisation and 
Exclusive Shareholder Governance Protection 
the litigation over the next 20 years would be at least $2 billions. 22 The Chapter 11 
reorganization automatically suspended further proceedings and temporarily halted 
the filing of new lawsuits against Manville. 
A report in 1964, prepared by Dr. Irving J. Selikoff, indicated that as early as 1929, 
and certainly during the 1930 s, Manville s management was aware of the potential 
health hazards of working with asbestos. 23 Indeed, in one Canadian plant, the medical 
director knew that seven employees had been diagnosed with asbestosis but decided 
not to tell them. 24 Nevertheless, the company decided not to take any protective 
measures. In effect, Manville had externalised the cost of that decision onto its 
employees. The financial cost it saved was passed onto them in the form of a social 
cost, ergo it was an externality. However, it was noteworthy that even though 
Manville decided not to afford its employees any special protection, it was not 
actually acting in violation of any State or Federal laws. In fact, at the time, there 
were no special safety standards required for those working with asbestos. `' 
This example is important because it shows that courts may be willing to impose 
heavy penalties upon corporations who try to make a profit at the expense of society. 
Two reasons indicate this willingness. Firstly, the court was willing to make Manville 
liable in a large number of lawsuits even though Manville had not actually broken any 
22 These figures were taken from R. Buchholz, Management Responses to Public Issues, 1985, pp. 322- 
35. 
2; See I. J. Selikoff et al, The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Insulation Workers (1965) 132 
Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sc. 139 and Asbestos. Who Knew What When? (1982) Boston Globe October 26`h at 49. 
'a The medical director justified his position thus: 
It must be remembered that although these men have the X-ray evidence of asbestosis, 
they are working today and definitely are not disabled from asbestosis. They have not 
been told of this diagnosis, for it is felt that as long as a man feels well, is happy at home 
and at work, and his physical condition remains good, nothing should be said. When he 
becomes disabled and sick, then the diagnosis should be made and the claim submitted by 
the Company. The fibrosis of this disease is irreversible and permanent so that eventually 
compensation will be paid to each of these men. But as long as the man is not disabled, it 
is felt that he should not be told of his condition so that he can live and work in peace and 
the Company can benefit by his many years of experience. Should the man be told of his 
condition today there is a very definite possibility that he would become mentally and 
physically ill, simply through the knowledge that he has asbestosis. 
Quoted in W. H. Shaw & V. Barry, , tforal Issues in Business, 1995,6`h ed., Belmont, California: 
Wadsworth Publishing Co., pp. 24-5. 
'` Such standards were only introduced in 1970 when Congress passed the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act. 
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law. 26 Accordingly, this decision had a retrospective effect; something that is usually 
anathema to most courts. Secondly, the courts were willing to breach their own 
procedural rules in order to find liability. In one of the many cases, Wilson v Johns- 
Manville Sales Corporation, 27 the District Court dismissed an action by an 
employee s widow on the grounds that the limitation period had expired. 28 Despite 
this, the Federal Court of Appeals reversed the decision and allowed to lawsuit to 
proceed. This decision could be viewed as harsh. Wilson started work for Manville 
in 1941 and by 1973 knew that he had a mild case of asbestosis. Yet he made no 
claim. It was only in February 1978 that he discovered that he had mesothelioma, a 
rare cancer caused by asbestos exposure. In May 1978, Henry Wilson died. One 
could ask the question how might Manville s management do business in a rational 
manner when, more than forty years after the situation arises, the legal rules 
governing that situation are abruptly altered. 29 
Examining the effects of externalities in an economic context will demonstrate how 
they are in fact economically inefficient. However, in order to do this, we need to 
first define what we actually mean by efficient. This is something that many 
commentators fail to do. Instead they simply assume that if it increases profits then it 
must be efficient. However, as we are dealing with social welfare, not just corporate 
welfare, profits are not a sufficient indicator. 
In assessing whether or not a proposed change will increase social welfare, two 
measures of efficiency can be used. The first is Pareto efficiency, named after its 
originator Vilfredo Pareto, a 19th century Italian economist. A transaction is Pareto 
efficient if the change will make somebody better off without making anyone else 
worse off. Pareto efficient acts must increase social welfare because some people are 
better off whilst no one loses. 
26 It is through this process of judicial interpretation and redefinition of the law that a company like 
Manville may suddenly find itself legally liable for millions of dollars in damages for activities that 
were not, at the time they occurred, in violation of any legal standards then existing. D. Silverstein. 
Managing Coi porate Social Responsibility in a Changing Legal Environment (1987-88) 25 
American 
Business U. 524 at 533. 
27 684 F. 2d 111 (D. C. Cir. 1982). 
'8 The so-called discovery rule under which a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff 
knows or 
through the exercise of due diligence should have known of the injury. Ibid. at pp. 1 15-6. 
- D. Silverstein, 1lanaging Corporate Social Responsibilit. v in a Changing Legal Environment (1987- 
88) 25 American Business U. 524 at 529. 
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However, Pareto efficiency is rarely used to gauge social welfare because few 
transactions meet the criteria of producing no losers. When corporations change 
policy or enter into transactions, a large number of people can be affected and some 
are bound to be disadvantaged. It is obvious that externalities are not Pareto efficient 
as they involve placing costs on parties outside the corporation. These parties become 
worse off and so Pareto efficiency is not achieved. 
Given the limitations of the Pareto standard, economists tend to adopt a more lenient 
benchmark. This is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, a standard developed by two British 
twentieth century economists, Prof. Nicholas Kaldor and John R. Hicks. 30 Under the 
Kaldor-Hicks test, a change is efficient if, in aggregate, the benefits of the change 
exceed the costs. In such a situation, those who gain will obtain enough to 
compensate those who lose, although no compensation need take place. The fact that 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency allows for losers means that it is less attractive from an 
ethical perspective than Pareto efficiency. 31 Nevertheless, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
should increase social welfare and since the Pareto test is almost impossible to satisfy, 
the Kaldor-Hicks standard is the one which economists tend to adopt most. 32 
However, determining whether externalities are Kaldor-Hicks efficient is much more 
difficult than determining if they are Pareto efficient. Under Pareto efficiency, all that 
is required is for one party to make a loss whereas under the Kaldor-Hicks test, the 
loss must be quantified. When we are dealing with social costs, this is extremely 
difficult to do. 
The Legitimacy Argument. 
Much of the literature concerning corporate social responsibility discusses the 
argument that certain functions are inherently political and should not be exercised by 
30 See N. Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility (1939) 
49 Economic Journal 549 and J. R. Hicks, The Valuation of the Social Income (1940) 7 Economica 105. 
31 B. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
15. 
.2R. A. Posner, Economic . 4nalvsis of 
Law, 1992,4`h ed., Boston: Little, Brown & Co., p. 14. Not all 
commentators use the Kaldor-Hicks standard though: see M. W. McDaniel, Stockholders and 
Stakeholders (1991) 21 Stetson L. Rev. 121 at 127, and N. Duxburv, Patterns of American 
Jurisprudence, 1995, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 390-1. 
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private institutions such as corporations. The job of corporations is to create wealth 
and the job of government is to redistribute that wealth. If corporations engage in 
social activity they ultimately usurp the inherently governmental function of wealth 
distribution or taxation. 33 In a wider sense, departing from the profit goal involves 
corporations balancing the various societal interests in an attempt to determine where 
the public interest lies. 34 If society decides that private charity is insufficient to meet 
the needs of the poor, to maintain art museums, and to finance research for curing 
diseases, it is the responsibility of government to raise the necessary money through 
taxation. It should not come from mangers purportedly acting on behalf of the 
corporation. 35 
Before examining this argument further, one reason why corporations are particularly 
susceptible to legitimacy arguments is due to the power that large corporations 
possess. There is nothing objectionable about individuals and small businesses going 
beyond the requirements of the law. However, due to the market power they possess, 
corporations can make decisions that can have significant public effects and, due to 
their desire to externalise, they can pass the cost of social responsibility onto outside 
parties. 36 Accordingly, this involves a trade-off between material and social 
prosperity and this is the function of democratically elected bodies, not private 
corporations. 37 If corporations were to usurp governmental functions in this way, it 
could lead to the corporation replacing the government, but lacking the government s 
accountability and ergo its legitimacy. One commentator has voiced the problem in 
the following dramatic manner: 
[The corporation s] proliferating employee welfare programs, its serpentine 
involvement in community, government, charitable and educational affairs, its 
prodigious currying of political and public favor through hundreds of peripheral 
preoccupations, all these well-intended but insidious contrivances are greasing 
the rails for our collective descent into a social order that would be as repugnant 
to the corporations themselves as to their critics. The danger is that all these 
J. Tolmie, Corporate Social Responsibility (1992) UNSWLJ 268 at 288. 
_4 D. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility (1979) 32 Stan. L. Rev. I at 27. See A. A. 
Auberbach, Law and Social Change in the United States (1959) 6 UCLA. L. Rev. 516 at 
516 who asks 
the question why should the corporate manager be the legitimate arbiter of the competing claims of 
stockholders, workers, consumers, the managers themselves and generations as yet unborn. 
"Corporate Responsibility in T. L. Beauchamp & N. E. Bowie (eds. ), Ethical Theory and Business, 
1993,4 Ih ed., Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, p. 50. 
36 R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law. 1986,3rd ed., Boston: Little Brown, pp. 395-6. 
J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law. 1994. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 318. 
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things will turn the corporation into a twentieth-century equivalent of the 
medieval Church. The corporation would eventually invest itself with all- 
embracing duties, obligations and finally powers-ministering to the whole man 
and molding him and society in the image of the corporations narrow ambitions 
and its essentially unsocial needs. 38 
Initially, this argument appears logical. However, over the last 30 years, a number of 
commentators have started to question the legitimacy argument. 39 They have argued 
that the distinction between public and private is becoming blurred and that 
today s large corporations are best described as public in character: in essence, 
corporations are becoming political institutions, and as such have the right to act in 
the interests of non-shareholder constituents. 
There are five current theories which attempt to explain the legitimacy of the 
corporation as a political institution. 40 In the first, the power wielded by managers is 
legitimated by the control which shareholders as members of the public exercise via 
the corporate electoral system. In the second, large corporations are perceived as 
private governments with constituents including those upon whom their actions have 
an impact. In the third, the political character of the corporation is derived from its 
close relationship with the state. Thus legitimation derives from a growing 
assimilation of the corporation into the state. 41 The fourth theory derives from the 
managerialist school. It argues that the corporate manager should engage in 
leadership and interest balancing apparently guided largely by his or her own 
conscience, perhaps as it reflects the mores of society at large. 42 The final theory is 
that of organisational behaviourists who argue that large corporations never had 
profit maximisation as a single goal. Instead, corporate managers juggle competing 
demands, many of which are only remotely connected with economic considerations. 
Irrespective of the above justifications, it may simply be the case that private 
enterprises can more efficiently allocate the provision of public goods than 
38 T. Levitt, The Dangers of Social Responsibility in H. D. Marshall (ed. ), Business and Government: 
The Problem of Power. 1970, Lexington; Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, p. 27. _`' See e. g. P. Blumberg, The Politicisation of the Corporation (1971) Bus. Law. 1551: P. Blumberg, 
The Publics Right to Know: Disclosure in the Major American Corporation [1973] Bus. Law. 1025; 
R. B. Stevenson, The Corporation as a Political Institution (1979) 8 Hofstra. L. Rev. 39; A. Miller. A 
. tfodest Proposal for- Helping to Tame the Corporate 
Beast (1979) 8 Hofstra. L. Rev. 63. 
40 These theories are taken from R. B. Stevenson, The Corporation as a Political Institution (1979) 
8 
Hofstra. L. Rev. 39 at 42-5. 
41 Ibid. at p. 43. 
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governments can. In this case, it is surely societally beneficial to permit corporations 
to engage in social activities even if to do so is to displace a modicum of the 
government s power. As one commentator has noted: 
It is largely left to private enterprise to make the critical public policy decisions 
governmental policy must ensure the success of private enterprise. To fail to 
do so is to risk detrimental effects on the economy and thus on the citizenry 
whose welfare is the chief function of government to advance . Government 
must, to a significant degree, be acquiescent to the needs and demands of 
business for to do so is to do no more than provide good government. 43 
Accordingly, the theoretical validity of the legitimacy argument may have to give way 
to the practical benefits that corporate social action can offer. Both the 
aforementioned efficiency argument and the next argument to be examined, the 
market argument, rely on efficiency justifications. Accordingly, if it can be 
demonstrated that corporations can allocate the provision of public goods more 
efficiently than governments, then the validity of the legitimacy argument is 
weakened. 
The Market Argument. 
In a presence of scarce resources, individuals are forced to make choices in terms of 
what to consume and what to produce. When individuals make choices, they forego 
other opportunities. In other words, there is no such thing as a free lunch. ýý The 
cost of foregoing one opportunity in favour of another is known as the opportunity 
cost. In order to minimise the opportunity cost, rational actors will act so as to 
improve their own well being, often referred to as their utility, welfare or wealth. The 
aggregate effect of such actions occurs through the operation of markets. In economic 
terms, a market is a forum in which those offering to buy and sell products or 
services interact. 
45 
Mainstream economics assumes a number of assumptions in relation to markets. It is 
assumed that buyers and sellers act rationally, are numerous, have full information 
about the products on offer, can contract at little cost, have sufficient financial 
J' 
Ibid. at p. 44. 
43 S. M. Beck, Corporate Power and Public Polici" in Bernier and Lajoie, Consumer Protection. 
Environmental Law and Corporate Poster, vol. 50,1985, Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, p. 184. 
as On this infamous phrase, see R. Hessen, Free Lunch in J. Eatwell et al (eds. ), 
The World of 
Economics, 1991, New York: W. W. Norton, p. 285. 
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resources to transact, can enter and leave the market with little difficulty, and will 
carry out the obligations which they agree to perform. 46 Under these assumptions, 
market participants will trade until no further gains can be realised i. e. the equilibrium 
price will reflect the value placed upon the good. The distribution will be allocatively 
efficient. When viewed like this, voluntary exchanges through markets appear 
optimally efficient. 
Applying this to the issue of companies, in matters of social policy companies should 
defer to the cumulative effect of individual preferences expressed through the 
market. 47 Adam Smith referred to this as the invisible hand. Companies should 
therefore not actively pursue social goals in the absence of market signals. This is 
demonstrated by the classic, if extreme, example cited by Milton Friedman. He refers 
to an industrial chemist who leaves her job because she prefers not to provide labour 
to help manufacture napalm for incendiary weapons. If many, many people feel that 
way, the cost of hiring people to make napalm will be high, napalm will be expensive, 
and less of it will be used. 48 Accordingly, morality is already in the market 49 and 
corporations should not try to exercise any independent moral judgment. 
However, as has been noted, in order to come to this conclusion, market theory does 
tend to assume that a number of conditions exist. If any of these conditions are not 
present and the market is defective, then maybe superior results could be achieved if 
the company corrected market shortcomings by actively pursuing social goals and 
departing from the profit goal. An examination of these various assumptions will 
demonstrate that when a market theorist invokes the iron discipline of competitive 
markets as a bar to corporate social responsibility of all types, he paints a picture of 
market structure that we are likely to dismiss as unrealistic. 
50 
°` B. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 6- 
46 Ibid. 
47 J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibiliti : Issues in the Theory of Company Law, 1994. 
(>\ford: Clarendon Press, p. 307. 
dA M. Friedman, There s No Such Thing as a Free Lunch, 1975, LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, p. 
245. 
49 T. M. Mulligan, The ;1 /oral Mission of Business in T. L. Beauchamp 
& N. E. Bo\\ ie (eds. ), Ethical 
Theory and Business, 1993,4`h ed., Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, p. 70. 
so U. Mashaw, The Economic Context of Corporate Social Responsibility in K. J. Hopt & G. 
Teubner 
(eds. ), Corporate Governance and Directors Liabilities: Legal, Economic and Sociological 
Analyses 
on Corporate Social Responsibility. 1985, Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, p. 59. 
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One assumption is that those who are affected by the company can affect its 
behaviour via the product market. However, not everyone who is affected by the 
company s activities has access to the market. For example, householders next to an 
engineering plant or the as of yet unborn will be affected by the behaviour of 
companies but will have no market relationship with them. 51 
A further assumption, already noted, is that buyers and sellers have full information 
about the products on offer. This will almost certainly not be the case. Certain 
market participants will have access to information that others do not. Notably, the 
company will have superior information than its customers. To ensure that all parties 
are better informed, the government can demand those with informational advantages 
to disclose what they know. In the UK, a public company faces substantial disclosure 
requirements. However, these are unlikely to fully equate the informational disparity 
between company and customer. Such informational inferiority will lead to sub- 
optimal market indications. 
Imagine that a market exists where all participants have access to full information. 
Supposing that a company s manufacturing process resulted in environmental 
damage. If all market participants have access to full information, then the company s 
customers will respond to the environmental damage by purchasing the products of a 
rival company that does not damage the environment. The company will, through the 
product market, note their customers dissatisfaction by lower profit margins. The 
company can then respond by making its manufacturing process more 
environmentally friendly. This is the crux of the market argument. Companies 
should only act in a socially responsible way when indicated to do so by the market. 
Ilowever, this type of market signal is likely to be very rare as the customers will 
usually have such poor access to information that they will never 
discover the 
company s negative social activities. The following example demonstrates this. 
'1 J. F. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theora" of Comparit- 
Latt, 1994. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 32 1. 
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The Royal Dutch/Shell Group comprises over 2000 companies in more than 100 
countries. 
52 It is the most profitable oil company in the world. It is responsible for 
5% of the world s oil and gas production (more than any other private company). 
These are facts that are readily available. However, what most customers will not 
realise is that Shell has a notorious environmental and human rights record. Most 
people will be aware of the Brent Spar incident. What they will not be aware of is the 
disastrous social impact of Shell s business in countries throughout the world. 
Ignoring Shell s environmental record, it is its human rights record that demonstrates 
how corporations can have significant negative impacts on whole countries. Shell is 
by far the largest foreign oil company in Nigeria, accounting for 50% of Nigeria s oil 
production. Nigeria is a military dictatorship heavily dependent on oil. By the early 
1990 s, oil production accounted for 90% of the country s foreign exchange 
receipts. 53 In 1997, Shell admitted to importing weapons and financing the military in 
Ogoniland. They also supplied vehicles, boats and a helicopter to transport soldiers 
who raided villages. 54 In 1997, Shell signed a 40-year, $2.7 billion contract to exploit 
the Camisea gas field in Peru. When Shell conducted preliminary exploration of the 
region in the mid 1980 s, the Nahua Indians were exposed to outsiders, resulting in a 
whooping cough and influenza epidemic that killed off over 50% of the population. 55 
During the height of the Apartheid era, many corporations and governments levied 
international sanctions against South Africa. Shell however, broke these sanctions 
and continued to sell oil to the government. As South Africa had no oil reserves of its 
own, oil was crucial to the South African economy. Shell s business was crucial to 
the government. From 1989 to 1993, Shell explored for oil and gas in Burma, giving 
the military junta much-needed currency and an undeserved endorsement of 
legitimacy. 56 Finally, in 1988, the Brazilian government proposed a number of 
constitutional welfare reforms aimed at greatly improving employees rights. Shell 
joined with 16 other corporations with Brazilian interests who together contributed $2 
million on advertising and lobbying against the reforms. 
52 Financial Times International Yearbooks, Oil and Gas, 1993, Harlow: Longman, p. 227. 
51 Shell Transport and Trading Company plc., The Annual Report, 1995, London: Shell. 
'4 See Corporate Watch, Shell: 100 Years is Enough! [Online] Available http: //wNvw. corporateNV-atch. 
oi* /publications/shell. htm I Oth October 2000. 
Ibid. 
56 A. MlacSwan, Shell is Latest Oil Company to Pull Out of Burma, 1992, Rangoon. Reuters Nees 
Service, 24`h November. 
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The vast majority of Shell s customers will be unaware of these facts and so the 
market penalty for such socially irresponsible behaviour will be slight or non-existent 
as the market will be unaware of it. Accordingly, Shell will get no signal from the 
market to curtail such irresponsible behaviour. 
Even if such informational deficiencies could be cured, there are problems of 
collective action. If the quality of a good is poor, consumers have an incentive not to 
buy it. There is much less incentive, however, for customers to alter their market 
behaviour where the quality of the good is high, but its manufacture entails social or 
environmental costs. How many of Shell s customers would boycott Shell s products 
if they knew of the above facts? Further, since individuals know that their purchasing 
decisions will have a minimal impact, it will not be worth their while to incur the 
additional expense of changing brands unless others are willing to do so. 57 
The Stakeholders Money Argument. 58 
The shareholders money argument was the crux of Friedman s argument. He argued 
that the shareholders were owners of the corporation and so the profits belonged to 
them. Further, the managers as agents of the shareholders had a moral obligation to 
manage the company in their interests. 59 Whether the shareholders are viewed as 
owners, residual claimants, principals or parties to a nexus of contracts, the point is 
that managerial behaviour that departs from the profit goal involves a non-consensual 
transfer of wealth from the shareholders that is morally improper. 60 
57 J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law, 1994, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 321. 
This argument is usually referred to as the shareholders money argument. However, as we shall see 
it can be argued that social expenditure spends money that not only belongs to shareholders but other 
stakeholders too. 
't' M. Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits in T. L. Beauchamp & 
N. E. Bowie (eds. ), Ethical Theory and Business, 1993,4`h ed.. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 
p. 56. 
60 J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law, 1994, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 309; D. R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement (1982) 15 
\and. L. Rev. 1259 at 1273. 
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Traditionally, this argument is referred to as the shareholders money argument. 
However, this may be limiting the scope of the argument. As Friedman himself 
noted, when a director departs from the profit goal: 
[he] would be spending someone else s money for a general social interest. 
Insofar as his actions in accord with his social responsibility reduce return to 
stockholders, he is spending their money. Insofar as his actions raise the price to 
customers, he is spending the customers money. Insofar as his actions lower the 
wages of some employees, he is spending their money. 61 
Accordingly, departures from the profit goal result in a net wealth loss, not just to the 
shareholders, but also to other societal groups. Therefore, and this can be linked to 
the efficiency argument, when management does not maximise profits, they are 
spending society s money. Accordingly, societal net wealth suffers. 
The question that now occupies us is how valid is this argument. Focusing on the 
shareholders, Easterbrook and Fischel, two advocates of the Friedman school that 
societal well being is best-served by a policy of profit maximisation, argue that the 
validity of the social expenditure which departs from the profit goal depends on the 
method in which the investors money was solicited. They note: 
If the venture at its formation is designed in the ordinary fashion - employees 
and debt investors holding rights to fixed payoffs and equity investors holding a 
residual claim to profits, which the other participants promise to maximise - that 
is a binding promise. 62 
In such a situation, Easterbrook and Fischel argue that the shareholders will have a 
legitimate complaint if managers depart from the profit goal. However, it could be 
argued that this is not because the shareholders own the money that is being invested. 
The complaint the shareholders have is a complaint for breach of contract, not for 
derogation from some ethereal ideal of corporate governance. 63 Conversely, if the 
investment is solicited upon the pronouncement that profit maximisation is to be 
coupled with social expenditure, then investors who buy shares in such a company 
would have implicitly consented to such social expenditure. Again, it is not a matter 
of who owns the money; it is a contractual arrangement. For example, [i]f a 
corporation is started with a promise to pay half of the profits to the employees rather 
61 N1. Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits in T. L. Beauchamp & 
N. T. Bowie (eds. ), Ethical Theory and Business, 1993,4`h ed.. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 
p. 57. 
62 F. H. Fasterbrook & D. R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416 at 1446. 
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than the equity investors, that too is simply a term of the contract. 64 Determining 
how the company solicited the shareholders investment could be derived from the 
company s objects clause as this sets out the aims and business scope of the company. 
The contentions of Easterbrook and Fischel are based more on the nexus of contracts 
conceptualisation of the firm rather than an ownership model of the firm. 
Accordingly, they add little to the stakeholders money argument. 
The stakeholders money argument is ultimately based on issues of ownership. This 
has already been examined generally in a previous chapter65 so a comprehensive 
analysis here will be unnecessary. 
This argument can be dismissed relatively easy. Legally, from the date of 
incorporation, the company acquires separate personality. The company as a juristic 
person cannot be owned. 66 Similarly, the assets of the company belong to the 
corporate entity, they do not belong to the shareholders or any other group. The 
shareholders have no interest in the assets of the company once it is incorporated. 67 
Accordingly, establishing on what purposes the company may expend assets and in 
whose interests it should be run on issues of ownership is not going to be successful. 
Conclusion. 
We have seen that the traditional arguments advocating profit maximisation are no 
longer enough to justify a narrow profit orientated view. This may explain why, 
despite recent reports stating the importance of profit maximisation, 68 a number of 
academics believe that corporations no longer act exclusively in the interests of profit. 
Writing as far back as 1970, one pro-Friedman commentator has stated that [t]he fact 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Supra. at Ch. 2. 
66 Shareholders are not, in the eye of the law, part owners of the undertaking. The undertaking is 
something different from the totality of the shareholdings. Per Evershed LJ in Short v Treasury 
Commissioners [ 19481 1 KB. 116 at 122. 
67 [T)he corporator even if he holds all the shares is not the corporation, and that neither he nor any 
creditor of the company has any property legal or equitable in the assets of the corporation. Per Lord 
Wrenbury in , llacaura v Northern Assurance Co. Ltd. [ 1925] AC 619 at 633. 68 See e. g. The Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance, 1998, London: Gee Publishing 
Ltd., para. 1.16. 
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is, the profit motive is simply not fashionable today. It has been dying a lingering. 
unmourned death for ten years. Rarely can a big business leader eulogize it today 
without being snubbed by his self-consciously frowning peers. 69 
Accordingly, many argue that the profit goal is too narrow and can often ignore many 
contributions that the corporation actually makes. Profit maximisation requires an 
attention to the bottom line. 70 Accordingly, intangible contributions are left out of 
the equation because of their unquantifiable nature. Similarly, the bottom line will 
not reveal the intangible harm that the corporation may be causing. For example, 
under the banner of profit maximisation, corporations have polluted the environment, 
produced unsafe products and engaged in illegal activity. A strict adherence to profit 
maximisation not only provides no disincentives for this kind of behaviour, it might 
actually encourage it. 
II. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR EXCLUSIVE SHAREHOLDER 
GOVERNANCE PROTECTION. 
Adherence to the legal model of the company does not simply require that companies 
act in the interests of shareholders. It also requires that our company law be pro- 
shareholder. In the absence of such laws, those who manage companies may be 
tempted to depart from the profit goal. Accordingly, for the legal model to thrive, not 
only must companies act in the interests of shareholders, the law must protect 
shareholders and give them powers to ensure that the profit goal is maintained. 
For reasons that will be examined, the standard analysis of the corporation found in 
law and economics literature assumes that shareholders should be the sole 
beneficiaries of corporate governance protection. This protection comes in a number 
of forms, but most commentators tend to focus on the existence of the fiduciary duties 
which, although strictly are owed to the company71 tend to operate solely in the 
T. Levitt, The Dangers of Social Responsibilihv in H. D. Marshall (ed. ), Business and Government. 
The Problem of Power, 1970, Lexington; Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, p. 24. 
70 L. L. Dallas, Working Toward a New Paradigm in L. E. Mitchell (ed. ), Progressive Corporate Laºtiw, 
1995, Oxford: Westview Press, p. 45. 
Percival v Wright (19021 2 Ch. 421. 
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interests of shareholders. 72 However, as we have saw in the previous chapter, there 
are numerous forms of protective mechanism and we also saw that almost all of them 
operate exclusively in the interests of the shareholders. Here, the reasons for 
exclusive shareholder governance protection will be examined. It will be seen that the 
these reasons are unacceptable in justifying exclusive shareholder governance 
protection. This examination when combined with an examination of these 
justifications in relation to non-shareholder constituents73 and the environment74 Zvi ll 
demonstrate that a pluralist governance structure is more theoretically justifiable as 
well as more efficient. 
The Shareholders as Owners. 
As has already been noted, 75 historically, the notion of ownership was the principal 
explanation and justification for the central role of shareholders. As this theory has 
been examined in detail, and subsequently doubted, in this thesis elsewhere, no further 
examination is required here save to note that we will be examining this justification 
in relation to non-shareholder constituents in a later chapter. 76 
The Shareholders as Residual Risk-Bearers. 
Accordingly, the justification for the pre-eminence of shareholder interests cannot be 
justified by relation to their ownership rights. We therefore need to look elsewhere 
and the modern justification frequently advanced relates to the shareholders position 
as residual risk-bearers. This has already been examined in a general sense as part of 
the efficiency justification for the nexus of contracts conceptualisation of the 
corporation. 77 Here, we will examine it specifically in relation to the interests of 
shareholders. 
A brief reprisal of this theory will be of aid. As corporate performance cannot be 
predicted with certainty, the benefits that parties within the corporate nexus receive 
also cannot be predicted with certainty. However, the fortunes of one party, namely 
72 Although as we have noted, directors can owe their duties to creditors 
most unsatisfactory manner. 
7; See infra. at Ch. 7. 
74 See infra. at Ch. 9. 
75 See supra. at Ch. 2. 76 See infra. at Ch. 7. 
and employees. albeit in a 
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the shareholders, fluctuate with performance to a greater degree than other parties as 
other parties (e. g. employees, creditors) are wealth constrained and so contract for a 
fixed amount. As shareholders bear the risk of poor corporate performance, they 
should hold the rights to the firm s residual income and retain exclusive governance 
protection. For this reason, historically, the shareholders have been designated the 
party best able to bear the risk of poor corporate performance. 
A simple example can be used to illustrate this point that it is economically beneficial 
to exclusively protect the shareholders because of the uncertain nature of their claim. 78 
Suppose that a firm has two classes of claimants, fixed (such as employees and 
creditors) and residual (the shareholders. ) At the end of period one, the firm will owe 
the fixed claimants £1 million. Suppose also that the firm has to choose between two 
prospective projects, A and B, both of which will require the firm to allocate 100% of 
its resources to the project. Project A has a 50% chance of producing a payoff of £1 
million and a 50% chance of producing a payoff of £5 million at the end of period 
one. Accordingly, the expected present value of Project A is £3 million. 79 Project B 
has a 50% chance of a payoff of £1 million and a 50% chance of a payoff of £6 
million. Thus while Project A has an expected value of £3 million, Project B has an 
expected value of £3.5 million. 
The shareholders will obviously prefer Project B since they are better off by £500,000 
if they select that project. Conversely, the fixed claimants will be indifferent because 
under either outcome, they will be certain to obtain the £1 million that is owed to 
them. Clearly, in such a situation, the fixed claimants should not have a role in the 
decisionmaking process. Both the firm and society are better off if the firm selects 
Project B because that is the project that maximises the firm s and society s wealth. 
This example backs up the residual risk arguments contention that corporate 
governance protection should flow exclusively to the firm s shareholders. As the 
above decision is infra-marginal with respect to all constituencies except the 
77 See supra. at Ch. 3. 
78 This example is derived from J. R. Macey, An Economic Anal I 1-sis of 
the Various Rationales for 
A faking Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties (1991-2) 21 Stetson 
LR. 23 at 28-30. 
71' (0.5 xU1,000,000) + (0.5. v £5,000,000) = £3,000,000. 
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shareholders, the shareholders should be the only party with legal right to the 
decisionmaking process. Further, the shareholder s position is unique as they are the 
only group with a meaningful stake in every decision made by a solvent firm. ß° 
However, imagine that there was a third choice, Project C. Project C has a 50% 
chance of producing a payoff of £500,000 and a 50% chance of producing a payoff of 
$10 million. The shareholders would Project C to Projects A or B since Project C has 
an expected value of £5.25 million, yielding a return to the shareholders of £4.25 
million. This is compared to Project As return of £2 million (after subtracting fixed 
claims) and Project Bs return of £2.5 million (after fixed claims. ) However, unlike 
Project A and B, the fixed claimants are not indifferent to the choice of project as, 
under Project C, there is a 50% chance that they will be paid only half the £1 million 
that is owed to them. 
Accordingly, fixed claimants will be willing to pay for the right to block Project C. 
Given this, it is incorrect to say that the shareholders are the only group with the 
correct incentives to decide between which project to adopt. Accordingly, 
decisionmaking powers and corporate governance protection should not flow 
exclusively to shareholders as other groups have an interest in corporate policy. 
The notion that non-shareholder constituents contract for a fixed amount only 
provides a partial account as to why the shareholders have been designated the party 
best able to bear risk. The principal reason behind the shareholders position as 
primary risk-bearers is due to the fact that they can substantially reduce their overall 
risk via a policy of diversification. Companies do not prosper and suffer to the same 
extent. By holding a portfolio of shares from a large number of companies, overall 
risk is reduced as variations in return will offset one another. This is part of a larger 
theory used by financial economists to construct portfolios known as the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM). 8' According to the CAPM, a numerical value (beta) denotes 
the variability of a return, with a higher beta representing a higher risk. Accordingly a 
risk-free asset (e. g. government bonds) is accorded a beta value of zero, whereas all 
80 1 11 Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law (1983) 26 J. L. & Econ. 395 at 404. 
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the shares in the market (the market portfolio) are accorded a beta value of one. Risk 
is related to return. The greater the risk, the greater the possible returns. Therefore. 
abnormal profits are only available in the short-term. Over the long-term, returns will 
even out. Therefore, under the CAPM, the investor can never beat the market but 
nor will the market beat them. 
This is an important point because it demonstrates that via a policy of diversification, 
share ownership may not be a particularly risky investment. 82 The residual risk 
argument is based on the shareholders being the party designated to bear the risk due 
to fluctuations in corporate performance, but as the CAPM demonstrates, the 
shareholders can minimise their risk to a large degree. Shareholders may be the party 
best able to bear risk but if the risk they face can be considerably reduced, then surely 
their claim to excusive governance protection is weakened. Surely, it would be more 
justifiable to assign governance rights according to which parties within the corporate 
nexus bear the most risk due to fluctuations in corporate performance. 83 
A variation of this argument argues that as shareholders bear the risk of corporate 
performance, they retain the ultimate authority to control the corporation because they 
have the greatest stake in the outcome of corporate decision-making . 
84 Accordingly, 
fiduciary duties should be owed to shareholders as they will value fiduciary duties 
most highly. As they value fiduciary duties most highly, they will pay other 
constituencies for the right to have these duties operated in their benefit. The 
following example demonstrates this: 
If the shareholders place an aggregate value of $10 million on the legal 
protection provided by a corporate governance system that allocates fiduciary 
duties exclusively to shareholders, while other constituents value it at $2 million, 
then both parties will be better off if the shareholders are permitted to 
compensate these other constituencies - in the form of higher interest on bonds, 
si See K. P. Arnbachstsheer and J. H. Ambrose, Basic Financial Concepts: Return and Risk in J. N1. 
Niapnn and D. L. Tuttle (eds. ), Managing Investment Portfolios: -I Dynamic Process, 
1983, 
Charlottesville, VA: Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts, p. 25 at pp. 48-55. 
IX' As F. H. Easterbrook & D. R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 1991. Cambridge. 
NIA: Harvard University Press, p. 29 state [i]nvestors who dislike risk can get rid of it. 
S, L. Roach, The Paradox of the Traditional Justifications for Exclusive Shareholder Governance 
Protection: Expanding the Pluralist Approach (2001) 22 Co. Law. 9 at 10. 
Xa J. R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment o 
Fundamental Corporate Changes (1989) Duke U. 173 at 175. 
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higher wages to workers and managers, and better prices for suppliers and 
customers - for the right to have fiduciary duties flow exclusively to them. 8' 
The question remains why would shareholders place the highest value on being the 
sole beneficiaries of fiduciary duties. The rationale commonly given is one already 
mentioned, namely: 
Uniquely, the residual claimants are interested in the firm s overall 
profitability, whereas creditors and managers [and presumably. other 
constituencies as well] are essentially fixed claimants who wish only to see their 
claims repaid and who will logically tend to resist risky activities. Having less 
interest in the overall [economic] performance of the firm, creditors can bargain 
through contract and do not need representation on the board to monitor all 
aspects of the firm s performance. 86 
Accordingly, fiduciary duties run solely to shareholders because, as residual 
claimants, [t]he gains and losses from abnormally good or bad performance are the 
lot of the shareholders, whose claims stand last in line. 87 
However, whilst the residual claimant argument provides a persuasive rationale for 
why shareholders should be beneficiaries of governance protection, it does not 
provide acceptable grounds for the contention that they should be the sole 
beneficiaries. We have already seen that fixed claimants, such as employees and 
creditors, can be affected by management s decisions. In later chapters, the risks that 
employees, creditors and the environment face will be examined in more detail. 88 
The Inadequacies of Contract. 
We have already briefly noted the limited contractual protection offered to 
shareholders. Here, this protection will be examined in more detail. Ever since 
Parliament enacted the first Companies Act in the mid-19`h century, English 
companies legislation has continued to include a provision declaring that a company s 
memorandum and articles constitute a contract which binds the members. 
89 This 
provision is now contained in s. 14 Companies Act 1985 which states that: 
as J. R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive 
Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciar_i" Duties (1991-2) 21 Stetson LR. 23 at 26-7. 
86 J. Choper, J. Coffee & R. Morris, Cases and Materials on Corporations, 1989,3rd ed., p. 29. 
31 F. H. Easterbrook & D. R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Lai (1983) 26 J. L. & Econ. 395 at 403. 
aR See infra. at Chs. 7 and 9. 
On the history, see J. H. Farrar ct al, Farrar s Company Law, 1998,4'f' cd., London: Butterworth-s, 
IT. 116-9, D. W. Chantler, Thc Shareholders Corporate Contract in Nestcrn Australia (1976) 12 
Western Aust. L. Rev. 336 at 338-9. 
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Subject to the provisions of this Act, the memorandum and articles, %-, -hen 
registered, bind the company and its members 
The contractual nature of the articles has been affirmed judicially on numerous 
occasions. 90 It is also generally accepted by the academic community. 91 This means 
that certain provisions in the articles can be enforced by a member in a contract 
action. 92 Accordingly, the articles of association offer the shareholders contractual 
protection. This contract can be drafted to meet the needs of the company in question 
and can be altered by the members via a special resolution. 93 Accordingly, as the 
articles represent a possible source of shareholder redress, one would assume that the 
shareholders would bargain with the company so as to obtain as many article 
safeguards as possible. However, as seen, this is not the case. Shareholders are so 
numerous that bargaining between shareholders and management becomes 
impossible. 94 Management unilaterally selects article provisions and the shareholders 
simply decide whether to invest or not. Investors who buy shares in the market a 
fortiori buy a package of rights, the contents of which are non-negotiable. 95 
Conversely, according to this argument, non-shareholder constituents (e. g. employees, 
creditors) can better protect themselves contractually by negotiating with the firm 
before entering into any obligations. 96 Proponents of this view therefore argue that, as 
shareholders cannot protect themselves contractually to the same extent as other 
stakeholders, the benefits of fiduciary duties should flow to them. The fiduciary duty 
fills the gaps in a corporate shareholder agreement. 97 
9° See Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc. [1994] BCC 475 at 488, per Hoffman LJ and Hickman v Kent 
or Ronuiev Marsh Sheepbreeders Association [19151 1 Ch. 881 in which Ashbury J reviews the case 
law in detail. 
91 See c. g. R. R. Drury, The Relative Nature of a Shareholder s Right to Enforce the 
Company Contract 
(1986) 45 CLJ 219 at 219-20 cf. J. H. Howard, Fiduciary Relations in Corporate Law 
(1991) 19 Can. 
Bus. LJ I at 8. 
K. W. Wedderburn, Shareholders Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle [1957] CLJ 194 at 209-15. 
S. 9 Companies Act 1985. 
,,, M. A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461 at 1471. 
See also 
V. Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric Qf Contract (1985) 85 
Colum. L. Rev. 1403 at 1412 who states that [s]cattered stockholders cannot, and 
do not, negotiate 
95 J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Poiicr and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company 
Law. 1993. 
O\ford: Clarendon Press, p. 183. 
96 This is not to say that non-shareholders do not face contracting problems. but the theory ark: ues 
that 
these non-shareholder constituents can solve these problems at far less cost than those problems 
confronting shareholders. 
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Even if the shareholders could effectively negotiate, their right to bring an action for 
breaches of the articles is not unqualified. Jurisprudence indicates that the articles 
only bestow rights on a shareholder as a member and not in any other capacity. This 
limits the contractual protection offered by s. 14 in two ways. First, a shareholder 
cannot bring an action in the courts if the issue in question is a matter of internal 
corporate procedure as opposed to conduct affecting him as a member. Second, a 
shareholder cannot enforce the articles in relation to matters affecting him in a 
capacity other than as a member. For example, in Eley v Positive Security Life 
Assurance Co., 98 the articles stated that the company employed the plaintiff 
shareholder for life as the company s solicitor. When his employment was 
terminated, the court held that he could not rely on the articles to sue the company. 
Of all the arguments justifying exclusive shareholder governance protection, the 
inadequacy of contract argument has the most merit. There is no doubt that the 
shareholders cannot adequately protect themselves contractually. Even if they could, 
it has been argued that management will constantly introduce new strategies designed 
to undermine whatever contractual protection the shareholders negotiate. 99 
Accordingly, for this reason, they should be beneficiaries of corporate governance 
protection. However, as will be seen, 100 the contention that non-shareholder 
constituents can protect themselves more effectively via contract will be seen to be 
highly questionable. If non-shareholder constituents, like the shareholders, cannot 
protect themselves via contract, then the shareholders right to exclusive governance 
protection becomes untenable. 
Conclusion. 
In Part I, we saw that the traditional justifications for the legal model preoccupation 
with profit maximisation are no longer sufficient to justify that approach. However, 
adherence to profit maximisation is only one part of the legal model s philosophy. 
The other part is that company law should exclusively protect the shareholders. In 
97 R. J. Schulze, Can this Marriage be Saved? Reconciling Progressivism with Profits in Corporate 
Governance Laws (1997) 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1607 at 1613. 
us 1)I Ex. D. 88. 
99 J. R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the i Various Rationales for ; Making Shareholders the Exclusive 
Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciai-vv Duties (1991-2) 21 Stetson LR. 23 at 39. I tNl See infra. at Ch. 7. 
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this Part, we examined the three reasons for exclusive shareholder protection. Like 
the reasons examined in Part I, the justifications offered by the legal model are no 
longer sufficient to justify exclusive shareholder protection. We established in 
Chapter 2 that shareholders do not own the company. We also saw that whilst 
shareholders do bear risk in relation fluctuations in corporate performance, there are 
means available to them to mitigate that risk. The idea that shareholders cannot 
protect contractually themselves is certainly true. However, the validity of this 
justification in relation to the legal model is only valid if non-shareholders are able to 
protect themselves contractually. As we shall see in the next chapter, this is probably 
not the case. 
CONCLUSION. 
We have noted that the legal model of the company is evidenced in practice in two 
ways. Firstly, under the legal model, the directors should act in a manner that 
maximises shareholder value. Secondly, corporate governance protection should be 
exclusive to the shareholders. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the theoretical basis behind the legal 
model in relation to the above. In Part I, we saw that the traditional arguments for the 
adoption of a policy of profit maximisation are no longer persuasive. There are strong 
indicators that traditional tools of shareholder wealth maximisation are not profit 
maximising in the long run. The invisible hand of the market has been shown to be 
ineffective in communicating the desires of consumers and other stakeholders. The 
legitimacy argument is weakened given that it appears that corporations can allocate 
public goods more efficiently than governments can. Finally, the stakeholders (or 
shareholders as Freidman stated) money argument fails for the same reason that may 
ownership arguments fail - the assets belong to the corporate entity. 
It is therefore apparent that the traditional reasons for profit maximisation are no 
longer strong enough to justify strict adherence to that policy. 
In Part II, we examined the second tenet of the legal model, namely that corporate 
governance mechanisms should exclusively protect the shareholders. We saw that the 
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traditional reasons for exclusive shareholder governance protection are so lonuer 
sufficient to justify an approach consistent with the legal model. In fact, as we shall 
see, in the next chapter, these traditional reasons can actually be used to justify' 
governance protection for non-shareholder constituents. 
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7 
Marrying the Theoretical Basis of the Legal Model and the 
Pluralist Approach 
INTRODUCTION. 
We saw in the previous chapter that the legal model s conception of exclusive 
shareholder protection was based upon three arguments. First, it is argued that the 
shareholders are owners of the company. In Chapter 2, we saw that this contention is 
no longer accurate. Shareholders may be owners of their shares, but shares confer no 
proprietary interest in the company. Here, we will demonstrate that whilst non- 
shareholders also have no ownership claim, their claim is no weaker than that of the 
shareholders. The final two arguments are derived from the new economic theory of 
the firm examined in Chapter 3. The second argument argues that shareholders 
deserve exclusive governance protection because they are the sole residual risk 
bearers of fluctuations in corporate performance. As we saw briefly in the previous 
chapter, fixed claimants can also bear residual risk. Here, the idea that non- 
shareholder constituents bear residual risk will be examined in more detail. Thirdly, it 
is contended that shareholders deserve exclusive protection because they cannot 
protect themselves contractually. We saw in the previous chapter that this is certainly 
true. However, the new economic theory argues that non-shareholder constituents, 
such as employees and creditors, can protect themselves contractually and therefore 
do not deserve governance protection. It will be seen in this chapter that this 
contention is highly debatable, especially in relation to employees. 
The new economic theory concentrates on the relationship between the managers and 
the shareholders. However, by removing the shareholders status as owner, the new 
economic theory removes the legal model s base for shareholder supremacy. 
Accordingly, there is scope to examine the contractual and risk-bearing position of 
non-shareholder constituents. It becomes clear that the three reasons for exclusive 
shareholder governance protection are no longer sufficient to justify an adherence to 
the legal model. In fact, it will be seen that there is a paradox in that they can be used 
to justify expanding governance protection to non-shareholder constituents. 
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Here the position of the two main non-shareholder constituents will be examined, 
namely the employees and creditors. ' By using the traditional argument examined in 
Chapter 6, a plausible case will be put forward for the contention that not only is 
governance protection justified for such non-shareholder constituents, but that such 
expansion of company law protection can actually result in efficiency gains. 
I. EMPLOYEES. 
The legal model and its underlying theoretical justifications argue that shareholders 
occupy a precarious position within the corporation for two reasons. First, 
shareholders bear the most risk from fluctuations in corporate performance, and 
second, non-shareholder constituents can adequately protect themselves via various 
means, whereas the shareholders cannot. This part of the chapter contends that both 
of these contentions are incorrect. It will be seen that employees also bear run the risk 
of loss through fluctuations in corporate performance. It will also be seen that the 
employees ability to protect themselves is almost as limited as that of the 
shareholders. 
Indeed, the last 10 years have borne out the precarious position of employees, 
especially in relation to job losses. Over the last century, employment cycles have 
risen and fallen due to various economic trends. However, there is little doubt that the 
mass redundancies in the late 1980 s and early 1990 s were the result of corporate 
downsizing. The figures are considerable. Between 1987 and 1995, IBM cut over 
200,000 jobs, and General Electric, even though it remained profitable, cut over 
100,000 jobs during the 1980 s. 2 On 25`h February 1992, General Motors announced 
that it was laying off 74,000 staff - making its total number of job cuts 
350,000 since 
the early 1980 s. 3 
Many academics studying downsizing attribute the layoffs to corporations elevating 
profit maximisation above all other interests i. e. obeying the legal model s dictates of 
The position of the environment will be examined in Chapter 9. It is acknowledged that other 
constituents such as consumers and suppliers may also be worthy of protection. 
See Making Companies Efficient: The Year Downsizing Grew Up (1996) Economist 21 
u December, 
v. 97. 
J. W. Singer, Jobs and Justice: Rethinking the Stakeholder Debate (1993) 43 Univ. 
Toronto U. 475 at 
475. 
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corporate goals. 4 These commentators started to seriously question the narrow focus 
of the legal model and that governance structures should start to more effectively 
protect non-shareholder constituents. These layoffs also demonstrated that the 
employee protection envisaged by the traditional theories was not practicable. For 
example, two months after the General Motors layoffs, the United Auto Workers, one 
of the strongest unions in the United States, called off its strike of the Caterpillar 
company after management threatened to replace all the workers. ' Negotiations 
continued but it was clear that the employees had no bargaining power. 
The inability of employees to protect themselves gave stakeholder activists even more 
credibility. Partly due to the mass layoffs and the subsequent public outcry, many US 
states passed stakeholder statutes, which allowed boards of directors top depart from 
the legal model s narrow conceptualisation and act in the interests of non-shareholder 
constituents. A number of more enlightened corporations have recognised that it is in 
the company s long-term interests to have regard to the well being of employees. For 
example, in 1991, Ben & Jerry s had to temporarily close down one of its plants. 
Instead of temporarily laying of the employees (as would be the case under the legal 
model), the company continued to employ them, paying them to work at odd jobs and 
in community service programs. 6 
However, if employees interests are to be fully protected, then a more convincing 
justification for their protection needs to be forthcoming. Here, using the traditional 
arguments advocated by legal model proponents, it will be demonstrated that there is 
a coherent, economic rationale for expanding the narrow goals of the legal model and 
offering legal protection to employees. Finally, we will use an economic tool termed 
game theory to demonstrate that employee protection can result in efficiency gains 
and that there is a plausible case for introducing regulation to force employers and 
employees to take the positions of each other into account. 
4 See e. r. Symposium, The Corporate Stakeholder Debate: The Classical Theory and 
its Critics (1993) 
43 Univ. Toronto U. 297, Symposium, New Directions in Corporate Law (1993) 50 Washington 
& 
Lee L. Rev. 1373. 
K. C. Crowe, Strikes are a Dud in Union Arsenal (1992) Newsday 3`d May, p. 78. 
6 See Ben & Jerry s Homemade Inc., 1991 Annual Report, 1992, p. 12. 
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The Employees as Owners. 
It will be remembered that in Chapter 2, when defining what constituted ownership, 
we used Honor s definition. We saw that Honor s definition rested upon 11 
characteristics. If it could be shown that the majority of these characteristics were 
present, the relationship could be described as one of ownership. By using Honor s 
test, we were able to establish that shareholders do not own the company - of the 11 
characteristics, the shareholders only satisfied two. 
The employees also do not own the company. However, they satisfy more of 
Honor s tests than the shareholders (it will be remembered that in Chapter 2 we saw 
that the shareholders satisfied two of Honor s tests - the employees satisfy three. ) 
First, whereas shareholders only have a right to a dividend, the employees do have a 
right to an income from sale of the firm s products. Second, the employee s right to 
the capital value of the firm is likely to be stronger. As we saw, shareholders are only 
entitled to the capital value in the event of a liquidation and even then are likely to get 
nothing if the liquidation is insolvent. Conversely, the employees, if owed 
remuneration, will be classified as preferential creditors and so will stand a much 
stronger chance of receiving what is owed to them. Finally, although it is possible for 
rank-and-file employees to have a fixed term, standard practice is that, unless some 
form of probationary period is involved, there will be no specified duration. 
7 A 
comparison with the position of the shareholders is set out below: 
Table 7.1: Employees Rights of Ownership. 
Right Shareholder over company Employee over company 
Possession No No 
Use No No 
Management Some No 
Income Some Yes 
Capital Some Yes 
Security No No 
Transmission No No 
No limit of term Yes Yes 
Duty not to do harm No No 
Judgment liability No No 
Residual control Yes No 
7 P. Davies and M. Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Polic. i, 1993. 
Oxford: Clarendon Pres. 
p. 24. 
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The point that is worth noting is that, according to Honor s test, the employee s have 
an ownership claim stronger than that of the shareholders. Of course, both are 
insufficient to establish ownership, but this has not stopped the notion of shareholder 
ownership from remaining pervasive. If, despite all the evidence to the contrary, 
commentators are willing to accept that shareholders own the firm, then by the same 
logic, they must acknowledge that the employees also have an ownership claim. 
Many commentators who advocate shareholder ownership of the firm do so, not on 
the basis of Honor s test, but on the basis of what the shareholders contribute, 
namely capital. They argue that the shareholders contribute the capital to the firm, so 
therefore own the firm. The flaws in this argument are obvious. First, the firm 
consists of more than capital - under the new economic theory, it does not even 
consist of that - it consists of a set of contracts. Second, whilst the shareholders may 
contribute the capital, it is not owned by them - it is owned by the firm, and third, not 
all of the capital in the firm derives from the shareholders. 
It is this final criticism that merits consideration. A consistent theme of the ownership 
model was that as the shareholders contribute the firm s capital, they deserve to have 
the company run in their interests exclusively. However, the shareholders are not the 
sole contributors of capital. Employees contribute capital, namely human capital. 
Further, the form of capital that the employees contribute is unique to them, whereas 
the monetary capital that the shareholders contribute can be obtained from other 
sources, most notably creditors. 8 
The point that needs to be stressed is that whilst the company owns any asset 
contributed to it, it may be useful to identify the derivation of that asset. Many parties 
contribute capital and other assets to the firm. Given this, the real question is why is 
the shareholders contribution considered enough to justify their primacy under the 
legal model. It is contended here that it is not enough. The employees expend more 
time and effort contributing to the firm s well being and deserve to have this taken 
into account. 
8 It is acknowledged that the forms of capital do differ with the shareholders contributing equity capital 
and the creditors contributing debt capital. Due to the need to adequately gear a firm, the 
differences 
betNveen the two types of capital are important. 
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The Employees as Residual Risk-Bearers. 
We saw in Chapter 3 that the efficiency justification for the new economic theory of 
the firm lay in the argument that the shareholders bear the residual risk of fluctuations 
in corporate performance. Conversely, non-shareholder constituents, such as 
employees and creditors, are wealth-constrained and so contract for a fixed amount, 
ergo they face no risk from fluctuations in corporate performance. In Chapter 6, we 
saw that the consequence of this was that as shareholders return is dependant on 
corporate performance, they should hold the right to the firm s residual income and 
that their interests should be exclusively protected by company law. This chapter 
rejects this claim that shareholders are the only bearers of residual risk. It agrees with 
the standard contractual contention that efficiency is maximised when governance 
protection is held by those who bear the residual risk. It is the identity of the residual 
risk-bearers that is debatable. Once the identity of the residual risk-bearers is 
established, and the shareholders status as unique risk-bearers dismissed, it becomes 
clear that the central perceptions of the legal model also need to be reappraised. 
As we have seen, the traditional argument contends that as the employees contract for 
fixed amounts (i. e. their remuneration), they bear no risk from the firm s activities. It 
is contended that this presumption is inaccurate due to the extent that employees 
subject themselves to firm-specific risk. Firm-specific risk arises when stakeholders 
undertake investment which creates capital that is of value, or will retain most of its 
value, only within the context of a given firm. 10 A simple example is an employee 
who is trained to use a piece of machinery that is unique to one company. Here, the 
employee has become subject to firm-specific risk since the human capital expended 
to learn how to use that piece of machinery will be useless outside the firm. It may 
also be the case that the employee and the machine in question may become co- 
9 It is acknowledged that employees just entering the employment market will have few or no firm- 
specific skills. Consequently, they will be able to move easily between jobs and companies will be 
able to secure replacements at low cost. Their mobility will therefore be high and they will face little 
residual risk. On this, see P. C. Weiler, Governing the Iforkplace: The Future of Labor and 
Employment Law, 1990, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, p. 64. 
10 G. Kelly and J. Parkinson, The Conceptual Foundations of the Company: A Pluralist 
Approach 
[1998] CfiLR 175 at 184. See also J. Parkinson. The Contractual Theory of the Company and the 
Protection of Non-Shareholder Interests in D. Feldman and F. Meisel (eds. ), 
Corporate and 
Commercial Law: ; i/odcrn Developments, 1996, London: Lloyds of London 
Press, p. 128 who 
describes it as investments in assets which cannot be redeployed to an alternative use or user without 
loss of productive value 
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specialised in that the economic rent 1 generated by the employee and the machine 
become dependant on the performance of the other, so that their individual 
contributions can no longer be identified. 12 Further, because employees who have 
made firm-specific investments cannot leave the company without sacrificing all or 
part of the value of their investment, the company s bargaining power is increased 
which increases the risk that the company will change the terms of the relationship to 
the employees detriment. In essence, employees who have a high level of firm- 
specific training decrease their job mobility, ergo their position is riskier than a person 
with no firm-specific training whose job mobility will be high. Several commentators 
argue that employees can safeguard against this risk via contract. 13 The employees' 
ability to protect themselves via contract will be examined in the next section. 
The important point in relation to the validity of the residual risk argument examined 
in the previous chapter, is that because of the potential of co-specialisation, the 
remuneration accrued by the employee for acquiring firm-specific skills, is no longer 
fixed. Instead, the employees will contribute to the total rent generated by the task, 
with their input being determined by a bargaining game between themselves and the 
company. 14 As the various factors have become co-specialised (that is the total rent 
is dependant upon each factor utilising their firm-specific skills), each factor has the 
ability to hold-up the other by threatening to withdraw from the relationship. Their 
ability to act on that threat will alter the total amount of rent generated by the task. 
The rent generated will also be affected by various external factors. The upshot of 
this is that the portion of the rent paid to the employees in return for acquiring firm- 
specific skills will be a residual payment, in very much the same way as the 
shareholders receive residual payments in the form of a dividend. 
15 The return on 
their firm-specific investment is therefore not fixed, but, like the returns of equity 
II An economic rent is the amount above the minimum required to attract a factor of production (such 
as an employee) to a particular task. Once a task has begun, any excess above the amount required to 
stop the factor of production from exiting the task is known as a quasi-rent. 
12 G. Kelly and J. Parkinson, The Conceptual Foundations of the Company: A Pluralist 
Approach 
[1998] CfiLR 175 at 185. 
1.1 See e. g. O. E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 1985, 
New York: Collier 
Macmillan, pp. 303-4. 
14 G. Kelly and J. Parkinson, The Conceptual Foundations of the Company: A Pluralist 
Approach 
[1998] CfiLR 175 at 185. 
15 Sec P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management, 1992. 
London: Prentice 
Hall International, p. 351: with high levels of firm-specific human capital, the decisions taken 
by the 
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investment, are dependent upon firm performance. Accordingly, the shareholders are 
not the only party to bear the residual risk of the firm s activities, and therefore, do 
not deserve exclusive access to the firm s residual income. 
The new economic theory holds that wealth is maximised if the residual income is 
held by those who bear the residual risk. Now that we have seen that employees can 
bear residual risk, the question is will wealth-maximisation still occur. The standard 
response of traditional contractualists is that wealth maximisation will not occur - 
they argue that wealth maximisation only occurs if residual rights are vested 
exclusively in the hands of shareholders because the shareholders will want to 
maximise profits. However, there have been for many years firms that vest residual 
rights solely in their employees. An often-cited example is the John Lewis 
Partnership which operates a large chain of department stores and has annual sales of 
over £2 billions. 16 However, by and large, these firms do not play a major role in the 
UK economy and tend to operate in specialised areas. 17 In other countries however, 
they are more prominent. The best example is Spain s Mondragon enterprise which 
provides a worldwide beacon for worker self-management. 18 Mondragon is a series 
of worker cooperatives, which, by 1995, had over 26,000 employees and sales of 
nearly £5 billions. ' 9 It is compulsory that all employees be members of the 
Mondragon organization and each member is obliged to vote in electing members to 
the Governing Council. Neither members nor outsiders own shares in the Mondragon 
enterprise. Rather, a member pays an entry fee which entitles him to a capital account 
with the firm. The account accrues interest and receives an allocation of net profits. 




Stake in the Store (1994) Economist June 1Vh; John Lewis Takes Partners Along on Road to 
Revival (1995) Independent on Sunday 12`h March. 17 J. Cornford, A Stake in the Company, 1990, London: Institute for Public Policy Research, pp. l 1-13: 
C. Cornforth and R. Paton, Worker Cooperatives and the Democratization of Work in 11'estern Europe 
in J. D. Wisman (ed. ), Worker Empowerment: The Struggle for Workplace Democracy, 1991, New 
York: Bootstrap Press, p. 59. 
18 L. D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics by Modern Publicly 
Fie'ld Corporations: A Critical . 'lssessment 
(1993) 50 Wash. And Lee L. Rev. 1625 at 1669. On 
Mondragon, see R. A. G. Monks and N. Nlinow, Corporate Governance, 1995, Oxford: Blackwell, 
pp. 257-64. 
19 4 Change of Culture for the Basque Co-operatives (1995) Financial Times 7 `h June. 
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However, as noted, firm structures such as this are in a minority in the UK. 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the prominence of such firms could have a 
number of beneficial effects on the economy. 20 
First, it has been argued that giving employees residual rights could result in a more 
equitable distribution of wealth. Under the current system (i. e. residual rights vested 
solely in the shareholders), corporate profits are allocated to those who are already 
well off enough to afford shares . 
21 Employees are more numerous than shareholders. 
Accordingly, if the employees had the right to the firm s residual income, the 
distribution of wealth amongst the nation s population would be broadened. 22 
Second, as we have seen, shareholders take a passive approach towards the companies 
that they invest in. Conversely, employees commit a significant portion of their time 
and effort towards the well being of the firm. Nevertheless, typically employees do 
not receive the full value created by their labour. They are paid a fixed wage with the 
profits being distributed to the shareholders. It can therefore be argued that the 
employees are not suitably rewarded for the contribution that they make. By giving 
employees a right to the residual income, the employees will receive the profits that 
they helped to generate. 23 
Third, it may be the case that firms that grant residual rights to their employees may 
operate in a more cost-effective manner. As noted, in a typical company, employees 
will not receive the full value created by their labour. They may therefore be inclined 
to relax on the job. They may also not be as careful with company equipment as they 
would their own and may even engage in self-serving conduct such as fraud or theft. 
Employees who have rights to the residual income will have an incentive not to 
partake in this behaviour. Instead of shirking, they will have an incentive to make an 
extra effort since this will equal extra reward. Accordingly, placing residual rights in 
the hands of employees should result in less absenteeism, greater work effort, better 
1° B. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
P-557. 
21 D. P. Ellerman, The Democratic ! Porker-Owned Firm: A Neil' Rfodel for the East and West, 1990, 
Boston: Unwin, Hyman, p. 53. 
22 L. Baddon et al, People s Capitalism: .a 
Critical analysis of Proft-Sharing and Employee Share 
Oii nership, 1989, New York: Routledge, p. 18. 
23 R. A. G. Monks and N. NIinow, Corporate Governance, 1995, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 249-54. 
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maintenance of equipment and fewer instances of dishonest behaviour. 24 This will 
result in a lowering of costs in respect of employee monitoring. 25 
It can therefore be seen that granting employees residual rights can have a number of 
advantages. The question therefore is why have not more firms adopted such a 
structure. The simple reason is that the disadvantages of such a firm structure 
outweigh the advantages. It has been seen that in a market system, firms that grant 
employees residual rights tend to suffer in comparison with companies that grant 
residual rights to the shareholders. This is why such worker-controlled firms tend to 
operate only in specialised niches of the economy. Those who are opposed to such 
firms place great weight in this fact. 26 However, there are more specific criticisms. 
First, in a firm that grants the residual income to its employees, each employee will 
receive the same salary and profits will be distributed equally. The employee will 
only receive a small fraction of the profits. Given this, he will have little direct 
incentive to maximise his performance and will not carry out his duties as efficiently 
as he could. 
Second, it is argued that such a firm structure would jeopardize the long-term 
prosperity of the company. 27 It is unlikely that an employee would sacrifice their 
immediate well being in order to benefit the firm in the long-term. Similarly, 
employees are unlikely to undertake investments that could take years to produce a 
return. There is always the possibility that the investment will not work out as 
planned. Even if the investment produces a profit, the profit may not accrue until the 
employee has left. Accordingly, the employees will opt to maximise income now at 
the expense of maximising long-term cash flows. 28 Management, being aware of this, 
24 B. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
x. 558. 
A. Hyde, Ownership, Contract and Politics in the Protection of Employees Against Risk (1993) 
43 
UTLJ 721 at 741-2. 
26 See e. g. H. Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOP s, Law Firms, 
Codetermination 
and Economic Democracy (1990) 99 Yale LJ 1749 at 1755-6; O. E. Williamson, 
The Economic 
Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting, 1985. 
New York: Free Press, 
pp. 223-31. 
M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to 
Labor- 
. 
11anaged Firms and Codetermination (1979) 52 J. Bus. 469 at 485-6. 
,QB. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
p. 564. 
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will hesitate to maintain equipment and buildings until they need to be maintained as 
a matter of emergency. Similarly, such firms will be unlikely to pursue research and 
development projects. A company that is run on such a basis will eventually be 
unable to compete with firms that have taken a more long-term approach. 
Third, firms that grant residual rights to employees tend to find it difficult to attract 
investment and accordingly, tend to underinvest. 29 This places such firms at a 
competitive disadvantage, especially in capital intensive sectors of the economy. 
Even the largest worker-controlled forms face this problem. In 1995, the 
aforementioned Mondragon enterprise took the first tentative steps towards allowing 
outside investment. The management believed that the enterprise would be operating 
at a disadvantage if it relied solely on internally generated capital . 
30 
The reason why such firms find it difficult to raise capital is because the individuals 
who work for such firms often do not have enough disposable income to invest. 31 
Take the following example. 32 A successful employee controlled firm encounters 
growing demand for its products and decides to expand its productive capacity. To 
raise the necessary capital, the firm recruits new workers on the condition that they 
pay an entry fee for the right to the residual income. This would allow the company 
to raise the necessary capital and have the requisite staff to meet new demand. 
However, worker-controlled enterprises are extremely reluctant to admit new 
members for two reasons. First, incumbent employees will be hesitant to split the 
firm s profits with individuals who have not invested their time and effort into the 
firm. 33 Second, there exist wealth constraints. Successful businesses are worth 
considerable amounts of money. Accordingly, the entrance fee will be expensive. In 
large plywood co-operatives in America, new entrants had to pay as much as 
29 G. K. Dow, Democracy Versus Appropriability: Can Labor-Managed Firms Flourish in a Capitalist 
World in S. Bowles et al (eds. ), Markets and Democracy: Participation, Accountability and Effrciencv, 
1993, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 176-7. 
30 See, -1 Change of Culture for the Basque Co-operatives (1995) Financial Times 7`h June. 31 S. Bowles and H. Gintis, The Democratic Firms: An Agency: Theoretic Evaluation in S. Bowles et a! 
(eds. ), ; llarkcts and Democracy: Participation, Accountability and Efficienc. 1% 
1993, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 31-2. 
32 B. R. Cheffins, Company Lair: Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
p. 568. 
33 J. Cornford, A Stake in the Company, 1990, London: Institute for Public Policy Research, p. 21. 
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$100,000 (about £65,000) with a down payment of S20,000.34 With Ki%vi 
International Airlines, new pilots bought into the company at a price of S50,000.35 At 
such levels, few employees, if any, can afford such an entrance fee. 
It can therefore be seen that there are significant problems with placing residual rights 
in the hands of employees. Employees appear to be aware of these problems too. In 
companies where the employees have a sizeable equity stake, they tend to divest 
themselves of their shares when they get the opportunity. A good example of this 
concerns the National Freight Corporation plc (NFC). NFC s employees bought the 
company when it was privatised in 1982. In 1989, the NFC floated its shares on The 
Stock Exchange and at the time had 83% of shares in the hands of its employees. 
During this flotation, NFC s chairman stated that the test of whether employee control 
works is whether or not the employees sell the shares when given the opportunity. 36 
If this is the case, then it failed in NFC s case. By the mid-1990s, the employees 
stake in NFC had fallen below 10%. 
Accordingly, the contentions held by the new economic theory and the legal model in 
relation to the bearers of residual risk can be doubted. Shareholders are not the sole 
bearers of residual risk and accordingly, their right to the residual income is 
weakened. We have seen that due to the existence of firm-specific skills, employees 
can also bear residual risk. However, although this increases the employee s claim to 
governance protection, it does not mean the control rights should be vested in the 
employees as they are in the shareholders. We have seen that this can have 
deleterious consequences regarding the efficiency of the firm. Accordingly, the 
employee s position as a residual risk-bearer should be used to justify legal protection 
but not to give them residual control rights akin to those of the shareholders. 
The Inadequacies of Contract. 
We saw in Chapters 3 and 6 that the traditional legal model position is that the s. 14 
contract does not offer shareholders sufficient protection, whilst non-shareholder 
lq On the entrance fee issue if plywood co-operatives. see K. V. Berman, If"orker-Owned 
Plntood 
Companies:. An Economic . analvsis, 
1967, Pullman, Wash.: Wash. St. Press. pp. 128-9. 
;sA Cautionar_t' Tale of'Clipped If ings (1995) Financial Times 23ý`t June. 
36 J. Cornford, 
.4 Stake in the 
Compare. 1990, London: Institute for Public Policy Research, p. 21. 
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constituents can protect themselves contractually and so do not value governance 
protection as highly as the shareholders. However, there are numerous reasons to 
believe that employees cannot protect themselves in a way that traditional theorists 
think. This part of the chapter will examine the employee s ability to protect 
themselves contractually. It will be seen that their ability to protect themselves 
through explicit contract terms is extremely limited. 37 Given this, a number of 
commentators have argued that employees deserve protection based upon terms that 
are implicit or hypothetical within the employment contract. These theories will also 
be examined. 
Explicit Contractual Protection. 
As has been noted, the new economic theory holds that employees can protect 
themselves via explicit contractual terms in the employment contract. It will be seen 
that this can be doubted for two reasons. First, contractualists only focus on monetary 
interests and ignore more amorphous employee interests. Second, it is highly unlikely 
that employees can obtain any real protection through bargain. These will now be 
examined. 
It has been contended that contractualists assess the costs of profit maximisation too 
narrowly. The contractual approach tends to focus on monetary considerations whilst 
ignoring more intangible but no less real costs. For example, if a worker was laid-off, 
the contractualists would focus simply on the discounted present value of the income 
that he or she would have earned, les any offset due to reemployment. They would 
not focus on psychological factors affecting the former-employee such as low self- 
esteem. Even if the former-employee did find alternative employment, he might 
suffer from insecurities in adjusting to his new working environment. Whilst these 
costs are almost impossible to assess in monetary terms, they are no 
less for that 
reason. 38 
37 Although occasionally, it is possible. In America, it is now common 
for employment contracts to 
include tin parachute clauses which entitle rank-and-file employees to severance pay 
if they lose their 
jobs as the result of a takeover. See R. Howse and M. J. Trebilcock, 
Protecting the Employment 
Bargain (1993) 43 UTLJ 751 at 758-9. 
'8 D. Nlillon, Communitarians in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies 
in L. E. 
Mitchell (ed. ), Progressive Corporate Law, 1995, Boulder, Colorado: West% iew Press. p. S. 
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Also the scope of people affected adversely by profit maximising activities is defined 
very narrowly by contractualists. For example, a plant closing will involve more than 
employee layoffs and the termination of certain commercial relationships. Consumers 
may lose access to certain products and communities will lose tax revenues and 
charitable donations. 
it will also be the case that many types of conduct harmful to employees will be 
difficult to foresee and therefore difficult to safeguard against contractually. This 
usually results from informational asymmetries benefiting management. Employees 
may be totally unaware of plans to close a plant and shift production to another 
location. Even where future contingencies are foreseeable, employees may choose 
not to bargain about them, believing that the remoteness of the risk does not justify 
the time and expense needed to decide ex ante how the costs are to be apportioned. 
These difficulties make it significantly less likely that agreements will be reached. A 
further major problem relates to the respective bargaining power of the employees 
when compared to management. However, before we examine disparities of 
bargaining power, it is worth examining whether or not free bargaining can actually 
provide adequate employee protection. 
The fundamental assumption underlying the new economic theory s reliance on non- 
shareholder protection through contract is that consent should be the sole basis for 
obligation. Contractualists argue that unless shareholders have consented to forego 
profit maximising activities, they should be under no obligation to sacrifice profits so 
as to benefit non-shareholders. If this consent is not present, the obligation on them 
becomes one of coercion. Coercion results in a lack of autonomy and autonomy is 
important because it implies an opportunity to pursue self-interest. This objective is 
best furthered by a legal regime dedicated to freedom of contract. And, if wealth is 
increased through unconstrained, then maximising freedom of contract will also 
maximise social wealth. 39 This was the fundamental normative premise underlying 
the new economic theory as we saw in Chapter 3. 
39 
Ibid. at p. 7. 
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However, many commentators reject this premise. Instead, they argue that freedom of 
contract is insufficient to provide all parties with adequate opportunities to pursue 
notions of self-interest. These commentators begin by pointing out that bargaining 
power is linked to wealth. As under the new economic theory, the shareholders 
obligation is defined by reference to consent, the employees ability to protect 
themselves from the costs of shareholder wealth maximisation will depend on the 
employee s ability to bargain and pay for the necessary protection. Assume that the 
employees are fully aware of the ways in which they are vulnerable and the process of 
bargain with management was cost-free. Even in such a situation (which in reality 
could never be), there would be uncircumventable limits to the protection that 
employees could obtain by contract. The employees ability to obtain governance 
safeguards from management would depend on their ability to pay for them. Some 
highly valued contractual terms would simply be too expensive to pay for; others 
would result in unacceptable sacrifices. It may therefore be the case, that even if 
bargaining were possible, it would not result in an acceptable standard of protection 
for employees. And as we saw in Chapter 3, the new economic theory is premised 
upon effective bilateral protection based upon free contracting. It has been seen that 
contractual protection is not bilateral and contracting is certainly not free. 
Given that employees, like the shareholders, cannot effectively protect themselves 
contractually, the law should step in to fill the gaps in the employment contract. 
There are already indications that this is starting to happen. For example, formerly, 
under case law principles, when a business was sold, this had the effect of terminating 
all employment contracts. Statutory measures now ensure that employment contracts 
in place at the time of the transfer are binding on the transferee and any dismissal is 
unjustified unless it is for an economic, technical or organisational reason. 
40 
Implicit Contractual Protection. 
Many employment contracts fail to take into account the existence of firm-specific 
risk. This highlights another possible reason for employee protection. It is extremely 
difficult to draft complete contracts that protect employees who have made 
firm- 
40 See Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 
1981, SI 1981/1794 (as 
amended by s. 33 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993. ) 
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specific investments. In fact, it is the case that complete contracting is impossible 
because certain employee interests are too uncertain to contract for e. g. complete 
contracts would need to protect the ability of the employees to accrue a return on their 
human capital investment i. e. continuity of employment. 
it is therefore apparent that employees can only obtain limited contractual protection 
because of the uncertain nature of their interests. Nevertheless, these interests are 
worthy of protection. A popular thesis in recent years has been that these interests are 
contractually protected by what have been termed implicit employment agreements. 
it is already the case that the courts will imply into the employment contract certain 
terms e. g. that employees are to have a right to reasonable notice prior to dismissal. 41 
Here we are concerned with implicit agreements promising something more 
substantial, namely job security. This idea that companies enter into implicit 
agreements promising continuity of employment is at odds with neo-classical 
assumptions, which assumes that employees are paid an amount equivalent to their 
marginal product. 42 According to the implicit contract thesis, at the outset of their 
careers, employees accept a wage that is lower than their marginal product. In return 
for this income sacrifice, employees are promised job security and an increase in 
remuneration during the later phases of their careers (when their wage is likely to be 
larger than their marginal product. )43 In effect, the employees have paid an 
insurance premium in the early years for which they obtain a return in later years. 
44 
There are two reasons to adopt such a scheme. First, by deferring compensation, 
implicit employment agreements deter shirking and other forms of employee 
behaviour because junior employees become bound to their work by the threat of 
possible future income forfeiture should their performance be inadequate. 
45 This 
ai P. Davies and M. Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy, 1993, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
p. 24. 
42 K. Stone, Labour Markets, Employment Contracts and Corporate Change in J. McCahery, 
S. 
Piccioto and C. Scott (eds. ), Corporate Control and Accountability: 
Changing Structures and the 
Dynamics of Regulation, 1993, Oxford: OUP, pp. 70-1. 
a} M1. A. 0 Connor, Promoting Economic Justice in Plant Closings: Exploring the Fiducian/Contract 
Law Distinction to Enforce Implicit Employment Agreements in L. E. Mitchell 
(ed. ), Progressive 
Corporate Law, 1995, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, p. 219. 
sa J. Parkinson, The Contractual Theory of the Company and the Protection of 
Non-Shareholder 
Interests in D. Feldman and F. Meisel (eds. ), Corporate and Commercial 
Law: Modern Developments, 
1996, London: Lloyds of London Press, p. 132. 
d> ht. A. 0 Connor, Promoting Economic Justice in Plant Closings: Exploring the 
Fiducian 'Contract 
Law Distinction to Enforce Implicit Employment . -Agreements 
in L. E. Mitchell (ed. ), Progressive 
Corporate Laºtw, 1995. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, p. 219. 
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bonding mechanism also protects the company s investment in the employee by 
ensuring that this investment is not wasted by the employees early departure. 
Second, as employees have a promise of job security, they have an incentive to learn 
firm-specific skills of the kind described earlier. These skills are of no value outside 
the firm, but as the employees have an expectation of continued employment, these 
skills will remain useful throughout their careers. 
One notable question is if the above guarantee of job security is so important to 
employees, why use implicit agreements rather than explicit contracts. The main 
reason is that the anticipated benefits of implicit employment agreements are not 
reducible to bargaining terms. The deferred compensation thesis is designed to 
motivate employees to increase productivity so that their future income stream is not 
threatened. The terms contained in explicit contracts do not induce employees to 
engage in increased productivity. The plain fact is that [d]etailed contractual 
specifications simply cannot describe this kind of worker motivation. 46 
Given that factors such as worker motivation cannot be defined in explicit contract 
terms, implicit agreements are used, but a significant issue must be what legal 
standing do these implicit agreements have. There is little doubt that they are not 
contracts in any legal sense because they are not the result of bargaining, nor are they 
implied contracts. Instead, the implicit agreement is a unilateral promise made by 
employers to workers, not as a result of bargaining, but because it serves their 
production and organizational goals. 47 Accordingly, implicit agreements are used 
because it benefits both parties to do so. Employees cannot contract for job security 
because of drafting inadequacies and, even if they could do so, the cost borne by them 
in the form of reduced wages would be too great. It is also in the interests of 
employers to honour implicit agreements in order to maintain a reputation of 
trustworthiness. Should an employer opportunistically breach an implicit agreement 
with his employees, this will send a detrimental message to all other parties that the 
employer has long-term relationships with. In time, this could deprive the company 
of such relationships; relationships that are necessary to the long-term profitability of 
46 Ibid. at p. 220. 
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the company. 48 Whilst this justification does have merit, if employers prematurely 
terminate employment, they, in effect, take back the deferred compensation that they 
owe to that employee. This results in an opportunistic transfer of wealth from the 
employees to the shareholders. It is believed by many that this temptation is too great 
for most managers, 49 especially given that the courts have on numerous occasions, 
allowed managers to break implicit contracts with employees. For example, some 
employers have breached implicit promises to provide health insurance by changing 
so the benefits structure to exclude employees who have AIDS. 
Given this temptation, a plausible argument for legal enforcement of implicit 
agreements has arisen. Employers, by deferring compensation, have induced reliance 
on the part of the employees that they will have continuity of employment. Given that 
market pressures exist which induce management to opportunistically terminate these 
implicit agreements, they should be protected. However, because they are not 
traditional explicit or implied contracts, traditional remedies for breach of contract 
(i. e. damages) are not available. The most common form of protection is the 
extension of the director s fiduciary duties to the employees. Fiduciary law is broader 
than contract law, and so can protect legitimate expectations that will not be protected 
under contract law. An excellent example of this is the case of Ypsilanti v General 
Motors Corp. 51 Here, the township of Ypsilanti gave General Motors eleven tax 
abatements of over $1.3 billion over a 15-year period. When applying for the most 
recent abatement, a GM spokesman said [u]pon completion of this project and 
favorable market demand, it will allow Willow Run to continue production and 
maintain profitable employment for our employees. 52 Despite high market demand, 
GM announced that it was closing the Willow Run Plant and moving to another 
facility. The lower court utilised promissory estoppel to force GM to keep the Willow 
47 K. Stone, Labour Markets, Employment Contracts and Corporate Change in J. NicCahery, S. 
Piccioto and C. Scott (eds. ), Corporate Control and Accountability: Changing Structures and the 
Dynamics of Regulation, 1993, Oxford: OUP, p. 87. 
aR J. G. Macintosh, Designing an Efficient Fiduciar_i' Law (1993) 43 Univ. Toronto U. 425 at 470-2. a9 M. A. 0 Connor, Promoting Economic Justice in Plant Closings: E. rploring the Fuliiciai: v Contract 
Law, Distinction to Enforce Implicit Employment Agreements in L. E. Mitchell (ed. ), Progressive 
Corporate Law, 1995, Boulder. Colorado: Westview Press, p. 220: J. Parkinson, The Contractual 
l/reoir'" of the Company and the Protection of Non-Shareholder Interests in D. Feldman and F. 
Meisel 
(eds. ), Corporate and Commercial Law: Modern Developments, 1996, London: Lloyd s of 
London 
Press, p. 133. 
'0 T. B. Stoddard, Now You re Insured. Now You re Not (1992) Netiv York Times 23)'d May. 
51 506 NW. 2d. 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 
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Run plant open. 53 On appeal, this decision was reversed because the court held that 
the above statement was not the type that could be construed as a clear promise; it was 
simply an expression of GM s hopes and expectations. 
There is little doubt that this decision is correct as a matter of contract law - the 
informal statements made by the GM spokesperson were not promissory. ' However, 
this decision does seem very harsh on the people of Ypsilanti. They had agreed to tax 
abatements because GM had tempted them with jobs. Under the fiduciary thesis 
however, it would no longer be necessary to analyse this situation in terms of 
contractual constraints. There is little doubt that had the court applied the implicit 
agreement thesis in the Ypsilanti case, they would have held that GM had breached 
the trust and confidence that the Township placed in it and would have required that 
GM maintain employment at the Willow Run plant until such a time as Ypsilanti had 
recouped its investment. 55 
It is therefore apparent that the primary means of protecting implicit agreements is by 
extending the fiduciary duty. The question we must now ask is in what circumstances 
will the courts extend the director s fiduciary duties in this manner. 
To date, the UK courts have not looked at this issue in any real detail. In America, 
however, the issue has received considerable judicial attention. Should the implicit 
agreement thesis become manifest in the UK, it is likely that the UK courts will look 
at the same factors. Accordingly, the following analysis primarily examines the US 
position. 
The courts have not been consistent in their acceptance of an extension of the 
fiduciary duty. Some refuse to accept that implicit agreements can alter the content of 
the legal model stating that they are unwilling to radically alter the scheme of 
'' Ibid. at p. 561. s; ('harter Township of Ypsilanti v General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-CK slip op. 
(Cir. Ct. 
Xashtenaw County, Mich., Feb. 9,1993). 
'a X1. A. 0 Connor, Promoting Economic Justice in Plant Closings: Exploring the Fiducian', Contract 
Lau Distinction to Enforce Implicit Employment Agreements in L. E. Mitchell (ed. ), Progressive 
Corporate Lair, 1995, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, p. 228. 
55 
Ibid. at p. 230. 
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commercial dealings. 56 Most members of the American judiciary are, however. 
willing to acknowledge that the term fiduciary is a broad one, able to take into 
account informal and implicit arrangements. 57 
The case law to date reveals that when determining whether or not to extend the 
fiduciary duty, the courts will look for three characteristics: (i) whether the 
relationship involved a high degree of trust, (ii) whether the relationship has continued 
for a long period, and (iii) whether one party is vulnerable because it relies on the 
other s decisionmaking discretion. 58 Experience has shown that it is difficult for an 
implicit agreement to satisfy the test lad down by the court, but occasionally the case 
law demonstrates that the test can be met. 
The main factor the courts emphasize in finding an extended fiduciary relationship is 
the degree of trust. There must be a greater degree of trust than in a traditional arm s- 
length relationship; so much so that it results in a moral commitment to maintain the 
relationship in adverse conditions. 59 The courts recognise that trust of this nature 
requires time to foster and therefore, will examine the length of the relationship to 
determine if it has existed for a sufficient period. 60 However, to date, the court s 
application has not been consistent, with one court finding a relationship of 24 years 
sufficient, 61 and another finding a relationship of 42 years insufficient. 62 In any case, 
the time period is a contributory factor rather than a controlling one. Absent a long- 
term relationship, the courts will occasionally find a sufficient relationship of trust. 
63 
We have seen that according to traditional contractual theory, fiduciary duties should 
not flow to non-shareholders because they can protect themselves via contract. We 
56 Ritchie Enter v Honeywell Bull Inc., 730 F. Supp 1014,1054 (D. Kan. 1990); 
Vanguard 
Telecommunications Inc. v Southern New England Tele. Co., 900 F 2d 645,653 (3d. Cir. 1990). 
,7D. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation (1988) Duke U. 879 at 915. 
''ý Broomfield v Kosow 212 NE. 2d. 556,560 (Mass. 1965). 
59 Gorski v Gorski 262 N. W. 2d. 120 (Wis. 1978) (holding that such a relationship could 
be inferred 
where parties were close, personal friends for over 28 years. ) 
60 See e. g. Walker v U-Haul Co., 734 F. 2d. 1068,1071 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that a 
14 year 
relationship was sufficient); Caserotti State Farm Ins. Co., 791 S. W. 2d. 561,565 
(Tex. Ct. App. 
1990) (stating that [p]roof of a confidential relationship outside the formal cases requires evidence that 
the dealings between the parties have continued for so long that one party is justified 
in relying on the 
other to act in his best interests. ) 
61 Deist v Wachholz 678 P. 2d. 188,193 (Mont. 1984). 
`'` Crim Truck ce Tractor Co. v Navistar Int I Transp. Corp., 823 
S. W. 2d. 591,593 (Tex. 19921. 
61 See e. g. Harris v Sewn, Title Co. Inc., 727 F. 2d. 1368 (5`h Cir. 1984). 
Inc. Southern New En V land Tele. 0 Co 900 F. 2d. 645 ,6 53 
3d Cir. 990 I 
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have also seen that this contention can be doubted. However, if it can be shown that 
the employee in question has the ability to protect themselves in commercial dealings, 
then the courts will be reluctant to extend the fiduciary duty. 64 For example, in Lee v 
Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 65 the court found no fiduciary duty between a property 
developer and Wal-Mart where the parties had informal relations developed over a 
ten-year period. The developer purchased land and built nine stores at Wal-Mart s 
direction based on oral approval from Wal-Mart s management. When Wal-Mart did 
not comply in the usual manner, the developer sued for breach of fiduciary duty. The 
court, in rejecting his claim, emphasised the developers ability to protect himself 
through a written contract, adding that as an experienced businessman, he should have 
known that relaxed business practices of this type were risky. 66 It may also be the 
case that too many protective arrangements will indicate to the court that a close 
relationship of trust is not present. Accordingly, the courts have refused to extend the 
fiduciary relationship when the parties have had several meetings, used lawyers in 
negotiations, maintained written records and took time to consider proposals. 67 
Not all courts, however, take the view that trust is the primary factor. Some have 
taken the view that the length of time or the closeness of the relationship are 
irrelevant. What is relevant is the amount of control that one party has over the 
other. 68 They emphasise that one party usually occupies a vulnerable position which 
causes them to rely upon the other. The type of vulnerability is usually a disparity of 
business experience where a pattern develops whereby one party unquestioningly 
follows the dominant party s advice. 69 
There is little doubt that the implicit agreement thesis is one of the more plausible and 
sophisticated arguments in relation to the protection of non-shareholder constituents. 
However, it has shown itself to be problematic for numerous reasons. The most 
obvious criticism that can be levelled at implicit agreements is their indeterminate 
64 See e. g. Flight Concepts Ltd. Partnership v Boeing Co., 819 F. Supp. 1535 1546 (D. Kan. 1993); In 
re Colocotronis Tanker Sec. Lith. 449 F. Supp. 828,833 (SDNY 1978). 
65 943 F. 2d. 554 (5'f' Cir. 1991). 
66 Ibid. at p. 557. 
67 See e. g. Ritchie Enter v Hone well Bull Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1014,1054 (D. Kan. 1990). 
69 Sec e. g. Cara Coq). v Continental Bank, 148 BR. 760 (E. D. Pa. 1992). 
69 See e. g. Production Credit Association v Farm Credit Bank 781 F. Supp. 595,610 (D. Minn. 1991 
Ilinnesota Timber Producers -1 ssociation v American Mutual Insurance Co., 766 F. 2d. 1261,1267 
(8`h 
Cir. 1985). cert. denied, 474 US. 1059 (1986). 
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nature. It was always going to be the case that implicit agreements content is 
unavoidably obscure and hence contentious. 70 This uncertainty will result in 
differing interpretations and different outcomes. 71 Whether an employee receives 
compensation would depend on the idiosyncratic and subjective appraisals of 
72 whoever hears the case. 
Although the indeterminacy criticism is inherent in the implicit agreement argument, 
it has been contended that it is not dispositive for two reasons. First, the courts 
confront difficult appraisal issues every day - they are required to appraise the future 
value of shares and damages resulting from torts and breaches of contract. 73 
Difficulty of quantification is not enough to totally dispose of the argument. Second, 
Stone argues that the promises of job security contained in implicit agreements are not 
imaginary or hallucinatory but are contained in the ubiquitous employer statements 
found in words, writings, and deeds to the effect that if you work here, if you do a 
reasonable job and don t cause trouble, you have a job for life. 74 Stone s contention 
can be criticised on various grounds. It is highly unlikely that today, such statements 
are ever made, let alone them being ubiquitous. Even if they are made, they are made 
with the knowledge that redundancies following, for example, a takeover, are 
common. Such statements must be read with this in mind. 
A second criticism is that even if implicit promises are made, they are not made to all 
employees. In order to keep up with demand, and bearing in mind that the training 
required for many jobs will be minimal, employers will make full use of casual and 
part-time labour. Such employees will have no guarantee of employment. 
70 J. Parkinson, The Contractual Theory of the Company and the Protection of Non-Shareholder 
Interests in D. Feldman and F. Meisel (eds. ), Corporate and Commercial Law: Modern 
Developments, 
1996, London: Lloyds of London Press, p. 134. 
71 H. Collins, Organisational Regulation and the Limits of Contract in J. McCahery, S. 
Piccioto and C. 
Scott (eds. ), Corporate Control and Accountability: Changing Structures and the 
Dynamics of 
Regulation, 1993, Oxford: OUP, p. 97. 
72 D. Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Latin: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies 
in L. F.. 
Mitchell (cd. ), Progressive Corporate Law, 1995, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, pp. 19-20. 
73 R. J. Schulze, Can This Marriage Be Saved? Reconciling Progressivism with Profits 
in Corporate 
Governance Laws (1997) 49 Stan. L. Res'. 1607 at 1618. 
74 K. Stone, Labour Markets, Emplovment Contracts and Corporate Change in J. 
McCahery, S. 
Piccioto and C. Scott (eds. ), Corporate Control and Accountability: 
Changing Structures and the 
Dynamics of Regulation, 1993, Oxford: OUP, p. 88. 
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Accordingly, as part-time employees become more common, the implicit agreement 
thesis will become an irrelevance to a larger proportion of the workforce. 7 
Third, even if it can be shown that implicit promises of job security are made, it is 
highly debatable that they are accompanied with an acknowledgement that they are 
legally enforceable. The implicit agreement argument actually has a sanction inherent 
to it, namely reputational damage. To allow legal enforcement would be to give the 
employees a remedy above and beyond that envisaged by the implicit agreement 
thesis. 76 Even firms that respect the value of secure employment need to have the 
ability to make redundancies if market pressures dictate. This is well illustrated by 
the layoffs at IBM in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For many years, IBM refrained 
from carrying out mass-layoffs and its executives stated that the company s practice 
was to ensure that the employees were content and productive. 77 However, between 
1986 and 1994 the company reduced its workforce from 407,000 to 215,000.78 IBM s 
managers felt compelled to make these layoffs following a sustained period of poor 
earnings. Further, if legal enforcement were permissible, then it could have an 
unforeseen consequence. If employees could persuade the court that they had a legal 
right regarding deferred compensation, then, by the same logic, firms might be able to 
bring claims against employees who want to leave their employment. Firms that 
expend capital training their employees could validly argue that they have a long-term 
property interest in the employee, with the consequence that the employee should not 
79 be allowed to leave until the firm has recouped its investment. 
Finally, as we shall see later, there are significant problems with a multifiduciary 
duty. 80 There are arguments that a multifiduciary duty can actually reduce 
accountability and increase the length of cases. Under the legal model, managers 
have only to maximise profits. If directors owed their duties to shareholders and 
75 J. Parkinson, The Contractual Theory of the Company and the Protection of Non-Shareholder 
Interests in D. Feldman and F. Meisel (eds. ), Corporate and Commercial Law: Modern Developments, 
1996, London: Lloyd s of London Press, p. 134. 
R. Daniels, Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism be Compassionate? (1993) 
43 Univ. 
loronto U. 315 at 337-8. 
n J. Bolt, Job Security: Its Time Has Come (1983) Harv. Bus. Rev. 115 at 116-8. 
When Slimming is Not Enough (1994) Economist 3`d September. 
m R. J. Schulze, Can This Marriage Be Saved? Reconciling Progressivism with Profits in Corporate 
Governance Laws (1997) 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1607 at 1618. 
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employees (as would be the case if the implicit agreement thesis could result in legal 
obligations) then the default rule would be that directors must maximise profits and 
provide job security for their employees. This would complicate managerial 
decisionmaking greatly. A simple and oft-cited example demonstrates this. Assume 
that a firm is considering closing a plant and laying off a considerable number of 
employees based on clear evidence that this would make the firm more efficient and 
increase profits. Shareholder interests would demand that the plant be closed. 
Employee interests would dictate that the plant be kept open. This situation may be 
complicated by the fact that employees in the firm s other plants would want the plant 
closed to ensure the continued profitability of the firm and therefore their jobs. It has 
been argued that as the directors could never please both constituents totally, both 
parties would resort to the courts to micromanage corporate decisionmaking when 
there was a possible conflict. 81 
The implicit agreements thesis is a brave attempt to find a credible means of attacking 
the legal model of the company. However, as we have seen, it can be criticised on 
numerous grounds. It relies on contractual premises to justify greater employee 
protection, so therefore, it must broadly agree with the new economic theory of the 
firm. However, the new economic theory and the implicit agreement thesis are 
irreconcilable for the following reason. The new economic theory argues that 
fiduciary duties should flow exclusively to shareholders because other constituents 
can protect themselves via contract. The implicit agreements thesis argues that 
employees cannot protect their job security explicitly by contract because it is too 
indeterminate a concept. However, there is implicit protection hidden in the cracks 
between the explicit terms which contain no such protection. 
82 Accordingly, there is 
contractual protection for the employees, albeit in an implicit form. The implicit 
agreement thesis requires that fiduciary duties be extended to employees because of 
the implicit contractual protection. However, the new economic theory would see 
these implicit agreements as proof that employees can protect their interests 'via 
contract and so would not require fiduciary duties to flow to them. Finally, many 
Here the term multifiduciary duty is used to describe a duty that is owed to more than one party 
within the corporate nexus. 
R. J. Schulze, Can This Marriage Be Saved? Reconciling Progressivism with Profits in Corporate 
Gmm, ernance Laws (1997) 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1607 at 1619. 
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implicit agreement proponents ignore the fact that if employees could sue for breach 
of implicit agreements, then companies could simply draft explicit clauses into 
employment contracts disclaiming any such agreements. 83 
Transactional Failure. 
Given these flaws, over the last few years, a new contractual model has arisen that, 
instead of concentrating on implicit agreements, serves to strengthen the employee s 
explicit contractual protection by focusing on various forms of transactional failure. 
This transactional failure argument has been advocated most strongly by Professor 
Ronald Daniels. 84 Professor Daniels starting point is to ask whether employers 
actually make the sort of promises that the implicit agreements thesis relies on. Due 
to inadequate employee information, the answer is usually no. Employees are 
unlikely to be informed about factors affecting job security, such as takeover activity. 
Accordingly, the bargain they make with management will be different than the one 
they would have made had they had full information. If employees were aware of 
these factors, they would contract for higher wages, or severance payments upon 
dismissal. 85 Thus the 1980 s takeover wave would not have been anticipated by those 
drafting contracts prior to 1980, and therefore some of the employees who lost their 
jobs would suffer an uncompensated loss in wealth. 86 Given unforeseen events such 
as this can and do occur, it is likely that there is no agreement regarding the 
managements ability to act for the benefit of the employees under future 
circumstances that are unforeseeable. The lack of agreement would constitute a gap 
in the contract, and accordingly, no implicit agreement could be founded. Even if 
82 D. Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Latt': Foundations and Law Reform Strategies in L. E. 
Mitchell (ed. ), Progressive Corporate Latin, 1995, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, p. 20. 
U In relation to this, it has been argued that managers could eliminate the shareholder expectation of 
profit maximisation by writing clauses into the s. 14 contract stating that managers are not expected to 
maximise profits. However, such disclaimers do not exist. Why might they exist 
in relation to 
employees but not in relation to shareholders? The difference can be explained 
by bargaining 
differences. Shareholders would not invest unless they believed that the management would make an 
effort to maximise profits - they would invest in companies committed to profit maximisation. 
Thus, 
to compete, managers must promise to maximise profits. Conversely, many employees 
do not have 
such bargaining power because firms regard their labour as dispensable - there are others waiting 
to 
take their jobs who will not care about implicit agreements. 
sa See R. Daniels, Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism be Compassionate? 
(1993) 43 
Univ. Toronto U. 315. 
J. Parkinson, The Contractual Theory of the Company and the Protection of N'on-Shareholder 
Interests in D. Feldman and F. Nteisel (eds. ), Corporate and Commercial Law:: 1lodern 
Developments, 
1996, London: Lloyds of London Press, p. 137. 
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there is no implicit agreement, however, a hypothetical contract approach may be 
used to justify protection of employee interests. A court might fill the gap in the 
contract by attempting to determine what the parties would have done had they been 
apprised of the risk at the time of the [contract] formation. 87 Judicial intervention 
would be justified on the basis of mutual mistake due to incomplete formation. 88 
Daniels believes that this hypothetical contract rationale would justify plant closure 
legislation, mandatory successorship rights, and mandatory bargaining 89 
The point that both of these theories emphasise is that employees cannot protect 
themselves by explicit contract terms. Indeed, this is starting to be recognised by 
contract theorists. Macey and Miller, two ardent proponents of the contractual thesis, 
only go so far as to say that contractual protection is only technologically feasible, not 
that employees are actually able to obtain such protection. 90 As we have seen, it is 
highly unlikely that employees do obtain such protection. Accordingly, the reform 
proposals mentioned try to extend protection to employees by protecting interests that 
would be protected in an ideal contracting regime, but are currently unprotected. The 
problem is that the interests that these contractual mechanisms try to protect are 
overly ambiguous. A move to protect such interests would constitute a radical 
departure from the legal model, and therefore needs to be substantial enough to justify 
such a move. Currently, the interests recognised by the implicit agreements thesis and 
the transactional failure argument are not substantial enough to warrant reform. 
Ultimately, it may be the case that both of these arguments miss the point. The legal 
model states that as shareholders cannot effectively protect themselves via contract, 
and therefore fiduciary duties should flow exclusively to them to fill the gap in the 
s. 14 contract. It further states that employees can protect themselves via contract and 
therefore do not need any form of legal protection. We have seen that this second 
contention is flawed. The employees cannot protect themselves contractually and 
86 R. Daniels, Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism be Compassionate? (1993) 43 Univ. 
Toronto U. 315 at 345-9. 
Ibid. at p. 341. 
a8 D. Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Lain: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies in L. E. 
Mitchell (ed. ), Progressive Corporate Lain, 1995, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, p. 18. 
ýIt' R. Daniels, Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism be Compassionate? (1993) 43 
Univ. 
Toronto U. 315 at 350. 
90 J. R. Macey and G. P.: Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: .4 
Contractual Perspective (1993) 43 Univ. 
Toronto U. 401 at 416-9. 
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therefore, according to the logic of the legal model itself, they deserve protection. 
Given this, there appears to be no need to construct elaborate contractual arguments 
that protect ethereal employee interests. Both of the above arguments advocate 
employee protection based on identifiable gaps in the employee contract. The above 
arguments also seek to identify these gaps. However, there is no need to identify 
these gaps - the fact that the gaps exist justifies employee protection. According to 
both the legal model and the new economic theory, any group that cannot protect 
themselves contractually deserve protection from the law. Both the legal model and 
the new economic theory state that the only constituent that cannot protect themselves 
are the shareholders. It has been shown in the part of the chapter that this assumption 
is incorrect. We will see that there are also other constituents that also cannot protect 
themselves in a way that the legal model envisages. 91 
Why are Employees Not Better Protected? 
From the above, it can be seen that there is a strong case for employee protection. 
However, as we saw in Chapter 4, the protection offered to the employees is scant. 
The question is given that protective measures for employees can result in efficiency 
gains, why do companies not demonstrate a greater commitment to their workforce. 
An efficiency-related explanation can be derived from what economists term game 
theory. Game theory has been described as an analytical device which allows for 
formal, rigorous examinations of individual decision-making, sheds light on situations 
where rational conduct will lead to sub-optimal outcomes. 92 By use of this theory it 
will be seen that although protecting employees can result in optimum efficiency, 
firms have an incentive not to do so. 
In our game, 93 the players are the employer and the employee, both with two choices. 
The employer has the choice of providing a high cost or a low cost workplace. 
Under the high cost option, the employer regularly consults his employees and 
QI Next we will see that creditors also have problems protecting themselves contractually, although they 
do appear to be in a stronger position than the employees. In Ch. 9, we will see that the environment 
has virtually no contractual protection at all. 
Q- B. R. Cheffins, Company Lain: Theor-v, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
p. 10. On game theory generally, see S. H. Heap et al, The Theory of Choice: 1 Critical Guide. 1992, 
Oxford: Blackwell and D. G. Baird et al, Game Theory and the Law, 1994, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
Unix ersity Press. 
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provides assurances of job security. With the low cost option, the employer 
unilaterally dictates working conditions rather than consulting with employees and 
will not hesitate to dismiss employees in order to reduce expenses. 
The employees choice is one of low effort and high effort. If they select low 
effort, the employee will demonstrate mediocre job performance and show reluctance 
towards any scheme that will increase their workload. Under the high effort option, 
the employees will deliver what game theorists term consummate performance. 94 
They will work diligently and will be willing to take the initiative to solve problems. 
Given each player has two options, there are four possible outcomes to this game. By 
inserting admittedly arbitrary numbers into the game, it can be seen how employee 
protection can result in efficiency gains and yet still not be adopted. 
First, if the employer selects high cost and the employee high effort, the 
employers profits will be £10,000 and the monetary benefits received by the 
employee will also be £10,000. Second, if the employer selects low cost and the 
worker choose low effort, the payoffs will be £6,000 for the employer and £6,000 
for the employee. Third, the employees choose high effort but the employer 
chooses a low cost work environment. Here, the employer s profits will be £ 12,000 
whereas the employees will receive £4,000. Note that the employers profits are 
higher than the first outcome because he will benefit from a hard-working workforce 
without providing job security or other employee related expenses. The employee s 
benefits will be less that outcome two because they will have made sacrifices in order 
to deliver consummate performance whilst gaining nothing in return. Fourth, if the 
employer selects the high cost option and the employees select low effort, the 
employers profits will be £4,000 and the employee s benefits will amount to £ 12,000. 
The employee s benefits are greater than in the other outcomes because they receive 
the benefits of a high cost environment whilst making the mediocre contribution of 
the low effort option. The employer is worse off than in the other outcomes because 
A This game is taken from B. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation, 
1997, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 578-9. 
44 On the terminology, see O. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications:. - Study in the Economics of Internal Organisations, 1975, New York: Free Press. p. 69. 
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he will have invested resources in his high cost work environment whilst receiving 
only a low level of productivity. 
It can be seen that in the above examples, the most efficient outcome is the high cost, 
high effort option since the total return will be £20,000. Under this outcome, 
employers would consult with their employees, provide assurances of job security and 
try to provide a worker friendly work environment. Accordingly, the most efficient 
outcome is achieved when the company protects its employees and takes their 
interests into account. Given this, the best overall strategy for both parties is to co- 
operate and take the steps necessary to reach the mutually advantageous high cost, 
high effort outcome. 
However, this is unlikely to happen. According to game theory, both parties will be 
tempted to forego co-operation because of their own self-interest and will, according 
to the terminology, defect. The employer will have an incentive to defect because 
his best return (E12,000) is achieved via the low cost, high effort outcome. Therefore 
if he believes that his employees will work diligently, he will be tempted to forego the 
costs associated with the high cost option. The employee s incentive is similar since 
their best return (£ 12,000) is achieved when they select the low effort option and the 
employer has selected the high cost option. If both sides defect and act according to 
this self-interest, the employer will select the low cost option and the employees will 
select the low effort option. This outcome yields a total return of £ 12,000 - the 
worst overall result for both players. 
The above supplies us with a justification for governmental intervention of behalf of 
the employees. Even when acting rationally, the employer and the employees may 
reach an outcome which is worst overall, even where there is ample scope for an 
outcome that maximises the joint welfare of both parties. The law can ensure that 
both parties reach mutually beneficial results by providing companies and workers 
with incentives to make the high cost and high effort choices. The codetermination 
systems examined in Chapter 4 are good examples of this. 
Conclusion. 
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Employee protection has been on the governance agenda for several decades. Little 
has been done however to further the protection of employees and those measures that 
have been introduced have been seen to be inadequate. S. 309 Companies Act 1985, 
examined in Chapter 4, is evidence of this. A possible reason for this lack of 
protection is the lack of a sound theoretical base for employee protection. This part of 
the chapter aimed to demonstrate that there are strong theoretical and economic 
reasons for expanding the scope of governance protection and increasing the 
protection offered to employees. Weak though it may be, the employees have an 
ownership claim akin to that of the shareholders. The employees, like the 
shareholders, can face risks due to fluctuations in corporate performance despite the 
fixed nature of their claims. Finally, the employees, again like the shareholders, have 
limited contractual protection. 
For these reasons, it is argued that if the shareholders are to receive corporate 
governance protection, then the employees should also receive protection. 
II. CREDITORS. 
The Creditors as Owners. 
In Chapter 2, we use Honor s test to establish that the shareholders cannot be owners 
of the firm. Earlier, in this chapter, we noted that using the same test, the employees 
also did not have an ownership claim, but that their claim was no less stronger than 
the shareholders. Now we will examine the position of the creditors. 
As with the employees, no one is going to contend that the creditors own the firm. 
However, in terms of Honor s test, the creditors have an equal ownership claim to 
the shareholders. The creditors, like the shareholders satisfy two of Honor s 11 tests. 
Again, the creditors have a right to the firm s capital when sold. In fact, if the sale is 
the result of insolvency, then the creditors interests totally eclipse those of the 
shareholders. Also, the creditors enjoy the right of judgment liability whereas the 
shareholders do not. If the company becomes unable to satisfy the creditors claims, 
then the creditors can obtain a creditors winding up and satisfy their claims that way. 
The results are set out below: 
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Table 7.2: Creditors Rights of Ownership. 
Right Me over my umbrella Shareholder over 
company 
Creditor over company 
Possession Yes No No 
Use Yes No No 
Management Yes Some No 
Income Yes Some No 
Ca ital Yes Some Yes 
Security Yes No No 
Transmission Yes No No 
No limit of term Yes Yes No 
Duty not to do harm Yes No No 
Judgment liability Yes No Yes 
Residual control Yes Yes No 
Once again, the claim here is insufficient to justify an ownership claim, but it is no 
weaker than that of the shareholders. 
As with the employees, it can be of aid to look at what the creditors contribute. The 
creditors, like the shareholders, contribute capital. The only difference is that the 
shareholders contribute equity capital whereas the creditors contribute debt capital. 
Aside form this semantic difference, their input into the firm is the same. One major 
difference, however, is that the shareholders input is protected by limited liability, the 
creditors is not. Accordingly, it has been argued that the creditors position is riskier 
than that of the employees. This contention will be examined next. 
The Creditors as Residual Risk-Bearers. 
As we saw in Chapter 6, the traditional position as regards the creditors is the same as 
the employees; both parties contract for fixed amounts and so therefore do not bear 
any risk from fluctuations in corporate performance. In Part I of this chapter, we saw 
that the employees can in fact suffer from residual risk through the gaining of firm- 
specific skills. In this part of the chapter, the creditor s position will be examined. It 
will also be seen that whilst creditors do contract for fixed amounts, they too can 
share in the risk of fluctuations in corporate performance. However, as we shall see 
later, they can also protect themselves to a greater degree than either the shareholders 
or the employees. 
As we briefly noted in Chapter 4, creditors bear risk due to the existence of limited 
liability. Here, this risk will be examined in more detail. It will also be seen that 
255 
Chapter 7: Marrying the Theoretical Basis of the Legal Model and the Pluralist Approach. 
creditors bear what is known as default risk, namely the risk that the company will not 
pay its debt. Both of these arguments apply when the company is insolvent or close to 
insolvency. Before examining these arguments, however, it is worth bearing in mind 
that the creditors risk can be increased even when the company is profitable. 
The general position adopted by most commentators is that when the company is 
successful, the risks faced by the shareholders and creditors will be very low because 
the value of the company s equity will be rising and so the risk of default will be low. 
However, this is not always the case. Conflicts between the shareholders and the 
creditors can exist which serve to increase the creditors risk even if the company is 
95 highly successful. 
Such a conflict can occur when the company transfers assets to the shareholders for 
inadequate consideration. Here, the shareholders will clearly benefit whereas the 
creditors risk will be increased due to the reduction of capital. The same result 
occurs if the company pays overly high dividends. Again the members benefit from 
an increase in wealth, whereas the equity cushion that protects the creditors will be 
eroded, which will increase their risk and diminish the value of the assets available for 
liquidation should it occur. 96 
Another area of conflict involves the issuance of fresh borrowing. This is something 
that the shareholders may view favourably since it means that the members will not be 
asked to provide additional funding. With new funds, the company may also be able 
to pursue potentially profitable transactions that it could not previously afford to 
pursue. Existing creditors will not view the new borrowing so favourably. As their 
return is fixed, the possibility of higher profits will make little difference to the 
creditors. However, an increase in borrowing will increase the company s debt-to- 
equity ratio. This will dilute the claims of the existing creditors, thereby increasing 
the risk that they will not be paid fully. 
95 See R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 1992,4`h ed, Boston: Little, Brown, pp. 
394-6; M. 
McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance (1986) 41 Bus. Lawyer 413 at 418-20. 
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It can therefore be seen that even when the company is profitable, the shareholders 
have the potential to increase the risk faced by the creditors. However, the real 
conflict between the shareholders and the creditors occurs when the company s 
solvency is in doubt. It is the shareholders position as beneficiaries of limited 
liability that increases the creditor s risk and it is to this that we now turn. 
Creditors and Limited Liability. 
Henry Manne has correctly argued that without limited liability, many small 
shareholders could not invest in public corporations. 97 He argues that if investors 
were required to supply unlimited amounts of capital, wealthy people would be 
reluctant to make small investments. Every equity holding, no matter how small, 
would place the shareholders personal assets at risk. Manne argues that limited 
liability eliminates this risk. 
Many commentators however, do not share Manne s view that limited liability solely 
minimises shareholder risk. Instead, they argue that it minimises shareholder risk by 
shifting the risk from the shareholders onto the creditors. 98 The theory is as follows. 
There is little doubt that limited liability encourages directors to engage in risk-taking 
activity of behalf of the shareholders. As shareholders, as recipients of the residual 
income, are able to share in the gains of corporate growth without risking more than 
their initial investment, investment is made on the basis that those in charge will take 
risks in order to pursue and exploit potentially lucrative projects and ventures. 
99 
There is little doubt that this risk-taking is beneficial. As Sealy notes, without limited 
liability, the world s railways would not have been built and many of today s 
information technology companies would not have got off of the ground. 
100 [T]he 
capacity to manage risk, and with it the appetite to take risks and make forward 
97 11. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics (1967) 53 Va. L. Rev. 259 at 259. 
98 See e. g. R. A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 1992,4`h ed., Boston: Little, 
Brown, p. 394: S. B. 
Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy and Economics 
(1992) 
87 Nw. Univ. L. Rev. 148 at 177-8; F. H. Easterbrook & D. R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation (1985) 52 Uni. Chi. LR. 89. 
99 B. R. Cheffins, Company Lacy: Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, oxford: Clarendon Press. 
p541. 
i00 L. Sealy, Directors Wider Responsibilities - Problems Conceptual, 
Practical and Procedural 
[1987] Monash Univ. LR. 164 at 181. 
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looking choices, are key elements of the energy that drives the economic system 
forward. 101 
However, limited liability also increases the default risk faced by the creditors. 
Limited liability induces the shareholders to gamble with the creditors money. Take 
the following example. A company has an issued share capital of £ 100. The directors 
then borrow £10,000 on the company s behalf. If the company does \vell, the 
shareholders will reap most of the benefit since they are the residual claimants. 
However, if things go badly, then the shareholders only lose their initial £ 100 
investment, whereas the creditors will receive little, if any, of the £ 10,000 which the 
company owes. This temptation to gamble with the creditor s money is compounded 
when the company nears insolvency. It may be the case that a company cannot avoid 
insolvency. In such a situation, the shareholders investment is lost, whereas the 
creditors will be concerned that they will not receive what they are owed. The 
responsible thing to do will be to wind up the company and keep any remaining funds 
inviolate in order to repay the creditors. Limited liability, however, creates a 
perverse incentive for an insolvent company to continue to trade. 102 As a company 
approaches insolvency, instead of winding up the company, limited liability induces 
the company to partake in investments which are riskier but alone offers the 
possibility, albeit remote, of a bonanza payoff that will prevent insolvency. 
103 The 
rationale for this course of action derives from the shareholders limited liability. If 
the risk is worthwhile and the company trades out of difficulty then the shareholders 
will benefit from the gains. If however, the risk does not pay off, then the 
shareholder s investment is lost, so any additional loses will be borne by the creditors. 
Because of this, investing in a limited liability company as a shareholder has been 
described as a heads we win, tails creditors lose situation. 
' 04 Accordingly, 
shareholders have an incentive to gamble with what the creditors have at stake. 
105 
101 H. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk, 1996, New York: New York: John 
WIIcv, p. 3. 102 D. D. Prentice, Creditors Interests and Directors Duties (1990) 10 OJLS 265 at 277. 
103 J. ('. Coffee Shareholders lersus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web (1986) 85 Michigan 
LR. I at 61. 
104 B. R. Cheffins. Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
p. 498. 
ios J. S. Ziegal, Is Incorporation (with Limited Liability) Too Easily Available (1990) 31 Les Cahiers 
de 
Droit 1075 at 1081. 
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Despite the adverse effects that limited liability can have on creditors, neither 
Parliament nor the courts have abrogated the basic rule in a systematic manner that a 
member in a limited company is under no obligation to repay the company s debts. 
The only provision in the Companies Act 1985 that specifically deems shareholders to 
be liable to creditors is in regards to a situation where the number of members of a 
company falls below a prescribed minimum. 106 
Creditors and Default Risk. 
The rate of return which a creditor earns if the company repays the principal and 
interest on time is known as the yield. The yield is fixed by the debt contract. The 
reason why creditors face risk is due to the fact that the yield on a debt obligation is 
only a promised rate of return. This is important because there is always the 
possibility that the debtor company will breach its obligation to repay the creditor. 
The possibility that the creditor will not be repaid is known as the default risk. The 
default risk faced by creditors increases significantly if the company is in financial 
trouble. Upon liquidation, the creditors have priority over the shareholders. 107 
However, if the company s debts exceed its assets, not every creditor will be paid. 
For this reason, corporate debt is never risk-free because any company, no matter how 
successful it may appear to be, can fail to repay its creditors. For example, in the 
1960 s, Pan American, a large American airline, was performing so well that it was 
taking advance bookings for its first passenger flight to the moon. By the 1990 s, 
however, the company was insolvent and unable to pay its creditors. 
The new economic theory argues that shareholders should be the sole beneficiaries of 
company law protection because they are affected most by fluctuations in corporate 
performance, whereas other constituents contract for fixed amounts and so do not 
Value protection so highly. However, the presence of default risk means that even 
though a creditor contracts for a fixed amount, the amount that he receives cannot be 
predicted with certainty. Instead there are a number of indeterminate outcomes from 
full and timely payment to complete default. This variation means that there is a 
l06 S. 24 Companies Act 1985. 
107 S. 107 Insolvency Act 1986, which applies only to voluntary liquidations, but the same principles 
apply to compulsory liquidations. 
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volatility risk associated with corporate debt. 108 The following example demonstrates 
this volatility. 109 
Imagine two debt contracts. The first one provides for a twelve-month loan to a 
company of £ 10,000 at 10% interest and carries and 4% risk of default. The expected 
monetary value of this obligation is £10,560, which is £10,000 at 10% interest 
multiplied by the 96% chance of full repayment. The second debt contract is a 
£10,000 government bond. It has a term of a year and can be assumed to be risk-free 
and offers an interest rate of 5.6%. The owner of the bond will therefore receive 
£ 10,560 (£ 10,000 principal and £560 interest) at the end of the year. Therefore the 
government bond and the loan have the same expected monetary value. However, the 
debt obligations imposed are not the same. As the government bond has no variation 
of return, the creditor will receive his £ 10,560. The loan does not carry the same 
certainty as there is a 96% chance that the creditor will receive £ 11,000 and a 4% 
chance that he will receive nothing. Accordingly, even though both contracts are 
fixed, the risk that the creditors face is very different. 
Conclusion. 
It can therefore be seen that creditors also face risks and that those risks increase as 
the corporations fortunes dwindle. The creditors risk increases whereas the 
shareholders does not due to the existence of limited liability. Conversely, many 
commentators argue that limited liability creates an externality in that the 
shareholders risks are passed onto the creditors. As a matter of risk per se, this 
conclusion cannot be doubted. The presence of limited liability and default risk 
increase the risks faced by creditors. In that sense, they are also residual risk bearers. 
However, as regards the creditors, the issue of risk is not enough to justify governance 
protection. This is because there are a number of steps that the creditors can take to 
lessen the risk or at least to ensure that they are compensated for this increase in risk. 
These steps will be examined in the next section. 
The Inadequacies of Contract. 
10' B. R. Cheffins, Company Latin: Theorl", Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
p. 73. 
109 Ibid. at pp. 73-4. 
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As we saw in the previous section, the traditional position is that limited liability 
serves to weaken the creditors position. Accordingly, limited liability results in 
uncompensated risk being imposed on creditors who deal with the company. 110 
Therefore, when examining whether the creditors need further protection, we are 
attempting to define what risks the creditors of a corporation have not agreed to 
accept in their dealings with it. 111 However, whether creditors suffer from 
uncompensated risk or not is open to debate. 
The discussion here is concerned with the effectiveness of the various markets in 
protecting creditor interests. There are those who contend that the market provides 
creditors with all the necessary protection, whilst others argue that such forms of 
protection are only partially effective. We will now examine the various methods that 
the creditors have to protect themselves. 
Before looking at the various methods of self-protection, it is worth noting that there 
exist market pressures that can serve to protect creditor interests. Companies will 
occasionally need fresh infusions of capital. If a company encounters financial 
difficulties, it will be unlikely to obtain this through issuing shares. It will therefore 
be force to obtain debt capital. In such a case, management will become dependant on 
the goodwill of creditors either to extend or to re-negotiate a loan and may not have a 
strong incentive to take action that will harm creditors interests. 112 Debtors with a 
history of default will find it difficult to find replacement credit. Another market 
pressure concerns the possibility of board removal. If a listed company encounters 
financial difficulties, then certain executives might be forced to leave due to pressures 
from the board or institutional investors. Even if this does not happen and the 
company is placed in receivership or wound up, the executives will probably have to 
step aside in favour of a licensed insolvency practitioner. Some commentators argue 
M D. D. Prentice, Corporate Personality, Limited Liability and the Protection of Creditors in R. 
Grantham & C. Rickett (eds. ), Corporate Personality in the 20`h Century, 1998, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, p. 104. 
III J. Dabner, Trading 11 pile Insolvent-A Case for Individual Creditors Rights Against Directors 
(1994) 17 UNSWLJ 546 at 574-5. 
iii L. Lin, Shift of Fiduciart" Duty Upon Corporate Insolvencv: Proper Scope of Directors 
Duties to 
Creditors (1993) 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1485 at 1508. 
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that these extra legal constraints may be more powerful than constraints created by 
legal rules and the risk of personal liability. 113 
The most obvious way that creditors can protect themselves is through the debt 
contract through the use of consensually negotiated contractual terms. As one 
commentator noted [a]re not bondholders, creditors, lenders and trade suppliers 
entitled to negotiate such creditor self protection provisions in indenture and other 
contractual arrangements with the corporation. 114 A typical debt contract will 
provide for a repayment date and the interest that is due. The interest rate that a 
creditor contracts for represents not only the cost of renting capital, but it also takes 
into account the possibility that the debtor will not repay the loan i. e. the default risk 
is a factor in determining the interest rate. ' 15 The following example demonstrates 
16 
Mr. Smith decides to borrow £1 million to invest in a prospective project together 
with £2 million of his own money. He wants the loan for a year since by the end of 
that period, it will be apparent whether or not the project has succeeded. As Mr. 
Smith is a wealthy man and providing that he gives a personal guarantee to the bank, 
the bank will regard the loan as riskless and offer Mr. Smith a riskless short-term 
interest rate of 6%. However, Mr. Smith is reluctant to risk more than the £2 million 
and so proposes a different arrangement whereby the bank will agree to accept 
repayment exclusively from the profits of the project, if there are any, a year from the 
time of the loan. This way Mr. Smith can limit his liability. The bank estimates that 
there is an 80% probability that the project will be successful enough to repay the loan 
and the interest on the repayment date, and a 20% probability that the project will fail 
to such an extent that not even a portion of the loan will be repaid. The bank s course 
of action is straightforward: it must calculate the amount, payable at the end of a year, 
that when multiplied by 80% (the probability that payment will be made) will equal 
113 R. J. Daniels, Must Boards Go Overboard? An Economic Analysis of the Effects of 'Burgeoning 
Statutory Liability on the Role of Directors in Corporate Governance in J. S. Ziegal (ed. ), Current 
Developments in International and Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law. 1994, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, p. 557. 
114 A. E. Stilson, Re-examining the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: 
Dc/i, nin Directors Duties to Creditors (1995) 20 Del. J. of Corp. L. 1 at 61. 
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£ 1,060,000 (the amount that the bank would have received if Mr. Smith had made the 
riskless loan. ) That amount is £1,325,000. "' Accordingly, the bank will charge \Ir. 
Smith 32.5% interest for the loan. At this rate of interest, the bank will be indifferent 
between the riskless and the risky loan. 
The above example demonstrates that the interest rate is calculated to take into 
account the risk of default. Although the law allows borrowers to shift the risk onto 
creditors, the risk is fully compensated by the higher interest rate, ergo there is no 
externality. Voluntary creditors receive compensation in advance for the risk that the 
firm will be unable to meet its obligations. 118 Accordingly, if the creditor believes 
that default is a possibility, he can contract for a higher interest rate. For example, 
banks will require a higher interest rate if a borrower is not credit-worthy. 119 
Accordingly, the contention that limited liability represents an externality can be 
dismissed. Costs are not passed onto the creditor as the creditor is fully compensated 
by the higher interest rate, 120 and if a creditor does not contract for a higher interest 
rate, the law should not support his shortsightedness. 121 
This theory can be criticised however. There are cases where the interest rate charged 
will fall below the level of risk undertaken, thus enabling the company to externalise 
the debt. This externalisation occurs for three reasons. 
First, it may be the case that the market signals that borrowers look to for information 
on prospective creditors will not be reliable. Borrowers will regularly screen 
creditors. However, if the market does not have access to full information then 
neither will the borrower. Accordingly, without full information, the interest rate 
1 17 Calculated by solving 0.8x =£ 106 fors. 
113 F 
. H. Easterbrook and D. 
R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation (1985) 52 Univ. Chicago 
LR. 89 at 105. 
119 B. R. Cheffins, Company Lain: Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
p. 74, R. W. Hutchinson and D. G. McKillop, Banks and Small to Medium Sized Business 
Financing in 
the United Kingdom: Some General Issues (1992) Feb. Nat. liest. Bank Q. Rev. 84 at 87-8. 
121° R., \. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations (1975-6) 43 Univ. Chicago 
LR. 499 
at 503. 
121 See D. A. Wishart, Models and Theories of Directors Duties to Creditors (1991) 14 
NZULR 323 at 
335 who states that [i]f creditors do not charge for the probability of certain events 
happening, they 
should not be supported in their foolishness. They should not survive to charge 
less than wiser 
people. 
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charged may not reflect the actual risk. Critics point out the dubious validity of the 
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis which claims: 
that all relevant information will be available to the market and that the market 
will rapidly, if not instantaneously, digest all information as it becomes 
available. 122 
If the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis is true, then accurate pricing is possible. 
However, as we saw in Chapter 6, the market suffers from considerable efficiency 
issues and so the validity of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis must be doubted. 
Second, the interest rate only takes into account the risk when the loan was made. 
During the period that the loan is outstanding, the risk of default may change. For 
example, the corporation may obtain additional loans not subordinated to the first one. 
To the extent that the change can be foreseen, it will be reflected by the interest rate at 
the outset. However, an unforeseen increase in risk is akin to a lowering of the rate of 
interest, which in turn externalises costs to the creditor. ' 23 To an extent this can be 
mitigated by the use of an amortized loan (which is repaid continuously rather than in 
a single payment on the repayment date). 124 Since the balance outstanding on the loan 
declines over time, and therefore the chance of unforeseen events arising, the lender is 
partially protected. 
It can therefore be seen that manipulation of the interest rate can theoretically be used 
to compensate the creditors for the shifting of risk caused by the shareholder s limited 
liability. However, as we have also seen, it is an imperfect solution. There is little 
evidence to indicate that trade creditors in fact do alter their interest rates to 
accommodate changes in the default risk. 125 Thankfully, there are other mechanisms 
available to creditors that enable them to protect themselves. 
Even before a contractual agreement is entered into, creditors have means of 
protection at their disposal. Creditors would be advised to screen potential debtors 
in 
122 J. N. Gordon and L. A. Kornhauser Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and 
Securities Research 
(1985) 60 NYULR. 761 at 770. 
123 J. M1. Landers, . -Another 
It'ord on Parents. Subsidiaries and . 411iliates 
in Bankruptcy (1975-6) 43 
Univ. Chicago LR. 527 at 530-1. 
L4 R-: \- Posner, The Rights of Creditors of. -iffrliated Corporations (1975-6) 
43 Univ. Chicago LR. 499 
at 503-4. 
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order to obtain information that is relevant in determining the probability of default. '26 
The creditor could demand access to the company s financial statements or evidence 
of its past credit history. Such information will aid the creditor in determining 
whether or not to advance credit and, if so, on what terms. It should be remembered 
that creditors are not forced to lend to any one corporation. They are free to put their 
money in low risk investments rather than to extend credit to corporations who may 
default. 
Creditors can diversify their debt-portfolio in very much the same manner that 
shareholders diversify their equity portfolios. Each debt contract will only have a 
small effect on the creditors financial status. Typical lenders are accordingly well 
placed to absorb the loss associated with the failure of a single business. Both trade 
creditors and banks will be in this position because they have numerous customers. 
Creditors who are still concerned about the possibility of default or from sustaining a 
large loss from a key customer also have the option to taking out insurance. Private 
insurers offer cover to suppliers and manufacturers for losses arising from default by 
trade debtors. 
Creditors may even choose to reduce the chance of default by exercising some 
measure of control over the company. For example, banks will often provide 
financial counselling. They will require access to sales forecasts and will make 
quarterly visits to the company in question. 
However, in the ordinary course of business, most lenders do not find it worthwhile to 
become closely involved in corporate decisionmaking. A major reason 
for this is the 
fixed nature of the creditors 127 As, under the legal model, all the profits go to 
the shareholders, the creditors return remains constant even if the company 
does 
125 B 
. R. Chetf ns, 
Companº, Law. - Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 
p. 01. 
I, (' On screening generally, see F. H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority 
Puzzle (1986) 72 Va. L. Rev. 
1393 at 1421-6. 
127 F. H. Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel. ! oting in Corporate Law (1983) 26 
J. of L. and Econ. 395 at 
403. 
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well. As the creditor gains nothing extra, he has no incentive to improve the 
profitability of the company. ' 28 
The normal position therefore is that creditors have little incentive to become 
involved in the running of companies. However, this position can change 
dramatically if the company starts to encounter financial problems. The incentive to 
intervene is the different approaches towards risk demonstrated by shareholders and 
creditors due to the existence of limited liability. 
The point that needs to be emphasised is that as the company nears insolvency, the 
creditors will become risk-averse whereas the company has an incentive to adopt 
riskier projects in order to ensure survival. Suppose that a company is deeply in debt 
and that the creditors, either through a provision in the debt contract or through 
legislation, have the power to take control of the company and sell off its assets. 129 
However, the company has developed a new product which will be successful in the 
market place. Two marketing approaches have been put forward. First, the company 
could market the product cautiously and sell the product at a price which will secure 
reasonable sales. This will allow the company to pay off a considerable portion of 
what it owes, but the creditors will still want to close the company down in order to 
secure the remaining debt. Second, the company could market the product 
aggressively and sell the product at a discounted price in order to secure high sales. It 
is unclear whether or not the product is popular enough to warrant such a sales 
strategy. However, if this strategy works out, then the company will be able to fully 
pay its debts and carry on trading. There is little doubt that the creditors will prefer 
the cautious strategy as this approach should ensure that the debt is repaid. Further, if 
the gamble on the aggressive approach fails, the company will be deeper in debt. 
Conversely, the shareholders will favour the aggressive strategy because this could 
result in a restoration of their equity value. If the gamble does not pay of, then, by 
virtue of their limited liability, they will not be liable for the additional debts that the 
company will gain. Given this, as the company nears insolvency, the creditors have a 
I2' B. R. Cheffins, Company Latt". Theory. Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
p. 75. 
IN Creditors who have managed to obtain security over their loans will often contract for the right to 
appoint a receiver to enforce their security. They also have a right to apply for a winding up order 
under s. 124 Insolvency Act 1986. 
266 
Chapter 7: Marrying the Theoretical Basis of the Legal Model and the Pluralist Approach. 
stronger incentive to intervene in managerial affairs so that the default risk that they 
face is not increased due to the shareholder s desire to undertake risky ventures. 
Finally, creditors can contract for some kind of security. Large creditors, such as 
banks, will be able to protect themselves via such mechanisms as personal guarantees 
and reservation of title clauses. However, not all creditors are in a position to insist 
upon such security. For example, trade creditors will probably not be in a position to 
demand security and so will be unable to contractually protect themselves. 130 
Furthermore, pressing for contractual protection may be counter-productive as the 
company may take its business elsewhere, particularly if they believe that another 
creditor will offer less restrictive terms. Such competitive pressures often force 
creditors to forego such protective measures. 131 
This is well illustrated with regards to the position of trade creditors. Trade creditors 
do not typically alter their standard loan agreements to take into account the risk of 
default. 132 Pedantry in such a situation could cost the creditor business. Further, since 
most trade creditors will have many customers, it would simply be too time 
consuming to monitor compliance. 
Conclusion. 
Like the employees, there is no doubt that creditors, like the shareholders, bear the 
risk that their interests will be affected by fluctuations in corporate performance. In 
this sense, the theory behind the legal model and the new economic theory is flawed. 
However, in relation to creditors, an examination of the risk they face is not enough to 
justify corporate governance protection. There is no doubt that the existence of 
default risk can severely prejudice creditors. However, the creditors are 
fully aware 
of this and indeed accept it. The risk is a normal one, a background presence 
in 
every transaction. 133 As Sealy notes creditors deal with a company as a matter of 
130 J . S. Ziegal, 
Creditors as Corporate Stakeholders: The Quiet Revolution - 
An Anglo-Canadian 
Perspective (1993) 43 Univ. Toronto U. 511 at 530. 
B. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 
1.81. 
2 L. A. Bebchuk and J. N1. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy 
(1996) 105 Yale U. 857 at 886-7. 
133 I. Flynn, Statutory Liability for Culpable Mismanagement in H. Rajak (ed. ), Insolvency 
Lai%' Theory 
and Practice, 1993, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, p. 135. 
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bargain, not of trust, and bargain involves risk. 134 Accordingly, the creditors accept 
the risk of default risk. 
If the risk faced by the creditors was uncompensated or there was no way for them to 
protect themselves, then they would be as deserving as the shareholders and the 
employees in determining the scope of corporate governance protection. However, 
we have seen that the risk faced by the creditors is not always uncompensated in that 
the interest rate compensates the creditor in advance for the possibility of default. We 
have also seen that there are various strategies available to creditors in able to protect 
themselves. 
However, the above is not true of all creditors. Many trade creditors will not be able 
to obtain an interest rate concession due to competitive pressures. Their ability to 
extract contractual protection will also be low due to inequalities of bargaining power. 
Accordingly, it is certainly the case that certain creditors are more deserving of 
protection than others. Also, irrespective of the above, as the company nears 
insolvency, the position of all creditors can be adversely affected by incentives 
created as a result of the shareholders limited liability. However, there is no doubt 
that the risk faced by creditors as the result of such incentives has been 
exaggerated. 135 The vast majority of creditors are promptly paid. If this were not so, 
the credit system would be radically different than it is today; in fact it might not even 
exist. 136 Therefore, it is to be hoped that any future legal protection aimed at creditors 
is aimed at those creditors most deserving. 
CONCLUSION. 
In the previous chapter, we examined three traditional arguments advocated for the 
legal model presumption that corporate governance protection should be exclusively 
available to shareholders. We saw that in relation to shareholders, with the exception 
of the weakness of contract argument, they are insufficient to justify the level of 
134 L 
. 
S. Sealy, Directors {rider Responsibilities-Problems Conceptual. Practical and Procedural 
[1987] Monash. Univ. LR. 164 at 176. 
135 F. H. Easterbook & D. R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation (1985) 52 Univ. Chicago 
LR. 89 at 104. 
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shareholder protection that we currently have. This chapter aimed to take the 
argument one step further and contend that these arguments can be used to justify 
governance protection for the two most obvious non-shareholder constituents, namely 
the employees and the creditors. 
It can be seen that the position of the employees and creditors is in many ways similar 
to that of the shareholders. All three parties have ownership claims, although none of 
them strong enough to establish ownership of the firm. All parties can be adversely 
affected by fluctuations in corporate performance. Therefore all parties face greater 
or lesser degrees of risk. Finally, all parties have a limited ability to protect 
themselves contractually. Traditional theorists argue that if contractual protection is 
limited then the law should step in to fill in the gaps. We have seen that the ability of 
employees and creditors to protect themselves is limited, albeit not as limited as the 
shareholders. 
For these reasons, it is contended that the protection offered to employees and 
creditors needs to be strengthened. Part of this strengthening will involve making it 
clear to directors that it is permissible to act in the interests of these non-shareholder 
constituents. This will be needed because it is still not clear whether or not corporate 
social, profit sacrificing behaviour is lawful. This issue will therefore be examined in 
the next chapter by examining the lawfulness of the most extreme form of profit 
sacrificing behaviour, namely corporate philanthropy. 
136 D. D. Prentice, Corporate Personality. Limited Liability and the Protection of Creditors in R. 
Grantham & C. Rickett (eds. ), Corporate Personality in the 200' Century. 1998, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, p. 99. 
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The Lawfulness of Departure from the Legal Model. 
INTRODUCTION 
Discussions surrounding the topic of corporate social responsibility tend to proceed 
upon the assumption that it is in the social interest that companies act for constituents 
beyond those who own stock, be that via the traditional legal model aim of profit- 
maximization' or via corporate acts designed specifically to benefit non-shareholder 
constituents. The move towards corporate social responsibility is characterized by a 
shift in the attitudes of traditional theorists. No longer prioritizing profit- 
maximization over corporate social responsibility, there is now an indication that 
these theorists view profit maximization as a long-term source of corporate social 
responsibility. 2 Accordingly, corporate philanthropy is increasingly being viewed as 
within the proper ambit of the corporations activities. 
However, a crucial element of this debate is often ignored, namely the lawfulness of 
acts which diverge from the traditional aim of profit-maximization. Asking whether 
or not a company may act in a socially beneficial way may seem to be an irrelevant 
question. After all, corporate donations, political, profit-motivated and altruistic, are 
regularly publicized, often disclosed3 and often serve to eschew the view that the 
corporation is concerned solely with the interests of shareholders irrespective of the 
effect on society. The question is, however, not only valid but could actually serve to 
enlighten an issue that has still not adequately been resolved, namely the lawful role 
of the corporation. 
The situation as regards the lawfulness of corporate social responsibility was 
first 
brought to the fore by Dodd in the aforementioned Harvard Debate when he stated: 
The view that those who manage our business corporations should concern 
themselves with the interests of employees, consumers and the general public, as 
For example, advocates of the new economic theory of the firm would argue that societal wealth 
is 
maximised when each party contracts for their own well being. If contracts are optimally 
beneficial for 
each party, collectively societal wealth-creation is maximised. 
A view that has become known as the enlightened shareholder value approach. 
See the Department 
of Trade and Industry, ;1 /odern Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy: The Strategic Frainett'ork. 
February 1999, London: HNI SO, para. 5.1.12. 
A S-234(4) and Sch. 7 Part IN Companies Act 1985. 
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well as the stockholders, is thus advanced today by persons whose position in the 
business world is such as to give them great power of influencing both business 
opinion and public opinion generally. Little or no attempt seems to have been 
made, however, to consider how far such an attitude on the part of corporate 
managers is compatible with the legal duties which they owe the stockholder- 
owners as the elected representatives of the latter. 4 
The separation of ownership and control and the subsequent freedom of the managers 
from shareholder control has enabled the directors to adopt goals divergent to profit- 
maximization. 5 Ultimately, the Harvard Debate ended, at least on paper, when Berle 
stated that the argument between him and Dodd has been settled (at least for the time 
being) squarely in favor of Professor Dodd s contention. 6 In justifying this position, 
Dodd relied heavily on cases permitting corporate philanthropy. 7 Corporate 
philanthropy constitutes the most obvious departure from the legal model in that it is 
supposedly totally altruistic. If philanthropic acts can be perceived as lawful, then any 
act that departs from the legal model goal of profit maximisation (in other words, acts 
that benefit non-shareholder constituents) can also be viewed as lawful. Accordingly, 
much of what will be examined will relate to philanthropic acts, but will also apply to 
any act that does not benefit shareholders and therefore is perceived as departing from 
the legal model. 
I. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
In Hutton v West Cork Railway Co., 8 Bowen U held that there should be no cakes 
and ale except such are as required for the benefit of the company. 
9 This quote has 
been interpreted by some academics to mean that corporate philanthropy was 
expressly forbidden. This was not the case, as the full quote reveals: 
The law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no 
cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit of the company . 
[A]s 
it seems to me, charity has no business to sit at boards of directors qua charity. 
10 
4 E. M. Dodd Jnr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees? (1931-32) 45 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1 145 at 
1156. 
5 J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company 
Latit", 1993, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, Ch. 9. 
6 A. A. Berle, The 20'h Century Capitalist Revolution, 1954, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 
p. 169. 
t L. C. B. Gower, Corporate Control: The Battle for the Berkeley (1954-55) 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1 17 h at 
1191. 
s (1883) 23 Ch. D. 654. 
9 Ibid. at p. 673. 
10 Ibid. 
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Although the distinction is fine, it nonetheless exists. Acts in which the company did 
not benefit per se was not permitted, irrespective of their merit. " However, a 
philanthropic act, which in some way benefited the company, would be permissible. 
This was admitted by Bowen U in Hutton when he cited the case of Hampson V 
Price s Patent Candle Co. 12 In Hampson, a company with no express power to pay 
gratuities was held to be acting within its powers when it paid a bonus of one weeks 
wages to its employees. Bowen U believed that such a bonus eases the friction 
between masters and servants, and is, in the end, a benefit to the company. 13 
Accordingly, the starting point, at least regarding the history of corporate departure 
from the legal model, was that the directors owed their duties to the shareholders, 
albeit in an indirect manner, and this was manifested by a policy of profit- 
maximization; a policy that has proved to be extremely resistant to change. It seems 
to have been accepted practically without question until only a decade or two ago that 
the sole purpose of any company was to make the greatest possible profits for its 
shareholders. 14 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW 
As may have been deduced, the judiciary has propagated the corporations role as a 
profit-maximizing institution. Until recently, statute had little part to play. In the UK, 
in the absence of statutory authority, the issue has come to be governed by the 
common law rules of ultra vires. Despite the fact that this doctrine has been heavily 
emasculated, 15 it still has a role to play as regards actions that are outside the 
company s objects. 16 
11 Parke v Daily News Ltd. [ 19621 Ch. 927. 
12 (1876) 45 U Ch. 437. 
13 (1883) 23 Ch. D. 654 at 673. 
14 L. S. Sealy, Cases and Materials in Company Law, 1992,5th ed., London: 
Butterworths, p. 157. 
I` It is contended that to describe the ultra vires rule as abolished, as many academics 
tend to. is 
incorrect. 
16 S. 35(3) Companies Act 1985 provides that: 
35(3) It remains the duty of the directors to observe any limitations on their powers 
flowing from the company s memorandum; and action by the directors which 
but for 
subsection (1) would be beyond the company s capacity may only 
be ratified by the 
company by special resolution. 
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Historically, a company could not be bound by actions that were outside the 
company s objects. 17 However, this proved to be extremely harsh on third parties 
innocently contracting with the company, who would find their contracts invalid. 
Accordingly, s. 108 Companies Act 1989 abolished the hazards faced by innocent 
third parties whilst retaining the directors liability. 18 Though in recognising the 
realities of commerce, both the transaction and the directors exoneration can be 
subsequently ratified by a special resolution. 19 
III. CORPORATE DONATIONS 
Despite the uncertainty concerning the role of the corporation, charitable giving is 
widespread. Unlike less tangible forms of corporate philanthropy, corporate 
donations are readily quantifiable due to the company s obligation to disclose such 
donations in the company accounts. 20 Further publicity is provided by the Charities 
Aid Foundation (CAF) who annually publish lists of the significant corporate donors. 
In 1991/92, the 213 responding companies donated nearly £85 millions. 21 Twenty- 
three companies gave over a million pounds each, and twelve over two millions. 22 The 
figures for the following year are even more impressive. One hundred and sixty-three 
of the top 500 companies gave £149.8 millions to charity. 23 Corporate charitable 
altruism is therefore seen as a conventional part of business life, although when 
compared to the total amount of donations derived from households in 1989/90, a 
figure estimated as between £3.4 and £5 billions, corporate donations appear less 
significant. 
Despite the fact that the practice of corporate giving is universal, particularly amongst 
large listed companies, its lawfulness is uncertain. Further, all the leading cases in 
17.1 chbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. Ltd. v Riche (1875) LR 7 HL 653. 
1S The reformed rules on ultra vires are now contained in ss. 35 and 35A Companies Act 1985. These 
provisions came about due to the UK s inclusion into the European Community, most notably s. 
9 
European Communities Act 1972 which was itself based on Art. 54 Treaty Establishing the European 
Co nmunity. 
29 S. 35(3) Companies Act 1985. 
'° S. 234 and Sch. 7 Part I Companies Act 1985. 21 Charities Aid Foundation, Charity Trends, 1992,15th ed.. Tonbridge: The Charities Aid Foundation, 
pp. 54-6. 
12 J. F. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibilihv: Issues in the Theory of Conrpan}y La%i', 1993, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 290. 
,=S. K. E. Saxon-Harold & J. Kendall (eds. ), Dimensions of the l'oluntarv Sector, 1995. Tonbridge: 
The 
Charities Aid Foundation. 
273 
Chapter 8: The Lawfulness of Departure from the Legal Model. 
this area were decided before the ultra vires reforms contained in the Companies Act 
1989, although it is acknowledged that this may make little difference. Case law has 
held that such donations may sometimes be permissible, as in the case of Evans v 
Brunner Mond & Co. Ltd., 24 and sometimes not, as in Tomkinson v South Eastern 
Railway Co. 25 and the more recent case of Simmonds v Heffer. 26 
In Evans, the shareholders authorized the directors to make donations totaling 
£100,000 to such universities, or other scientific institutions in the United Kingdom 
as they may select for the furtherance of scientific education and research. The 
reason advocated for the donations was that the company hoped that the donations 
would eventually ensure access to a larger and better-trained pool of personnel from 
which to recruit future staff. The company therefore saw a direct causal link between 
the donation and the company s welfare; that the cakes and ale were for the 
company s benefit. One shareholder disagreed and challenged the resolution on the 
basis that the community at large was the true beneficiary, and that the company, as 
part of the community, may derive some distant, remote and more or less insignificant 
benefit but a benefit out of all proportion to the cost. 27 The court agreed with the 
director and held the resolution valid. The court stated that the donation was neither 
too remote nor too speculative for the company to accrue benefit. 
The question that arises is how did the court come to such a decision. Unlike their 
French counterparts, 28 British judges will not assume an investigative function. Even 
if they did, the benefit accrued would be incapable of quantification, both financially 
and temporally. Accordingly, the court was in no position to assess the long-term 
benefits accrued from the donation. It is therefore no surprise to discover that this 
case has been commented upon as depending on little more that a judicial guess. 
29 
4 L9211 1 Ch. 359. 
25 11887) 35 Ch. D. 675. 
2'L19831 BCLC 298. 
27119211 1 Ch. 359 at 365. 
See A. Tunc, The Judge and the Businessman (1986) 102 LQR 549 at 555 who notes that It is 
inconceivable that a judge [in a French court] would state that business decisions are the sole pro\ 
ince 
of the board. 
29 J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibilitº : Issues in the Theory o Company 
Last', 199-1. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 274. 
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In Evans, the sole question was did the donation confer a benefit to the company. 
However, in the earlier case of Tomkinson, it was held that not only must there be a 
benefit to the company, but there must also be a thematic connection between the 
donor and donee. Here, the South-Eastern Railway Company attempted to donate 
£1,000 towards the construction of the Imperial Institute. The company contended 
that the attendance to such events might result in an increase in railway traffic. In 
declaring the donation ultra vires, Kay J held: 
To say that any expenditure which may indirectly conduce to the benefit is 
intra vires, seems to me extravagant. 30 
Accordingly, it was held that it was not within the objects of a railway company to 
donate monies to sporting events. 31 Although never overtly overruled, given the 
changes in the ultra vices laws, it is unlikely that this case still represents good law. 
Similar reasoning was applied in the more recent case of Simmonds v Heffer. 
32 In this 
case the company was the League Against Cruel Sports Ltd., a company set up to 
oppose cruelty to animals. The company made two donations to the Labour Party: a 
general donation to the party s electoral fund worth £50,000 and a specific donation 
worth £30,000 to help fund publicity for the party s manifesto pledge to criminalise 
certain blood sports. The League sought to rely on three paragraphs located in its 
objects relating to the opposition of animal cruelty. 
The specific donation was upheld, the general donation was not. The specific 
donation furthered the League s object of opposing cruelty. Conversely, the general 
donation was struck down because the money could have been spent on policies 
unrelated to the opposition of blood sports. The court stated that the above provisions 
in the memorandum were not objects, but powers incidental to the true objects of 
the 
company. 33 
These cases must now be read in light of the reforms 
brought in by the Companies 
Acts 1985 and 1989. Prior to 1989, it was unclear whether or not gratuitous 
donations 
'0 (1887) 35 Ch. D. 675 at 680. 
31 Today, such a donation could be justified as a form of advertising. 
See D. Wragg, The Effective Csc 
of Sponsorship, 1994, London: Kogan Page. Marketing 
in Action Series; C. Gillies. Business 
Sponsorship, 1991, Oxford: Butterworths Heinamann. 
3, I19831 BCLC 298. 
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were made intra vires by the 1985 Act. Farrar contended that dealing normally 
predicated reprocity and asked whether the language of the former s. 35 was wide 
enough to cover a corporate gift or other gratuitous donation it is arguable that it 
should not. 34 The former s. 35 was also the subject of judicial consideration in the 
case of Re Halt Garage35 where the court stated: 
In any event, the view is expressed in Gore-Browne on Companies (43`d edn, 
1977) paras 3-16, that the recipient of a corporate gift is not a person dealing 
with the company within the meaning of the section and that those words 
contemplate a contractual relationship. 36 
This confusion has been cleared up by the reformed s. 35A(2)(a); 37 a provision 
included following the recommendations of the Prentice Report, 38 so that the 
recipients of gratuitous donations are afforded the same protection as others who deal 
with the company. 
The question that now occupies us is to what extent, if any, does the doctrine of ultra 
vires still exist. S. 108 Companies Act 1989 altered the provisions of the 1985 Act so 
as to lessen the burden upon innocent third parties. As a result of these changes, the 
company s capacity is no longer limited by the objects clause. 39 Despite this, 
however, the shareholders right to restrain directors from entering into an act outside 
the objects of the company is retained. 40 Therefore, should the shareholders discover 
that the directors plan to depart from the legal model and benefit a non-shareholder 
constituent, and this is not authorised by the objects, then the shareholders can obtain 
an injunction to stop this act. Accordingly, in a reduced, but nonetheless important 
sense, the ultra vires doctrine still survives. Therefore, the older cases concerning 
ultra vires still have a role to play. 
33 Ibid. 
3iJ. H. Farrar, N. E. Furey & B. M. Hannigan, Farrar s Company Law, 1991,3`d ed., London: 
Butterworths, p. 112. 
35 [1982] 3 All ER 1016. 
Ibid. at p. 1039, per Oliver J. 
37 35A(2)(a) [Interpretation] (2) For this purpose (a) a person deals with the company if he is party 
to any transaction or other act to which the company is a party 
DTI, Reform of the Ultra Vires Rule: A Consultative Document, 1986, London: DTI. 39 S. 35(1) Companies Act 1985: 
35(l) The validity of an act done by a company shall not be called into question on the 
ground of lack of capacity by reason of anything in the company s memorandum. 
40 S. 35(2) Companies Act 1985. 
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As has been noted, in order for a donation to be intra vires, it had to benefit the 
company. This nebulous rule was refined in the case of Re Lee Behrens. ' Here, the 
directors of the company covenanted on behalf of the company to pay a pension to the 
widow of a former managing director. No general meeting was convened to discuss 
the proposal and no power was conferred on the company by its objects to make such 
a payment. However, the case of Henderson v Bank of Australasia 42 established that 
a trading company continuing in business had an implied power to make such a gift. 
In coming to his decision, Eve J said that the validity of any gift had to be tested by 
the answers to three pertinent questions: (i) Is the transaction reasonably incidental to 
the carrying on of the company s business? (ii) Is it a bona fide transaction, and (iii) 
is it done for the benefit and to promote the prosperity of the company. 43 In finding 
the payment invalid, Eve J held that the directors had not considered whether or not 
the payment was beneficial to the company. The fact that the directors had not put the 
payment to a general meeting was evidence of this. 
Subsequent cases44 have demonstrated, however, that the Lee Behrens tests contain a 
substantial lacuna, namely where the company has a substantive, non-commercial 
object. In Re Horsely & Wei g ht Ltd., ` 5 Buckley U stated that the: 
objects of a company do not need to be commercial; they can be charitable or 
philanthropic; indeed, they can be whatever the original incorporators wish, 
provided that they are legal. Nor is there any reason why a company should not 
part with its funds gratuitously or for non-commercial reasons if to do so is 
46 within its declared objects. 
It should be pointed out that the majority of companies will not have such an object, 
and therefore, a gratuitous disposition of assets will only be valid if it falls within an 
express or implied power. If the company does, however, contain such an object47 
4' 119321 2 Ch. 46. 
42 (1888) 40 Ch. D. 170. 
dl [193212 Ch. 46 at 51. 
as There is judicial inconsistency as to the validity of Re Lee Behrens. In the landmark case in this area, 
Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd. v British Steel Coloration r] 98513 All ER 52 at 80-1 Slade LJ 
stated that the Lee Behrens test should, in my opinion, now be recognized as being of no assistance. 
However, the same judge in the same case, later said that it may well be helpful in considering 
'ý hcther or not in any given case directors have abused the powers vested in them by the company. a` [198213 All ER 1045. 
°6 Ibid. at p. 1052. In this case, the object in question gave the company power 3(o): to grant pensions 
to employees and ex-employees and directors and ex-directors 47 Hanson PLC, one of the UK s largest companies, has an object to support and subscribe to any body 
of persons or trust established for the advancement of education or carrying on any educational 
establishment. The Body Shop International PLC contains four such objects: (B) To institute and 
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then, theoretically, there can never be a problem of the donations being authorized. 
The word theoretically is used because for a time the situation was unclear. In 
Charterbridge Corporation Ltd. v Lloyds Bank, 48 the court suggested that even if the 
company had an express non-commercial object, the directors would still have to act 
in a bona fide manner. 49 Likewise, in Brady v Brady '50 Nourse LJ suggested that the 
ratio of Re Horsely might be restricted in its application: 
In its broadest terms the principle is that a company cannot give away its assets. 
So stated, it is subject to the qualification that in the realm of theory a 
memorandum of association may authorise a company to give away all its assets 
to whomsoever it pleases, including its shareholders. But in the real world of 
trading companies, charitable or political donations, pensions to widows of ex- 
employees and the like apart, it is obvious that such a power would never be 
taken. The principle is only a facet of the wider rule, the corollary of limited 
liability, that the integrity of a company s assets, except to the extent allowed by 
its constitution, must be preserved for the benefit of all those who are interested 
in them, most pertinently its creditors. 51 
The situation, at least for the time being, has now been clarified in the case of Rolled 
Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd. v British Steel CorUoration. 52 In this case, Browne- 
Wilkinson U held: 
the use of the phrase ultra vires should be restricted to those cases where the 
transaction is beyond the capacity of the company and therefore wholly void . 
[I]t is clear that a transaction falling within the objects of the company is capable 
of conferring rights on third parties even though the transaction was an abuse of 
the powers of the company 53 
This case, decided before the 1989 reforms, was the first step in the abolition of this 
doctrine against third parties. 
At this point, a summary of the current position will be of use. If the company has an 
express non-commercial object, then the shareholders will be unable to sustain an 
action under ss. 35 and 35A Companies Act 1985, either before or after the transaction 
support (whether by donation or otherwise) campaigns or educational programs for human and civil 
rights [and] community projects. (C) To establish and develop equitable and responsible 
trading 
relationships, particularly in respect of community economic initiatives. (D) 
To implement policies 
aimed at protecting the natural environment (E) To institute and support campaign against animal 
testing. 
48 [1 9701 Ch. 62. 
49 The proper test, I think must be whether an intelligent and honest man 
in the position of the 
directors of the company concerned, could, in the whole of the existing circumstances, 
have reasonably 
believed that the transactions were for the benefit of the company. Ibid. at p. 74. per Pennycuick 
J. 
`0119881 BCLC 20. 
'1 Ibid. at p. 38. 
-119861 Ch. 246. 
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has taken place. If there is no express authorizing object then unless the donation is 
incidental to the company s business and beneficial to the company, the court will not 
imply a power. Where no power exists, the court will not imply one. In such a case, 
the shareholders will be unable to invalidate a transaction that has already taken place, 
but will be able to enjoin a prospective donation or hold the directors liable under 
s. 35(3) after the transaction. 
It can therefore be seen that, in relation to the ultra vires rule, acts that depart from the 
legal model of the company are permissible providing that there is a provision in the 
objects permitting such departure. However, even if there is no such provision, once 
such an act has become a legal obligation, then it will still be valid, although the 
directors will be liable for breach of duty under s. 35(3). 
Unlimited Objects Clauses and the Impact of s. 3A Companies Act 1985. 
In Re Introductions Ltd., 54 Harman U held that you cannot have an object to do 
every mortal thing you want, because that is to have no object at all. 
55 Theoretically, 
in the light of s. 3A Companies Act 1985, that is now possible. 
It has been a long held tenet of company law that each company must contain within 
its memorandum, a set of object clauses. 
56 The judiciary s attitude has been that the 
objects exist in order to delineate the activities of the company, to limit the company s 
power. Referring to the Companies Act 1948, Lord Wrenbury held: 
I cannot doubt that when the Act says that the memorandum must state the 
objects the meaning is that it must specify the objects, that it must 
delimit and 
identify the objects. 57 
Accordingly, a set of objects that set out to be limitless would not 
be lawful. As far 
back as 1890, North J stated that: 
'; 
Ibid. at p. 303. 
'' f 19701 1 Ch. 199. 
Ibid. at p. 209. 
.6S. 2(1)(c) Companies Act 1985. The DTI Company Law Review 
Steering Groups Report Modern 
Company Luwfior a Competitive Econoniv: The Strategic 
Framework, February 1999, London: DTI, 
para. 5.3.18 recommends that this requirement be abolished 
for new companies and existing companies 
should have the option to retain or abolish. Shareholders would 
be free to enact any restrictions the, 
wish in the form of objects. Following ss. 1 17 and 125 
Company Law Review Act 1998, Australian 
companies can now be formed without a constitution. 
57 Colman v Brougham f 19181 AC 514 at 522. 
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If the memorandum were to state, as the objects of the company, that it was to 
carry on any business whatever which the company might think would be 
profitable to the shareholders, in my opinion that would not be a statement of the 
objects of the company as required by the Act. 58 
However, since the conception of the requirement that the objects must delineate the 
powers of the company, this principle has been judicially sapped 59 by the courts. 
Here, the cases that emasculated this principle will be examined culminating with an 
analysis of s. 3A, a provision that theoretically eliminates this requirement. For 
present purposes, the importance of unlimited objects should not be underestimated. 
If they are indeed lawful, then this is equivalent to parliamentary permission that the 
company may engage in almost any activities that it wishes, including acts of 
corporate philanthropy. 
Judicial erosion of this principle derived from the High Court of Australia in the case 
of HA Stephenson & Son Ltd. v Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. 6° Here, the appellant 
company was formed to carry on the trade of produce merchant in Western Australia. 
It contracted with the respondent company in Calcutta for the purchase of jute. The 
contract was not explicitly authorised by the objects but clause (j) gave the company 
power: [t]o carry on any other business whether manufacturing or otherwise as the 
company may deem expedient. The question was whether the jute purchases were 
made intra vires by this provision. 
In holding the purchase valid, Dixon J held: 
The true meaning of the object would appear to be to authorise the company to 
carry on any business found to be connected or associated with any existing 
business of the company . 
Wide as such a definition is, it does not appear to be 
considered too indefinite to pass muster as a lawful object, and upon this 
memorandum no greater restriction of the general words is justified 
61 
These subjective objects were upheld in the UK in the landmark case of Bell Houses 
Ltd. v City Wall Properties Ltd. 62 Here, both companies were property developers. 
The plaintiff company introduced the defendants to a financier who provided them 
with a bridging loan of £1 million. In return for this introduction, the defendants 
,Q Re Crown Bank (1890) 44 Ch. D. 634 at 644. 
59 S. de Gay, Problems Surrounding Use of the New Single Objects Clause (1993) 137 SJ 
146 at 146. 
60.1931) 45 CLR 476. 
61 .,.. ioia. at p. 49 i. Al 
°" I196612 013 656. 
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agreed to pay the plaintiffs £20,000. The defendants reneged on this fee arguing that 
a mortgage-broking transaction such as this was outside the plaintiff company s 
objects. The plaintiff company had no express term authorising the transaction but 
sought to rely on clause 3(c) which stated: To carry on any other trade or business 
whatsoever which can, in the opinion of the board of directors, be advantageously 
carried on by the company in connection with or as ancillary to the general 
business of the company. At first instance, Mocatta J upheld the defendant s 
contention that the transaction was ultra vires, with the consequence that the plaintiff 
went unrewarded for their part in the transaction. The plaintiffs appealed and the 
Court of Appeal reversed the decision. 
In holding the transaction intra vires, Salmon U held that: 
An object of the plaintiff company is to carry on any business which the 
directors genuinely believe can be carried on advantageously in connection with 
or ancillary to the general business of the company. It may be that the directors 
take the wrong view and in fact the business in question cannot be carried on as 
the directors believe. But in matters not how mistaken the directors may be. 
Providing they form their view honestly, the business is within the plaintiff 
company s objects and powers. 63 
The significance of the above two cases is considerable. In effect, they permit 
subjective open-ended objects allowing the directors to partake in activities not 
overtly covered by the objects. Accordingly, the objects clause no longer delineates 
the powers of the company. However, these cases do not approve unlimited objects 
clauses. In both HA Stephenson and Bell Houses, the court explicitly stated that in 
order for a transaction to be valid, it must be connected in some way with the business 
of the company. Therefore, what these two cases have introduced in effect is a class 
of subordinate objects clause derived from the original objects. They are akin to the 
relationship between primary and secondary legislation: they have the same level of 
authority but the existence of the subordinate is defined and fully dependent on the 
scope and existence of the primary. 
The position at this point is that in order for an act to be valid it must either (a) be 
explicitly permitted by the objects clause, or; (b) be believed by the directors that such 
an act is connected to the company and can be carried on advantageously. This 
6, lbid. at p. 690. 
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position was, however, complicated by the case of Newstead (Inspector of Taxes) 
Frost. 64 
This case involved the television presenter David Frost. As part of a scheme designed 
to reduce the amount of tax paid on overseas earnings, he entered into a partnership 
agreement with a company in the Bahamas. The General Commissioners found the 
partnership valid with the result that he was only taxed on sums remitted in the UK. 
The Inland Revenue appealed on the grounds that the company was acting ultra Ores 
in entering into the partnership. 
The case revolved around memorandum clause 3(6), which authorized the company: 
To carry on any business as bankers, capitalists, financiers, concessionaries and 
merchants and to undertake and carry on and execute all kinds of financial 
commercial trading or other operations and generally to undertake and carry out 
all such obligations and transactions as an individual capitalist may lawfully 
undertake and carry out. 
The difficulties arose concerning the meaning of the phrase other operations. In the 
House of Lords, Viscount Dilhorne said: 
I doubt if the business of the partnership is properly to be described as a 
commercial operation, but if it is not a financial or commercial operation it 
certainly is covered by the words all kinds of other operations. 65 
This is the problematic area. As stated earlier, any activity not covered by the objects 
must be connected to the objects in some way. Here, it is unclear whether the other 
operations need be connected to the substantive objects. If they do not, then the 
company will be able to partake in any lawful activity, thereby ensuring that detailed 
objects would be irrelevant. Given that his lordship makes this exact point, one is led 
to believe that this is the conclusion arrived at: 
It is true that if they are given an unlimited meaning it is hard to see the purpose 
of the other words in clause 3 (6) or indeed the object of including the other 
paragraphs of clause 3 for a statement that the object of the company was to 
carry on and execute all kinds of operations would cover all the other stated 
objects. 66 
64 119801 1 WLR 135. 
65 
Ibid. at p. 141. 
66 Ibid. 
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Ultimately, the position is unclear. There is no House of Lords decision on the matter 
and until the position is clear, companies will continue to use elaborately detailed 
objects. As we shall see, this is even so despite the introduction of a general objects 
clause. 
As we have seen, the ultra vires doctrine underwent a considerable emasculation 
following the Companies Act 1989. As part of this process, the Act introduced a 
provision permitting the company s memorandum to state that the object of the 
company is to carry on business as a general commercial company. According to 
s. 3A Companies Act 198567 this means: 
(a) the object of the company is to carry on any trade or business whatsoever, 
and 
(b) the company has power to do all such things as are incidental to the carrying 
on of any trade or business by it. 
Some have assumed that the intention of Parliament in introducing this provision was 
to encourage companies to curtail from drafting long detailed objects clauses. In fact, 
in line with the reforms contained in the 1989 Act, the adoption of s. 3A will mean 
that the company will effectively have opted out of the ultra vires rule for internal 
purposes. 68 However, for reasons that will be examined, poor drafting has led to a 
situation where the new provision is little used, or where it is used, it is still used in 
conjunction with detailed objects. 69 
S. 110 Companies Act 1989 was introduced relatively late in the Act s passage 
through Parliament. Accordingly, it escaped thorough scrutiny. This explains why 
the Act contains several phrases and words that are highly ambiguous, and more 
importantly for our purposes, the wording of the Act appears to oppose corporate 
philanthropy. 
Firstly, there is uncertainty as to what is meant by the words trade and business. If 
a literal approach is adopted, then corporate philanthropy will not appear to be 
covered. The objects clause will permit all kinds of profit-making activity, but not 
67 ý........ .. ý_. ý ýnn tntroaucea ny s. ii u Lompantes Hct i va,,,. 
°x Lord Strathclyde, Hansard, 21" February 1989. 
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activity that departs from the profit goal. This is upheld by the use of the phrase 
general commercial company. If this is the case, then companies that have at their 
heart charitable activities, for example charitable or holding companies, may be 
precluded from using the new objects clause. 70 If this interpretation is correct, then it 
can be said that s. 3A directly upholds the legal model by not permitting non-profit 
making activity. Conversely, a more liberal approach may be adopted in which the 
words trade or business may also include activities that are not reciprocal of profit 
led. 
Secondly, regardless of the meaning of the words trade or business, the company 
can engage in any activity within its field of trade. What this means is that there is no 
longer a need for subjective objects clauses such as those found in the Bell Houses 
line of authority. 
Finally, s. 3A applies where the company s memorandum states that the object of the 
company is to carry on business as a general commercial company. The use of the 
word the implies that the s. 3A objects clause should be the only stated object. 
However, this has not been the case. Due to its uncertain nature, s. 3A is used in 
conjunction with the very protracted objects that it was enacted to replace. 
The above problems ensure that s. 3A is not going to form part of the new Companies 
Act. In its opening document, the Company Law Review Steering Group looked at 
s. 3A under the heading Obsolescent or Ineffective Provisions. 71 
The Role of the Directors Fiduciary Duties. 
The ultra vices doctrine is but one part of a two-part test of validity. The second 
constraint on director s power derives from their position as fiduciaries. It should be 
noted here that there is a blurred relationship between the ultra wires doctrine and the 
69 The most recent report to state this is the DTI Company Law Review Steering Group s 
Report 
Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy. The Strategic Frametirork, 1999, HMSO, 
para. 5.3.17. 
° S. de Gay, Problems Surrounding Use of the New Single Objects Clause (1993) 137 SJ 146 at 146. 
71 Company Law Review Steering Group, : lfodern Company Law 
for a Competitive Economy, March 
1998. London: DTI, para. 3.4. 
284 
Chapter 8: The Lawfulness of Departure from the Legal Model. 
directors fiduciary duties. Even if a donation is intra vires, it may still be invalidated 
if the directors are found to have breached their fiduciary duties. 
The objects clause in the company s memorandum states the activities for which the 
company has been formed, although these may be altered by special resolution. 72 
Conversely, the fiduciary controls on managerial autonomy place a duty on the 
directors to act indirectly in the interests of the shareholders, a duty resulting from the 
private conception of the company and company law. The shareholders own the 
company73 and therefore have a right to expect it to be run in their own interests. 
In Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. 
574 Lord Greene MR held that directors must act: 
bona fide in what they consider-not what a court may consider-is in the interests 
of the company, and not for any collateral purpose. 75 
At one point, this was held to be one test alone. Providing that the directors honestly 
believed that they were acting in the best interests of the company, the proper 
purposes test was irrelevant. 76 Today, however, it is now firmly established that 
directors must act in the best interests of the company and for a proper purpose. 77 
Accordingly, both duties will be examined. 
The bona fide test has been a harsh example of the difficulties surrounding judicial 
interpretation. As we have seen, 78 two issues specifically have caused ambiguity, 
namely the meanings of bona fide and the company. We will briefly re-examine 
both of these in relation to corporate philanthropy. The meaning of the company 
will be examined first. This issue has considerable significance for the question of 
corporate donations. If a narrow interpretation is used, then the societally beneficial 
nature of donations will not fit within a narrow definition. 
72 S. 4 Companies Act 1985. Although as we have seen, the objects clause no longer limits the 
company s capacity. 
73 As we have seen, many company law theorists actively assert that it is inaccurate to describe the 
shareholders as owners. On why the ownership argument is no longer accurate, see supra. at Ch. 2. 
,a 119421 Ch. 304. 
75 Ibid. at p. 306. 
76 Tcck corporation v Alillar (1972) 33 DLR (3d) 288 at 312, per Berger J. 
77 Hvºrard Smith Ltd. v . -I mpol 
Petroleum Ltd. [19741 AC 821. 
78 Supra. at Ch. 4. 
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The bona fide duty appears to be something of a paradox. It is a well-established 
tenet of company law that the directors owe their fiduciary duties to the company as a 
legal entity. 79 Shareholders and creditors cannot enforce the duty, 80 nor can fellow 
directors. 81 However, this does not mean that the board must act so as to promote the 
interests of the entity, 82 even though the duty is owed to the entity. A duty to benefit 
an entity that cannot experience well-being would be irrational. 83 The most accurate 
statement of the duty appears to be that the corporate entity is a vehicle for benefiting 
the interests of a specified group or groups. 84 In upholding the legal model of the 
company, this has come to mean the shareholders. Professor Gower notes: 
Despite the separate personality of the company it is clear that directors are not 
expected to act on the basis of what is for the economic advantage of the 
corporate entity, disregarding the interests of the members. 85 
He goes on cite the case of Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinenzas86 as authority for this 
statement: 
the phrase the company as a whole does not mean the company as a 
commercial entity as distinct from the corporators. 
87 
It should be stressed however, that despite a few limited areas, 88 a company owes no 
fiduciary duty to its members. Rather it is a duty to promote the success of the 
business venture, in order to benefit the members. 89 Accordingly, any donation must 
benefit the members. 
Recently, the definition of the company has undergone a slight modification. In 
1980, Lord Diplock held that the interests of the company are not exclusively those 
79 Percival v Wright [19021 2 Ch. 421. Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. [19421 Ch. 304; Multinational Gas 
and Petrochemical Co. Ltd. v Alurltinational Gas & Petrochemical Services Ltd. (19831 Ch. 258. 
So Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co. Ltd. v Multinational Gas & Petrochemical Services Ltd. 
1983 Ch. 258; Brant Investments Ltd. v KeepRite Inc. (1990) 80 DLR (4`h) 161. 
Lee v Chou Wen Hsien [1984] 1 WLR 1202. 
Re Halt Garage Ltd. [19821 3 All ER 1016; Dawson International PLC v Coats Paton PLC 
119891 BCLC 233. 
X3 P. L. Davies and Lord Wedderburn, The Land of Industrial Democracy [ 1977] I LJ 197 at 199. 
sa J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Thea"_v of Company Latin. 1993, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 77. 
L. C. B. Gower, Principles of Modern Company Latin, 1992,5`h ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, p. 555. 
86 11951 ] Ch. 286. 
S7 Ibid. at p. 291, per Evershed M1R. 88 Such as when a company is the target of a takeover (Heron International Ltd. v Lord Grade [ 19831 
BCLC 244) or where the company is a quasi-partnership (Ebrahimi v Il'estbourne Galleries Ltd. and 
others [1973] AC 360. ) For more on the possibility of a direct fiduciary duty, see supra. at Ch. 4. 
89 J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory ol'Companv Latin, 1993. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 77. 
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of shareholders but may also include those of creditors. 90 In following three 
Australian cases, 91 Nourse U, in the leading case in this area held that where a 
company is both going and solvent, first and foremost come the shareholders 
Conversely, where the company is insolvent, or even doubtfully solvent, the interests 
of the company are in reality the interests of the existing creditors alone. 92 
This extension of the bona fide duty to creditors has important implications for the 
issue of donations. If a liberal approach is to be adopted and corporate donations are 
to be permitted, then they will only be permissible if the company is financially 
healthy. If a company is doubtfully solvent, then the directors have a duty to keep the 
funds inviolate so that if the company becomes insolvent, the creditors will be paid. 
This reflects a reality of commerce. The practice of corporate philanthropy should be 
restricted to those companies that have the ability to afford it. Companies in financial 
difficulty should direct all their efforts towards becoming solvent or, if that is not 
possible, to ensure that the company will be able to pay it creditors. Accordingly, one 
could argue that as the company approaches insolvency, the company is actually 
required to move away from the legal model and act in the interests of its creditors as 
opposed to its shareholders. 
The phrase bona fide is also not free from ambiguity. As noted, the dictionary offers 
two meanings: in good faith and genuine. The distinction is important as the 
former is a more subjective test whereas the latter is objective in nature. To the regret 
of many, 93 the court has adopted the former. In Charterbridge Corporation Ltd. v 
Lloyds Bank Ltd., 94 Pennycuick J said: 
The proper test I think must be whether an intelligent and honest man in the 
position of the director of the company concerned, could have reasonably 
believed that the transactions were for the benefit of the company. 95 
This subjective approach goes hand in hand with the tenet that the court will not 
interfere in the internal management of the company. However, it is not the case that 
1 onln o Ltd. and Another v Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. and another (1940) 1 WLR 
627 at 634. 90 
91 I1'alker i' Wimbourne & Others (1976) 50 AJLR 446; Nicholson v Permakraft 
(NZ) Ltd. II `)N+ 'II 
NZLR 242: Kinsela i' Russell Kinsela Pty. Ltd. (1986) 10 ACLR 395. 
Brach' v Bradv [ 198713 BCC 535 at 552. 
93 E. g. L. Sealy, Bona fides and Proper Purposes in Corporate Decisions [1989) 15 
Mon. L. R. 265 
at 269. 
1)4 119701 Ch. 62. 
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in order to exonerate themselves, all the directors need to do is demonstrate subjective 
honesty. As far back as 1883 Bowen U said: 
Bona fides cannot be the sole test, otherwise you might have a lunatic 
conducting the affairs of the company, and paying away its money with both hands in a manner perfectly bona fide yet perfectly irrational. 96 
This has come to be known as the amiable lunatics test. Despite the subjective 
standard, there is an objective minimum. If the board s decision is one that no 
reasonable director or shareholder could have reasonably believed was for the benefit 
of the company, then the court can invalidate it. However, such instances are rare. 
The second strand of the duty is the proper purpose doctrine. The weakness of the 
bona fide test, namely its subjective nature, has necessitated that the courts place 
greater emphasis on this second strand. 97 Directors have considerable power, but their 
power is limited by the purposes for which that power may be exercised. If directors 
breach this power and act for an improper purpose, then the court may intervene. 
Powers given to [directors] for one purpose cannot be used by them for another 
purpose. To permit such proceedings would be to sanction not the use but the 
abuse of their powers. 98 
These limits may be derogated by the articles of association. 99 However, in practice, 
it is difficult to lay down in advance the purposes for which directors may exercise 
their powers. 100 Therefore, every case must be decided on its own facts. 101 
Despite this, the courts have developed principles with which to determine the proper 
purpose(s). However, to date, the issue of donations has not been litigated on in this 
area. Accordingly, the proper purpose doctrine will not be examined any further as 
any conclusions would be estimations at best. 
95 Ibid. at p. 74 (Italics added. ) 
96 Hutton v West Cork Railway Co. (1883) 23 Ch. D. 654 at 671. 97 L. Scaly, Bona Fides and Proper Purposes in Corporate Decisions [1989] 15 Mon. L. R. 
265 at 
266. 
98 Re Cameron s Coalbrook Steam, Coal & Swansea & Loueher Railway Co., Bennett s 
Case (1854L-5 
De GM &G 284 at 298, per Turner U. 
19 Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. [19.12] Ch. 304 at 306. 
100 In Howard Smith Ltd. v . 4mpol 
Petroleum Ltd. [1974] AC 821 at 835, Lord \Vilberforce stated that 
[t]o define in advance exact limits beyond which directors must not pass is, in their 
lordships view. 
impossible. 
101 4dvancc Bank of Australia Ltd. v FAI Insuranccc Australia Ltd. (1987) 9 NSWLR 
464. 
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Conclusion. 
As can be seen, the lawfulness of acts that depart from the profit goal is not an easy 
issue to determine. At its most basic level, however, it can be seen that a two-fold test 
needs to be passed. First, it will need to be determined whether or not the proposed 
act is ultra vires. We have seen that the ultra vires doctrine is not hostile to 
philanthropic acts per se provided that they are permitted in the company s objects. 
Second, it will need to be demonstrated that the act in question does not contravene 
the directors fiduciary duties. Having examined both of the above tests, it can be 
seen that the law, in practice, will accommodate a certain degree of departure from the 
legal model. The conclusion must therefore be that the current limited forms of social 
activity are permissible under the law and that there is room for companies to engage 
in more extensive acts of social responsibility before the legal constraints become a 
serious threat. 102 
CONCLUSION 
Many years ago, the US states began to abolish the doctrine of ultra virus. This 
abolition served as a vital catalyst in bringing about the existence of philanthropic 
statutes and legalizing corporate philanthropy. In 1989, Parliament took the first step 
towards abolishing this ancient doctrine. However, it was only a step and as we have 
seen, in certain important respects, the ultra vires still survives. Accordingly, the old 
case law concerning the company s capacity still has a role to play. Instead of 
bringing clarity to this area of the law, we now have a situation where, depending on 
the objects of the company and the point in time when the shareholders discovered of 
the act in question, the transaction may be governed by either pre or post-1989 
law. 
Likewise, the ambiguous wording of s. 3A has also failed to bring about any real 
clarity. Many companies have not used the new objects clause or, 
if they have, they 
are used in conjunction with existing objects. 
Therefore, the key to the lawfulness of corporate philanthropy can be seen to 
be the 
role of the doctrine of ultra vires, or at least some statutory recognition of 
the 
corporations right to pursue non-profit goals. Many 
forms of activity that depart 
102 J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of 
Company Law. 1993. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 280. 
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from the legal model can in fact be justified on the basis of long-term profit 
maximisation. This means that it is unlikely that most forms of philanthropy will be 
in breach of the directors fiduciary duties. 
One must therefore conclude that it is indeed permissible for corporations to depart 
from the parameters of the legal model of the company and engage in activities that 
are not profit maximising. This means that the company should be free to benefit 
non-shareholder constituents such an employees and creditors. In the previous 
chapter, we demonstrated that their interests are certainly worthy of consideration. 
Provided that there are objects permitting such action, the ultra vires doctrine is not 
hostile to employees or creditors. Given that it appears that the next Companies Act 
will abolish the ultra vires doctrine, there will be no constitutional limitations upon 
the company s ability to benefit and protect non-shareholder constituents. We saw in 
Chapter 4 that directors are now permitted to take into account the interests of 
employees and creditors. Whilst we saw that the duties placed upon the directors to 
take employee and creditor interests into account are weak, the fact that the directors 
are able to do so demonstrates an acceptance that it is lawful for companies to act in 
the interests of such parties. 
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Corporate Environmental Responsibility 
INTRODUCTION: CORPORATE POLLUTION -A GROWING 
PROBLEM? 
In 1969, the American corporation Union Carbide set up a subsidiary, Union Carbide 
of India Ltd. (UCIL), to produce pesticides at its Bhopal plant in the State of Madhya 
Pradesh. One of the ingredients in the production of these pesticides was Methyl 
Isocyanate (MIC), a highly toxic gas. On the night of 2"d-3rd December 1984,40 tons 
of MIC leaked from the plant and drifted eight kilometres downwind over the city of 
Bhopal. It moved over the poor settlements and onto the more densely populated 
areas of the city. The original death count was estimated at 2,000. ' By 1987, the 
official death toll stood at 3,500 and by 1992, it was over 4,000. However, victim s 
organisations have placed the death toll at nearer 16,000. Over 400,000 people were 
seriously injured. A year after the disaster, the Indian Health Minister announced that 
36 women had spontaneously aborted, 21 babies were born with deformities and there 
were 27 stillbirths, all suspected to have been caused by the gas leak. Even today, 10- 
12 children die every month as a result of illnesses related to the disaster. Despite all 
of this, Union Carbide still maintains that MIC is merely a mild throat and ear 
irritant. 2 
The disaster gave rise to the largest lawsuit in history. Three years after the disaster, 
487,000 claims had been filed in India under the statutory scheme for the registration 
and processing of claims set up by the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of 
Claims) Act 1985. The lawsuit lasted over seven years. Although the final settlement 
of $470 millions satisfied the Government of India, it was condemned by the victims 
as being wholly inadequate. 3 
The figures vary widely. Poor documentation, mass burials and cremations, and conflicting medical 
opinions ensure that the precise number will never be known. 
See Round the World: India - Long Term Effects of MIC (1989) 644Lancet April 
29`h p. 952. 
3 J. Cassels, The Uncertain Promise cal' Law: Lessons from Bhopal, 1993, Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press Incorporated, Preface. 
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Whilst, thankfully, disasters on the scale of Bhopal and Chernobyl are exceptionally 
rare, they are viewed as typifying what is perceived to be a recurring problem, namely 
corporate environmental pollution. The number of examples is almost endless. In 
1996, Marcropper, a subsidiary of a Canadian mining company operating in the 
Philippines, released toxic liquid tailings into the surrounding area. The Boac River 
was so severely polluted as to be declared biologically dead. In the same year, 
another Canadian mining company, Freeport McMoran Copper & Gold, dumped 
significant amounts of mine waste in Indonesia leading to substantial local unrest in 
which two Indonesian tribesman were shot dead and three soldiers injured. 
Given the numerous examples of corporate pollution, there is little doubt that the law 
has found it extremely difficult to regulate corporate environmental activity. The 
question that must be asked is why have corporations been able to continually cause 
environmental damage. One notable reason that should be stated at the outset is that 
in general, corporate law has little to say on the corporations environmental 
behaviour; that is left to environmental law and environmental regulation has to date 
experienced significant difficulties in regulating corporate environmental activity. 
The corporation has shown itself to being remarkably adept at displacing and avoiding 
liability under the general environmental law. The first part of this chapter will 
examine why environmental law has been unable to effectively regulate corporate 
environmental activity. Part II will examine some specific facets of corporate law that 
permit the corporation to evade its environmental obligations. Finally, Part III will, 
based on the theoretical justifications analysed in Chapter 6 and expanded upon in 
Chapter 7, examine a number of possible theories that could be used to justify greater 
corporate environmental protection measures from companies themselves. 
I. THE INADEQUACY OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
The History of Environmental Regulation. 
Public concerns regarding the environment first arose in the early 1960 s when. Rachel 
Carson s book Silent Spring4 triggered a debate that has gripped the public since. 
d R. Carson, Silent Spring, 1962, Hammondsworth: Penguin. 
' Although as T. Cannon, Corporate Responsibility. 1992, London: Pitman Publishing, P .188 points 
out, the Romans saw people crippled and the environment polluted by their early mining methods. 
292 
Chapter 9: Corporate Environmental Responsibility. 
Since then, [t]he evidence that pollution, land degradation, deforestation, ozone 
depletion, climate change, and the loss of biological diversity are inflicting serious 
and in some cases irreversible damage to the planet which sustains us, is increasingly 
compelling. 6 As this evidence has increased, so too have calls for greater 
environmental regulation. This environmental regulation has evolved in two distinct 
phases. The first phase began in the early 1970 s when governments around the world 
responded to increasing pubic concern by enacting a plethora of regulations designed 
to prevent or minimise environmental degradation. 7 Generally, all over the world, 
these regulatory approaches followed the United States command and control model 
of regulation. A command and control approach to regulation basically involves 
legislatures prescribing certain behavioural standards and setting up regulatory 
agencies to monitor and enforce compliance of these standards. However, by the late 
1970 s, it became apparent that command and control regulation had not been as 
successful as the legislatures had hoped. Regulatory agencies, notably those in the 
United States and the UK, adopted an adversarial stance towards those they were 
regulating which increased regulatory resistance and proved counterproductive. 8 
Further, the environmental regulations themselves were often inflexible and 
prohibitively costly for businesses to comply with. 9 Following these developments, 
centralized bureaucratic standard-setting - the hallmark of traditional command and 
control models - has now been subject to continued criticism for being an inherently 
inefficient and cumbersome way to control pollution 10 and for failing to deliver the 
environmental benefits that it promised. ' 
However, it has been argued that the critics of command and control regulation have 
gone too far for a number of reasons. Firstly, whilst the original command and 
control models of regulation were indeed inflexible and excessively costly, recent 
6 N. Gunningham, Introduction in N. Gunningham, P. Grabosky and D. Sinclair, Smart Regulation: 
Designing Environmental Policy, 1998, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 3. 
7 On this first phase, see R. Kagan, Regulatory Enforcement in D. Rosenbloom & R. Schwartz (eds. ), 
Handbook of Regulation and Administrative Law, 1994, Dekker: New York. 8 See E. Bardach & R. Kagan, Going By the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness, 
1982, Philadelphia: Temple University Press; D. Vogel, National Styles of Regulation: Environmental 
Policv in Great Britain and the United States, 1986, New York: Cornell University Press. 9 D. J. Fiorino, Towards a New System of Environmental Regulation: The Case for an Industry Sector 
Approach (1996) 26(2) Environmental Law 457 at 459. 
10 E 
. D. Elliot, Environmental 
TQI: Anatom_' of a Pollution Control Program That Works! (1994) 92 
Michigan LR. 1847 at 1849. 
11 E. g. see W. E. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law (1995) 89(40) Northwestern University LR. 1227. 
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models are showing themselves to be much more flexible and cost-effective. 
Secondly, critics often overlook that the regulatory agencies created to police 
command and control regulations are often unable to perform the tasks for which they 
were created due to a lack of resources. Finally, it should not be forgotten that, 
notwithstanding the aforementioned difficulties, command and control regulation has 
achieved many significant victories in stopping, or at least slowing, environmental 
degradation. 12 For example, both water and air quality have been substantially 
improved in many jurisdictions over the last 30 years, due mostly to governmental 
regulation. 13 
However, as will be seen later in this chapter, many of these gains have come at an 
unnecessarily high social and economic cost. In certain areas, command and control 
regulation has shown itself to be totally ineffective. 14 There is also mounting 
evidence that the current forms of command and control regulation have reached their 
limits as regards technical capacity and cost-effectiveness. ' 5 
It was against the backdrop of this acknowledgement of the shortcomings of 
command and control regulation that regulatory critics were able to mount a challenge 
against the traditional command and control model and advocate a policy of 
environmental deregulation. This began the second phase of environmental 
regulation. In fact, this campaign for deregulation was so successful that certain areas 
of environmental regulation that were previously subject to 20 years of governmental 
regulation, were substantially deregulated during the 1980 s. However, due to public 
opposition, wholesale environmental deregulation did not take place and, despite 
resources for environmental regulation being slashed significantly during the Reagan 
12 See G. Easterbrook,. 4 Moment on the Earth: The Coming of Age of Environmental Optimism, 
1995, 
New York: Viking Press. 
13 S. Cohen, EPA: .4 Qualified 
Success in S. Kamieniecki, R. 0 Brien & M. Clarke (eds. ). 
Controversies in Environmental Policy. 1986, Albany: State University of New York Press, p. 174. 
14 For example, command and control regulation is poorly equipped to 
deal with complex 
environmental problems such as climate change and loss of biological diversity. which 
demand a far 
more sophisticated strategy. See A. L. Alm, .a 
Need for New A pproaches: Command and Control is 
No 
Longer a Cure-All (1992) EPA Journal 18. 
15 N. Gunningham, Introduction in N. Gunningham, P. Grabosky and D. Sinclair, Smart Regulation: 
Designing Environmental Policy, 1998, Oxford: Clarendon Press. p. 7. 
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and Thatcher administrations, 16 the regulatory structure and legislation remained 
largely intact. 
Despite this, there is no doubt that the regulators are losing the argument. Proponents 
of command and control are reluctant to argue for stringent regulation for fear of 
alienating the business community, who argue that such regulation will make them 
less competitive and hasten their departure to another jurisdiction. '? Further, it is now 
apparent that, even if regulation were to come back into favour, it would probably be 
unsuccessful. Firstly, the problems of command and control regulation encountered 
during the first phase of environmental regulation are yet to be resolved, and 
secondly, governmental resources for environmental regulation are extremely limited. 
Industrial premises can only be inspected once every few years which means that 
these inspectors often have to rely on industry to monitor itself. This coupled with the 
fact that regulatory agencies often do not have the time and resources to initiate 
prosecutions means that today, the traditional command and control model is 
perceived as highly limited. '8 However, as we shall see, there is little to indicate that 
total deregulation would be any better. What is required is a mixture of approaches. 
Recognition that what was required was a policy mixture first came in the early 
1990 s with the work of Ayres and Braithwaite who argued that what was needed was 
responsive regulation capable of providing creative options to bridge the abyss 
between deregulation and pro-regulatory rhetoric. 19 By the mid-1990 s, this 
dissatisfaction with the regulatory status quo led to a number of national and 
international proposals that contained regulatory mixtures. This first to emerge was 
Agenda 21, a 1992 sustainable development policy proposed at the Rio Earth Summit, 
the largest ever gathering of world leaders. 20 Soon to follow was the EU s Fifth 
Action Program which aimed to create a new interplay between the main groups of 
16 See J. A. Lash, A Season of Spoils: The Reagan Administrations Attack on the Environment, 1984. 
New York: Pantheon Books. 
17 N. Gunningham, Introduction in N. Gunningham, P. Grabosky and D. Sinclair, Smart Regulation: 
Designing Environmental Policy, 1998, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 8. 
1e See, for example, N. Gunningham, Negotiated Non-Compliance: A Case Study ol'Regulatori" Failure 
(1987) 9(1) Law and Policy 69. 19 1. Ayres & J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, 1992. 
New York: OUP, p. 14. 
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actors (government, enterprise, public) and the principal economic sectors (industry. 
energy, transport, agriculture and tourism) through the use of an extended, and 
integrated range of instruments. 21 
However, despite the promising nature of these proposed instruments, little has been 
done to put them into practice. As the OECD stated in 1997 instruments, while 
pervasive, are the least analysed [public management tool]. When they are analysed, 
they tend to be studied individually rather than comparatively. 22 Whilst the United 
States EPA had, by the mid 1990 s, introduced a number of flexible policy-mixed 
programmes, they remained ancillary to its other activities and has, to date, only 
produced marginal results. 23 A similar situation is evident in Europe with heavy 
reliance on command and control regulation and only limited application of policy 
mixtures. Over ten years after Agenda 21 was put into action, extinction rates are 
higher than at any time since the disappearance of the dinosaurs. 24 The Fifth Action 
Program mentioned earlier was, according to a report in late 1996, making extremely 
slow progress and was nowhere near completion. 25 Initiatives at a national level have 
also been disappointing. In the UK, two high level reports in 1997 identified inertia 
as the dominant governmental response to issues of environmental sustainability. 26 
Forms of Environmental Regulation. 
As was noted above, we have moved from a process of regulation towards one of 
deregulation. However, the deregulation process was only partial and so we are left 
with an amalgam of various regulatory mechanisms. The various mechanisms used to 
regulate corporate environmental activity will be examined here. It will be seen that 
20 United Nations Commission for Environment and Development (UNCED), Agenda 21: Programme 
of Ac Lion For Sustainable Development, Section 1 Chapter 8(B) Providing an Effective Legal and 
Regulatori' Framework, 1992, Geneva: UNCED, p. 55. 
21 Commission of the European Community (CEC), Towards Sustainabilitv: Fifth Action Program of 
the European Union, 1992, Brussels: CEC, p. 25. 
22 PUMA/OECD, Choices of Policy Instruments, 20th March 1997,15`h Session of Public Management 
Committee, Paris: PUMA/OECD. 
D See T. Davies & J. Mazurek, Industry Incentives for Environmental Improvement: Evaluation ut US 
Federal Initiatives, 1996, Washington DC: Resources for the Future. 
a Figures place extinction rates at over 75 species per day. See T. Juniper, The Corporate Transition 
to Sustainable Development in N1. K. Addo (ed. ), Human Rights Standards and the Responsibilit. v of 
Transnational Corporations, 1999, Cambridge: Kluwer Law International, p. 78. 
25 See H. Joliffe, European Union Fifth Action Program: Progress Report on implementation of 
Towards Sustainabilirv (1996) 5(4) Review of European Community and Environmental Law 542. 
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each has unique flaws that have proved almost impossible to overcome. Accordingly, 
it will become evident that a mixture of the various forms of regulation is required if 
environmental degradation is to be reduced. 
Command and Control Regulation. 
As noted, during the first phase of environmental regulation, the primary 
governmental response to the problem if environmental damage was to apply direct 
or command and control regulation designed to prohibit or restrict environmental 
degradation. We will now look at this form of regulation in more detail. 
A common feature of command and control regulation is the setting of an 
environmental target such as a limit on industrial emissions, and the application of a 
penalty if these targets are not met. In determining these targets, many legal systems, 
most notably the United States, adopt a best available technology (BAT) or similar 
technology based standard. 27 This involves setting a standard on the basis of what is 
technically feasible at the time. The industry in question may also have an impact on 
the standard set. In the UK, a differing set of standards has been used. Many older 
statutes use a standard known as the best practical environmental option (BPEO). 
According to the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, BPEO emphasises 
the protection and conservation of the environment across land, sea and air and 
establishes for a given set of objectives, the option that provides the most benefit or 
least damage to the environment as a whole, at an acceptable cost, in the long term as 
well as the short term. 28 Several statutes then moved to a best practicable means 
(BPM) standard. 29 However, more recent statutes have employed a differing standard 
requiring forms to use best available techniques not entailing excessive costs 
(BATNEEC). Accordingly, the definition of BATNEEC is crucial as to whether the 
new breeds of environmental legislation will succeed, and it is to this we will now 
turn. 
26 See Environmental Data Services Ltd., Sustainable Development Advisors Take Government to Task 
(1997) ENDS Report, Number 264, p. 7. 
,' See A. S. Miller, The Origins and Current Directions of United States Environmental La't' and 
Polici'. An Overview in B. Boer, R. Fowler & N. Gunningham (eds. ), Environmental Outlook- Law and 
Policy, 1994. Sydney: Federation Press. 
28 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Twelfth Report of the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Policy, February 1988, Cm. 3 10, pp. 11-2. 
,y See for example s. 2 Alkali and Works Regulation Act 1906 and s. 5 
Health and Safety lit Work Act 
1974. 
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The first point that needs to be made is that BATNEEC does not prohibit pollution 
absolutely. Even with the best pollution controls in place, environmental damage 
might still occur. Accordingly, by balancing the need to minimise harm with the 
constraints of feasibility and the costs of prevention, the Act is clearly relying on the 
principle of proportionality, as many other statutes worldwide tend to. 30 
In defining the scope of BATNEEC, the courts have looked back to the case law 
defining BPM. Unfortunately, BPM was never fully defined, but there are partial 
definitions. However, there is authority that the term practicable is to be defined 
more stringently that reasonably practicable. In Adsett vK and L Steel Founders 
and Engineers Ltd., 3' Parker CJ stated that [i]t seems to me that practicable must 
impose a stricter standard that reasonably practicable. 32 This was followed in the 
case of Moorcroft v Thos Powles & Sons Ltd., 33 where Lord Parker, in interpreting the 
word impracticable stated that it must mean not possible or not feasible. At any 
rate it means something very much more than not reasonably practicable. 34 So, it 
would seem to follow that as a matter of language and law, the BPM duty, and most 
likely the BATNEEC duty, will not invalidate a means simply because it is extremely 
costly, providing that it is feasible. 
It would therefore appear that under such a regulatory standard, a very strict level is 
required. However, it is now clear that the issue of cost does enter the issue. 
Irrespective of the strict legal definitions of BPM and BATNEEC, the various 
pollution Inspectorates have interpreted the term BPM with regard to financial 
considerations. For example, the annual report of the Chief Inspector for the Alkali 
and Clean Air Inspectorate states that [i]n deciding whether such costs are 
practicable in any given circumstances, it is the aim to achieve a reasonable balance 
between the costs of prevention (or dispersion) on the one hand and the benefits on 
the other. 35 By tempering the need to ensure BPM with this balance test between 
30 For example, see the US Clean Air Act 1982 which requires emission levels to 
be set at le\ cls which 
ýrovide an ample margin of safety. 
[19531 1 All ER 97. 
3' Ibid. at p. 98H. 
33 [196211 WLR 1447. 
Ibid. at p. 1454. 
Health and Safety Executive, Industrial. Hr Pollution 1981,1982, London: HMSO, para. 
146. 
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benefit and cost, it has been contended that this has weakened the regulatory 
standards. 36 Also, the Inspectorate s intention to take into account local conditions 
and circumstances raises the worry that the standard will be even lighter where firms 
operate in areas of high unemployment. 
Provided that there is adequate monitoring and enforcement, the main strength of 
command and control regulation is its clarity. The expected behaviour of regulatees 
can be specified in advance with considerable clarity (for example, by the setting of 
national minimum standards), making it relatively easy to identify breaches and 
punish those in breach. 37 Accordingly, both regulator and regulatee are both aware of 
their roles leading to greater compliance and enforcement. 
There is indeed evidence that this is the case. Command and control regulation has 
been relatively successful in curbing pollution, outlawing extremely hazardous 
substances and the dumping of toxic waste and the protection of endangered species. 
Other benefits include reductions in airborne pollutants such as lead concentrations 
and ozone depleting substances, and similar successes in water improvements have 
resulted in a drastic improvement in the quality of our national rivers. 38 One 
commentator has argued that command and control BAT standards have a number of 
advantages over more flexible instruments. In particular, he cites: 
decreased information, collection and evaluation costs, greater consistency 
and predictability of results, greater accessibility of decisions to public scrutiny 
and participation, increased likelihood that regulations will withstand judicial 
review, reduced opportunities for manipulative behaviour by agencies in 
response to political or bureaucratic pressures, reduced opportunities for 
obstructive behaviour by regulated parties, and decreased likelihood of social 
dislocation and forum shopping resulting from competitive disadvantages 
between geographical regions or between firms in regulated industries. 
39 
36 M. Purdue, Integrated Pollution Control in the Environmental Protection Act 1990:. 4 Coming of 
Age of Environmental Latin? (1991) 54 MLR 534 at 543. 
37 O. McGarity, Four Dimensions of Health and Environmental Regulation, cited in N. Gunningham, 
D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky, Instruments or Environmental Protection in N. Gunningham, D. Sinclair 
and P. Grobosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policº". 1998, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
4l. 
On these successes, see C. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory Scene (1990) 57 
Uni. Chi. LR. 407 
and A. W. Reitze, .a 
Century of Pollution Control Latin: What Worked; What s Failed; What 
Might 
Work (1991) 21 Environmental Law 1549. 
39 H. Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulator, Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and Fine 
Tuning Reforms (1985) 37 Stan. LR. 1267 at 1271. 
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Further, it has been argued that stringent command and control regulations can result 
in technological innovations that aid regulatory compliance and, in doing so, can 
enhance international competitiveness. 40 For example, in Germany, tough command 
and control regulations have been credited not only with increased efficiency through 
technological and managerial improvements, but also the creation of new pollution 
control industries. 41 These firms can export their products and services to countries 
that have aspirations of matching Germany s impressive environmental record. 
Despite these successes, command and control regulation is better suited to some 
situations than others. The clear standards that command and control models 
advocate are better enforced against firms that are readily identifiable and 
accessible. 42 For example, regulators in the United States enforcing a Federal law 
that required limited erosion and site remediation at strip mines were far more 
successful when dealing with larger firms which were easy to identify, visit and 
monitor when compared to their enforcement record with smaller firms. 43 Command 
and control regulation has shown itself ineffective in dealing with transitory, mobile 
firms, is unable to regulate pollution that transfers from one medium to another and 
cannot keep apace with technological innovations and economic circumstances. 
Sadly, most of the most severe environmental issues fall into these categories with the 
result that many of the most pressing environmental concerns, such as deforestation, 
desertification, agricultural run-off and urban air pollution, have not been alleviated 
by command and control regulations. 44 Also, command and control regulation is 
clearly going to have more success regulating the behaviour of large firms because 
they are so identifiable. However, most environmental damage derives from small 
and medium sized firms. Although their individual impact may be small, collectively 
their influence is significant. It has been claimed that small and medium sized firms 
40 M. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, 1990, London: Macmillan Press. 
41 N. Gunningham, D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky, Instruments or Environmental Protection 
in N. 
Gunningham, D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy. 
1998, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 43. 
a'_ Ibid. Kagan refers to the difference between regulating elephants and foxes : 
it is harder for 
elephants to hide. See R. Kagan, Regulatomy Enforcement in D. Rosenbloom & R. Schwartz 
(eds. ), 
Handbook of Regulation and Administrative Lawtw, 1994, New York: Dekker. 
41 N. Shover, D. A. Clelland & J. Lynxwiler, Enforcement or Negotiation: Constructing a Regulatory 
Bureaucracy, 1986, Albany: State University of New York Press. 
44 A. L. Alm, A Need. for Neut" Approaches: Command and Control is No Longer a Cure-All (1992) 
EPA 
Journal 18`' May 6 
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account for around 70% of total environmental pollution in the UK. 45 Even if the 
regulations in place are effective, compliance needs to be monitored. Unfortunately, 
resources are insufficient to monitor effectively, especially in the case of small and 
medium sized firms. Even in relatively well-resourced areas such as workplace 
safety, it has been stated that small firms can anticipate being inspected once every 80 
years and in reality most firms will never be inspected. 46 
Further examination reveals some fundamental weaknesses and contribute to the 
perception that command and control regulation is of limited effectiveness. One of 
the most common criticisms is that command and control regulation requires 
regulators to have a detailed knowledge of the internal workings of the industries in 
question. For example, as noted earlier, many command and control regulations 
establish a BAT standard and in order to determine these standards regulators have to 
engage in lengthy and intricate information gathering exercises in order to set 
effective and appropriate standards. Given that regulatory agencies often have highly 
limited funding, such exercises cause a massive drain on their resources. Even if 
regulators have the requisite funds, there is still a considerable imbalance of 
knowledge between the regulators and industry. Even if the regulators did strike an 
appropriate standard, it would only be a temporary solution as technology, population 
and economic situations change and the environmental provisions will need to change 
with them. 47 
Uniform command and control regulations also raise efficiency issues. Firms will 
differ in terms of how much they need to spend in order to comply with pollution 
reducing regulations. However, uniform standards prevent firms from personalising 
their solutions to meet the needs of their business, even though some firms may be 
able to reduce pollution at much lower costs. The net effect of this is to increase the 
48 overall cost of regulation. A further efficiency issue is that the onus is on the 
'' Small Firms and the Environment: A Groundwork Status Report, 1998, Birmingham: Groundwork 
Foundation National Office, p. 13. 
46 N. Gunningham, Regulating Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (2002) 14 Journal of 
Environmental Law 3 at 23. 
4' A. L. Alm- 4 Need for New Approaches: Command and Control is No Longer a Cure-. A11(1992) EPA 
Journal 18`h May 6. 
48 N. Gunningham, D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky. Instruments or Environmental Protection in N. 
Gunningham, D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, 1998, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 44. 
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regulators to increase pollution reduction by constantly updating BAT standards. The 
reason for this is that under uniform command and control regulations, there are no 
incentives for firms to go beyond the minimum standards, especially if the firm has 
already invested in technology that meets the existing standard. 49 Consequently, the 
onus is always on the government to apply stricter standards, which again entails an 
in-depth examination into the industry in question. It has been contended that this 
inability to encourage firms to go beyond minimum standards is one of the most 
serious failures of command and control regulation. 50 
These regulatory inefficiencies increase the costs and compound the difficulties faced 
by the enforcement agencies. Many agencies are committed to enforcement but have 
insufficient resources to monitor regulatory compliance effectively. Accordingly, the 
deterrent value that they have is emasculated. However, even where such agencies 
can pose a viable deterrent threat, such regulatory agencies often face considerable 
defiance and resistance. Makkai and Braithwaite have found that where a regulatory 
agency undertook a deterrent role, regulatory compliance actually went down. 
' This 
resistance is understandable when regulation impedes corporate efficiency and 
competitiveness. Ultimately, it leads to an adversarial relationship between regulator 
and regulatee which jeopardises efficiency further. 
Finally, command and control regulations are vulnerable to political manipulation. 
There are several recent examples where regulatory policy has been strongly 
influenced by groups with political influence who aim to serve their own agendas at 
the expense of improved environmental policy. 
52 
49 C. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory Scene (1990) 57 Uni. Chi. LR. 407. 
50 This is certainly the case in the US and UK. However, compare this with the position 
in Germany 
where the law requires BAT standards to be drafted in such a way as to give 
incentives to companies 
that implement cutting-edge technologies that go beyond the minimum requirements. 
See S. Breyer, 
Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation, 1993, Cambridge: 
Harvard University 
Press and J. Bernstein, Alternative Approaches to Pollution 
Control and If aste ;1 /anagement - 
Regulatory and Economic Instruments. 1993, Washington DC: 
The World Bank. 
51 J. Braithwaite & T. Makkai, Trust and Compliance (1994) 4 Policing and Society 1. 
,, See R. Leone, Who Profits? 11"inners, Losers and Government Regulation, 1986, New 
York: Basic 
Books and B. A. Ackerman & W. T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air or 
How the Clean Air Act Became a 
Ifultibillion-Dollar-Bail-Out for High-Sulfur Coal Producers and What Should Be Done About 
It. 
1981, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
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Given these weaknesses of command and control regulation, a number of 
commentators have argued that this form of regulation has reached the limits of its 
effectiveness. 53 However, legislatures worldwide have also recognised that command 
and control regulation has several flaws and, in recent years, have developed a 
number of new innovations that aim to avoid some of the weaknesses discussed 
previously. 
We noted that one significant weakness of command and control regulation is that it 
creates an adversarial atmosphere between industry and the regulators. One notable 
initiative that has succeeded in reducing this weakness is the United States Yorktown 
Project, a joint enterprise between the EPA and the Amoco Corporation. By 
cooperating, these parties were able to identify the ways in which command and 
control regulation failed to encourage or reward innovation. They then showed that 
by permitting each firm to tailor its compliance strategy rather than the one-fits-all 
approach was far more cost effective and encouraged greater innovation. 
Accordingly, the various participants selected the most effective pollution options 
available given their specialised industries, often these solutions being vastly differing 
to those prescribed by the regulations. The result was that by prioritising projects in 
this manner, equivalent release reductions could have been achieved at 25% of the 
cost. 
54 
As well as the Yorktown Project, the Clinton administration adopted several other 
innovations in line with the aims of the Reinvesting Environmental Law initiative. 
55 
The first of these was Project XL, a project designed to reward companies that have 
developed creative, common sense ways of achieving superior environmental 
performance at their facilities. 56 This initiative attempts to avoid the broad brush 
approach of traditional command and control models by allowing companies to 
53 D. J. Fiorino, Towards a New System of Environmental Regulation: The Case for an Industry 
Sector 
Approach (1996) 26(2) Environmental Law 457, A. Moran, Tools of Environmental Policy: Market 
Instruments Versus Command and Control in R. Eckersley (ed. ), ; Markets, the State and the 
Environment, 1995, Melbourne: Macmillan Press, p. 73 and W. E. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Latin 
(1995) 89 Northwestern University LR. 1227. 
B. J. Raffle & D. Mitchell, Effective Environmental Strategies: Opportunities for Innovation and 
Flexibility Under Federal Environmental Laws, 1993, Chicago: Executive Summary, Amoco, p. 1. 
1. On this, see W. J. Clinton & A. Gore Jnr., Reinventing Environmental Regulation, 1995, 
Washington 
DC: The White House. 
`61hid. 
at p. 36. 
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propose alternative environmental strategies where the company can demonstrate 
that such strategies will achieve better environmental results than expected to be 
achieved under existing law. 57 Another notable initiative, created by the EPA, is the 
Sustainable Industry Project, which aims to develop policies that foster permanent 
integration of environmental protection functions into the basic profit-orientated 
activities of industrial firms. 58 As we shall see this is a noteworthy development as it 
is often the incompatibility between profit maximisation and environmental regulation 
that leads many corporations to disobey the regulations. 
The US is not the only country to adopt new innovations in environmental policy. 
The Victorian EPA in Australia, under its accredited licensing scheme, also aims to 
move away from the inflexible command and control regulations and permit facility- 
specific environmental policies. Those firms that succeed in their goals of reducing 
pollution will be rewarded by being relieved of certain regulatory burdens such as 
works approvals or licensing requirements. 59 In order to participate, firms must have 
an exemplary environmental record, they must conduct periodic environmental 
reviews and implement an environmental management system. The aim of the 
accredited licensing scheme is to avoid one of the key weaknesses of traditional 
command and control models, namely to provide an incentive to go beyond mere 
compliance with existing regulations. 
The regulators in Denmark have gone one step further by negotiating pollution 
reduction targets with industry that go well into the middle of this century. 
60 These 
targets go well beyond the requirements of current command and control regulations. 
Here in the UK, there is also evidence that a more flexible approach designed to 
reward good environmental behaviour is emerging with the advent of the integrated 
6' pollution control concept. 
57 
Ibid. 
tg US EPA, Sustainable Industry: Promoting Strategic Environmental Protection in the Industrial 
Sector: Phase 1 Report, 1994, Washington DC: US EPA, p. 1. 
59 A. T. lies, 
. 
adaptive %Ianageinent: Making Environmental Latin and Policy More 
Dynamic. 
Experimentalist and Learning (1996) 13(4) Environmental and 
Planning Law Journal 288 at 299. 
See R. Gerits & J. Hinssen, Environmental Covenant for the Oil and Gas Producing 
Industry. A 
I (1/tiable Policy Instrument (1994) 24(6) Environmental Policy and 
Law 323. 
61 Ho\wwever, this concept encountered numerous problems in its early stages and 
has, to date, not been 
successful. See K. Allott, Integrated Pollution Control: The First Three 
Years, 1994, London: 
Environmental Data Services. 
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However, it should be noted that, despite their potential, these innovations are still in 
their infancy and their effectiveness will not be known for a number of years. 
However, already concerns are being expressed that these initiatives focus too 
strongly on large firms and that the administrative requirements of these initiatives 
will prove too costly for many smaller firms. Further, there is a danger that setting 
standards for the future (as has been done with the Dutch covenants) will result in a 
serious miscalculation or technological change. 62 
Self-Regulation. 
Self-regulation has started to play an increasingly important role in corporate 
governance issues in the UK. However, its contribution is often overlooked in 
relation to environmental regulation. With the growing recognition of the weaknesses 
of command and control models, it appears that self-regulation is beginning to play an 
important role as an alternative, or as a compliment, to, governmental regulation. 
Self-regulation can be defined as a process whereby a recognised industry group 
regulates the behaviour of its members. 63 Self-regulation can further be defined in 
terms of the degree of governmental intervention (due to the fact that absolute self- 
regulation with no governmental involvement is rare. )64 However one defines self- 
regulation, the point to be noted is that recently, a number of sophisticated self- 
regulatory schemes have been developed in the area of environmental regulation. 
These include increased safety measures introduced by the Institute of Nuclear Power 
Producers (INPO) in the US, 65 encouraging sustainability under the Brazilian 
62 N. Gunningham, D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky, Instruments or Environmental Protection 
in N. 
Gunningham, D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental 
Policy, 1998, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 50. 
63 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Meeting on Alternatives to Traditional 
Regulation, 1994, Paris: OECD, p. 7. 
64 See, for example, the three forms of self-regulation found in J. V. Rees, Reforming the 
It orkplace:. 4 
Study of Self-Regulation in Occupational Health and Safety, 1988, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 
p. 9. 
65 See J. V. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety 
Since Three Mile 
Island, 1994, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. INPO is a private regulatory body with about 
400 
employees that develops standards, monitors companies and investigates accidents. 
With an annual 
budget of about US$54 millions, INPO has been responsible for significant 
improvements within the 
industry. 
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Extractive Reserves system, 66 and the Canadian forest industry s Sustainable Forest 
Management Certification System. 67 
However, one scheme in particular, due to its ambition and scope, deserves particular 
mention, namely the chemical industry s Responsible Care programme. However, 
before examining the details of this scheme, some background information on the 
chemical industry will be of aid. It will also demonstrate why traditional command 
and control models have shown themselves to be insufficient. 
The late 1980 s witnessed a significant expansion in the chemical industry. During 
that period, world chemical gross output grew from US$744 billions to US$1.136 
trillions. 68 In the US, the chemical industry is the second largest manufacturing 
industry with some 1.1 million employees and over $316 billions in sales. It is also a 
leading industry in Europe where it accounts for 37% of the total European 
manufacturing balance. 
Just as the chemical industry is a major source of world income, so too is it major 
source of world pollution. It is the United States largest generator of toxic chemicals, 
releasing about 20 billion pounds of toxic chemicals into the environment. 69 Roughly 
half of all releases reported under the EPA s Toxic Release Inventory and 80-90% of 
hazardous waste generation reported through the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, are attributed to the industry. 70 Similar information in Europe is 
lacking, but evidence indicates that the pattern is similar. 71 There are also significant 
public outcries over the risks of accidents and explosions in chemical factories. 
66 See Environmental Law Institute (ELI), Brazils Extractive Reserves, 1996, Washington DC: ELI, 
Ch. V. 
67 See G. T. Rhone, Canadian Standards Association Sustainable Forest Management Certification 
System, 1996, Ottawa: Industry Canada. 
6$ International Labour Organisation. Chemical Industries Committee, Recent Developments in the 
Chemical Industry, 1995, Geneva: ILO, p. 10. 
69 R. Gottlieb (ed. ), Reducing Toxics: A Newtw Approach to Policy and Industrial Decision ; flaking, 
1995, Washington DC: Island Press, p. 210. 
70 US EPA, Toxic Release Inventory, 1993. Washington DC: EPA, p. 60. These figures were three 
tines greater than the next highest polluter, the metal industry. 
71 For example, see International Labour Organisation, Chemical Industries Committee, 
Recent 
Developments in the Chemical Industry, 1995, Geneva: ILO, p. 34. 
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Responding to the public condemnation following the above, the chemical industry 
has made concerted efforts over the last decade to improve its environmental record. 
Since 1987, the US chemical industry claims to have reduced releases of toxic 
emissions by 49%. 72 A CMA survey of its member companies found that releases had 
been reduced by 16%, underground injection by 14% and transfers by 21 %. 73 The 
cost of these reductions has not been low - the industry estimates it at S22 billions 
since 1973.74 In 1993 alone, pollution abatement spending was over USS4.4 billions 
rising to US$6 billions in 2000.75 European chemical companies have responded 
similarly. In the UK, capital spending on environmental protection has risen from 8% 
in 1990 to 14% in 1992.76 Australian chemical companies have also increased 
expenditure. 
One reason why the chemical industry has been able to pollute the environment so 
freely is that in most developed countries, the chemical industry has been regulated 
entirely by the various forms of command and control regulation. Accordingly, the 
criticisms aimed at command and control models mentioned earlier are directly 
applicable to regulation of the chemical industry. Accordingly, a new form of 
regulation had to be adopted. This need led to the adoption of the Responsible Care 
programme which now operates in 41 countries and reaches around 88% of the global 
chemical industry. The programme has been described as the most ambitious and 
comprehensive environmental, health and safety improvement effort ever attempted 
by an industry, 77 and as an outstanding model for voluntary industry efforts to 
promote chemical risk management and compliment environment, health and 
safety regulatory processes. 78 
72 See Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), Fact Sheet: Chemical Industry Halves Toxic 
Releases, 1996, Washington DC: CMA. 
71 Chemical Manufacturers Association, The Year in Review, 1996-97,1997 Responsible Care 
Progress Report, Washington DC: CMA, pp. 5-7. 
" Chemical Manufacturers Association, US Chemical Industry Statistical Handbook 1995.1995. 
Washington DC: CMA, p. 107. 
75 L. Ember, Overhaul of Environmental Law Needed for Sustainable 
Development (1993) larch 15`h 
Chemical and Engineering News, p. 17. 
'6 European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) [Online] Available http"//\v vwinset net cefie cgi-bin 
November 1996. 
77 J. R. Il irl, Don t Trust Us, Track Us (1992) UN 242 No. 21 (17 
`h December). 
78 International Council of Chemical Associations Global Status Report on 
Responsible ('. ire. ICC. -1 
Readies ltseljjor Ottawa , 1Ieeting (1996) 5 Careline 1. 
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The Responsible Care programme itself is relatively simple. Chemical companies 
commit themselves to improving all aspects of their business that relates to health and 
the environment. This will be achieved in two-steps. The first step is the 
establishment of a number of Codes of Practice that aim to reflect industry best 
practice. These are intended to become the rules (in addition to the prevailing 
legislation) by which member companies operate. Adoption of these rules and 
compliance with them is a condition of council membership. 79 According to the 
ACIC, these Codes would be sensitive to community concerns, provide information 
on possible hazards, encourage community involvement in emergency response 
planning and establish a regular process of positive communication. 80 The second 
step is a commitment to establish community participation and consultation 
mechanisms. In Australia, this is achieved through the National Community Advisory 
Panel (NCAP), in the US by the National Public Advisory Panel and in Canada by a 
National Advisory Pane1.81 For example, the Australian NCAP comprises of a cross- 
section of individual community thought leaders with particular concerns for 
environmental safety and health issues. 82 NCAP provides a vehicle through which 
the community may help shape the Responsible care programme. 
As has been noted and will be seen later, most forms of regulation can only achieve 
their full potential if the interests of the regulators and regulates coincide. It has been 
contended that the chemical industry is one area where such a scenario exists. The 
reason for this is that the chemical industry is dominated by large multinational 
corporations who have both the motivation and the ability to implement the changes 
that the Responsible Care programme envisages. The motivation comes from the 
decreasing reputation of the industry following a series of public accidents such as 
Bhopal mentioned earlier. Traditionally, firms have tried to disassociate themselves 
from the accident in question. However, as chemical accidents tend to be highly 
visible and easily attributed to an individual corporation, this strategy has become 
increasingly difficult. Accordingly, large chemical companies have found that the 
only way to improve their image is to improve their environmental record. As one 
79 Australian Chemical Industry Council (ACIC), Annual Report, 1993, Melbourne: ACIC, p-2- 
80 Ibid. at p. 3. 
81 It should be noted that, to date, these three countries are the only ones to have well-established public 
advisory bodies in place. 
s2 Australian Chemical Industry Council (ACIC), Annual Report, 1993, Melbourne: ACIC, p. 3. 
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senior executive stated, the chemical companies just [could not] advertise their «av 
out of it. 
83 
Initially, the task of improving the industry s reputation was left to the initiatives put 
in place by individual companies and there is evidence to suggest that many 
companies put such initiatives into place. 84 However, individual initiatives soon 
proved insufficient to improve the reputation of the industry as a whole. As one 
industry spokesman stated Du Pont and other majors can t rest on their 
accomplishments. They need to recognise than any incident in the industry destroys 
the credibility of everyone. 85 The Canadian Chemical Producers Association 
President Jean Belanger noted in 1991 that if a paint company or a plating company 
does something wrong the headlines the next day will scream that chemicals have 
been wrongly handled and so we will all be tarred by the same brush. 86 The practical 
effect of this is that each company must monitor its competitors. Large companies 
know that the best way to achieve this is by using the Responsible Care programme. 
The question is will it be successful. 
Potentially, the answer is yes. [T]he various Responsible Care mechanisms designed 
to develop mutual trust among competitors; to facilitate mutual aid, information and 
technology sharing, peer support, and pressure; for corporate shaming; and dialogue 
with local communities, the public and governments, create a climate which can 
motivate and drive corporate executives to do far more in terms of environmental 
performance than the law could credibly require. 
87 
However, despite this considerable potential, there are also numerous problems. 
Again, like all other forms of regulation, self-regulation works better 
in some areas 
than it does in others. Notably, the Responsible Care programme suffers 
from the 
traditional conflict between environmental protection and profit maximisation. 
In 
83 
. An interview with C. Greenert quoted 
in Responsible Care (1991) Harvard Business School 
Documents 9-391-135,1-26. 
84 For examples, see Chemical Manufacturers Association (CILIA), 
annual Reports fin- 1996 and 1997, 
1997, Washington D. C.: CMA. 
s, Quoted in N. Gunningham. The Chemical Industry in N. Gunningham. P. 
Grabosky & D. Sinclair. 
Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, 1998, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, p. 161. 
86 
Ibid. 
Ibid. at pp. 163-4. 
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particular, the market pressures that drive some companies to short-term profitability 
are not compatible with the aims of the Responsible Care programme. It is clear that 
those firms that are economically marginal will be unable to afford the luxury of a 
long-term view. 88 Such firms are highly likely to sacrifice environmental concerns for 
short-term profitability. Further, these firms will probably be heavily reliant on old, 
inefficient plant and machinery that emit the highest levels of pollution. To refit such 
a plant would be far too expensive for such firms and so environmental concerns are 
89 subordinated. 
In contrast, companies with high profit margins and advanced technology will be in a 
far better position to adopt strategies that yield long-term benefits. Accordingly, they 
can adopt long-term strategies that can align the disparity between environmental 
protection and profit maximisation. 
Accordingly, the motivation to implement the Responsible Care programme will be 
far less for small companies than it will be for larger companies. For large companies 
with a high public profile, the consequences of a poor environmental record will be 
both substantial and visible, thereby making environmental improvements a high 
priority. Such firms will have the ability to make such improvements. Conversely, 
many smaller companies do not have a public presence and therefore, their business 
will be far less affected by a poor environmental record. Their capacity to remedy 
environmental problems is also often very limited. Evidence for this came when the 
Australian Chemical Specialty Manufacturers Association, a body that represents 
small and medium sized chemical companies, withdrew completely from the 
Responsible Care programme, citing the excessive costs and burdens that the 
programme imposed upon its members. 
38 President s Council on Sustainable Development, Eco-Efficiency 
Task Force, Chemical Operations 
Demonstration Project, 1995, Washington DC, p. 22. 
89 As one commentator stated [v]oluntary actions are likely to 
be viewed as dispensable c\travagances 
by companies suffering financial difficulties. They may 
be abandoned over time as management 
changes or pressure for such effort fades. See R. Abrams 
& D. H. Ward, Prospects /or Safer 
Communities: E, nert cnci" Response, Community Right to 
Know, and Prevention of Chemical Accidents 
(1990) 14 Harvard Environmental Law Review 135 at 188. 
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This disparity also results in a problem that frequently arises, namely the free-rider 
problem. 90 Given the above, many smaller companies, if not properly regulated, will 
continue to inflict significant harm on the environment, which will seriously 
emasculate the effectiveness of, if not totally defeat, the Responsible Care 
programme. If the majority of smaller companies do not comply, then the larger 
companies lose much of their incentive to comply, for, as we have seen, they will be 
tarred with the same brush and the industry as a whole will be criticised. 
Environmentally friendly companies will suffer the same criticism and stigma that the 
non-complying companies suffer. Accordingly, complying companies may be putting 
themselves at a disadvantage to their more pragmatic rivals, who will increase their 
profits through non-compliance whilst gaining all the benefits by free-riding off the 
efforts of complying companies. 
A further problem of the Responsible Care programme, which is also a problem akin 
to most self-regulatory schemes, is the issue of how to punish those who refuse to 
comply. If moral pressure from peers is ineffective, then in cases where members 
clearly disregard their obligations in respect of Responsible Care and government 
expectations, their membership can be terminated. 91 However, the expectations of 
this occurring are very low. For example, in North America, where Responsible Care 
has been operational for a number of years, there have been no expulsions. This 
appears to reflect the philosophy of the various regulatory bodies. As a senior 
member of the UK Chemical Industry Association (CIA) has stated [y]ou can t get 
acceptance just by jamming things down people s throats. 92 In 1996, Denmark 
became the first Responsible care participant to expel a member for poor 
environmental performance. 93 However, even expulsion may not be punitive enough. 
Many chemical industry associations will not disclose the identity of firms that 
withdraw from the Responsible Care programme, thereby reducing the public 
shaming element of the scheme. 
We have already discussed this problem in relation to institutional investors. 
See supra. at Ch. 5. On 
the free-rider problem generally, see M. Olson, The Logic of Collective 
Action. 1965. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
" Australian Chemical Industry Council (ACIC), Responsible Care Program Guide. 1990. Melbourne: 
: \CIC, p. 20. 
°' T. Posner (1992) 5 The Engineer 20 at 20. 
a; The former member is now suing the Industry Association 
for doing so. 
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The final and perhaps most emasculating weakness of the Responsible Care 
programme is its lack of accountability. The industry as a whole now has such a 
tarnished reputation that no self-regulatory scheme may be effective. As one 
commentator as noted: 
The chemical industry is long past the time when it can say we re doing x, y and 
z, and have people take its word for it While there is certainly more 
accountability in Responsible Care than in other industry programs, there is still 
not enough teeth in it. 94 
The simple fact is that whilst industry is responsible for monitoring its own conduct, 
there will always be a temptation to exaggerate the extent of its accomplishments. 
This is why ultimately, many critics believe that the Responsible Care programme 
will be unable to overcome the public trust problems identified earlier. 
In fact, in relation to environmental issues, self-regulation has acquired a tarnished 
image. Many conservationists and consumer organisations view self-regulation as a 
cynical attempt by industry to give the appearance of regulation whilst serving the 
interests of the parties concerned. As one commentator has noted: 
Self-regulation is frequently an attempt to deceive the public into believing in 
the responsibility of an irresponsible industry. Sometimes it is a strategy to give 
the government an excuse for not doing its job. 95 
These critics argue that self-regulation lacks the virtues of command and control 
regulation in terms of visibility, credibility, accountability, compulsory application to 
all, greater likelihood of rigorous standards being developed, cost spreading, and 
availability of a range of sanctions. 96 
Accordingly, whilst self-regulation can offer much, it has considerable limits. And 
when these limits arise, we must again rely on the traditional command and control 
models. This may explain why many commentators prefer traditional command and 
control models to recent self-regulatory ones. 
97 
94 Peter Sandman quoted in D. Rotman, Pushing Pollution Prevention (1991) 
Chemical Week 17'h July 
30 at 33. 
95 J. Braithwaite, Responsive Business Regulatorv Institutions in C. Cody & C. Sampford (eds. ), 
Business, Ethics and Law, 1993, Sydney: Federation Press, p. 91. 
96 K. Webb & A. Morrison, The Legal Aspects of Voluntary Codes in D. Cohen & K. Webb (eds. 
), 
Exploring Voluntary, * Codes in the Marketplace, 1998, Ottawa: Government of 
Canada, p. 1. 
As one government regulatory official noted [i]f self-regulation worked, 
Moses would haN e come 
down from the Mountains with the Ten Guidelines. Quoted in P. Grabosky & 
J. Braith'ý aitc. Oj 
312 
Chapter 9: Corporate Environmental Responsibility. 
Voluntarism. 
Voluntarism is similar to self-regulation. Under self-regulation, industries coalesce to 
regulate their firms activities, whereas voluntarism is based on individual firms 
unilaterally deciding to act in an environmentally friendly manner without any 
industry coercion. This usually takes the form of voluntary agreements between 
governments and individual businesses or non-mandatory 98 contracts between equal 
partners, one of which is government, in which incentives for action arise from mutual 
interests rather than from sanctions. 99 
There are many examples of voluntary schemes such as this. Amongst the most 
numerous are schemes involving landholders where, in return for financial support, 
landholders agree to refrain from an act that could potentially harm the environment. 
However, not all initiatives of this kind rely on financial inducements. In Australia, 
for example, many states have programmes in place designed to protect local wildlife. 
Some of these programmes carry no financial inducements at all. The same is true of 
the Australian Landcare programme, an initiative designed to reduce land 
degradation. Some voluntary schemes reward participants not with financial awards, 
but with an increased public recognition. For example, the United States EPA s 33/50 
programme encourages firms to reduce the release of toxic substances by positive 
public recognition. 100 Participation is completely voluntary and there is no 
enforcement by law. Instead the programme relies on co-operation between industry 
and the EPA and the only incentive to participate is the possibility that the firm s 
reputation could improve. Initial evaluations of the scheme have shown that 
participating firms have significantly reduced toxic emissions. 101 
Manners Gent/e, Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business Regulatorti Agencies, 1986, 
Melbourne: OUP, p. 184. 
98 The use of the phrase non-mandatory is crucial for if there was some element of coercion, then they 
night be regarded as some form of command and control regulation. 99 OECD, Alerting on Alternatives to Traditional Regulation, 1994, Paris: OECD, p. 7. 100 On this, sec A. S. Miller, The Origins and Current Directions of United States Environmental Law 
and Pol it ':. 4n C vei-r icit, in B. Boer, R. Fowler & N. Gunningham (eds. ), Environmental Outlook: Latin 
and Policy, 1994, Sydney: Federation Press. 
101 S. Arora & T. N. Cason, An Experiment in Voluntary Environmental Regulation: Participation in 
EPA s 3.00 Programme (1995) 28(3) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 271. 
Another successful programme introduced by the EPA is the Green Lights programme whereby firms 
agree in writing to install energy efficient lighting. In less than three years, the programme signed up 
over 5°% of all commercial office space and is showing investment returns of 20-40° 
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Voluntarism has several significant advantages over command and control regulation. 
Most notably, its non-interventionist approach is likely to result in high industry 
acceptability and minimal equity concerns. 102 However, like self-regulation, it is 
likely to work better in some areas than in others. It will be most successful where 
regulatees perceive that it is in their self-interest to be environmentally friendly. 
Sadly, however, this is not often the case. Usually, there is a significant gap between 
the public desires for environmental protection and the interests of landholders in 
relation to biodiversity conservation and land improvements. The problem lies in the 
fact that private landholders usually have no financial incentive to take account of the 
social costs of their actions. This is a classic example of a negative externality. The 
direct benefits of biodiversity loss (e. g. increased agricultural production resulting 
from the clearing of land) go directly to individual landholders whereas the costs (e. g. 
loss of species, ecosystems and genetic resources) are borne by society at large. 
There is also a free rider problem in that the impact of one landholder clearing their 
land will make little impact on the overall problem, nor will their decision influence 
the behaviour of other landholders. Therefore, each landholder will have an incentive 
to take advantage of the willingness of others to protect the environment whilst 
damaging it themselves. 
The challenge that voluntarism faces is how to build mechanisms that strengthen, 
rather than emasculate, an environmental custodian ethic. Environmental protection 
must be put on a par with profit maximisation. If this can be done, then voluntary 
agreements can prove extremely effective because: 
they avoid adversarial relations; involve business or other groups in political 
processes; improve compliance because rules rest on consensus rather than 
coercion; and pennit, through negotiation, the development of instruments better 
adapted to economic and competitive contexts. 103 
However, at the moment, we are far from achieving these aims. Currently, profit 
maximisation and environmental protection are often viewed as mutually exclusive 
102 N. Gunninghan, D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky. Instruments or Environmental Protection 
in N. 
Gunningham, D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, 
1998. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 58. 
103 OECD, ; fleeting on . -llternathves to 
Traditional Regulation, 1994, Paris: OECD, p. 7. 
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aims and until this can be changed, voluntarism will never be able to achieve its full 
potential. 
Education and Information Instruments. 
The variety of instruments of this type is broad and varied. However, they can be 
classified into the following categories: '04 
(i) education and training; 
(ii) corporate environmental reporting; 
(iii) community right-to-know and pollution inventories; 
(iv) product certification, and; 
(v) award schemes. 
(i) Education and Training. 
As noted, one reason why other methods of regulation have failed to achieve their full 
potential is because the attitude amongst many corporations is that profit 
maximisation and environmental protection are mutually exclusive aims and as profit 
maximisation is the more important aim, environmental protection is often ignored. 
One commentator has noted that most firms, particularly small and medium sized 
firms do not possess the knowledge, skills or solutions necessary to allow them to 
fully integrate the environment into their business practices. 105 In order for 
environmental degradation to stop, this needs to change. This is where education and 
training become crucial. They are critical for changing attitudes and behaviour so that 
the various initiatives can work. Accordingly, it is apparent that they are not per se a 
form of regulation. Rather they are supplementary to the more traditional forms of 
regulation, enabling those forms to operate more effectively. 
There is considerable evidence that schemes of this kind can improve environmental 
protection. However, like self-regulation and voluntarism, they work best where their 
agendas coincide with their targeted participants. One commentator has demonstrated 
this with the following examples: 
104 These categories are taken from N. Gunningham, D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky, Instrument' or 
Environmental Protection in N. Gunningham, D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky, Smart Regulation: 
Designing Environmental Policy, 1998, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 60. 
105 F. Tilley, The Gap Between Environmental Attitude and Environmental Behaviour of Small Firms 
(1999) 8 Business Strategy and the Environment 238 at 245. 
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where informed resource users have a self-interest in protecting biodiversity, 
then educational programmes, appropriately designed, can bring about very 
substantial benefits. If, for example, eutrophication of a lake is due to farmers 
using more fertilizer than is necessary to maximize profits, it may only be 
necessary to bring this to their attention. Enlightened self-interest may then be 
sufficient to solve, or at least reduce, the problem. Education and information 
provision can assist to improve management of common-property resources such 
as a fishery. Fishers may learn that the continued use of a certain type of net will 
reduce stocks to such an extent that they would lose their livelihoods. 106 
The critical factor in the success of these programmes is whether or not that can 
effectively target and deliver their message to the intended parties. This may require 
some innovative approaches. For example, in Australia, it was determined that the 
most effective way to target and educate users of ozone depleting substances in 
commercial refrigerators was to train and certify private contractors who serviced 
such refrigerators. 107 The benefits of this approach were not only improved 
environmental practices on the part of the contractors but also the delivery of reliable 
information to otherwise unreachable small and medium-sized businesses. Another 
method of targeting is to provide toll-free help-lines. This approach has been adopted 
by the DTI with its Environmental Enquiry Point; a service which provides technical 
help to companies who wish to improve their environmental records. 
(ii) Corporate Environmental Reporting. 
Although a relatively new development, there is evidence indicating that corporate 
environmental reports are becoming a useful internal diagnostic tool that can be used 
to enhance a firm s environmental record. Already a number of new developments 
are starting to appear including the use of eco-balance sheets and environmental 
accounting which measures all business inputs and outputs and calculates 
environmental efficiency per unit of production. 108 However, before these reports can 
achieve their full potential, a number of flaws need to be ironed out, namely the 
reports need to be consistent and need to be independently verified. 
106 N. Cunningham, D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky, Instruments or Environmental Protection in N. 
Gunningham, D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, 1998, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 60. 
107 See Australia and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council, Revised Strategy for O: one 
Protection in Australia: Report No. 30,1994, Canberra: AGPS. 
108 On this, see C. Jaseh, Environmental Information Systems in Austria (1993) 13(2) Social and 
Environmental Accounting 7. 
316 
Chapter 9: Corporate Environmental Responsibility. 
(iii) Community Right-To-Know and Pollution Inventories. 
We have already noted that in order for effective regulation to occur, informational 
asymmetries need to be reduced. The same is true of environmental regulation. 
Accordingly, a number of countries have introduced laws requiring the disclosure of 
pollution and other hazardous activities. Such legislation is commonly referred to as 
community right-to-know (CRTK) and is designed to inform the public of a firm s 
environmental record and any environmental policies in place. The central feature of 
CRTK legislation is the pollution inventory which compiles data on the emission of 
pollutants or chemicals to the air, water and land. 109 Its function is to document the 
release or transfer of selected chemical pollutants to all media as a basis for 
developing and monitoring the effectiveness of pollution prevention measures of 
programs. 110 In the US, this inventory has been hailed as by the former administrator 
of the EPA as one of the most effective instruments available 111 for reducing toxic 
emissions. 
The most famous piece of CRTK legislation is the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) 1986.12 More recently Canada has 
followed suit and introduced a national pollution inventory modelled closely on the 
EPCRA. Many European countries, including the UK, have also introduced similar 
laws. 
The US experience with CRTK has demonstrated this it can have significant benefits, 
namely it can provide communities with much needed information, highlight the 
shortcomings of regulatory agencies and create an impetus for stricter control, create 
an incentive for companies to reduce emissions by sensitising them to community 
109 N. Gunningham, D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky, Instruments or Environmental Protection in N. 
Cunningham, D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy, 1998, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 64. 
110 Pollutant Release Transfer Register, p. 2 quoted in N. Gunninghani. D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky. 
Instruments or Environmental Protection in N. Gunningham, D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky. 
Smart 
Regulation: Designing Environmental Polin, 1998. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 64. 
111 W. Reilly, -liming Before I1'e Shoot: The Quiet Revolution in 
Environmental Polin (1990) Address 
to the National Press Club, Washington DC, September 26th 
112 Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act 1986,42 USC et seq. Public Law 99-499. 
The first piece of CRTK legislation was introduced in New Jersey in 1983. 
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pressure and can even influence the price of the firm s stock thereby rewarding the 
good and punishing the bad. ' 13 
However, like the other forms of regulation, CRTK also suffers from some 
considerable weaknesses. Firms often fear that disclosure will allow competitors to 
gain an unfair advantage, or that the information they disclose will be sensationalized 
by public interest groups. Another problem is the tendency to focus on toxic hot 
spots at the expense of more widely dispersed pollutants. ' 14 CRTK legislation relies 
on local communities using the available information to put pressure on companies to 
improve their environmental operations. When there is no immediate threat or where 
there is no identifiable local community, then CRTK legislation has far less success. 
For these reasons, CRTK, like self-regulation and voluntarism, can only be viewed as 
a supporting form of regulation. 
(iv) Product Certification. 
Increasingly, consumers are taking into account a company s environmental record 
when deciding which products and services to purchase. " 5 However, as we noted in 
Chapter 6, the market is not particularly reliable in providing consumers with accurate 
information about a company s environmental record. Accordingly, in order to 
inform consumers of the environmentally friendly nature (or otherwise) of various 
products, governments can introduce labelling standards and eco-labelling schemes. 
In practice, the success of eco-labelling schemes has been sporadic at best due to a 
number of inherent difficulties. Assessing the environmental impact of various 
competing products is an extremely difficult task. ' 16 Many schemes of this nature, 
with the exception of Germany s Blue Angel scheme, have run into strong industry 
opposition. Further, eco-labelling schemes can often entail considerable costs, 
especially if the labelling envisages a full life-cycle analysis of the product. Several 
11, JT Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to the Capitol Toxic 
Release 
Inventory Data (1995) 27(1) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 98. 
114 N. Gunningham, D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky, Instruments or Environmental Protection 
in N. 
Cunningham, D. Sinclair and P. Grobosky, Sniart Regulation: Designing Environmental 
Policy, 1998, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 64. 
115 S. Dawson & N. Gunningham, The . tore Dolphins There . -ire the 
Less I Trust What They re Saying: 
Can Green Labelling Work? (1996) 18(1) Adelaide LR. 1. 
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schemes that were supposed to be self-financing eventually required governmental 
assistance. ' 17 For these reasons, a number of governments have withdrawn from the 
eco-labelling schemes. 
(v) Award Schemes. 
Award schemes, like product certification schemes, aim to contribute to the education 
of consumers. When companies act in an environmentally friendly manner, they are 
awarded. The publicity that accompanies an award has a number of beneficial effects. 
The company will benefit from the good publicity that, where it not for the schemes 
existence, may never have become known to the public. This publicity will have an 
educative function, serving to raise public awareness about relevant issues. 
There are already several award schemes in operation. The European Commission 
runs the high-profile European Better Industry Awards for Industry, where the 
winning candidate receives a trophy and considerable public recognition. 118 A similar 
scheme is the Oregon Governors Awards for Toxic Use Reduction. 119 Private 
institutions also award prizes such as the Goldman Environmental Prize, which 
recognizes achievements by environmental activists. ' 20 
As with most other forms of non-governmental regulation, the success of educational 
schemes often depends on the interests of the parties and the schemes aligning, 
thereby providing continuing incentives for environmental protection. For example, 
schemes designed to highlight the financial savings available from energy efficient 
products will be more likely to be successful because their adoption will aid all 
concerned. However, self-interest is not an essential prerequisite. There is evidence 
that some firms may be willing to sacrifice profit once they are made aware of the 
importance of curtailing environmental degradation. As the OECD has stated: 
116 For more, see J. A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and Future of Environmental Labelling 
(1993) 10(1) Yale Journal on Regulation 147. 
117 S. Dawson & N. Gunningham, The More Dolphins There Are the Less I Trust What Thee' re Saving: 
Can Green Labelling Work? (1996) 18(1) Adelaide LR. 1. 
118 On this scheme, see J. Elkington, P. Knight & J. Hailes, The Green Business Guide, 1992, 
London: 
Victor Gollancz. 
119 See L. R. Jones & J. H. Baldwin, Corporate Environmental Policy and Government Regulation, 
1994, Connecticut: JAI Press. 
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people and businesses often care deeply about contributing responsibly to 
the public good (businesses also care about reputation) and governments can 
also use information, communications, encouragement, peer pressure, and 
education strategies to convince the public of the need for change. 121 
However, it appears that in many cases, this view is optimistic. Even when many 
firms perceive the need for environmental responsibility, they still act in a detrimental 
manner if the necessary measures conflict with their own self-interest. For example, 
in South Australia, when a number of farmers were made aware of the need for 
conserving biodiversity, many of them still attempted to clear their land. Only 
regulation stopped them from doing so. Accordingly, educational schemes only have 
real effectiveness when the interests of all parties align. 
These difficulties are compounded when dealing with small and medium sized firms. 
Evidence indicates that there are difficulties in persuading such firms to act in an 
environmentally friendly manner even where it is in the firm s interests to do so and 
they are given financial incentives. 122 For example, the Department of the 
Environments Small Company Environmental and Energy Management Assistance 
Scheme (SCEEMAS) provides a 50% subsidy for the costs of consultancy fees in the 
implementation of the European Union s Eco-Management and Audit Scheme 
(EMAS). Despite a comprehensive national advertising campaign and supplementary 
information, such as guides, videos and newsletters, being sent to thousands of small 
and medium sized firms, a subsequent review revealed that only 136 firms had 
participated in SCEEMAS. 123 Unsurprisingly, the scheme was abandoned. 
II. THE CORPORATION AS A MECHANISM FOR EVADING 
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 
The Corporate Veil and the Doctrine of Identification. 
Ever since the House of Lords established that an incorporated company is an entity 
distinct from those who own it, to such an extent that there can be no relationship of 
121 OECD, Meeting on : Alternatives to Traditional 
Regulation, 1994, Paris: OECD, p. 8. 
1 J. Merritt, EMS in SATE Won t Go? Attitudes, Awareness and Practices in the London Borough of 
Croydon (1998) 7 Business Strategy and the Environment 90 at 100. 
123 Report on SAIEs and the Environment (for the European 
Commission, Directorate General 
Environment), Brussels: ECOTEC Research and Consulting 2000 [Online] . \' ailable 
http: //www. europa. eu. int/conim. /environnient/sme/-index-htm. 
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principal and agent between the company owner and the company, ' 4 there has been 
debate as to who is the most appropriate party to prosecute in the event of an 
environmental breach; the company or its officers. Historically, the court s adherence 
to the corporate veil has ensured that the corporations officers were able to hide 
behind the corporations separate personality. For example, in 1991, the Herald of 
Free Enterprise set sail with her bow doors open, resulting in her capsizing and the 
deaths of 188 people. When the case came to trail, 125 the court held that P&O was 
responsible for the mistakes of its employees and, accordingly, the directors evaded 
liability. 126 
However, except in circumstances where the company is liable directly or vicariously 
by statute, the company will only be liable for the acts of its employees if they have 
the requisite authority. This is a pragmatic requirement; it is unrealistic to expect a 
company to oversee the actions of a workforce that may number in the thousands. 
The question that arises in such cases is how does the court determine whether or not 
the company is liable for the acts of its employees. 
The doctrine of identification arose in order to answer this question. One of the 
earliest decisions related to this was Lennard s Carrying Co. Ltd. v Asiatic Petroleum 
Co. Ltd. 127 Here Viscount Haldane LC stated that: 
a corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it 
has a body of its own; its active and directing will must consequently be sought 
in the person of somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, but 
who is really the directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and 
centre of the personality of the corporation. 128 
The phrase directing mind and will was seized upon by the courts as the test for 
determining who was to be prosecuted. However, the test, as laid out in Lennards, 
was somewhat vague and subsequent cases needed to set it out more clearly. One of 
the most famous descriptions of what constitutes a directing mind and will came 
'24 Salomon vA Salomon & Co. Ltd. [18971 AC 22. 
125 Rv P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd. (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 72. 
126 It should be noted that two directors and a senior manager were prosecuted 
for manslaughter but this 
charge was later withdrawn from the jury. 27 119151 AC 705. 
X 28 Ibid. at pp. 713-4. 
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from the case of Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd. v TJ Graham & Sons Ltd.. 129 where 
Lord Denning stated: 
A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and 
nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools 
and act in accordance with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the 
company are mere servants or agents who are nothing more than hands to do the 
work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and 
managers who represent the directing mind and will of the company, and control 
what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the 
company and is treated by the law as such. 130 
This seemingly simple test was applied in the case of Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v 
Natrass131 where it was held that directors, officers and senior managers of companies 
would be able to render their companies liable. However, it is not status per se that 
matters; what is important is that the persons in question have the authority to 
determine and direct company policy. ' 32 Technically, the liability is not vicarious. 
Rather, the individuals in question are thought to be so identified with the company 
that they embody its mind and will; they are the company. ' 33 
The obvious question is how will the courts determine who constitutes the brain of 
the company. An early English case that looked at this issue is R i' AIE'dlev. 1 34 Here, a 
company discharged coal tar into the River Thames causing the death of several 
thousand fish. In determining who controlled the corporation, the court stated: 
if persons for their own advantage employ servants to conduct works, they 
must be answerable for what is done by those servants. 135 
A much more precise definition was given by Dickson J in the Canadian case of Rv 
Sault Ste Marie: ' 36 
The element on control, particularly by those in charge of business activities 
which may endanger the public, is vital to promote the observance of regulations 
designed to avoid that danger. This control can be exercised by supervision or 
129 Ll 9571 1 OB 159. 
130 Ibid. at p. 172. 131 [19721 AC 153. 
132 J. Gobert, Corporate Criminality: New Crimes for the Times [ 1994] Crim. LR. 722 at 723. 
133 Although in Natrass, the court held that in most cases, this will be limited to the directors, officers 
and senior managers, the issue of who may render the company liable will not always be clear. Lord 
Diplock opined that the answer may be found in the articles of association or the memoranda. See 
[9721 AC 153 at 200. 
13411834) 6 Car &P 290; 172 ER 1246. 
'" Ibid. at p. 1250, per Denman CJ. 136 
(1978) 85 DLR (3d) 161. 
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inspection, by improvement of his business methods or by exhorting those whom he may be expected to influence or control. 137 
The doctrine of identification, embraced by the House of Lords in Natrass, can be 
criticised for being too narrow and for failing to acknowledge the complexity of the 
modern corporation. When liability arises in the course of a company s business, it is 
likely to be the result of a breakdown of more than one sphere of the company s 
operation, not simply the directors, officers or senior managers. 138 Corporate 
activities may be misguided in their creation, inadequately supervised of 
incompetently carried out. To identify the full extent of the corporate wrongdoing 
would require an aggregating of all these failures. However, the courts have firmly 
rejected any efforts to aggregate corporate responsibility. ' 39 
In recent years, however, the doctrine of identification has lost some of its importance 
due to the trend of imposing personal liability upon certain individuals within the 
corporation. Most environmental statutes impose personal liabilities upon directors 
and officers of the company, the most notable example being s. 157 Environmental 
Protection Act 1990: 
Where an offence committed by a body corporate is proved to have been 
committed with the consent or connivance of, or to be attributable to any neglect 
on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body 
corporate he as well as the body corporate shall be guilty of that offence and 
shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. 
At first glance, this seems to cover a significant number of persons within the 
corporation. However, the courts appeared to have rejected a literal interpretation of 
the statute and interpreted it restrictively. For example, the courts, when deciding 
who constitutes a director will look at the individual s level of authority rather than 
simply their title. Accordingly, in Dean v Hiesler, 140 the respondent was acquitted 
because he had not been appointed by a duly convened meeting of the board. 
141 Other 
cases look beyond the technicalities of the defendants appointment and examine the 
level of authority. In Rv Boal, ' 42 the Court of Appeal stated that: 
137 
Ibid. at p. 179. 
138 J. Gobert, Corporate Criminality: New Crimes for the Times [1994] Crim. LR. 722 at 723. 
139 R l' NM Coroner for East Kent, ex parte Spooner (1989) 88 Cr. App. R. 10. 
140 f194212AllER340. 
141 This stands in stark contrast to other areas of the law, most notably the law of agency and ultra sires 
where the rule in Turquand s case operates so as to render such appointment deficiencies 
irrelevant. 
142 (19921 3 All ER 177. 
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The intended scope of [the section] 143 is to fix with criminal liability only 
those who are in a position of real authority, the decision-makers within the 
company who have both the power and responsibility to decide corporate policy 
and strategy. It is to catch those responsible for putting proper procedures in 
place; it is not meant to strike at underlings. 144 
Normally, however, there will be little problem in determining whether an individual 
constitutes a director for the purposes of environmental legislation. More problematic 
is identifying who constitutes a manager. Again, the courts have shown a 
willingness to look beyond the officers title and have attempted to determine the 
level of authority. In Woodhouse v Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council, ' 45 Mr. 
Woodhouse was the site manager of the company s main waste disposal site. Both 
the company and Mr. Woodhouse were convicted at first instance of storing waste in a 
trailer on site without the appropriate consent. On appeal, however, it was held that 
although he was a site manager, he was not a manager for the purposes of the 
legislation because he lacked the power and responsibility to decide corporate policy 
and strategy. 
This policy of examining authority rather than title can be contrasted with the position 
in America. In State v Kailua Wreckers Inc., 146 the defendant was the wife of the 
owner of the company. Although she was an officer of the company, she took no part 
in the running of the business. Nevertheless she was held to have managerial 
authority sufficient to discover and, if necessary, remedy breaches of the law. This 
she failed to do and accordingly, was found liable, along with the company and other 
officers, of unlawfully burning wrecked cars. 
Accordingly, in many cases, both the company and its officers can 
be liable. 
However, it will not always be the case that all parties will be prosecuted. 
Sometimes 
the philosophy behind a provision will hint at which party or parties should 
be 
prosecuted. For example, certain provisions require clean-up campaigns or 
compensation for clean-up campaigns. 
'47 In such a case, the normal course is to bring 
a civil action against the company as opposed to the officers 
for the simple reason that 
143 In this context, s. 23 Fire Precautions Act 1971. 
141 f 199213 All ER 177 at 18 1. 
'4' 
H9941 1 BCLC 435. 
146 62 Hawaii 222,615 Z°730 (1980). 
147 For example, s. 161 Water Resources Act 1991. 
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the company will have access to greater funds; something that has come to be known 
as the deep pockets approach. In the case of such civil actions, the UK legislature 
might wish to consider the adoption of so called profit-stripping provisions similar 
to those seen in s. 146C Ontario Environmental Protection Act 1990. Under such 
provisions, the court may impose an increased fine based on the amount acquired or 
accrued to the defendant as a result of the commission of the offence. Such a 
provision could help curtail the activities of those companies who prefer to breach the 
law rather than expend the necessary capital need to comply with environmental 
regulations. For such companies, the fines levied by the courts are often considerably 
less than the costs of making their plant, machinery and waste disposal protocols 
environmentally friendly. In other cases, punishing the director can have beneficial 
consequences. For example, when a director has been convicted of an indictable 
offence, he can also be disqualified from acting as a director. 148 The minimum period 
of disqualification is two years and the maximum period is 15 years. The value of 
such provisions is that directors who persistently ignore environmental legislation can 
be disqualified from taking part in the management of companies. In more serious 
cases, directors can be severely fined or imprisoned. Imprisonment is rare, but is has 
occurred. The first custodial sentence was announced by the Health and Safety 
Executive on the 23rd January 1996.149 Ron Hill of Ridings Farm, near Bristol, was 
charged with offences under the Control of Asbestos at Work Regulations 1987 and 
the Asbestos (Licensing) Regulations 1989. Mr. Hill had demolished a building using 
an excavator without taking any precautions to prevent the spread of asbestos 
contained in roofing sheets and pipework lagging. Mr. Hill was sentenced to an 
immediate custodial sentence of three months and ordered to pay £4,000 costs. 
The Corporation, Mens Rea and Strict Liability. 
As regards criminal environmental liability, determining the identity of the defendant 
is only the first step. The prosecuting authorities will also need to establish the 
requisite mens rea. Concerning corporate environmental liability, many statutes 
require evidence of consent, connivance or neglect. 
148 S. 2 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
14, ' See Health and Safety Executive Release E13: 96. 
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Proof of consent seems to require the defendant to know that the illegal activity was 
being carried on and agreed to it. This was the conclusion of the Court of Appeal in 
Attorney-Generals Reference (No. 1 of 1995) . 
150 They stated that if a director 
consents to an illegal activity, ignorance on his part of the illegality of the act is 
ignorance of the law, which is no defence. 
Connivance suggests acquiescence of an act which is likely to lead to the commission 
of an offence. In Huckerby v Elliot, 151 Ashworth J affirmed the following words of a 
stipendiary magistrate: 
Where he connives at the offence committed by the company he is equally well 
aware of what is going on but his agreement is tacit, not actively encouraging 
what happens but letting it continue and saying nothing about it. 152 
Due to the difficulties in establishing the mental elements of environmental liability, 
several statutory provisions now impose strict liability. For example, in Alphacell 
Ltd. v Woodward, 153 the company operated a factory in which paper was made. The 
layout of the plant was such that if two pumps failed, waste material would be 
discharged into a river. The pumps failed and the river was polluted by the waste 
material. The House of Lords dismissed the company s appeal against conviction for 
causing polluting matter to enter a stream contrary to s. 2 Rivers (Prevention of 
Pollution) Act 1951.154 The company had caused the pollutant to enter the river and 
this was sufficient to make it guilty of the offence; there was no need to establish any 
mental element. 
The Enforcing Authorities and Prosecution Policy. 
The responsibility for enforcement of regulatory laws relating to environmental 
offences is usually entrusted to an inspectorate rather than the police. Such 
inspectorates include Her Majesty s Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP), the 
Environmental Agency (formerly the National Rivers Authority), the Health and 
Safety at Work Executive (HSE) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food 
(MAFF), now known as the Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs 
150 (1996) The Times 30th January 
15 '[19701 1 All ER 189. 
152 Ibid. at p. 192. 
153 [1972] AC 824. 
154 This has since been repealed and replaced by s. 85 Water Resources Act 1991. 
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(DEFRA). Most of these inspectorates will have written policy statement indicating 
when they will prosecute. However, notably as regards the prosecution of individual 
corporate officers, both the HMIP and the Environmental Agency have no written 
statement of prosecution. ' 55 In contrast, the HSE has identified the following 
situations where corporate and individual prosecutions may be appropriate. Where 
the company is clearly solvent156 and the commission of the offence arose due to 
defects in the management system, the company is the more appropriate party to 
prosecute. Where, however, there is a clear instance of blameworthiness on the part 
of the director(s) then the public interest would be best served by prosecuting the 
individuals. 
However, whilst prosecution guidelines exist, in reality prosecutions are rare. Instead 
the regulatory agencies tend to adopt a compliance strategy, where the objective is 
not to punish the company for past offences, but to persuade it from committing future 
ones. 157 This compliance strategy is consistent with the self-image of regulators who 
tend to think of themselves as expert advisers rather than environmental police. 158 
Whilst at first, this approach may seem overly lenient, there are numerous 
justifications for a compliance policy. Immediate concerns may arise that demand the 
adoption of a compliance strategy. One example offered is where a company, through 
negligence, releases contaminated drugs onto the market. 159 The immediate goal 
should be to locate and recall the drugs before they can be taken by any consumers. 
Cooperation from the company is vital but is unlikely to be forthcoming if it is likely 
to result in the company incriminating itself. In such a situation, a voluntary 
agreement coupled with an agreement not to prosecute provides the company with an 
incentive to cooperate. 
155 P. Jewkes, The Personal Liability of Directors in the United Kingdom for Environmental 
O encccs 
[1996] 4 Env. Liability 87 at 89. 
I56 Conversely, if the company is likely to go into liquidation, then it would make more sense 
to 
prosecute the director. 
1.7 See Reiss, Selecting Strategies of Social Control over Organisational Life in K. Hawkins and 
J. 
Thomas (eds. ), Enforcing Regulation, 1984, Boston: Kluwer. 
159 J. Gobert, Corporate Criminality: New Crimes for the Tinies [1994] Crim. LR. 722 at 725. 
1 S' J. Brathwaite and P. Pettit, Not Just Desserts, 1992, Oxford: Clarendon. pp. 193-4. 
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The Environment and Profit Maximisation. 
As has already been stated, in return for investing their capital, shareholders expect a 
return on their investment. In order to provide a percentage return on investor s 
capital, growth must occur each year. In order to achieve this, the corporation came 
to adopt a policy of profit maximisation. 160 We have also noted that an effective way 
of maximising profits is to reduce costs via a process of creating negative 
externalities. This will be briefly reiterated. 
A corporation creates negative externalities when, in the absence of legal restraints, it 
successfully passes on its costs onto outside parties such as employees, creditors, the 
public and the environment. We have noted that such behaviour may not, in the long 
run, maximise profits. Nevertheless, externalities have now become an accepted part 
of the profit maximisation strategy and the corporation has shown itself extremely 
adept at taking advantage of the cost-saving benefits that externalities can offer. As 
Robert Monks, a former economic aid to Robert Reagan, has stated: 
the corporation as an entity became so powerful that it quickly outstripped the 
limits of accountability and became something of an externalizing machine, in 
the same way that a shark is a killing machine - no malevolence, no intentional 
harm, just something designed with sublime efficiency for self-preservation, 
which it accomplishes without any capacity to factor in the consequences of 
others. 161 
This is particularly true as regards environmental externalities. A classic example is 
the disposal of industrial waste. Most companies that have a manufacturing base will, 
in some form or another, produce waste products that cannot be recycled or used in 
the manufacturing process. As one commentator noted for every 100 pounds of 
product we manufacture we create at least 3200 pounds of waste. 
162 In some 
cases, the waste products may be toxic, corrosive or radioactive. Such waste must be 
disposed of. At this point, the corporation has two alternatives; it can either (i) 
expend capital in destroying the waste or safely disposing of it or; (ii) pass the cost of 
waste disposal onto the environment by dumping it either at sea or at a landfill site. 
As corporations have an overriding objective to maximise profits, it is likely that the 
160 The arguments for profit maximisation were examined in detail in Ch. 6. 
161 R. A. G. Monks & N. Minow. Power acid Accountability. 1991, New York: Harper Collins. p. 24. 
162 P. Hawken, Natural Capitalism, 1997, San Francisco: Mother Jones Reprints. 
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latter option will be taken irrespective of the environmental damage caused. . As one 
commentator has stated: 
The goal of the corporation is, first to survive, and, second, to return a profit to 
its shareholders (its legal owners) and if the air has to be fouled to accomplish 
these goals, then the air will be fouled. 163 
Corporations themselves have acknowledged that this is the case. In 1991, the 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (a private group consisting of the 
heads of major corporations such as DuPont and Dow Chemical) admitted: 
Today, for instance, the earth s atmosphere is providing the valuable service of 
acting as a dump for pollutants; those enjoying this service rarely pay a 
reasonable price for it. 164 
The point that needs to be stressed is that the philosophy behind environmental law 
and the profit maximising nature of the corporation seem to be incompatible. 
Looking at the above example, the philosophy behind environmental law would 
demand that the corporation expend the necessary capital required to dispose of the 
waste safely without damaging the environment. However, the theory behind profit 
maximisation would seem to require that the corporation take advantage of the 
externality on offer and pass its costs onto the environment by dumping the waste. 
III. JUSTIFYING CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESPONSIBILITY. 
In Chapter 7, we saw that traditional justifications for exclusive shareholder 
governance protection could be used to justify expanding company law protection 
beyond the narrow confines of the legal model. We noted that these traditional 
arguments could be used to justify governance protection for the employees and 
shareholders. Here, we will once again be using the traditional arguments to justify 
protection of the environment. As we have seen, traditionally environmental 
regulation has been left solely to environmental law with company law playing no 
part whatsoever. We have also seen that environmental law has been unable to 
effectively regulate corporations for two reasons (i) the various methods of regulation 
each have weaknesses, and; (ii) the corporation has demonstrated an ability to evade 
163 P. Montague, New Strategy Focuses on Corporation [Online] Available http: /i\v\v\v. envirolink. or 
J 
pubs/Rachel/rehw309. htms p. 1. 
164 S. Schmidheiny et al, Changing Course. 1992, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. p. 
9. 
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general environmental regulation. The second reason could be alleviated by using 
company law to regulate environmental activity. It is hoped that company law, with 
its superior knowledge, will be able to take into account the special characteristics of 
the company that general environmental law cannot. This will lead to provisions that 
cannot be so easily evaded and will be designed with corporations in mind. 
Ownership of the Corporation s Assets. 
As we have seen, a popular argument for exclusive shareholder governance protection 
is that the shareholders own the company and its assets, and accordingly have a 
legitimate claim to have the company run in their own interests. ' 65 We have also seen 
that this contention has proved to be extremely resistant to change despite its obvious 
flaws. A possible reason for this might be that a narrow definition has been adopted 
of the word asset. 
The ownership argument seems to be premised on the contention that a company 
consists of nothing but capital assets, for that is all the shareholders contribute. 
Accordingly, the ownership argument adopts a narrow interpretation of asset based 
on financial factors alone. However, the dictionary definition of asset is anything 
valuable or useful. 
This definition indicates that the financial definition is too narrow. Academics and 
the business community alike would agree that the assets of a company go far beyond 
simple capital, and as the breadth of the definition increases, so to does the claim of 
other parties within the corporation. 
For example, there is no doubt that the employees constitute a considerable asset of 
the company. How many times have we heard CEO s and Managing Directors 
describe employees as a company s greatest asset? The ability to rent capital from 
creditors is also an asset. Both of these constituents have of late started to receive 
increased recognition from company law due to their obvious input and reliance on 
the firm. 166 The point that needs to be stressed is that justifications based on 
165 
Supra. at Ch. 2. 
166 This recognition was examined in Ch. 4. 
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ownership are perfectly valid. It is the contention that the company itself is owned 
that is misleading. As noted, the company as a separate entity is incapable of being 
owned. 167 However, the assets are capable of being owned, but only by the company 
itself and this is where a legitimating principle may lie. 
The question that lies at the heart of the stakeholder debate is why should non- 
shareholder constituents benefit from company law protection. Many commentators 
justify stakeholder inclusion by reference to a moral obligation - stakeholders are 
affected by the corporations activities and therefore morally corporations should 
include stakeholder interests in the decisionmaking process. As noted, such moral 
arguments are unlikely to carry sufficient weight to result in departure from the legal 
model. Accordingly, we need a more tangible justification. The answer could lie in 
identifying where the corporation s assets derive from. Economics has identified four 
crucial assets known as the factors of production and consist of land, labour, capital 
and rent. If a party to the company can claim to contribute one of these assets, then it 
may have a right to expect the company to be run with its interests in mind. For 
example, shareholders and creditors contribute capital and employees contribute 
labour. 
The environment also has such a claim. In fact, it has a multi-faceted claim. Firstly, 
the environment contributes land; not only the physical site of the company s 
headquarters but also any natural resources used by the company. 
168 The other factor 
of production is capital. In using natural resources or by using the environment as a 
dumping ground, corporations reduce their costs. As profit is increased by increasing 
revenue or decreasing costs, the environment serves to decrease the company s capital 
expenditure. In effect, the amount saved is akin to a capital injection. 
Therefore, the ownership argument as it stands is flawed in that it rests upon the 
assumption that the assets of the company are owned by those who contribute them. 
Assets in a broader sense are owned by and benefit the company. As the company 
167 Pl. Davies, Gower s Principles of Modern Companv Law, 1997,6th cd.. London: swcet 
& 
Maxwell, p. 301. 
168 L. Roach, The Paradox of the Traditional Justifications for Exclusive Shareholder 
Governance 
Protection: Expanding the Pluralist Approach (2000) 22 Co. Law. 9 at 13. 
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benefits, those who contribute those assets should benefit too. They certainly should 
not suffer for contributing to the company, as the environment does. 
Residual Risk and Certain Risk. 
The practice of limiting the word asset to financial assets had had the corollary of 
limiting the definition of risk to financial risk. The residual risk argument 
concentrates solely on the risk that shareholders face and as the majority of 
shareholders care only for their dividends, a narrow financial interpretation has come 
to dominate. However, as regards the environment, this interpretation is obviously 
inadequate. 
In fact, as we shall see, regarding the environment risk is in inappropriate term. The 
term risk denotes a lack of certainty, the idea that a future outcome is indeterminate. 
We can examine the position of shareholders, employees and creditors by reference to 
risk because their benefits derived from the firm are indeterminate in both time and 
quantity. This is not the case with the environment. Many companies, particularly 
companies involved in the industrial sector, are going to create waste or by-products 
that harm the environment. There is no risk, only fact. The residual risk argument is 
premised on protecting the party best able to bear risk. In the case of pollution, the 
environment is the only party able to bear the damage, and consequently, the risk. 
One reason why the environment faces certain risk is due to the corporation s desire 
to externalize. Corporations will try, in the absence of legal restraints, to pass on their 
costs to third parties. 169 These costs are known as external costs or negative 
externalities. A common third party to bear negative externalities is the environment. 
For example, the most common form of environmental external costs would be the 
dumping of waste products into a river. The costs of disposal have been externalized 
from the company and passed onto the environment. This has led to the corporation 
being described as: 
169 See R. G. Lipsey, An Introduction to Positive Economics. 1989,7`h ed., London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, pp. 400-2,424-5; G. Richardson, A. Ogus and P. 
Burrows. Policing Pollution: .4 
Stud,, of 
Regulation and Enforcement, 1982. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 
7-10; M. Jacobs, The Green 
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something of an externalizing machine, in the same way that a shark is a killing machine-no malevolence, no intentional harm, just something 
designed with sublime efficiency for self-preservation, which it accomplishes 
without any capacity to factor in the consequences to others. 170 
Of course, whilst externalization decreases corporate costs, it concomitantly increases 
social costs. '71 In order to discourage negative environmental externalities, it has 
been suggested that corporations be made to pay those who bear the social costs of 
corporate pollution. 172 As a result, corporations would install waste management and 
pollution disposal mechanisms as this would be cheaper than making compensation 
payments. However, such a solution would be unlikely to succeed for the reason that 
as the environment is unowned, disposal into it cannot be quantified and subsequently 
charged for. ' 73 
The Inadequacy of Contract. 
As we have see, one of the few legitimate justifications for providing shareholders 
with primary governance protection is because they cannot protect themselves 
contractually. The articles of association are laid down unilaterally by management 
and so shareholders are forced to either adopt the directors terms or not buy into the 
company. 
The position as regards the environment is different to other groups within the 
corporate nexus. The obvious difficulty is that as the environment is not an aggregate 
of persons; there is no identity to contract with. Therefore, the environment cannot 
protect itself via contract. 
One solution adopted by the more enlightened companies is to contain pro- 
environmental provisions in the articles. For example, The Body Shop plc has four 
such objects: 
170 R. A. G. Monks and N. Minow, Power and Accountability, 1991, New York: HarperCollins, p. 
24. 
171 F-11. Easterbrook & D. R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporation Law, 1991. Harvard 
University Press, p. 50. 
172 A converse suggestion offered is that those who would bear social costs pay the corporation not 
to 
pollute, i. e. the corporation is paid the amount that the externality would save. 
See R. H. Coase. The 
Problem of Social Cost (1960) 3 J. Economics 1. 
173 J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company 
Law, 1994. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 312. 
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(B) To institute and support (whether by donation or otherwise) campaigns 
or educational programs for human and civil rights [and] community projects. 
(C) To establish and develop equitable and responsible trading relationships, 
particularly in respect of community economic initiatives. (D) To implement 
policies aimed at protecting the natural environment (E) To institute and 
support campaign[s] against animal testing. 
Obviously, the environment cannot sue for breach of contract. However, as noted, the 
articles form a contract between the shareholders and the company. Consequently, 
the provisions of the articles can be enforced by a member in a contract action. ''' 
Therefore, there is limited contractual protection. However, for two reasons this 
protection is ineffective. 
The first reason has already been mentioned. As the directors unilaterally lay down 
the articles, most companies will not contain such provisions as they act as a 
curtailment to managerial freedom. The second reason is that in order to ensure that 
firms are environmentally friendly they need to expend capital. Capital expenditure 
means lower short-term profits. Lower short-term profit means lower or no 
dividends. This is unlikely to appeal to shareholders, the vast majority of whom 
invest simply as a means of acquiring a profit. Accordingly, as such provisions are 
contained in the articles, the environment is reliant on the shareholders for 
enforcement. As enforcement would result in both effort on the part of the 
shareholders and expenditure on the part of the company, the shareholders have little 
incentive to enforce such provisions. 175 
Given that the environment cannot protect itself via contract and the shareholders may 
be unwilling to, the issue has been left to statutory regulation. The provisions in 
question tend to follow a standard formula, the most notable example being s. 157(l ) 
Environmental Protection Act 1990: 
Where an offence under any provision of this Act committed by a body 
corporate is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance 
of, or to have been attributable to any neglect on the part of, any 
director, 
manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate or a person 
who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he as well as the 
body 
174 KW Wedderburn. Shareholders Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle [1957] CLJ 194 at 
209- 
15. 
115 L. Roach, The Paradox oJ' the Traditional Justifications for Exclusive 
Shareholder Governance 
Protection: Expanding the Pluralist Approach (2000) 22 Co. Law. 9 at 14. 
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corporate shall be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded 
against and punished accordingly. 176 
These provisions, however, are part of environmental law and this is the area of the 
law that has come to regulate the company s environmental activity. Company law 
has had little part to play for the simple reason that the philosophy behind these 
environmental provisions is at odds with the philosophy behind company law. 
Company law s preoccupation with profit has been a major factor in its exclusion 
from the realm of environmental regulation. Profits are increased by either increasing 
revenue or decreasing costs. As we have noted, corporations decrease costs via a 
process of externalization. In order to protect the environment corporations must 
cease externalizing their costs. As a result, the corporation will no longer have a free 
dumping ground and will be forced to expend capital so as to provide a means of 
safely disposing of waste. This is where company law and environmental law 
diverge. The philosophy behind environmental law would dictate that the corporation 
expends capital as opposed to externalize costs. Conversely, the profit maximization 
preoccupation of company law would dictate that the corporation takes advantage of 
the environment as a means of reducing costs. As has been noted: 
The goal of a corporation is, first, to survive, and, second, to return a profit 
to its shareholders (its legal owners) and if the air has to be fouled to 
accomplish these goals, then the air will be fouled. 177 
Conclusion. 
In Chapter 7, we saw that the traditional justifications for exclusive shareholder 
governance protection could be used to justify expanding the scope of company law 
protection to include the company s employees and creditors. Here we use the same 
justifications to justify environmental protection. 
The ownership argument is often premised upon the derivation of capital. 
Legal 
model theory contends that as the shareholders contribute the capital, they own the 
company. They therefore have a right to have the company run in their interests. 
We 
176 Examples of similar provisions include s. 52 Clean Air Act 1993, s. 
36 Radioacti %e Substanccs Act 
1993, s. 217 Water Resources Act 1991 and s. 210 Water Industry Act 
1991. 
177 P. Montague. New Strategy Focuses on Corporations [online] Available http: 
//NN'NNw\N enN-irolink. org 
/pubs/ rachel/rehw309. htms p. 1. 
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saw in Chapter 7 that other constituents can also contribute capital. The same is true 
of the environment. Of course, as with the employees and the creditors, no ownership 
claim is established. However, the claim is no weaker than that of the shareholders. 
It could be argued that in relation to the residual risk argument, the claim of the 
environment is stronger than that of the shareholders. The risk that the shareholders 
face can be minimised via a diversified portfolio. Therefore, the shareholders can 
protect themselves against the risk that they face. The environment cannot. 
Likewise, the environment cannot protect itself via contract. Neither can the 
shareholders, yet their lack of contractual protection warrants company law 
intervention. Legal model theorists justify this by saying that there is a gap in the 
protection offered to the shareholders and so company law should fill this gap. The 
only way that the environment can gain contractual protection is if such a provision is 
put in the articles. As we have seen, this is unlikely. Therefore there is a gap in the 
environment s protection. 
CONCLUSION. 
Corporate environmental regulation has been left to general environmental law as 
opposed to company law. Numerous regulatory methods have arisen to combat the 
increase in environmental degradation. As we saw in Part I, the various methods have 
much to offer. However, no one method is totally effective with each having 
weaknesses that need to be offset by the strength of the others. What is needed is a 
mixture of regulatory methods. To date, this has not happened. 
What makes corporate regulation even more difficult is the fact that the corporation 
has shown itself adept at evading environmental provisions. Part 
II saw that the 
corporation has a number of unique characteristics that make environmental 
regulation extremely difficult. These unique characteristics need to 
be taken into 
account when drafting environmental provisions. This 
is a matter for company law, 
not general environmental law. 
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Company law s involvement in environmental matters will need a stronger 
justification. Possible justifications were examined in Part III. These were the same 
justifications examined in Chapter 6 and used to move away from a legal model 
position in Chapter 7. These justifications demonstrate that the position of the 
environment is akin to that of the shareholders. Both parties can be deemed to have 
ownership claims, albeit not particularly strong ones. Both parties bear risk from the 
activities of the company. Finally, both parties are unable to effectively protect 
themselves via contract. This leads us to conclude that the environment is deserving 
of more attention from our company law. 
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The Proposed Statement of Directors Duties and the 
Operating and Financial Review 
INTRODUCTION. 
As we have noted, companies legislation has never sought to formally prescribe the 
role of the director. However, it has been contended that there is little doubt that the 
directors are responsible for the smooth running of their companies. ' As the Cadbury 
Committee stated boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their 
companies. 2 Given their key role, their duties form one of the central issues in 
company law. However, currently, their duties are to be found in a confusing and 
compendious mass of case law and the occasional statutory measure. These in turn 
are supplemented by regulations in the company s articles, and various provisions in 
the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, the Listing Rules and the Combined Code. 
As we saw in Chapter 4, the various measures that seek to prescribe to whom these 
duties are owed are not particularly coherent. 
Given this, for many years, there has been discussion of a statutory statement of 
directors duties that would consolidate and codify the existing case law and statute 
law into one clearer, formal statement of directors duties. A major step toward this 
was taken in 1999 when the Law Commission formally recommended that directors 
duties be made statutory and offered a proposed statement. 
3 The Law Commission s 
examination was a necessary one given the lack of clarity in this area of the law. 
However, its remit was a limited one. In particular, whilst the Law Commission 
examined the content of directors duties, it did not examine the issue of to whom 
these duties would be owed to. 4 Fortunately, as we shall see, the Government shortly 
after instigated a fundamental review of company law. It became inevitable that this 
would include a thorough examination of directors duties. This review was carried 
J. Birds, The Reform of Directors Duties in J. de Lacy (ed. ), The Reform of 
United Kingdom 
Company Law, 2002, London: Cavendish, p. 149. 
Report on the Financial. -t spects of Cot-poi-ate Governance, 
1992, London: Gee, para. 2. . 
See the Law Commission Report No. 261, Company Directors: Regulating 
Conflicts of Interests and 
Formulating a Statement of Duties, 1999, Cm. 4436, London: 
TSO. Note that the actual arguments for 
and against a statutory statement of duties will not be examined 
here. 
4 The Law Commission acknowledged this at para. 1.32. 
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out by the Company Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG) and it is to their work that 
we now turn. 
I. THE DRAFT STATEMENT OF DIRECTORS DUTIES. 
The CLRSG was set up in 1998 by the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 
Margaret Beckett, to devise a framework of company law which facilitates enterprise 
and promotes transparency and fair dealing. S The first consultation document set out 
its objectives as, amongst others, to provide straightforward, cost-effective and fair 
regulation which balances the interests of business with those of shareholders, 
creditors and others. 6 In relation to this objective, the most difficult task faced by the 
Review was to determine the objectives that companies should aspire to and to take 
into account the range of interests that directors need to balance. The Review termed 
this the scope of company law. 7 
The February 1999 consultation document acknowledged what we have already 
demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, namely that our current system of company law 
operates largely to benefit the shareholders. 8 It then went on to advocate two possible 
areas of reform, which it termed the enlightened shareholder value model and the 
pluralist model. The main difference between these two models lies in relation to 
what happens when there is a clash of interests between the shareholders and the other 
stakeholders. 9 The enlightened shareholder value model, which was later to become 
what is known as the inclusive approach, stated that the shareholders interests 
should prevail. Conversely, the pluralist model argues that the directors should 
balance these potentially conflicting interests, without giving automatic priority to the 
shareholders. 10 Both of these models will now be examined. 
` Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy. March 
1998, London: DTI, Foreword. 
6 Ibid. at para. 5.1. 
7 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Latin for a Competitive Economy: The 
Strategic Framework, February 1999, London: DTI, Ch. 5. 
8 Ibid. at paras. 5.1.4-5. 
9 J. Parkinson, Inclusive Company Law in J. de Lacy (ed. ), The Reform (? f United Kingdom Company 
Law, 2002, London: Cavendish, p. 44. 
10 Company Law Review Steering Group, . Ilodern 
Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The 
Strategic Framework, February 1999, London: DTI, para. 5.1.13. 
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The Inclusive Model. 
The February 1999 consultation document stated that enlightened shareholder value 
model advocates argue that the ultimate objective of companies as currently 
enshrined in law -i. e. to generate maximum value to shareholders - is in principle the 
best means also of securing overall prosperity and welfare. 11 Basically, this view is 
the same as that espoused by Friedman. Although many favoured this view, 
subsequent consultations revealed that many viewed this model as being too narrow. 
Those involved in the consultation process expressed a hope that the duty would be 
framed in an inclusive way. 12 This meant that whilst the shareholder primacy 
element would be retained, this would need to be balanced with the need to foster 
effective relationships over time, with employees, customers and suppliers, and in 
the community more widely. 13 Following this, the enlightened shareholder value 
model soon became known as the inclusive approach. 
The inclusive approach is premised upon the belief that long-term profit maximisation 
can only occur through the fostering of co-operative relationships with the various 
non-shareholder constituents. Taking the employees as a major non-shareholder 
group, as we saw in Chapter 7, factors such as optimal employee effort and innovation 
cannot be contracted for. Factors such as these are necessary to attaining long-term 
financial well-being, and as they cannot be contracted for, they can only be achieved 
if the parties trust each other. 
It has been argued that such relationships of trust between the company and its 
employees have become crucial in the modern economy given that technological 
innovations means that the abilities of the workforce are an important factor 
governing the company s ability to compete. 14 We also saw in Chapter 7 that 
employees may be reluctant to gain firm-specific skills if they do not trust the 
II Ibid. at para. 5.1.12. 
12 Company Law Review Steering Group. ; tlodern Company Lain for a Competitive Econom. j,., 
Developing the Fi-amewt ork, March 2000, London: DTI, para. 2.11. 
13 Ibid. 
14 P. F. Drucker, Post-Capitalist Societe, 1993, Oxford: OUP. pp. 19-47. 
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company s management. Employees that trust their employers will be eager to 
acquire firm-specific skills and this in turn can have a positive effect on profits. ' S 
That long-term co-operative relationships with employees are crucial to corporate 
prosperity is starting to become acknowledged. Both the RSA16 and the Commission 
on Public Policy and British Business17 have stated that the poor performance of 
British companies can be attributed in part to the failure to cultivate long-term 
relationships of the kind discussed. The CLRSG hopes that the adoption of an 
inclusive approach will result in a long-term perspective that can result in co- 
operative relationships. 
There is practical evidence that employee prosperity can have beneficial effects. The 
American company, Ben & Jerry s Homemade Inc., strives to aid its employees in 
various ways. It offers a variety of employee benefits including generous life, health 
and disability insurance plans, an employee stock purchase plan and an employee 
profit-sharing plan to which Ben & Jerry s contributes 5% of its pre-tax earnings, as 
well as free health club memberships and affordable day care. The employees are 
also allowed to take home three free pints of ice cream every workday. By traditional 
measures, the company treats its employees extremely well. The firm s employees 
recognize this. An independent survey of the attitudes of Ben & Jerry s employees 
indicated that its employees are far happier in their jobs than employees in other 
American companies. Employees in turn believed that they were far more productive 
because of this. ' 8 
However, the inclusive approach goes further than requiring co-operative 
relationships with employees and other parties within the supply chain. It also states 
that wider responsibilities such as those to the community and the environment are 
also vital to corporate success. It has been argued that responsible behaviour of this 
kind can result in increases in profits by reducing costs, e. g. certain environmental 
J. Kay, Foundations of Coipoi-ate Success: How Business Strategies Add value, 
1993, Oxford: OUP, 15 
chs. 3-5. 
16 RSA Inquiry, Tomorrow s Company: The Role of Business in a Changing World, 
1995. London: 
RSA. 
17 Commission on Public Policy and British Business, Promoting Prosperity: 
A Business Agenda fnr 
Britain, 1997, London: Vintage. 
18 Ben & Jerry s Homemade Inc., 1990.4nnual Report, 1992, Vermont: Ben & Jerry s, p. 
10. 
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initiatives such as waste recycling and energy conservation can have positive effects 
on profit margins. 19 Acting in a socially responsible manner can also reduce costs in 
that it can create its own advertising. 
For example, since 1989, Ben & Jerry s has supported a non-profit organisation, I% 
for Peace, which consists of two entities: an educational foundation and a legislative 
action campaign that supports the passage of legislation allocating 1% of the US 
defence budget to programs to build understanding between nations. Not only has the 
company named its chocolate and nut ice cream bar the Peace Pop but also the 
company s Foundation allocates 1% of the company s pre-tax earnings to 1% for 
Peace. The company prints an explanation of the cause and its involvement on the ice 
cream s packaging. Although some retailers initially refused to carry the product, 
believing it to be too political, the huge advertising surrounding the product, none of 
which Ben & Jerry s asked for or paid for, soon made the product a huge success. 
However, Ben & Jerry s has actually gone further than the inclusive approach 
envisages. In supporting local communities, Ben & Jerry s actually adopts measures 
guaranteed to lower profits without the expectation of regaining those profits through 
increased productivity or customer goodwill. The company has a policy of paying 
higher prices to support dairy farmers in Vermont. As Ben Cohen stated, $500,000 
annually will come out of our profits, where it doesn t belong, and into farmers 
pockets, where it does belong. We refuse to prop up our bottomline with bankrupt 
family farms. 21 Other companies have also sought to alleviate social problems in 
such a way. In 1988, the Body Shop plc. created a subsidiary known as Soapworks 
Ltd. The company decided to base this factory in Glasgow in an attempt to mitigate 
22 the area s astonishingly high (70%) unemployment rate. 
19 J. Braithwaite and P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation, 2000, Cambridge: 
CUP, pp. 267-9. 
20 See L. D. Solomon, On the Frontier cof Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics 
by Modern 
Public/, v Held Corporations - .4 
Critical Assessment in L. E. Mitchell (ed. ), Progressive Corporate 
Laºt', 1995, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, p. 291. 
21 Ben & Jerry s Homemade Inc., 1991 Annual Report, 1992. Vermont: Ben 
& Jerry s. p. 7. 
22 A. Roddick, Bodiy and Soul, 1991, pp. 1 -55-9. 
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Companies such as Ben & Jerry s and The Body Shop are exceptional. `ý However, 
whilst many companies will not voluntarily act as responsibly as the above 
companies, there are incentives to stop them acting irresponsibly. The last decade has 
witnessed an increase in market penalties aimed at those firm who behave 
irresponsibly. The most obvious form of market penalty is an organised boycott of a 
company s products. There have been several recent notable boycotts including those 
against Nestl (for selling infant milk formula to developing counties), Shell (for the 
disposal of the Brent Spar Oil facility in the North Sea) and Nike (for sweatshop 
conditions in overseas factories. )24 However, whilst the media coverage at the time 
was significant, it appears that the high-profile campaigns against these companies 
had little or no effect upon the share price. One unpublished study investigating the 
financial effects of the Nike, Nestl and Shell campaigns concluded that: 
[Whilst] not investigated in a scientific way the examples show that the 
negative press referring to specific incidents is not proved to have a long-term 
25 negative effect on the price of the company s shares. 
This has led one commentator to state that, based upon his own survey: 
the company that did worst in [my social responsibility] rankings - News 
International - actually had the largest share price rise. Clearly the public s 
purchasing of shares is still not greatly affected, as yet, by the companies level 
of social responsibility. 26 
However, a more effective method of consumer pressure is beginning to emerge, 
namely ethical purchasing. A recent report on ethical purchasing in the UK 
commissioned by the Co-operative Bank found that around 5% of the population 
claimed to base their purchases on ethical considerations. 18% said that they 
frequently bought or avoided products depending on the manufacturers social 
reputation. The survey concluded by stating that around half the population have, at 
some point, chosen a product because its manufacturer had a positive social reputation 
23 It is interesting to note that the responsible reputation that Ben & Jerry s and The Body Shop ha% e 
cultivated can actually backfire should these companies not sustain their whiter than white reputation. 
In the mid-I990s, both of these companies came under public attack for misleading their customers and 
the public in their claim to be socially responsible. 
For other case studies, see N. Craig Smith, ; t/oralitiv and the , Market: Consumer 
Pressure for 
Corporate Accountability. 1990, London: Routledge, Ch. 8. 
25 Quoted in S. Zadek, The Civil Corporation: The : Vetiv Econonn of Corporarr 
Citi_E'niship, 2001, 
London: Earthscan, p. 61. 
26 M. Hopkins, The Planetary Bargain, 1998, London: HarperCollins. p. 56. 
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or rejected a product because of a poor social reputation. 27 A survey carried out in 
America by Cone Inc. found even greater evidence of ethical purchasing. The study 
found that 65% of Americans, nearly 130 million consumers, stated that they would 
be likely to switch brands or retailers to another associated with a good cause. 28 
This slow move toward ethical purchasing is indicative of a shift in the views of 
consumers regarding the role of corporations. In this respect, the results of the 
Millennium Poll on consumer expectations of corporate social responsibility are 
significant. The poll covered 23 countries on six continents and interviewed over 
25,000 consumers. The survey found that, across the globe, roughly two in three 
consumers want companies to go beyond the legal model goal of profit maximisation 
and contribute more to achieving broader social goals. Over half the Europeans, and 
71 % of those in the UK, believed that businesses did not pay enough attention to their 
social responsibilities. 29 Other surveys have found similar trends. 30 
This inclusive approach is certainly provocative. It suggests that societal well-being 
and profit making can go hand-in-hand over the long-term. 
3' Certainly, this 
perception of a win-win situation is becoming popular. The World Business 
Council for Social Development certainly recognises that profit and social 
responsibility can go hand-in-hand: 
Concern is sometimes expressed that corporate social responsibility has no 
clear business benefits and could destroy shareholder value by diverting 
resources from core commercial activities However, the WBCSD supports the 
view that a coherent CSR strategy based on sound ethics and core values offers 
clear business benefits. 32 
27 R. Cowe and S. Williams, li'lio are the Ethical Consumers?, 2000, Manchester: 
The Co-operative 
Bank. 
N Cone Inc., Cone/Roper Cause Related Trends Report: Evolution of Cause Branding, 1999, 
Boston: 
Cone Inc. 
29 Environics International Ltd., Executive Briefing: The , tlillennium Poll on 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 1999, Toronto: Environics International Ltd. 
30 See e. g. The Conference Board Inc., Consumer Expectations on the 
Social Accountability of 
Business, 1999, New York: The Conference Board, pp. 9-13; Fleishman Hillard, Consumers 
Demand 
Companies with a Conscience, 1999, London: Fleishman Hillard 
Europe. 
11 P. Utting, Business Responsibility for Sustainable Development, 2000, Geneva: 
United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development, p. 7. 
12 World Business Council for Social Development, Corporate Social Responsibility, 
1999. Geneva: 
WBCSD, p. 2. 
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Some have argued that this recognition defeats the Friedman view that the social aim 
of business is to increase its profits. 33 Alice Tepper-Marlin, the President of the 
Council on Economic Priorities, stated Milton Friedman, the prime advocate of the 
position that the responsibility of business is exclusively to maximize profit for 
shareholders, has lost the debate. 34 
However, it has been argued that inclusive approaches of this kind are a sophisticated 
restatement, rather than a refutation, of Friedman s proposition. 35 Friedman said that 
business should not only comply with the law but also with the expectations of the 
societies within which they operate. From this viewpoint, the inclusive approach 
more or less states this by saying that businesses should address new social norms that 
arise. 
The idea that profits and principles can go hand-in-hand has not been accepted 
wholeheartedly. Korten has argued that there is a trade-off between profits and 
principles. For this reason, he argues that ethical firms are eventually pushed out of a 
competitive market. 36 Many however, disagree. Mark Goyder, the head of the Centre 
for Tomorrows Company, believes that tomorrows successful companies will 
necessarily be those who adopt an inclusive view to their stakeholders. 37 
In conclusion, although the inclusive model shares the current goal of the legal model 
(that is to maximise profits), it does it in a way that encourages a broader societal 
outlook. As we have seen, this does not only involve the traditional stakeholder 
constituents in the supply chain, but actually encompasses the community and the 
environment. The traditional legal model outlook states that profit maximisation is 
best achieved via corporate policies that seek to benefit the shareholders. The 
inclusive approach differs in that it focuses on those long-term relationships that can 
exist between parties inside and outside the corporation. It is the aim of the inclusive 
33 The views of Friedman were examined in Chapter 6. 
34 Confederation of British Industry, Global Social Responsibilit}', 1999, London: 
CBI, p-2- 
35 S. Zadek, The Civil Corporation: The New Economy of Corporate Citizenship, 2001, London: 
Earthscan, p. 53. 
36 D. Korten, 11'he n Corporations Rule the ll'orld. 1997, West Hardford, Conn.: 
Kumarian. 
,'M. Goyder, The Living Company, 1998, Aldershot: Gower. 
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approach to better foster these relationships. 38 It is too early to state whether or not 
the inclusive approach can start to marry profits and principles. 
The Pluralist Model. 
Whilst, over the long-term, the interests of the shareholders and other constituents will 
coincide, this will not always be the case. Conflicts of interest will arise. Under the 
inclusive approach, upon the occurrence of such conflicts, preference should be given 
to shareholder interests. This means that non-shareholder constituents are going to 
suffer. The pluralist position contends that preference should not automatically be 
given to the shareholders but that the management should seek to balance these 
potentially conflicting interests. 39 
The pluralist model has an economic justification. Giving the shareholders automatic 
priority will not always be the most efficient response. As we saw in Chapter 7, 
employees often make firm-specific investments in their companies. Employees who 
believe that priority will automatically be given to the shareholders may be reluctant 
to make such investments. 40 Likewise, it is not always the case that social 
responsibility and long-term profit maximisation are consistent. Acting in a socially 
and environmentally responsible way may have the effect of reducing profits by 
increasing costs. As we saw in Chapters 6 and 9, a common mechanism of profit 
maximisation is to externalise costs onto parties outside the company. Acting in a 
socially and environmentally responsible way may mean foregoing opportunities to 
externalise these costs with the result that the company s costs will increase which 
will in turn reduce profits. 
Adoption of a pluralist approach would require a significant redefinition of 
directors 
duties. Instead of defining the company simply as the aggregate of shareholders, a 
new definition would have to be determined that would take into account all of the 
other relevant groups. Much of what we have looked at in previous chapters would 
become a reality. For example, adoption of a pluralist approach may require 
the 
,eJ. Parkinson, Inclusive Company Last, in J. de Lacy (ed. ), The Reform of United Kingdom 
Company 
Lair, 2002, London: Cavendish, p. 
48. 
39 Company Law Review Steering Group, : Modern Company Lattw for a Competitive 
Economy: The 
Strategic Framett'ork. February 1999, London: DTI, para. 5.1.13. 
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company to honour its implicit promises to its employees, even though, as we saw in 
Chapter 7, such promises are unenforceable at law. Also if the position of non- 
shareholder constituents were to become more prominent, these constituents may 
begin to require representation or protection from the corporate governance 
mechanisms examined in Chapter 6. Such reform would be extremely extensive. 
The View of the CLRSG. 
Before looking at the recommendations of the CLRSG, it is interesting to note the 
parallels between the work of the CLRG and the Harvard Debate examined in Chapter 
1. The two views put forward by the CLRSG are, in essence, the same views as those 
put forward by Berle and Dodd over 70 years ago. The view of Berle was that the 
shareholders should retain primacy. This view is very similar to the view espoused by 
the inclusive model, albeit that the inclusive model now recognises that wider 
constituents and their relationships with the shareholders can have a positive impact 
on the company s profits. The view of Dodd was that the company should take into 
account a community of interests and that the directors should balance these interests 
and not automatically prioritise the interests of shareholders. This view is essentially 
identical to the pluralist model of the company. 
We noted that on paper, the Harvard Debate was won by Dodd. We also, however, 
noted that, historically, it is Berle s view that has been dominated. This view is 
supported by the view of the CLRSG who recommended that the inclusive approach 
be adopted. 41 Although the Review did express some support for the objectives 
behind the pluralist approach, 42 their main concern was that they could see no 
practical way of enforcing such a duty. 43 This was exactly the principal objection of 
Berle in relation to Dodd s community standard. 
44 
40 Ibid. at para. 5.1.24. 
41 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Developing the Framework, March 2000, London: DTI, para. 2.22, Company Law Re\ 
iew Steering 
Group, Modern Conlpanv Law 
. 
for a Competitive Econonty: Completing the Structure, 
November 2000, 
London: DTI, para. 3.5. 
J' Company Law Review Steering Group, ; tlodern Company Law 
fora Competitive Economy: 
Developing the Framework, larch 2000, London: DTI, para. 2.21. 
43 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economv: 
Completing the Structure, November 2000, London: DTI, para. 3.5. 
44 05 A. A. Berle, For Whom Corporate : 1lanu ers Are Trustees: .4 
Vote (1932) 45 Har . 
L. Rev. I-S at 
1 30 7. 
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The Review went on to identify a number of other problems. If the pluralist vie%%, 
were adopted, then the directors would have to balance the views of numerous groups 
within the corporate nexus. Such a duty would probably have to be subjective. If the 
duty were objective, this would give an overly wide discretion to the court; a 
discretion that the court cannot be expected to realistically desire or exercise. '' 
However, a subjective duty would in practice amount to little more than discretion 
and this discretion would be largely unpoliced. 46 In any case, it may be that the 
objectives of the pluralist duty can be achieved via an inclusive approach. Provided 
that the law makes it clear that the inclusive approach should maximise the 
community of interests between shareholders and wider constituents, then the Review 
believes that a pluralist approach is largely unnecessary. 47 
Given the above, the CLRSG drafted its statement of directors duties with an 
inclusive approach in mind. It is also intended that the new statement should 
significantly clarify the law in this area. The current law is based in a complex series 
of cases. Recent developments, examined in Chapter 4, have served to complicate the 
law rather than clarifying it. This lack of understanding was demonstrated by an 
Institute of Directors study carried out in 1999 which stated that many directors 
believed that the law required them to maximise short-term shareholder benefit at the 
expense of long-term profit. 48 
In line with the philosophy behind the inclusive approach, the central obligation is to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members. 
49 This upholds 
the current legal model view that the shareholders interests override all other parties 
within the corporate nexus. However, the statement then goes on to list other material 
factors that the directors must take into account. These include the company s need 
to foster its business relationships, including those with its employees and suppliers 
4' J. Parkinson, Inclusive Company Law in J. de Lacy (ed. ), The Reform of United Kingdom Company 
Law, 2002, London: Cavendish, p. 50. 
46 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Developing the Framework, March 2000, London: DTI, para. 3.24. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Institute of Directors, Good Boardroom Practice, 1999, London: IOD. 
49 Schedule 2 para. (2)(a) Draft Statement of Directors Duties. This central obligation 
is subject to the 
requirement to comply with the company s constitution and the duty to act for a proper purpose. 
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and the customers for its products and services 50 and its need to have regard to the 
impact of its operations on the communities affected and on the environment. ,' This 
is also indicative of an inclusive approach in that it attempts to bring together 
shareholder and stakeholder interests. The central aim of shareholder wealth 
maximisation is achieved by building successful relationships with members of the 
supply chain and the community and the environment. The issue of short-termism is 
addressed by the requirement that directors should take into account both the long- 
term and short-term consequences of their acts. 52 
This statement of directors duties has now been accepted by the government in its 
recent White Paper. 53 Some qualifications were made in relation to creditors but these 
have already been discussed in Chapter 4 and will not be re-examined here. 
II. THE OPERATING AND FINANCIAL REVIEW (OFR). 
It has been argued that the approach taken by the CLRSG places less emphasis on a 
modification of directors duties and more emphasis on increased disclosure 
obligations. 54 In this respect, the CLRSG s proposals for a mandatory OFR are of 
crucial importance. The emphasis on increased disclosure is intended to respond to 
the numerous criticisms aimed at the current reporting regime, namely that it is too 
narrow in scope and pays attention only to tangible assets whilst ignoring less tangible 
assets such as human capital, soft assets and the company s effect on the 
environment. 
55 
The CLRSG responded to these criticisms by recommending that sizeable public 
companies and a small number of very large private companies56 should produce an 
50 Schedule 2 para. (2)(2)(a) Draft Statement of Directors Duties. 
51 Schedule 2 para. (2)(2)(b) Draft Statement of Directors Duties. 
52 Schedule 2 para. (2)(1)(a) Draft Statement of Directors Duties. 
53 DTI, Modernising Company, Law, July 2002, Cm. 5553-I, London: DTI. 
'4 J. Birds, The Reform of Directors Duties in J. de Lacy (ed. 
), The Reform of United kingdom 
Company Law, 2002, London: Cavendish, p. 160. 
s Company Law Review Steering Group. Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Developing the Framework, March 2000, London: DTI., para. 5.74. 
56 The CLRSG recommended that the exact thresholds need 
further research. For their proposals, see 
DTI, Modernising Company Law, July 2002, Cm. 5553-I, London: DTI., para. 4.36, \\ho recommend 
that in order to qualify a public company needs to meet two of the 
following three criteria: (i) turnover 
exceeding £50 million, (ii) balance sheet total exceeding 
£25 million, and (iii) employees exceeding 
500. For private companies, the figures are (i) 
£500 million. (ii) £250 million, and (iii' 5.000 
respectively. 
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OFR. The purpose of the OFR will be to provide a discussion and analysis of the 
performance of the business and the main trends and factors underlying the results and 
financial position and likely to affect performance in the future, so as to enable users 
to assess the strategies adopted by the business and the potential for successfully 
achieving them. 57 
The Review put forward seven headings to be covered by the OFR. Of these, three 
are mandatory. 58 However, in relation to the inclusive approach, it is the other four 
headings that are most relevant. These categories include: 
" An account of the company s key relationships with employees, customers, 
suppliers and others, on which its success depends; 
" Corporate governance - values and structures, and 
" Policies and performance on environmental, community, social, ethical and 
reputational issues including compliance with relevant laws and regulations. 
It should be noted that reporting on the above issues is not mandatory, but rather a 
matter for the directors good faith and judgment in determining if the above is 
material. Given this, it could be argued that these proposals do not go quite far 
enough. 59 Given that the OFR will only apply to very large companies, it is difficult 
to see how headings relating to the environment or the workforce can ever be 
immaterial in understanding the business. This may lead to piecemeal reporting 
which will compromise the goal of financial transparency that the OFR aims for. 
Gaps will remain, most notably in areas where the company needs to improve and the 
market may view such omissions and assume the worst. 
Against this is the fact that the process determining what the directors put in the OFR 
will be subject to review by the auditors and should the auditors believe that the 
process by which the directors determined materiality is insufficient, then they can 
make the company produce a revised OFR. Further, if all of the headings were made 
mandatory, then there is reason to believe that this would be overly prescriptive. A 
concern that arises several times is that if all of the headings were made mandatory, 
57 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Developing the Framework, March 2000, London: DTI, para. 5.79. 
`IR These are (1) the company s business and business objectives, strategy and principal drivers of 
performance, (ii) a fair review of the development of the company s business and (iii) the dynamics 
of the business. 
5(' J. Parkinson, Inclusive Company Law in J. de Lacy (ed. ). The Reform of United Kingdom Company- 
Latin, 2002, London: Cavendish, p. 57. 
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this could lead to what has been termed boilerplate reporting, where the report is 
made in a perfunctory manner rather than taking into account the actual situation of 
the company. 60 
However, one criticism that auditor review does not alleviate is the idea that the OFR 
is designed solely with the information needs of the shareholders in mind. The 
original CLRSG recommendations were more open-ended about to whom the OFR 
should be directed. As we have seen, the CLRSG adopted an inclusive approach in 
relation to the scope of company law issue. One of the aims of the inclusive 
approach is to align corporate behaviour with market and societal pressures for 
improved social and environmental performance with a mind to improving 
shareholder monitoring of the company s response to these pressures. As the White 
Paper notes, 61 the information disclosed will be of value to consumers, employees and 
NGOs, who are the sources of external pressure, but what is actually reported is not 
determined by their information needs. 
The above proposals aim to improve several notable areas of weakness in our 
corporate governance system. The basic aim is that the OFR will improve 
performance in the areas that are subject to disclosure. This will be achieved by 
providing interested parties (not just the shareholders) with information on how well 
the company is performing in these areas. Those parties who do not feel that the 
company is performing as well as it should can then exert pressure on the company 
based on the information they have received. Finally, we saw in Chapter 5 that the 
market for corporate control relies on what is known as the Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis (ECMH). The ECMH basically states that the company s share price 
reflects the company s performance. We also saw in Chapter 5 that there are several 
factors that serve to weaken the ECMH s ability to disseminate information into the 
market. The result is that the company s shares may not be accurately priced. It is 
hoped that the OFR s increased disclosure obligations will result in more information 
being available to the share market which in turn will lead to an increase in the 
60 Company Lam Review Steering Group, , Modern 
Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final 
Report, June 2001, London: DTI, para. 3.3 5. 
61 DTI, , %/c)clcrnisin; 
Company Law. July 2002, Cm. 5551-1. London: DTI, para. -. z2. 
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accuracy of share prices. 62 If the share price can take into account long-term stable 
relationships of the kind envisaged by the inclusive model, then short-term pressures 
are likely to be reduced. 
The potential of the OFR is encouraging. However, reporting of this type is still at an 
embryonic stage. Given this, between November 2000 and February 2001, a study 
using a trail OFR was carried out by The Industrial Society using five companies; 
and four audit frms. 64 The five companies produced trail OFRs on which the auditors 
gave their views (although they did not audit them). All participants were extremely 
positive about the OFR s ability to improve reporting and there was a general 
consensus that the OFR was an idea whose time has come. 65 However, only once 
the proposal is introduced formally will the true results be known. There are strong 
indicators to believe that the OFR can result in an increase in the quality of reporting 
and the accuracy of what is reported. 
CONCLUSION. 
Even though the approach taken by the CLRSG is in essence a shareholder-centred 
one, it would be wrong to classify it as an affirmation of the legal model in its strictest 
form. The legal model holds that companies should act exclusively in the interests of 
their shareholders. This is not the view of the inclusive approach. The approach 
adopted by the CLRSG attempts to increase shareholder wealth by building long- 
term, stable, co-operative relationships with all parties within the supply chain. If this 
can be achieved then all parties within the corporate nexus should benefit. 
The approach taken by the Review even goes so far as to include the community and 
the environment in its list of relevant factors for the directors to take into account. 
This is a fundamental inclusion. As we have seen, the inclusion of stakeholders such 
as the employees and the creditors is relatively uncontroversial. The inclusion of 
wider constituents such as the community is a radical reform given the influence that 
62 J. Parkinson, Inclusive Company Law in J. de Lacy (ed. ), The Reform of United Kingdom Company 
Latin, 2002, London: Cavendish, p. 52. 
63 These were British Airways plc., British Telecommunications plc., Clydesdale Bank plc., 
Great 
Universal Stores pie. and ITNET plc. 
64 These were Ernst & Young, Grant Thornton, KPMG and PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 
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the legal model has had over the last century. Nevertheless, these reforms have been 
accepted by the Government and will form part of the next Companies act. 
The CLRSG is to be praised for taking a brave step towards doing what Dodd and 
numerous other academics have been unable to do for the last century, namely to 
begin the process of designing a mechanism to include wider constituents within 
directors duties. Whilst the steps taken have not been radical departures from the 
legal model, they are nonetheless significant. Hopefully, the recommendation of the 
CLRSG will ultimately lead to a full realisation of the community standard the Dodd 
envisaged. 
65 Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Final 




This thesis ends with the quote that began it. Over seventy years ago, Adolf Berle 
stated: 
It is the thesis of this essay that all powers granted to a corporation or to the 
management of a corporation, or to any group within the corporation, whether 
derived from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all times 
exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest 
appears. 
In doing so, Berle commenced the Harvard Debate and ignited a spark that has burned 
amongst the corporate academic community since. Whilst the technical arguments of 
Berle and Dodd are no longer relevant to justify their respective contentions, the issue 
that they brought to the fore has been of paramount importance since. As the validity 
of the legal model comes under increased scrutiny, contemporary commentators are 
starting to revisit the Harvard Debate and the work of Dodd, Berle and Means. In 
examining the Law Commission s consultation paper concerning a draft statement of 
directors duties, one prominent commentator stated Berle s work and the debates 
which it generated over half a century ago still provide important insights into the 
fundamental questions underlying not only the duties of directors of large public 
2 
companies but corporate governance in general. The question posed in the Harvard 
Debate is exactly the same question that this thesis is concerned with, namely in 
whose interests should the corporation be run. 
The quote above exemplified Berle s pro-shareholder view. It also exemplifies the 
view espoused by the legal model of the company. Berle, more than anyone else 
before him, had demonstrated how pro-shareholder the law was. There is little doubt 
that he was the first champion of the legal model of the company. 
As we saw in Chapter 1, Berle s view was not without its critics and Dodd offered a 
conception of the company based not on a pro-shareholder view, but on the view that 
the company had an obligation to act for a community of interests. We also noted that 
on paper, Dodd won the debate when Berle conceded in 1954. However, 
in reality, 
A. A. Berle Jr., Corporate Powers As Powers in Trust (1930-1) 44 Hare. L. Rev. 1049 at 1049. 
2 P. Ireland, Back to the Future? Adolf Berle, the Law Commission and Directors 
Duties (1999) 20 
Co. Law. 203 at 204. 
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Although they are not proposing such a rigorous reaffirmation of the shareholder 
primacy principle as Berle did, their reasons for not expanding the duty are the same. 
There was no workable scheme for enforcing a pluralist standard in the 1930s and 
there is still no workable scheme. Berle was not anti-stakeholder - quite the opposite 
- he simply could not see any way of dealing with the growth of managerial power 
other than a reaffirmation of the legal model. He believed that legal mechanisms that 
took into account the interests of stakeholders would take time to develop and until 
then we should protect the interests we know. 5 History has proven him correct. We 
are starting to realise that non-shareholder interests are worthy of protection and the 
proposals by the Company Law Review Steering Group are the first real step in 
legally acknowledging this. They are still however, heavily influenced by the legal 
model of the company. 
The Harvard Debate is a perfect metaphor for the stakeholder debate. Although Berle 
lost the debate, the law has not changed in a way that significantly recognises pluralist 
interests (although it is hoped that the new proposals will alter this). Similarly, 
although many academics and business leaders will argue that the key to corporate 
prosperity is the fostering of long-term relationships with all members of the 
corporate nexus, the law has not altered to reflect this. By and large, the law still 
upholds the legal model of the company. 
The Harvard Debate provides a useful introduction into the stakeholder debate. 
However, although the principles are as relevant today as they were then, the 
reasoning offered for their respective positions have not aged as well. Both Berle and 
Dodd in advocating their positions advanced trustee-based arguments, albeit 
in a 
metaphorical rather than a literal manner. Today directors cannot be considered to 
be 
trustees for the shareholders. Accordingly, new theories need to be 
found. 
Pro-legal model theorists resorted to perhaps the oldest 
justification for shareholder 
primacy, namely the idea that the shareholders owned the company and so 
had a 
proprietary right to have it run in their interests. 
Historically, this was a natural 
assumption. Shareholders were active in management and 
had an equitable interest in 
5 A. A. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: .4 Note (1932) 
45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365 at 
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the company s assets. However, following incorporation by registration and the 
separation of ownership and control, this trend ended. Those in control of the 
company became increasingly detached from those who contributed the capital. The 
court s increased recognition of corporate personality ensured that the company itself 
became incapable of being owned. 
There is little doubt that today the ownership argument is not a sufficient justification 
for the shareholders central position as sole recipients of corporate governance 
protection. The concept that the company could be owned and that ownership claims 
could be used to justify the level of company law protection was no longer tenable. 
Therefore, a new conceptualisation of the company was needed. 
This new conceptualisation of the company was examined in Chapter 3. The new 
economic theory of the firm was not based on ownership of the corporation but rather 
viewed the corporation as a nexus of contracts. Company law protection was not 
based on the strength of ownership claims but rather on the ability of the various 
parties to protect themselves via contract. Traditional legal theorists leapt upon this to 
justify their shareholder-centred model by stating that the shareholders were unable to 
protect themselves via contract due to the unilateral nature of the articles of 
association. 
However, like the ownership argument, the new economic theory suffered from 
several descriptive inaccuracies, notably, to describe statutory provisions as off the 
shelf contractual terms is sophistical. Further the free bargaining that the new 
economic theory envisages is not present in many large companies. Finally, the new 
economic theory took too narrow a view by focusing solely on the agency costs that 
arise between the directors and the shareholders. Despite this, the new economic 
theory remains the dominant contemporary conceptualisation of the corporation. 
However, there are indications that it is waning as an accurate conceptualisation and 




Both of the above conceptualisations tended to be pro-shareholder. The ownership 
model focused solely on the ownership claim of the shareholders. The new economic 
theory focused solely on the shareholder s inability to protect themselves via contract. 
This inherent bias towards shareholders was revealed in Chapter 4 when we examined 
the legal protection offered to the various constituents within the company. We saw 
that traditionally the directors owe their duties to the company. When defining who 
constitutes the company, it is well established that it is to mean the shareholders. 
However, when we examined the authority for this, we found it to be highly 
unconvincing. 
As a corollary of this shareholder centred model, the protection offered to non- 
shareholder constituents is extremely weak. We saw that the directors duties have 
been modified to take into account the interests of creditors. However, the duty 
comes into effect at a very late stage, by which time there are unlikely to be any assets 
left to pay the company s creditors. There is the potential of effective protection in 
the shape of s. 214 Insolvency Act 1986 and the provisions contained in the Company 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986. However, we saw that the effectiveness of these 
provisions is emasculated by the funding limitations of the various enforcement 
authorities. 
Employee protection is similarly weak. Again the directors duties were modified to 
take into account the interests of employees by s. 309 Companies Act 1985. However, 
as we saw, there is no practical way for employees to enforce the duty. In fact, the 
effect of s. 309 may be to actually reduce accountability by increasing the scope of the 
directors decisionmaking power. The ineffectiveness of s. 309 was recognised by the 
Company Law Review Steering Group who recommended it not be part of the next 
Companies Act. 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that UK company law in heavily influenced by the legal 
model of the company. This was backed up in Chapter 5 which examined the various 
corporate governance mechanisms in the UK. Chapter 5 stated that virtually all of the 
mechanisms existed in order to protect the shareholders, give the shareholders a voice 
or exert pressures upon the directors to act like shareholders. 
In other words, 
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corporate governance mechanisms, like the protection offered by our company law, 
adopt a shareholder-centred approach. 
These opening five chapters form Part I of this thesis. Their intention was to examine 
the theoretical and practical basis behind the UK system of corporate governance. We 
saw that traditionally conceptualisations of the company have tended to adopt a pro- 
shareholder ideology. This theoretical basis has heavily influenced practical 
protection with both UK company law and corporate governance mechanisms 
adopting a pro-shareholder ideology. Over the last 20 years, this has started to change 
but not in a satisfactory way. Stakeholder protection is piecemeal and largely 
ineffective. 
The following three chapters form Part II of the thesis. Their aim is to provide a more 
acceptable theoretical and economic justification for increased stakeholder protection. 
First, however, the basis of the legal model of the company was examined in Chapter 
6. We saw that the legal model has two facets. The first was that the company should 
act solely in the interests of shareholders. The second was a corollary of the first. As 
companies should act solely in the interests of shareholders, company law should 
facilitate this by solely protecting the shareholders. 
Regarding the first facet, we examined four theories traditionally use to justify a profit 
maximising approach. We saw that these theories are no longer capable of justifying 
such a rigid adherence to profit maximisation. 
It was the second facet that was to form the basis of this thesis contention that 
corporate governance protection should be expanded to include non-shareholder 
constituents. Here we examined three theories used by legal model theorists to justify 
exclusive shareholder corporate governance protection, namely the ownership 
argument, the residual risk argument and the inadequacies of contract argument. In 
relation to the shareholders, we saw that the first two theories were no loner 
sufficient to justify exclusive shareholder protection. The inadequacy of contract 
argument certainly provides a strong justification for shareholder protection 
because 
the shareholders cannot protect themselves via contract. However, as we saw in 
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Chapter 7, it does not provide a sufficient justification for exclusive shareholder 
protection. 
Chapter 7 took the traditional justifications for exclusive shareholder governance 
protection, examined in Part II of Chapter 6, and used them to justify expanding the 
ambit of shareholder protection to include the company s employees and its creditors. 
We saw that both the employees and the creditors have an ownership claim akin to 
that of the shareholders. Like the shareholders, their ownership claim is so weak that 
it cannot be said that they in any way own the company. The point is that if the 
shareholders are to receive corporate governance protection based on their ownership 
claim, then the employees and creditors should also be included. 
In Chapter 6, we saw that the shareholders can minimise their risk by a policy of 
equity diversification. Nevertheless, they still face risk resulting from fluctuations in 
corporate performance. However, legal model theorists contend that they are the only 
party to face such risk. In Chapter 7, we saw that this was not the case. We saw that 
both the employees and the creditors can be adversely affected by changes in the 
corporations fortunes. Again, as with the ownership argument, the employees and 
creditors have a claim akin to that of the shareholders. Accordingly, they should 
receive comparable protection. 
The final justification examined in Chapter 7 related to the ability of the relevant 
parties to protect themselves via contract. In Chapter 6, we saw that the shareholders 
cannot protect themselves via contract. However, the legal model theory relies on the 
assumption that other stakeholder can. As we saw in Chapter 7, this is not the case. 
The ability of the employees and the creditors to protect themselves via contract is 
almost as limited as that of the shareholders. Legal model theory argues that fiduciary 
duties should be owed exclusively to shareholders to fill in the gaps in their 
contractual protection. If other stakeholders also have such gaps in their protection, 
then they also have a claim to similar protection. 
Many corporate governance theorists concentrate on the issues examined 
in the 
previous two chapters, namely should corporations act solely in the interests of 
shareholders or should they be encouraged to act in a socially responsible manner. 
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However, what these theorists tend to ignore is the lawfulness of acts that depart from 
the legal model of the company. We have seen that the legal model is still the 
predominant influence on our company law and historically, acts that did not benefit 
the shareholders have been held unlawful; the cases of Parke v Daily News6 and 
Dodge v Motor Ford Co. 7 being the most famous examples. Arguments about 
whether or not corporations should be socially responsible are irrelevant if the law 
does not permit such responsibility. 
The lawfulness of acts that depart from the legal model as the focus of Chapter 8. The 
ambit of acts that depart from the legal model is extremely wide and so to limit this 
ambit and provide as comprehensive a lawful picture as possible, I chose to examine 
the lawfulness of the most extreme form of act that departs from the legal model, 
namely corporate philanthropy. Basically, we saw that in the UK the position is far 
from clear. The ambit of the ultra vires doctrine is far from clear and is in the process 
of being abolished. The directors fiduciary duties revolve around acting in the 
interests of the company. Traditionally, this has come to mean the shareholders. 
The authority for this is, however, highly unsatisfactory. Accordingly, as a principle 
it is uncertain. If non-shareholders are to become recipients of company law 
protection, we need to clarify the law significantly. 
Chapter 8 concluded Part II of this thesis. The aim of Part II was to highlight the 
inadequacies of the legal model of the company -a model which has had a profound 
effect on UK company law since its creation. We saw that the theories relied upon by 
legal model theorists are no longer sufficient to justify their shareholder-centred 
model. In fact, the theories that they propose can now be used to justify a move away 
from the legal model and a move towards increasing the ambit of corporate 
governance protection to include non-shareholder constituents. 
Part III of this thesis concerned corporate environmental responsibility. 
Corporate 
environmental responsibility has not received much attention 
from corporate 
academics because companies tend to be regulated by the general environmental 
law. 
The various regulatory methods used by general environmental 
law were examined. 
6Il962] Ch. 927. 
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We saw that no one method is effective in regulating corporate environmental 
activity. This regulation was made all the more difficult by the unique nature of the 
corporation which allows it to evade or compensate against the various mechanisms 
examined. Finally, we took the traditional justifications examined in Chapter 6 and 
expanded upon in Chapter 7, and used them to justify expanding the protection 
offered to the environment, just as we did in relation to the employees and the 
creditors. 
The final part of this thesis was Chapter 10 which examined an area of imminent 
reform that could have an impact upon the main issues brought up in this thesis, 
namely the work of the Company Law Review Steering Group. Notably, we looked 
at the statutory statement of directors duties and the Operating and Financial Review. 
We noted, with optimism, the effect that these reforms could have. However, they are 
only a first step and the reforms are relatively conservative. It remains to he seen 
what the final versions will be and how effective they will be in practice. 
The issue of in whose interests should the company be run and whose interests should 
company law protect is the oldest unanswered question in company law. The largest 
obstacle to increased recognition of non-shareholder constituents is devising a 
mechanism of accountability that does not fall foul of the too many masters line of 
criticism. It has not been the aim of this thesis to devise such a mechanism. Before 
such mechanisms can be created, we need to know why they should be created. An 
approach that moves away from the legal model needs to be justified. The aim of this 
thesis has been to demonstrate that the traditional theories behind our company law 
are increasingly anachronistic and inaccurate. The legal model is increasingly being 
viewed as too narrow and inefficient in the long term. New theories are emerging in 
opposition to the legal model, yet using the same lines of reasoning that the legal 
model once used. 
The aim of this thesis has been to demonstrate the increasing validity of these 
theories. Theories of this kind are still in a relatively embryonic stage when compared 
to the legal model of the company. However it is my belief that they are starting to 
170 NW 668 (1919). 
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erode the validity of the legal model. It is a long and ongoing process but ultimately 
one which will lead to a justification strong enough to convince our corporations and 
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